Article 2
Whether the virtues are connected such that he who has one has all
| Et videtur quod non.
| And it seems not.
|
| Dicit enim Beda super Lucam, quod sancti magis humiliantur de virtutibus quas non habent, quam extollantur de virtutibus quas habent. Ergo quasdam habent, et quasdam non habent; non ergo virtutes sunt connexae.
| 1. In commenting on Luke, Bede says that the saints are more humbled by the virtues they do
not have than extolled for those they have. Therefore, they have some and lack others, and the
virtues are not connected.
|
| Praeterea, homo post poenitentiam est in statu caritatis: de his autem patitur difficultatem operandi propter consuetudinem praecedentem, ut dicit Augustinus contra Iulianum; et sic huiusmodi difficultas videtur provenire ex habitu contrario virtuti, per malam consuetudinem acquisitam, cum quo non potest simul esse virtus ei contraria. Ergo aliquis potest habere unam virtutem, scilicet caritatem, et carebit aliis.
| 2. Moreover, a man is in the state of charity after penance, and yet he experiences difficulty in certain matters because of his earlier practice, as Augustine says against Julian. But a
difficulty of this kind seems to arise from a habit contrary to virtue, due to an acquired bad
inclination incompatible with the contrary virtue. Therefore, someone can have one virtue,
namely, charity, and lack others.
|
| Praeterea in omnibus baptizatis caritas invenitur. Sed quidam baptizati non habent prudentiam, ut patet maxime in morionibus et phreneticis, qui non possunt esse prudentes, secundum philosophum; et etiam in quibusdam adultis simplicibus, qui non bene videntur esse prudentes, cum non sint bene consiliativi, quod est opus prudentiae. Non ergo qui habet unam virtutem, scilicet caritatem habet omnes alias.
| 3. Moreover, charity is found in all those who have been baptized, but some of the baptized
do not have prudence, as is particularly evident in the retarded and insane, who cannot be
prudent, according to the Philosopher, and even in some simple adults who do not seem to be
prudent, since they do not deliberate well, which is a work of prudence. Therefore, he who
has one virtue, namely charity, does not have all the others.
|
| Praeterea, secundum philosophum in VI Ethic., prudentia est recta ratio agibilium, sicut ars est recta ratio factibilium. Sed homo potest habere rectam rationem circa unum genus factibilium puta circa fabrilia, et non habebit rectam rationem circa alia artificialia. Ergo etiam potest habere prudentiam circa unum genus agibilium, puta circa iusta, et non habebit circa aliud genus, puta circa fortia; et ita poterit habere unam virtutem absque alia.
| 4. Moreover, according to the Philosopher in Ethics 6, prudence is right reason concerning
things to be done, as art is right reason regarding things to be made. But a man can have right
reason with regard to one sort of makeable things, for example, tools, and not with respect to
other artificial things. Therefore, he can also have prudence concerning one sort of act, for
example, just acts, and not have it concerning another, for example, brave acts. Thus, he will
have one virtue without the others.
|
| Praeterea, philosophus dicit in IV Ethic., quod non omnis liberalis est magnificus, et tamen utrumque est virtus, scilicet liberalitas et magnificentia; et similiter dicit, quod aliqui sunt moderati, non tamen magnanimi. Non ergo quicumque habet unam virtutem, habet omnes.
| 5. Moreover, the Philosopher says in Ethics 6 that not every liberal person is magnificent, yet
both liberality and magnificence are virtues; similarly he says that some are moderate and not
magnanimous. Therefore, it is not the case that whoever has one virtue has them all.
|
| Praeterea, apostolus dicit I ad Corinth., cap. XII, 4: divisiones gratiarum sunt; et postea subdit: alii datur per spiritum sermo sapientiae, alii sermo scientiae, quae sunt intellectuales virtutes, alii fides, quae est virtus theologica. Ergo aliquis habet unam virtutem, et non habet aliam.
| 6. Moreover, the Apostle says in 1 Corinthians 12:4: “There are varieties of gifts;” and afterwards (8:9) adds: “To one through the Spirit is given the utterance of wisdom; and to
another the utterance of knowledge” (which are intellectual virtues), “to another faith” (which is a theological virtue). Therefore, one can have one virtue and not another.
|
| Praeterea, virginitas est quaedam virtus, ut Cyprianus dicit. Sed multi habent alias virtutes qui non habent virginitatem. Ergo non quicumque habet unam virtutem, habet omnes.
| 7. Moreover, virginity is a virtue, as Cyprian says. But many have other virtues and do not
have virginity. Therefore, not everyone who has one virtue has them all.
|
| Praeterea, philosophus dicit in VI Ethic., quod Anaxagoram et Thaletem sapientes quidem dicimus, non autem prudentes. Sed sapientia et prudentia sunt quaedam virtutes intellectuales. Ergo aliquis potest habere unam virtutem sine aliis.
| 8. Morever, the Philosopher says in Ethics 6 that although we call Anaxagoras and Thales
wise we do not call them prudent. But wisdom and prudence are intellectual virtues.
Therefore, a person can have one virtue without the others.
|
| Praeterea, philosophus in eodem Lib. dicit, quod quidam habent inclinationem ad unam virtutem, et non ad aliam. Potest ergo contingere quod aliquis exercitetur in actibus unius virtutis, et non in actibus alterius. Sed ex exercitio actuum acquiruntur quaedam virtutes, ut patet per philosophum in II Ethic. Ergo, saltem, virtutes acquisitae non sunt connexae.
| 9. Moreover, in the same book the Philosopher says that some have an inclination to one
virtue but not to another. It can happen, therefore, at someone practices the acts of one virtue an not those of another. But from the performance of acts virtues are acquired, as is clear from the Philosopher in Ethics 2. Therefore, the acquired virtues at least are not connected.
|
| Praeterea, virtus etsi secundum aptitudinem sit a natura, tamen secundum esse perfectum non est a natura, ut dicitur in II Ethic. Manifestum est etiam quod non est a fortuna, quia quae sunt a fortuna, sunt praeter electionem. Relinquitur ergo quod virtus acquiratur in nobis vel a proposito vel a Deo. Sed a proposito (ut videtur) potest acquiri una virtus sine alia: quia unus potest habere intentionem ad acquirendum unam virtutem, et non aliam. Similiter etiam et a Deo: quia aliquis potest petere a Deo unam virtutem, et non aliam. Ergo omnibus modis una virtus potest esse sine alia.
| 10. Moreover, although the aptitude for virtue comes from nature it cannot be perfected by
nature, as is said in Ethics 2. It is manifest as well that it is not from fortune, because the goods of fortune are outside the realm of choice. It follows, therefore, that we acquire virtue
either by putting our minds to it or from God. But it seems that one virtue can be acquired
intentionally without another since one can have the intention of acquiring one virtue but not
another. Similarly, someone can ask God for one virtue and not another. Therefore, in
whatever way it be considered, one virtue can be without others.
|
| Praeterea, finis in moralibus comparatur ad actus virtutum in moralibus, sicut in demonstrativis principia ad conclusiones. Sed homo potest habere unam conclusionem sine alia. Ergo potest habere unam virtutem sine alia.
| 11. Moreover, in moral matters, the end is related to the acts of the virtues, as principles are to conclusions in demonstrative matters. But a man can have one conclusion without others.
Therefore, he can have one virtue without others.
|
| Praeterea, Augustinus dicit in quadam Epist. de sententia Iacobi, quod non est divina sententia, qua dicitur: qui habet unam virtutem, habet omnes; et quod homo potest habere unam virtutem sine alia, puta misericordiam, et non continentiam; sicut et in membris corporis unum potest esse illuminatum, sive decorum aut sanum, sine alio. Ergo virtutes non sunt connexae.
| 12. Moreover, Augustine says in a letter about the judgment of Jacob that it is not a divine
judgment that he who has one virtue has them all, and that a man can have one virtue without
the others, for example, mercy and not continence, much as in the body one member can be
well, handsome, or healthy, and another not. Therefore, the virtues are not connected.
|
| Praeterea, ea quae sunt connexa, aut hoc est ratione principii, aut ratione subiecti, aut ratione obiecti. Sed non ratione principii, quod est Deus, quia, secundum hoc, omnia bona quae sunt a Deo, essent connexa; nec etiam ratione subiecti, quod est anima, quia secundum hoc omnes non essent connexae; nec iterum ratione obiecti, quia per obiecta distinguuntur: non est autem idem principium distinctionis et connexionis. Ergo et cetera.
| 13. Moreover, things are connected either by reason or principle or subject or object. But the
virtues cannot be connected by reason of their principle, God, because then it would follow
that all the goods that are from God are connected. Nor by reason of their subject, the soul,
because not all are connected on that basis. And not by reason of object, because they are
distinguished from one another by their objects and the principle of distinction and
connection cannot be the same. Therefore...
|
| Praeterea, intellectuales virtutes non habent connexionem cum moralibus; sicut patet maxime de intellectu principiorum, qui potest haberi sine moralibus virtutibus. Sed prudentia est virtus intellectualis, quae ponitur una cardinalium. Ergo non habet connexionem cum aliis cardinalibus, quae sunt virtutes morales.
| 14. Moreover, the intellectual virtues are not connected with the moral virtues, as is most
evident in the understanding of principles, which can be had without the moral virtues. But
prudence is an intellectual virtue, which is numbered among the cardinal virtues. Therefore, it
does not have a connection with the other cardinal virtues, which are moral virtues.
|
| Praeterea, in patria non erit fides et spes, sed tantum erit ibi caritas. Ergo etiam in statu perfectissimo virtutes non erunt connexae.
| 15. Moreover, in heaven there will be neither faith nor hope, but only charity. Therefore, even
in the most perfect state the virtues are not connected.
|
| Praeterea, Angeli, in quibus non sunt virtutes sensitivae, et similiter animae separatae, habent caritatem et iustitiam, quae est perpetua et immortalis; non autem habent temperantiam et fortitudinem, quia hae virtutes sunt irrationabilium partium, ut dicitur in III Ethic. Ergo virtutes non sunt connexae.
| 16. Moreover, angels and separated souls, which are perpetual and immortal, do not have
sense powers, and they have charity and justice but not temperance and fortitude because
these are virtues of the irrational parts, as is said in Ethics 3. Therefore, the virtues are not connected.
|
| Praeterea, sicut sunt virtutes quaedam animae, sunt etiam quaedam virtutes corporales. Sed in virtutibus corporalibus non est connexio, quia aliquis habet visum qui non habet auditum. Ergo neque etiam in virtutibus animae.
| 17. Moreover, some virtues are of the soul, but there are also virtues of body. But there is no
connection among the bodily powers, since one can have sight and not hearing. Therefore,
neither is there a connection among the virtues of the soul.
|
| Praeterea, dicit Gregorius super Ezechielem, quod nemo repente fit summus; et in Psalm. LXXXIII, 8, dicitur, quod ibunt de virtute in virtutem. Non ergo simul acquirit homo virtutes, sed successive; et ita virtutes non sunt connexae.
| 18. Moreover, Gregory says on Ezechiel that no one suddenly becomes the best, and in Psalm
83, 8, it is said: “They shall go from strength to strength.” Therefore, a man does not acquire the virtues simultaneously, but successively, and thus the virtues are not connected.
|
| Sed contra. Est quod Ambrosius dicit super Luc.: connexae sunt et concatenatae: ut qui unam habuerit, omnes habere videatur.
| ON THE CONTRARY. 1. Ambrose says in commenting on Luke that they are connected and
interlocked such that he who has one is seen to have them all.
|
| Praeterea, Gregorius dicit XXII Moral., quod si una virtus sine alia habeatur, aut virtus non est, aut perfecta non est. Sed perfectio est de ratione virtutis: virtus enim est perfectio quaedam, ut dicitur in VII Physic. Ergo virtutes sunt connexae.
| 2. Moreover, Gregory says in morals on Job 23 that if one virtue could be had without the
others, either it is not a virtue or it is not perfect. But perfection is of the very notion of virtue. “For virtue is a certain perfection,” as is said in Physics 7. Therefore, the virtues are
connected.
|
| Praeterea, super illud Ezech., I, 11: duae pennae singulorum iungebantur, Glossa dicit, quod virtutes sunt coniunctae; ut qui una caruerit, alia careat.
| 3. Moreover, with respect to Ezekiel 1:11: “Two wings of every one were joined,” the Gloss says the virtues are conjoined such that he who lacks one, lacks the others.
|
| Respondeo. Dicendum, quod de virtutibus dupliciter possumus loqui: uno modo de virtutibus perfectis; alio modo de virtutibus imperfectis. Perfectae quidem virtutes connexae sibi sunt; imperfectae autem virtutes non sunt ex necessitate connexae.
| RESPONSE. It should be said that we can speak of virtues in two ways, as perfect and as
imperfect. Perfect virtues are connected to one another, but imperfect virtues are not
necessarily connected.
|
| Ad cuius evidentiam sciendum est, quod cum virtus sit quae hominem bonum facit, et opus eius bonum reddit, illa est virtus perfecta quae perfecte opus hominis bonum reddit, et ipsum bonum facit; illa autem est imperfecta, quae hominem et opus eius reddit bonum non simpliciter, sed quantum ad aliquid.
| In evidence of which it should be noted that since virtue is that which makes a man and his
work good, the virtue that makes a man’s work and himself good is perfect virtue, whereas
the imperfect does not make a man and his work good simply speaking, but only in a certain
respect.
|
| Bonum autem simpliciter in actibus humanis invenitur per hoc quod pertingitur ad regulam humanorum actuum; quae quidem est una quasi homogenea et propria homini, scilicet ratio recta, alia autem est sicut prima mensura transcendens, quod est Deus. Ad rationem autem rectam attingit homo per prudentiam, quae est recta ratio agibilium, ut philosophus dicit in VI Ethic. Ad Deum autem attingit homo per caritatem, secundum illud I Ioan., IV, 16: qui manet in caritate, in Deo manet, et Deus in eo.
| Human acts are good simply speaking when they attain to the rule of human acts, one of
which is, as it were, homogeneous and proper to man, namely, right reason, and the other a
first transcendent measure, which is God. A man attains right reason through prudence, which
is right reason concerning what is to be done, as the Philosopher says in Ethics 6. A man
attains to God through charity, according to John 4, 16: “God is love, and he who abides in
love abides in God, and God in him.”
|
| Sic igitur est triplex gradus virtutum. Sunt enim quaedam virtutes omnino imperfectae, quae sine prudentia existunt, non attingentes rationem rectam, sicut sunt inclinationes quas aliqui habent ad aliqua virtutum opera etiam ab ipsa nativitate, secundum illud Iob, XXXI, 18: ab infantia crevit mecum miseratio, et de utero egressa est mecum. Huiusmodi autem inclinationes non simul insunt omnibus, sed quidam habent inclinationem ad unum, quidam ad aliud. Hae autem inclinationes non habent rationem virtutis, quia virtute nullus male utitur, secundum Augustinum; huiusmodi autem inclinationibus potest aliquis male uti et nocive, si sine discretione utatur; sicut equus, si visu careret, tanto fortius impingeret, quanto fortius curreret. Unde Gregorius dicit in XXII Moral., quod ceterae virtutes, nisi ea quae appetunt, prudenter agant, virtutes esse nequaquam possunt; unde ibi inclinationes quae sunt sine prudentia, non habent perfecte rationem virtutis.
| There is then a threefold grade of virtue. For there are some wholly imperfect virtues which
exist without prudence, not attaining right reason, such as the inclinations which some have
to certain works of virtue even from their birth, according to Job 31:18: “For from my infancy
mercy grew up with me: and it came out with me from my mother’s womb.” Such
inclinations are not all at once in everybody, but some have an inclination to one and others to
another. Such inclinations do not have the mark of virtue, however, because no one uses a
virtue badly, according to Augustine, but a person can use such inclinations badly and
harmfully if he acts without discretion, much as a horse if it lacks vision will run faster the
harder it is beaten. Hence, Gregory in Morals on Job 22 says that other virtues, unless those
who desire act prudently, cannot be called virtues at all. Hence, these inclinations without
prudence do not fulfill the definition of virtue.
|
| Secundus autem gradus virtutum est illarum quae attingunt rationem rectam, non tamen attingunt ad ipsum Deum per caritatem. Hae quidem aliqualiter sunt perfectae per comparationem ad bonum humanum, non tamen sunt simpliciter perfectae, quia non attingunt ad primam regulam, quae est ultimus finis, ut Augustinus dicit contra Iulianum. Unde et deficiunt a vera ratione virtutis; sicut et morales inclinationes absque prudentia deficiunt a vera ratione virtutis.
| The second grade of virtues are those that attain right reason but do not attain God through
charity. These are in a sense perfect with respect to the human good, but not simply speaking
perfect, because they do not attain the first rule, which is the ultimate end, as Augustine says
against Julianus. Hence, they fall short of the true definition of virtue much as moral
inclinations without prudence fall short of the true definition of virtue.
|
| Tertius gradus est virtutum simpliciter perfectarum, quae sunt simul cum caritate; hae enim virtutes faciunt actum hominis simpliciter bonum, quasi attingentem usque ad ultimum finem. Est autem considerandum ulterius, quod, sicut virtutes morales esse non possunt absque prudentia, ratione iam dicta, ita nec prudentia potest esse sine virtutibus moralibus; est enim prudentia recta ratio agibilium. Ad ipsam autem rectam rationem in quolibet genere requiritur quod aliquis habeat aestimationem et iudicium de principiis, ex quibus ratio illa procedit; sicut in geometricalibus non potest aliquis habere aestimationem rectam, nisi habeat rectam rationem circa principia geometricalia. Principia autem agibilium sunt fines; ex his enim sumitur ratio agendorum. De fine autem habet aliquis rectam existimationem per habitum virtutis moralis; quia, ut philosophus dicit in III Ethic., qualis unusquisque est, talis et finis videtur ei; sicut virtuoso videtur appetibile, ut finis, bonum quod est secundum virtutem; et vitioso illud quod pertinet ad illud vitium; et est simile de gustu infecto et sano. Unde necesse est quod quicumque habet prudentiam, habeat etiam virtutes morales.
| The third grade is of virtues that are perfect simply speaking, because they are with charity.
These virtues make a man’s act simply good, as attaining the ultimate end. It should be
considered further that just as moral virtues cannot exist without prudence, for the reason already given, so prudence cannot exist without the moral virtues, for prudence is right reason about things to be done. For right reason in any genus one must have estimation and judgment of principles,
from which reason proceeds, as in geometry one cannot have a correct estimate unless his
reason is right concerning geometrical principles. But ends are the principles in things to be
done and from them is drawn the reason for acting. But a person has a right estimate of the
end thanks to the habit of moral virtue because, as the Philosopher says in Ethics 3, as a
person is, so does the end appear to him. For to the virtuous that which is the good according
to virtue seems desirable as an end, but to the vicious the desirable is that which pertains to
his vice. And it is the same with healthy and unhealthy taste. Hence it is necessary that
whoever has prudence also has moral virtues.
|
| Similiter etiam quicumque habet caritatem, oportet quod habeat omnes alias virtutes. Caritas enim est in homine ex infusione divina, secundum illud Rom. V, 5: caritas Dei diffusa est in cordibus nostris per spiritum sanctum, qui datus est nobis. Deus autem ad quaecumque dat inclinationem, dat etiam formas aliquas, quae sunt principia operationum et motuum, ad quos res inclinatur a Deo; sicut igni dat levitatem, per quam prompte et faciliter sursum tendit; unde, ut dicitur Sap. VIII, 1, disponit omnia suaviter.
| Similarly, whoever has charity, must have all the other virtues. But charity is in man by a
divine infusion, according to Romans 5:5: “The charity of God is poured forth in our hearts
by the Holy Spirit who has been given to us.” But to whomever God gives an inclination he
also gives certain forms which are the principles of action and motion to the things God
inclines him to, just as he gives lightness to fire so that it can quickly and easily leap upward.
Hence, it is said in Wisdom 8:1: “and orders all things sweetly.”
|
| Oportet igitur quod similiter cum caritate infundantur habituales formae expedite producentes actus ad quos caritas inclinat. Inclinat autem caritas ad omnes actus virtutum, quia cum sit circa finem ultimum, importat omnes actus virtutum. Quaelibet enim ars vel virtus ad quam pertinet finis, imperat his quae sunt circa finem, sicut militaris equestri, et equestris frenorum factrici, ut dicitur in I Ethicor. Unde secundum decentiam divinae sapientiae et bonitatis, ad caritatem simul habitus omnium virtutum infunduntur; et ideo dicitur I ad Corinth. XII, v. 4: caritas patiens est, benigna est, et cetera.
| So it is necessary that, along with charity, there should be infused habitual forms for
expeditiously producing the acts to which charity inclines. But charity inclines to the acts of
all the virtues: Since it is concerned with the ultimate end, it implies the acts of all virtues.
But any art or virtue which pertains to the end commands those which are for the sake of the
end, as the general commands the cavalryman and the cavalryman the maker of harness, as is
said in Ethics 1. Hence, according to the fittingness of divine wisdom and goodness, along
with charity, the habits of all virtues are infused along with charity, and therefore it is said in
1 Corinthians 13, 5: “Charity is patient, is kind,” etc.
|
| Sic ergo, si accipiamus virtutes simpliciter perfectas, connectuntur propter caritatem; quia nulla virtus talis sine caritate haberi potest, et caritate habita omnes habentur. Si autem accipiamus virtutes perfectas in secundo gradu, respectu boni humani, sic connectuntur per prudentiam; quia sine prudentia nulla virtus moralis esse potest, nec prudentia haberi potest, si cui deficiat moralis virtus. Si tamen accipiamus quatuor cardinales virtutes, secundum quod important quasdam generales conditiones virtutum, secundum hoc habent connexionem, ex hoc quod non sufficit ad aliquem actum virtutis quod adsit una harum conditionum, nisi omnes adsint; et secundum hoc videtur assignare causas connexionis Gregorius, in Lib. XXI Moralium.
| Therefore, if we mean simply perfect virtues, they are connected because of charity, because
no such virtue can be had without charity and, if charity is had, all of them are had. If we
understand virtues perfect in the second grade, with respect to the human good, they are
connected through prudence, because no moral virtue can be had without prudence nor can
prudence be had if one is lacking moral virtue. But if we understand the four cardinal virtues
insofar as they imply the general conditions of virtue, in this way they are connected in the
sense that it does not suffice to the act of virtue that one of these conditions be present if all
are not, and this is the reason Gregory gave for their connection in Morals on Job 21.
|
| Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod propter inclinationem quae est ex natura, vel ex aliquo dono gratiae, quam habet aliquis magis ad opus unius virtutis quam alterius contingit quod aliquis promptior est ad actum unius virtutis quam alterius; et secundum hoc dicuntur sancti aliquas virtutes habere, ad quarum actus magis sunt prompti, et aliquas non habere, ad quas sunt minus prompti.
| Ad 1. It should be said that because of an inclination one has to the work of one virtue rather
than another, which is either natural or a gift of grace, it happens that one more promptly
performs the act of one virtue than another; and in this way the saints are said to have some
virtues on which they are prompt to act and not to have others on which they are less prompt
to act.
|
| Ad secundum dicendum, quod cum habitus secundum se facit prompte et delectabiliter operari, potest tamen hoc impediri per aliquid superveniens; sicut habens habitum scientiae interdum impeditur ad eius usum per somnolentiam vel ebrietatem, vel aliquid huiusmodi. Sic ergo iste qui poenitet, consequitur cum gratia gratum faciente, caritatem, et omnes alios habitus virtutum, sed propter dispositiones ex actibus priorum peccatorum relictas patitur difficultatem in executione virtutum quas habitualiter recipit; quod quidem non contingit in virtutibus acquisitis per exercitium actuum, per quos simul et contrariae dispositiones tolluntur, et habitus virtutum generantur.
| Ad 2. It should be said that although habits as such make someone act promptly and with
pleasure, this can be impeded by something supervening, as one having the habit of science is
sometimes impeded from using it by sleepiness or drunkenness or something of the like.
Therefore, one who repents receives by grace charity and all the other virtues but because of
the lingering dispositions from his prior sins he experiences difficulty in the performance of
virtues which he has received habitually. This does not happen with virtues acquired through
the practice of acts, which at the same time remove contrary dispositions and generate the
habits of the virtues.
|
| Ad tertium dicendum, quod ille qui baptizatur, simul cum caritate recipit et prudentiam, et omnes alias virtutes; sed de necessitate prudentiae non est ut homo sit bene consiliativus in omnibus, puta in mercationibus et rebus bellicis et huiusmodi, sed in his quae sunt necessaria ad salutem: quod non deest omnibus in gratia existentibus, quantumcumque sint simplices, secundum illud I Ioan. II, 27: unctio docebit vos de omnibus; nisi forte in aliquibus baptizatis impediatur actus prudentiae propter corporalem defectum aetatis, sicut in pueris, vel pravae dispositionis, sicut in morionibus et phreneticis.
| Ad 3. It should be said that those who are baptized receive prudence along with charity and
all the other virtues too, but it is not of the necessity of prudence that a man deliberate well in
everything, for example, in trade and military matters and the like, but only in the things
necessary for salvation, which are not lacking to those in grace, however simple they be,
according to 1 John 2:27: “But his anointing teaches you concerning all things”; unless
perhaps in some of the baptized the act of prudence be impeded on account of the bodily
defect of age, as in children or those of deformed dispositions, such as the retarded and mad.
|
| Ad quartum dicendum, quod artificialia diversorum generum habent principia omnino disparata: et ideo nihil prohibet habere artem circa unum genus eorum, et non circa aliud. Sed principia moralium sunt ordinata ad invicem, ita quod per defectum unius sequeretur etiam defectus in aliis; puta, si quis deficeret ab hoc principio quod est concupiscentias non esse sequendas, quod pertinet ad concupiscentiam, sequeretur interdum quod sequendo concupiscentiam faceret iniuriam, et sic violaretur iustitia; sicut etiam in una et eadem arte vel scientia, puta in geometria, error unius principii inducit errorem in totam scientiam. Et inde est quod non potest esse aliquis sufficienter prudens circa materiam unius virtutis, nisi sit prudens circa omnes.
| Ad 4. It should be said that artifacts of different types have wholly different principles, so
nothing prevents someone having one kind of art and not another. But the principles of
morals are so interrelated to one another that the failure of one would entail the failure in
others. For example, if one were weak on the principle that concupiscence is not to be
followed, which pertains to desire, then sometimes in pursuing concupiscence, he would do
injury and thus violate justice. So too in one and the same art or science, for example,
geometry, an error about one principle leads to error in the whole science. Thence it is that
one cannot be sufficiently prudent with regard to the matter of one virtue unless he is prudent
with regard to them all.
|
| Ad quintum dicendum, quod potest dici quod contingit esse aliquem liberalem, sed non magnificum quantum ad actus: quia aliquis parum habens, potest in usu eius quod habet, exercere actum liberalitatis, non autem magnificentiae; quamvis aliquis habeat habitum, per quem etiam magnificentiae actum exerceret, si materia adesset. Et similiter dicendum est de moderantia et magnanimitate. Ista responsio tenenda est omnino in virtutibus infusis. In virtutibus etiam acquisitis per actum, potest dici, quod ille qui acquisivit habitum liberalitatis in usu parvae substantiae, nondum acquisito habitu magnificentiae, sed habito liberalitatis actu, est in proxima dispositione ut acquirat habitum magnificentiae per modicum actum. Quia igitur in propinquo est ut habeatur, idem videtur ac si haberetur, quia quod parum deest, quasi nihil deesse videtur, ut dicitur in II Physic.
| Ad 5. It should be said that it happens that someone can be called liberal but not high-minded
with respect to an act, because someone having little can use what he has to perform an act of
liberality but not of magnificence, although he might have the virtue by which he could also
perform the act of magnificence if he had the wherewithal. Similarly, it must be said of
moderation and magnanimity. This solution is to be held without reservation in the case of
infused virtues, but in virtues acquired through acts it can be said that he who acquired the
habit of liberality in the use of little, not yet having acquired the habit of magnificence but
actually having the habit of liberality, is in proximate potency to acquiring the habit of
magnificence with but slight effort. Therefore, because what is close to being had seems the
same as being had, what is lacking only a little seems not to be lacking at all, as is said
Physics 2.
|
| Ad sextum dicendum, quod sapientia et scientia non accipiuntur in illis verbis apostoli neque secundum quod sunt virtutes intellectuales, quae tamen connexionem non habent, ut infra dicetur, neque secundum quod sunt dona spiritus sancti, quae connexionem habent secundum caritatem; sed secundum quod sunt gratiae gratis datae: prout scilicet aliquis abundat scientia et sapientia, ut possit aedificare alios ad finem et Dei cognitionem, et contradicentes arguere; unde et apostolus non dicit: alii datur sapientia, alii scientia; sed: alii datur sermo sapientiae, alii sermo scientiae. Unde Augustinus dicit in XIV de Trinitate, quod huiusmodi scientia, non pollent fideles plurimi, quamvis ipsa fide polleant. Fides etiam non accipitur ibi pro fide informi, ut quidam dicunt, quia donum fidei commune est omnibus; sed accipitur pro quadam fidei constantia, seu certitudine, quae interdum abundat etiam in peccatoribus.
| Ad 6. It should be said that in those words of the Apostle wisdom and knowledge are
understood neither as intellectual virtues, which, however, have no connection, as will be said
below, nor as gifts of the Holy Spirit, which are connected through charity, but insofar as they
are of grace freely given: namely, insofar as someone abounds in knowledge and wisdom so
that he can spur others to the end and to the knowledge of God, convincing those who object.
Hence, the Apostle does not say that to one is given wisdom and to another knowledge, but to
one is given the utterance of wisdom, to other the utterance of knowledge. Hence, Augustine,
in On the Trinity 14, says that many believers are not strong in such knowledge although they
might be strong in faith itself. Faith does not mean here unformed faith, as some say, because
the gift of faith is common to all, but means the constancy of faith or its certitude, which
sometimes abounds even in sinners.
|
| Ad septimum dicendum, quod virginitas secundum quosdam non nominat virtutem, sed quemdam perfectiorem statum virtutis. Non autem oportet quod quicumque habet virtutem, habeat eam secundum gradum perfectum. Et ideo sine virginitate, castitas et aliae virtutes haberi possunt. Vel, si detur quod virginitas sit virtus, hoc erit secundum quod importat habitum mentis, ex quo aliquis eligit virginitatem conservare propter Christum. Et hic quidem habitus esse potest etiam in his qui carnis integritate carent; sicut et habitus magnificentiae potest esse sine magnitudine divitiarum.
| Ad 7. It should be said that some hold that virginity is not the name of a virtue so much as of
a more perfect state of virtue. But it is not necessary that anyone who has a virtue have it in
its perfect grade. Therefore, chastity and the other virtues can be had without virginity. Or, if
virginity is taken to be a virtue, this will be insofar as it implies a habit of mind by which one
chooses to preserve virginity for the sake of Christ. And this habit can exist even in those who
are not intact in the flesh, just as the habit of magnificence can be without a lot of wealth.
|
| Ad octavum dicendum, quod virtutes intellectuales non sunt connexae ad invicem; et hoc propter tria. Primo quidem, quia quae sunt circa rerum diversa genera, non sunt coordinata ad invicem, sicut et de artibus dictum est. Secundo, quia in scientiis non convertibiliter se habent principia et conclusiones; ita scilicet quod quicumque habet principia, habeat conclusiones, sicut in moralibus dictum est. Tertio, quia virtus intellectualis non habet respectum ad caritatem, per quam ordinatur homo ad ultimum finem. Et ideo huiusmodi virtutes ordinantur ad aliqua particularia bona: puta geometria ad dimetiendum circa abstracta quaedam, physica circa mobilia, et sic de aliis. Unde eadem ratione non sunt connexae qua nec virtutes imperfectae, ut supra, in corp. art., dictum est.
| Ad 8. It should be said that the intellectual virtues are not interconnected and this for three
reasons. First, because virtues concerned with different kinds of things are not related to one
another, as has been said of the arts. Second, because in the sciences principles and
conclusions are not convertible, such that whoever has the principles has the conclusions, as
has been said about moral matters. Third, because intellectual virtue is not related to charity
by which man is ordered to his ultimate end. Therefore, such virtues are concerned with
particular goods, for example, geometry with measuring abstract entities, Physics with mobile
things, and so on with the others. Hence, they are not connected for the same reason that
imperfect virtues are not, as was said about in the body of the article.
|
| Ad nonum dicendum, quod quaedam virtutes sunt quae ordinant hominem in his quae occurrunt in vita humana: sicut temperantia, iustitia, mansuetudo et huiusmodi; et in talibus necesse est quod homo, dum exercitatur in actu huius virtutis, vel simul etiam exerceatur in actibus aliarum virtutum, et tunc acquiret omnes habitus, virtutum simul; vel oportet quod bene se habeat in uno et male in aliis, et tunc acquiret habitum contrarium alteri virtuti, et per consequens corruptionem prudentiae, sine qua nec dispositio, quam acquisivit per actus alicuius virtutis, habet proprie rationem virtutis, ut supra, in corp. art., dictum est. Huiusmodi autem habitibus acquisitis circa ea quae communiter in vita occurrunt, virtualiter iam habentur quasi in propinqua dispositione si qui alii habitus virtutum sunt, quorum actus occurrant frequenter in conversatione humana; sicut de magnificentia et magnanimitate dictum est, in solutione ad 5 argumentum.
| Ad 9. It should be said that there are some virtues which order man with respect to the things
that occur in human fife, such as temperance, justice, patience, and the like, and with them a
man Must either, while actually performing the act of a virtue, simultaneously perform the
acts of the other virtues and thus acquires all habits of the virtues together, or he must be
good in the one and bad in the others. But in the latter case, he acquires a habit contrary to a
virtue and consequently the corruption of prudence without which, as has been said above in
the body of the article, the disposition acquired through the act of any virtue cannot properly
be called a virtue. Such acquired habits bearing on things that commonly occur in fife are
already virtually had as it were in proximate disposition if one has other virtues whose acts
frequently occur in human intercourse, as was said of magnificence and magnanimity in the
solution of argument 5.
|
| Ad decimum dicendum, quod virtutes acquisitae causantur a proposito; et necesse est quod simul causentur in homine qui sibi proponit acquirere unam virtutem; et non acquiret, nisi simul acquirat prudentiam, cum qua omnes habentur, ut dictum est in corp. art. Virtutes autem infusae causantur immediate a Deo, quae etiam causantur ex caritate, sicut ex communi radice, ut dictum est in corp. art.
| Ad 10. It should be said that acquired virtues are caused purposely, and must be all caused
together in a man who proposes to himself to acquire one of them, nor are they acquired
unless at the same time one acquires prudence with which all are had, as was said in the body
of the article. But infused virtues are caused immediately by God, and they are also caused by
charity as by their common root, as was said in the body of the article.
|
| Ad undecimum dicendum, quod in scientiis speculativis non se habent principia convertibiliter ad conclusiones, sicut accidit in moralibus, ut dictum est in corp. art., et ideo qui habet unam conclusionem, non necesse est quod habeat aliam. Esset autem necesse, si oporteret, quod quicumque habet principia, haberet conclusiones, sicut est in proposito.
| Ad 11. It should be said that in speculative sciences principles and conclusions are not
convertible as they are in morals, as was said in the body of the article. Therefore, he who has
one conclusion does not necessarily have another. If this were the case, it would be necessary
that whoever has the principles has the conclusions, as the objection assumes.
|
| Ad duodecimum dicendum, quod Augustinus loquitur ibi de virtutibus imperfectis, quae sunt dispositiones quaedam ad actus virtutum; unde et ipsemet probat in VI de Trinitate, connexionem.
| Ad 12. It should be said that Augustine is speaking there of imperfect virtues which are
dispositions to the acts of virtues; hence, he himself proves their connection in On the Trinity 6.
|
| Ad decimumtertium dicendum, quod virtutes habent connexionem ratione principii proximi, id est sui generis, quod est prudentia vel caritas; non autem ratione principii remoti et communis, quod est Deus.
| Ad 13. It should be said that virtues are connected by reason of the proximate principle of
their genus, which is either prudence or charity, not by reason of the remote and common,
which is God.
|
| Ad decimumquartum dicendum, quod prudentia specialiter inter virtutes intellectuales habet connexionem cum virtutibus ratione materiae circa quam est; est enim circa mobilia.
| Ad 14. It should be said that among the intellectual virtues prudence has a special connection
with the [moral] virtues by reason of its matter, for it is concerned with changeable things.
|
| Ad decimumquintum dicendum, quod in patria, deficiente spe et fide, succedent quaedam perfectiora, scilicet visio et comprehensio, quae connectentur caritati.
| Ad 15. It should be said that in heaven where hope and faith disappear certain more perfect
things succeed them, namely, vision and comprehension, which arc c0nncctcd with charity.
|
| Ad decimumsextum dicendum, quod in Angelis et animabus separatis non est temperantia et fortitudo ad hos actus ad quos sunt in hac vita, scilicet ad moderandum passiones sensibilis partis; sed ad quosdam alios actus, ut patet per Augustinum in XIV de Trinitate.
| Ad 16. It should be said that In the angels and separated souls there is not temperance or
fortitude with respect to such acts as are performed in this life, namely, moderating the
passions of the sensible part, but to other acts, as is evident in Augustine On the Trinity 14.
|
| Ad decimumseptimum dicendum, quod potentiae animae non se habent convertibiliter cum essentia; quamvis enim nulla potentia animae possit esse sine essentia, tamen essentia animae potest esse sine quibusdam potentiis; puta sine visu et auditu, propter corruptionem organorum quorum huiusmodi potentiae proprie sunt actus.
| Ad 17. It should be said that the powers of the soul are not convertible with its essence, for
although no power of the soul can exist apart from essence, yet the essence of the soul can
exist without some powers, for example, without sight and hearing because of the corruption
of the organs of which such powers are properly the acts.
|
| Ad decimumoctavum dicendum, quod non propter hoc homo est summus, quod habet omnes virtutes, sed propter hoc quod habet eas in summo.
| Ad 18. It should be said that a man is not the best because he has all the virtues but because
he has them to the greatest degree.
|