Proportionate Properties in Friendship
Chapter 1


ἐν πάσαις δὲ ταῖς ἀνομοιοειδέσι φιλίαις τὸ ἀνάλογον ἰσάζει καὶ σώζει τὴν φιλίαν, καθάπερ εἴρηται, οἷον καὶ ἐν τῇ πολιτικῇ τῷ σκυτοτόμῳ ἀντὶ τῶν ὑποδημάτων ἀμοιβὴ γίνεται κατ' ἀξίαν, καὶ τῷ ὑφάντῃ καὶ τοῖς λοιποῖς. In all friendships of dissimilar persons proportion equates the parties and preserves friendship, as has been indicated.” Thus in justice between citizens a return according to value is made to the shoemaker for the shoes he gives. A similar thing is done to the weaver and to other artisans.
      A.  Why disturbance... cannot happen in an exchange based on justice. — 1759
ἐνταῦθα μὲν οὖν πεπόρισται κοινὸν μέτρον τὸ νόμισμα, καὶ πρὸς τοῦτο δὴ πάντα ἀναφέρεται καὶ τούτῳ μετρεῖται· For that reason people invented money to serve as a common measure, and all salable goods were referred to it and measured by it.
      B.  How friendship is disturbed by lack of a proportionate measure.
                   a.   He proposes the cause of the disturbance. — 1760
ἐν δὲ τῇ ἐρωτικῇ ἐνίοτε μὲν ὁ ἐραστὴς ἐγκαλεῖ ὅτι ὑπερφιλῶν οὐκ ἀντιφιλεῖται, οὐδὲν ἔχων φιλητόν, εἰ οὕτως ἔτυχεν, πολλάκις δ' ὁ ἐρώμενος ὅτι πρότερον ἐπαγγελλόμενος πάντα νῦν οὐδὲν ἐπιτελεῖ. In friendship, however, the lover sometimes complains because his lavish love is not returned—but perhaps he has nothing deserving of love. On the other hand, the beloved very often complains that the lover had promised everything before, but now fulfills nothing.
                   b.   He shows in which friendships this occurs. — 1761
συμβαίνει δὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα, ἐπειδὰν ὃ μὲν δι' ἡδονὴν τὸν ἐρώμενον φιλῇ, ὃ δὲ διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον τὸν ἐραστήν, ταῦτα δὲ μὴ ἀμφοῖν ὑπάρχῃ. διὰ ταῦτα γὰρ τῆς φιλίας οὔσης διάλυσις γίνεται, ἐπειδὰν μὴ γίνηται ὧν ἕνεκα ἐφίλουν· οὐ γὰρ αὐτοὺς ἔστεργον ἀλλὰ τὰ ὑπάρχοντα, οὐ μόνιμα ὄντα· διὸ τοιαῦται καὶ αἱ φιλίαι. ἡ δὲ τῶν ἠθῶν καθ' αὑτὴν οὖσα μένει, καθάπερ εἴρηται. These accusations are made when the lover seeks pleasure and the beloved, utility; and neither has the qualities the other seeks, Consequently, the friendship is broken off since the very reasons why it was formed no longer remain. The parties did not love one another for themselves but for advantages to be gained, and these were not enduring; hence neither were the friendships enduring. But friendship based on virtue remains, as we have indicated, because each friend is loved for himself.
διαφέρονται δ' ὅταν ἕτερα γίνηται αὐτοῖς καὶ μὴ ὧν ὀρέγονται· ὅμοιον γὰρ τῷ μηδὲν γίνεσθαι, ὅταν οὗ ἐφίεται μὴ τυγχάνῃ, οἷον καὶ τῷ κιθαρῳδῷ ὁ ἐπαγγελλόμενος, καὶ ὅσῳ ἄμεινον ᾄσειεν, τοσούτῳ πλείω· εἰς ἕω δ' ἀπαιτοῦντι τὰς ὑποσχέσεις ἀνθ' ἡδονῆς ἡδονὴν ἀποδεδωκέναι ἔφη. εἰ μὲν οὖν ἑκάτερος τοῦτο ἐβούλετο, ἱκανῶς ἂν εἶχεν· εἰ δ' ὃ μὲν τέρψιν ὃ δὲ κέρδος, καὶ ὃ μὲν ἔχει ὃ δὲ μή, οὐκ ἂν εἴη τὰ κατὰ τὴν κοινωνίαν καλῶς· ὧν γὰρ δεόμενος τυγχάνει, τούτοις καὶ προσέχει, κἀκείνου γε χάριν ταῦτα δώσει. Friends quarrel when given favors different from what they desire, for failure to get what a man wants is like getting nothing. This recalls the lyre-player who was promised that the better he sang the more he would be paid, but next morning when he demanded fulfillment of the pledge the man who promised replied that he had already given pleasure (i.e., of expectation) for pleasure. Certainly if each had wished this it would have been satisfactory. But if one wanted amusement and got it while the other wanted gain and did not get it, an unfair exchange was made; for a man is intent on acquiring what he needs and will give what he possesses to get it.
      A.  He suggests the means... to preserve peace in friendship.
                   a.   The estimate... should be made by the person who first receives the benefit. — 1764-1765
τὴν ἀξίαν δὲ ποτέρου τάξαι ἐστί, τοῦ προϊεμένου ἢ τοῦ προλαβόντος; ὁ γὰρ προϊέμενος ἔοικ' ἐπιτρέπειν ἐκείνῳ. ὅπερ φασὶ καὶ Πρωταγόραν ποιεῖν· ὅτε γὰρ διδάξειεν ἁδήποτε, τιμῆσαι τὸν μαθόντα ἐκέλευεν ὅσου δοκεῖ ἄξια ἐπίστασθαι, καὶ ἐλάμβανε τοσοῦτον. ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις δ' ἐνίοις ἀρέσκει τὸ μισθὸς δ' ἀνδρί. But who is to fix the amount due to each, the person giving or the person receiving the benefit? The giver evidently seems to leave this to the recipient as, they say, Protagoras used to do. For when he taught he told the student to estimate the value of the knowledge imparted; and Protagoras accepted no more. But in such matters some are satisfied to “let a man have his fixed fee.”
                   b.   How complaint... follows — 1766
οἱ δὲ προλαμβάνοντες τὸ ἀργύριον, εἶτα μηδὲν ποιοῦντες ὧν ἔφασαν διὰ τὰς ὑπερβολὰς τῶν ἐπαγγελιῶν, εἰκότως ἐν ἐγκλήμασι γίνονται· οὐ γὰρ ἐπιτελοῦσιν ἃ ὡμολόγησαν. τοῦτο δ' ἴσως ποιεῖν οἱ σοφισταὶ ἀναγκάζονται διὰ τὸ μηδένα ἂν δοῦναι ἀργύριον ὧν ἐπίστανται. οὗτοι μὲν οὖν ὧν ἔλαβον τὸν μισθόν, μὴ ποιοῦντες εἰκότως ἐν ἐγκλήμασίν εἰσιν. Those who first accept money and then carry out nothing they promised—their promises being extravagant—are proper targets for complaints; they are not doing what they undertook to do. The Sophists were forced to this course, for nothing would have been given for their teaching. Such persons then are justly accused for not doing what they are paid to do.
                   a.   In friendships based on virtue. — 1767-1768
ἐν οἷς δὲ μὴ γίνεται διομολογία τῆς ὑπουργίας, οἱ μὲν δι' αὐτοὺς προϊέμενοι εἴρηται ὅτι ἀνέγκλητοι τοιαύτη γὰρ ἡ κατ' ἀρετὴν φιλία, τὴν ἀμοιβήν τε ποιητέον κατὰ τὴν προαίρεσιν αὕτη γὰρ τοῦ φίλου καὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς· οὕτω δ' ἔοικε καὶ τοῖς φιλοσοφίας κοινωνήσασιν· οὐ γὰρ πρὸς χρήμαθ' ἡ ἀξία μετρεῖται, τιμή τ' ἰσόρροπος οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο, ἀλλ' ἴσως ἱκανόν, καθάπερ καὶ πρὸς θεοὺς καὶ πρὸς γονεῖς, τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον. Where the gift is not made with a promise of service, people who give for the sake of others cannot be complained of—as we have noted. This is in accord with the nature of friendship for virtue; and a return is made in view of the giver’s intention which has a special relevancy in a friend and virtue. A similar course should be followed with those imparting philosophy, for their value cannot be measured in terms of money nor can they be given an equivalent return. Perhaps it suffices that we repay them what is possible, as is done with the gods and our parents.
                   b.   In other kinds of friendships.
                         i.    He proposes his intention. — 1769
μὴ τοιαύτης δ' οὔσης τῆς δόσεως ἀλλ' ἐπί τινι, μάλιστα μὲν ἴσως δεῖ τὴν ἀνταπόδοσιν γίνεσθαι δοκοῦσαν ἀμφοῖν κατ' ἀξίαν εἶναι, εἰ δὲ τοῦτο μὴ συμβαίνοι, οὐ μόνον ἀναγκαῖον δόξειεν ἂν τὸν προέχοντα τάττειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ δίκαιον· If the gift is not of this nature but was made in view of a recompense, a return which seems fair to both parties must be arranged. When this is not possible, appraisal of compensation by the beneficiary will seem not only necessary but just.
                         ii.   He proves his proposal.
                               x.   BY ARGUMENT. — 1770
ὅσον γὰρ οὗτος ὠφελήθη ἢ ἀνθ' ὅσου τὴν ἡδονὴν εἵλετ' ἄν, τοσοῦτον ἀντιλαβὼν ἕξει τὴν παρὰ τούτου ἀξίαν. A person will have what is just when he is repaid according to the help and pleasure afforded the recipient; and this is what happens in buying.
                               y.   BY THE AUTHORITY OF LAW. — 1771
καὶ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ὠνίοις οὕτω φαίνεται γινόμενον, ἐνιαχοῦ τ' εἰσὶ νόμοι τῶν ἑκουσίων συμβολαίων δίκας μὴ εἶναι, ὡς δέον, ᾧ ἐπίστευσε, διαλυθῆναι πρὸς τοῦτον καθάπερ ἐκοινώνησεν. ᾧ γὰρ ἐπετράφθη, τοῦτον οἴεται δικαιότερον εἶναι τάξαι τοῦ ἐπιτρέψαντος. τὰ πολλὰ γὰρ οὐ τοῦ ἴσου τιμῶσιν οἱ ἔχοντες καὶ οἱ βουλόμενοι λαβεῖν· τὰ γὰρ οἰκεῖα καὶ ἃ διδόασιν ἑκάστοις φαίνεται πολλοῦ ἄξια· ἀλλ' ὅμως ἡ ἀμοιβὴ γίνεται πρὸς τοσοῦτον ὅσον ἂν τάττωσιν οἱ λαμβάνοντες. In some places the law prescribes that no legal action is possible in voluntary contracts, taking the position that a person who trusts another should be repaid according to the terms of the original agreement. It supposes that the person receiving the benefit makes a more just arrangement. In general those who have things and those who want them do not make equal valuations; each group puts a big price on what it owns and has for sale. But a return is made according to the appraisal of the recipient.
                         iii. He answers an implied question. — 1772
δεῖ δ' ἴσως οὐ τοσούτου τιμᾶν ὅσου ἔχοντι φαίνεται ἄξιον, ἀλλ' ὅσου πρὶν ἔχειν ἐτίμα. However, a man ought to appraise a benefit not at the value it seems to have after he gets it but at the value it had before he received it.
In omnibus autem dissimilium et cetera. Postquam philosophus ostendit quid est amicitia, et determinavit de amicitiae speciebus, hic in nono libro determinat de amicitiae proprietatibus. Et primo ponit proprietates amicitiae. Secundo movet quasdam dubitationes circa praedeterminata, ibi, dubitatur autem utrum oportet et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo determinat ea quae pertinent ad conservationem et dissolutionem amicitiae. Secundo determinat de amicitiae effectibus, ibi, amicabilia autem quae ad amicos et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo determinat ea quae pertinent ad conservationem amicitiae. Secundo determinat quaedam, quae pertinent ad dissolutionem ipsius, ibi, habet autem dubitationem et de eo et cetera. Circa primum tria facit. Primo proponit id quod est amicitiae conservativum. Secundo ostendit quomodo per huius defectum amicitia turbatur, ibi: hic quidem igitur inventa est et cetera. Tertio docet remedia contra huiusmodi periculum, ibi: dignitatem autem et cetera. 1757. After the Philosopher has shown the nature of friendship and defined the kinds of friendship, he now discusses the properties of friendship in the ninth book. First he gives the properties. Then [Lect. 8], at “Likewise the question etc.” (B. 1168 a 28), he raises doubts on questions already settled. He treats the first point from two aspects. First he considers matters pertaining to the preservation and the breaking up of friendship. Next [Lect. 4], at “Kindly acts etc.” (B.1166 a), he investigates the effects of friendship. He discusses the first point in a twofold manner. First, he treats matters pertaining to the preservation of friendship. Second [Lect. 3], at “A question comes up etc.” (B.1165 a 37), he considers questions concerned with its destruction. He handles the first point under three headings. First [I] he proposes a means of preserving friendship. Then [II], at “For that reason etc.,” he shows how friendship is disturbed by the absence of this means. Third [III], at “But who is etc.,” he recommends remedies against disturbance of this sort.
Et quia in amicitiis aequalium manifestum est, quod amicitia conservatur per hoc quod aequivalens redditur, manifestat primo qualiter possit conservari amicitia, quae est dissimilium personarum adinvicem, quod magis dubium esse videbatur. Et dicit, quod in omnibus talibus amicitiis dissimilium personarum puta patris ad filium, regis ad subditum, et sic de aliis, adaequat et conservat amicitiam hoc, quod exhibetur analogum, id est id quod est proportionale utrique. Et hoc manifestat per exemplum eius quod accidit in politica iustitia, secundum quam, ut dictum est in V: coriario pro calciamentis quae dedit fit retributio secundum dignitatem, quod est secundum proportionem; et idem est de textore, et de reliquis artificibus. 1758. Obviously, friendship between equals is preserved by a fair return. Hence he first explains how it is possible to preserve friendship existing between persons unlike one another—a thing that seems rather doubtful. He observes that in all such friendships between dissimilar persons, like father and son, king and subject and so on, friendship is equated and preserved by something which is analogous or proportionate to each. He makes this clear by an example found in political justice; accordingly, we said in the fifth book (975-976) that a return in conformity with proportionate value is made to the shoemaker for the shoes he gives. The same thing applies to the weaver and other artisans.
Deinde cum dicit: hic quidem igitur etc., ostendit quomodo propter defectum analogi turbatur amicitia. Et circa hoc duo facit. Primo proponit causam quare huiusmodi perturbatio contingere non potest circa iustitiae commutationem. Et dicit, quod hic, scilicet in commutationibus politicis inventa est quaedam communis mensura, scilicet denarius, ad quem sicut ad mensuram omnia, commutabilia referuntur. Et eorum pretium per denarios mensuratur. Et ideo certum esse potest quid pro quo reddendum sit. Sed ea quae secundum amicitiam commutantur, puta affectus et obsequia amicorum, appretiari pecunia non possunt. 1759. Then [II], at “For that reason” he shows how friendship is disturbed by lack of a proportion. He treats this point in a twofold manner. First [II, A] he states the reason why disturbance of this sort cannot happen in an exchange based on justice. He observes that in exchanges between citizens there is found a common measure, currency, to which all articles of exchange are referred as to a criterion; and their price is measured by means of currency. Consequently what is to be charged for them can be determined. But the relations, which are exchanged in friendship, for example, affections, and services of friends, cannot be computed in money.
Et ideo secundo ibi, in amicitia autem etc., ostendit quomodo propter defectum analogi amicitia perturbatur. Et primo ostendit ex eo quod non fit recompensatio ab uno amico alteri. Secundo ex eo quod non recompensatur id quod quaerebatur, ibi, contendunt autem et cetera. Circa primum duo facit: primo ponit causam perturbationis amicitiae. Secundo ostendit in quibus amicitiis hoc contingat, ibi, accidunt autem talia et cetera. Circa primum considerandum est, quod recompensatio amicitiae attenditur secundum duo. Primo quidem quantum ad interiorem affectum amoris, et quantum ad hoc dicit, quod quandoque in amicitia contingit quod amator accusat eum quem amat, quoniam cum ipse superabundanter amet, non redamatur ab eo quem amat. Et quandoque sua accusatio est iniusta, puta si contingat, quod nihil habeat in se unde sit dignus amari. Secundo fit recompensatio amicitiae quantum ad exteriora dona vel obsequia. Et quantum ad hoc dicit, quod multoties ille qui amatur accusat amatorem, quia cum prius repromiserit sibi omnia, tandem nihil perficit. 1760. Therefore, at “In friendship, however,” he explains how friendship is disturbed by lack of a proportionate measure. He shows this first [II, B, 1] from the fact that one friend does not repay the other; then [II, B, 2], at “Friends quarrel etc.,” from the fact that repayment is not what was deserved. He discusses the first point under two headings. First [II, B, 1, a] he proposes the cause of the disturbance in friendship. Next [II, B, 1, b], at “These accusations are made etc.,” he shows in which friendships this occurs. Concerning the first point we must note that repayment in friendship is judged according to two phases. First in relation to the interior act of love. On this aspect he says that in friendship the lover sometimes complains that, while he lavishes love on the beloved, the beloved does not return the love; and at times his complaint is unjustified, for instance, if he does not have anything making him deserving of love. Second, repayment of friendship is made in external gifts or services. Regarding this aspect he remarks that the beloved very often complains because the lover had promised him everything in the beginning but delivered nothing in the end.
Deinde cum dicit: accidunt autem etc., ostendit in quibus amicitiis haec contingant. Et dicit, quod praedictae mutuae accusationes inter amatorem et amatum accidunt, quando amator amat amatum propter delectationem, amatus autem amat amatorem propter utile. Contingit autem quandoque, quod ista non existunt; quia scilicet nec amatus exhibet amatori delectationem nec amator amato utilitatem, et ideo fit dissolutio amicitiae, cum non permaneant illa, propter quae sola amicitia erat. Non enim seinvicem propter seipsos amabant, sed propter praedicta, scilicet utilitatem et delectationem, quae non sunt permanentia, et ideo nec tales amicitiae sunt permanentes. Sed, sicut supra dictum est, amicitia quae est propter bonos mores est permanens, quia secundum eam amant seinvicem amici propter seipsos. 1761. Next [II, B, 1, b], at “These accusations “are made,” he shows in which friendships this occurs. He remarks that these mutual complaints between lover and beloved take place when the lover seeks pleasure and the beloved wants utility. But sometimes these qualities are not present because the beloved neither provides pleasure for the lover, nor the lover utility for the beloved. Consequently, the friendship is broken off, since the very reasons for its existence no longer remain. The persons did not love one another for themselves but for the conditions mentioned, viz., utility and pleasure; and these are not enduring, so neither are friendships of this kind. But friendship for the sake of virtue is permanent—as we have indicated (1622-1623)—because friends love each other for themselves according to virtue.
Deinde cum dicit contendunt autem etc., ostendit quomodo amicitia turbatur per hoc quod non recompensatur id quod quaerebatur, sed aliud. Et dicit, quod multoties amici contendunt adinvicem, cum non recompensentur eis illa quae appetunt, sed quaedam alia. Cum enim aliquis non potitur eo quod desiderat, simile est ac si nihil ei fieret. 1762. At “Friends quarrel” [B, 2] he shows how friendship is disturbed because repayment is not made in the service sought but in something else. He observes that very often friends contend among themselves when they have been given favors different from those they desire; for failure to get what a man wants is like getting nothing at all.
Et ponit exemplum de quodam cytharoedo, cui quidam repromisit, quod quanto melius cantaret, tanto plus ei daret; cum autem in mane post cantum petiisset repromissiones sibi adimpleri, respondit promissor, quod ipse pro delectatione reddiderat ei delectationem, quia versa vice in aliquo eum delectaverat. Et si quidem citharoedus quaerebat delectationem, sufficienter se habet recompensatio facta. Si vero promissor quaerebat delectationem, cytharoedus autem lucrum, non est bene facta communicatio, quia unus eorum habet quod quaerebat, alius autem non. Ille enim qui exhibet aliquid, ad illa attendit quibus indiget, et horum gratia dat illa quae dat. 1763. He gives an example of a lyre-player who was promised that the better he sang the more he would be paid. But the morning after playing, when he asked fulfillment of the pledge, the man who promised replied that he had already returned pleasure for pleasure, because conversely he had given the musician pleasure. If the lyre-player was looking for pleasure, the repayment made him was sufficient. But if the one who promised wanted amusement and the player gain, an unfair exchange was made since one party has what he wanted but the other does not. The man who offers a service is intent on getting what he needs and he gives what he possesses to get it.
Deinde cum dicit dignitatem autem etc., docet remedia contra praedictas amicitiae turbationes. Et circa hoc duo facit. Primo docet quae sint observanda, ad hoc quod pax amicitiae conservetur. Secundo determinat quamdam dubitationem, ibi, dubitationem autem habent et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo ostendit ad quem pertineat aestimare dignam recompensationem in amicitiis. Secundo ostendit qualiter huiusmodi recompensatio fiat, ibi, in quibus autem non fit et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo ostendit, quod aestimatio dignae recompensationis pertinet ad eum qui primo accepit beneficium. Secundo ostendit quomodo ex eius defectu sequitur accusatio in amicitiis, ibi, praeaccipientes autem et cetera. 1764. Then [III], at “But who,” he recommends remedies against these disturbances in friendship. He discusses this point from two aspects. First [III, A] he suggests the means to be used to preserve peace in friendship. Next [Lect. 2; III, B], at “On the other hand etc.” (B.1164 b 22), he resolves a difficulty. He treats the first point under two headings. First [A, 1] he explains who should determine a proper repayment in friendship. Then [A, 2], at “Where the gift etc.,” he shows how this repayment is made. He handles the first point in a twofold manner. First [III, A, 1, a] he shows that the estimate of a fair repayment should be made by the person who first receives the benefit. Second [III, A. 1, b], at “Those who first etc.,” he shows how complaint in friendship follows from this person’s negligence.
Dicit ergo primo, quod ordinare dignitatem recompensationis pertinet ad utrumque: scilicet ad eum qui ante dedit, et ad eum qui ante accepit beneficium. Sed tamen ille qui ante dedit, videtur concedere iudicium recompensationis illi qui accepit, sicut dicitur de Protagora philosopho, quod cum doceret discipulos, iubebat quod discipulus honoraret eum muneribus quantum dignum sibi videbatur dare pro his quae eo docente sciebat; et tantum accipiebat ab unoquoque eorum. In talibus enim amicitiae obsequiis sufficit quibusdam quod eis redditur secundum aestimationem recipientium beneficia. Et sic videntur sufficienter mercedem recipere; quia merces datur viro, scilicet benefico, non autem rei exhibitae. Et ideo sufficiens videtur esse merces quae sufficit viro, etiam si non aequiparet beneficium. 1765. He notes first that the arrangement of the amount of repayment pertains to both: the man who bestowed and the man who received the benefit. However, he who bestowed it seems to leave the estimate of the repayment to him who received it. Thus it is said that when Protagoras the philosopher taught students, he told each to reward him with presents that seem to the student fair for the instruction received from the teaching; and Protagoras accepted only that much. In such services of friendship some are satisfied to be recompensed according to the recipients’ judgment of the benefits. In this way they seem to receive an adequate fee, because it is given for the man doing the favor and not for the favor done. This is why it seems satisfactory that the fee suffice for the man even if it is not equal to the benefit.
Deinde cum dicit praeaccipientes autem etc., ostendit quomodo perturbatio amicitiae provenit ex defectu eorum qui primo accipiunt. Et dicit, quod illi qui primo accipiunt pecuniam, ante scilicet quam serviant, deinde nihil faciunt eorum quae promiserunt, quia forte promissiones fuerunt superfluae, convenienter accusantur, quia non perficiunt ea quae promiserunt. Et hoc coguntur facere sophistae, quia pro omnibus quae sciunt nihil daretur eis, si committerent arbitrio discentium sicut Protagoras faciebat, eo quod tota eorum scientia in quibusdam apparentibus et frivolis consistit. Sic igitur isti convenienter accusantur, dum non faciebant illa pro quibus mercedem accipiebant. 1766. Next [III, A, 1, b], at “Those who first,” he shows how friendship is disturbed by negligence on the part of those who first receive. He remarks that those who first accept money before they render any service, and then do none of the things they promised—perhaps because their promises were extravagant—naturally meet with complaints since they do not perform what they promised. This is what the Sophists are driven to do, because nothing would be given them for everything they know if the decision was left to their students, for all their learning consists in shallow and trifling doctrines. So then these men are accused when they do not perform the duties for which they accept a fee.
Deinde cum dicit: in quibus autem etc., ostendit quomodo debeat fieri recompensatio in amicitiis. Et primo quantum ad amicitias quae sunt secundum virtutem. Secundo quantum ad alias amicitias, ibi, non tali autem existente et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod si non fiat collatio beneficii propter confessionem, idest promissionem alicuius certi ministerii, sicut in praedictis fiebat: (contingit quandoque) quod illi qui ante dant beneficia aliquibus propter ipsos accipientes, et non intuitu alicuius recompensationis. Manifestum est ex praedictis in VIII quod tales sunt inaccusabiles. Hoc enim pertinet ad amicitiam quae est secundum virtutem, in qua facienda est retributio, respiciendo ad electionem, sive affectum facientis. Electio enim maxime pertinet ad amicitiam et virtutem, sicut supra dictum est. 1767. At “Where the gif” [III, A, 2] he shows how repayment ought to be made in friendship: first [2, a], in friendships based on virtue; then [2, b], at “If the gifts etc.,” in other kinds of friendships. He observes first that where the gift is not made with an agreement or promise of a certain service, as was done in the friendships already treated, men sometimes bestow benefits for the sake of the person receiving them and not in view of a return. It is evident from discussion in the eighth book (1743) that such people are not to be complained of, for this is characteristic of friendship according to virtue in which a return must be made by considering the intention or will of the doer. Indeed, intention has a special relevancy to friendship and virtue, as has been noted (1538).
Et sicut hoc observatur in amicitia quae consistit in communicatione virtutis, sic etiam observandum est in communicatione philosophiae, puta inter magistrum et discipulum. Non enim dignitas philosophiae quam quis addiscit, potest mensurari secundum pecuniam nec potest discipulus aequivalens pretium magistro reddere; sed forte reddendum est illud quod sufficit, sicut etiam Deo et parentibus. 1768. Our view regarding friendship which consists in the sharing (communicatione) of virtue is the view we should take of sharing of philosophy, for instance, between master and student. The value of philosophy to someone learning is not measurable in terms of money; neither can a student make an equivalent return to his teacher, but perhaps that return, which suffices for God and parents, is to be made.
Deinde cum dicit: non tali autem etc., ostendit qualiter fiat recompensatio in aliis amicitiis. Et circa hoc tria facit. Primo proponit quod intendit. Secundo probat propositum, ibi, quantum enim et cetera. Tertio respondet tacitae quaestioni, ibi, oportet autem forte et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod si non sit talis datio, quod scilicet aliquis det amico propter seipsum sed in aliquo recipiendo sit dantis intentio, oportet quod fiat retributio quae videatur ambobus digna, scilicet et danti et accipienti. Et si hoc non contingat, debet aestimare dignam compensationem ille qui prius habuit beneficium. Et hoc non solum est necessarium, sed etiam iustum. 1769. Then [2, b], at “If the gift,” he shows the way a return is made in the other kinds of friendship. He discusses this point from three aspects. First [b, i] he proposes his intention. Second [b, ii], at “A person will have etc.,” he proves his proposal. Third [b, iii], at “However, a man etc.,” he answers an implied question. He says first that, if the benefit is of such a nature that the person does not give for the friend’s sake but wishes repayment, there must be a return that seems fair to both the giver and the recipient. If this is not possible, then he who was benefited ought to determine a compensation that is reasonable; such a procedure is not only necessary but just.
Deinde cum dicit quantum enim utique etc., probat propositum. Et primo per rationem. Secundo per auctoritatem legis, ibi, alicubi autem et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod quantum aliquis est adiutus per beneficium amici in amicitia utilis, aut quantum acceptat delectationem in amicitia delectabilis, tantum dignum est quod recompenset, quia sic etiam videtur fieri in emptionibus, quod scilicet quantum aliquis aestimat rem, pro tanto emat eam. Quantum autem aliquis sit adiutus ex beneficio, vel quantum acceptet delectationem, ipse maxime scire potest qui est adiutus vel delectatus. Et ideo necessarium et iustum est quod eius existimationi committatur recompensatio. 1770. At “A person will have’ [b, ii] he proves his proposal: first [ii, x] by argument; then [ii, y], at “In some places etc.,” by the authority of law. He notes first that a fair repayment will be determined according to the help a person receives from a friend’s benefit in useful friendship and from pleasure acquired in pleasurable friendship. Buying, too, seems to be done in this fashion, that a man’s appraisal of a thing will be the price he pays for it. But the amount of help or pleasure derived from a benefit can best be known by the person receiving the help or pleasure. Consequently, it is necessary and just to make repayment according to his judgment.
Deinde cum dicit: alicubi autem etc., ostendit idem ex auctoritate legis. Et dicit quod in aliquibus civitatibus lege statuitur, quod non fiat aliqua vindicta circa voluntarias conventiones si postea aliquis eorum se deceptum reputet, quasi oporteat ut, si aliquis voluntarie credidit alicui beneficium suum vel obsequium, quod solvatur secundum eius iudicium cui credidit secundum modum primae communicationis. Existimant enim legislatores quod ille cui a principio concessum est, magis iuste debet ordinare recompensationem quam ille qui ei concessit. Et hoc ideo, quia multa sunt quae non aequaliter appretiantur illi qui iam habent ea et illi qui de novo volunt ea accipere. Videtur enim singulis quod propria bona quae dant sint digna multo pretio. Sed tamen retributio debet fieri in tantum quantum aestimant recipientes. 1771. Next [ii, y], at “In some places,” he proves the same point by the authority of law. He observes that in some states the law prescribes that no redress is possible in voluntary agreements for one of the parties who afterwards pleads deception. If a person voluntarily trusts someone with a benefit or service, payment must be made according to the judgment of the person trusted in conformity with the conditions of the original exchange. For legislators are of the opinion that the person who was given the benefit at the outset ought to arrange the repayment more justly than he who granted it. They think this way because there are many things which are not valued at the same price by those who have them and by those who want to have them. Indeed, individuals apparently think that the goods they offer are worth a big price. But a return ought to be made according to the appraisal of the recipients.
Deinde cum dicit: oportet autem etc., respondet tacitae quaestioni dicens, quod ille qui recipit beneficium debet appretiare ipsum non secundum hoc quod ei videtur dignum postquam iam habet, sed quantum appretiabatur antequam haberet. Solent enim homines appretiari bona temporalia adepta minus quam quando ea non habita cupiebant, et praecipue in necessitate existentes. 1772. At “However, a man” [b, iii] he answers an implied question. He says that a man ought to estimate a benefit not at the price that he considers fair after he receives it but at the value he gave it before he received it.

Doubts on the Duties of Friendship
Chapter 2
B.   He now raises doubts concerning benefits and repayments to friends.
      1.   HE RAISES THE DOUBTS. — 1773
ἀπορίαν δ' ἔχει καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα, οἷον πότερον δεῖ πάντα τῷ πατρὶ ἀπονέμειν καὶ πείθεσθαι, ἢ κάμνοντα μὲν ἰατρῷ πιστεύειν, στρατηγὸν δὲ χειροτονητέον τὸν πολεμικόν· ὁμοίως δὲ φίλῳ μᾶλλον ἢ σπουδαίῳ ὑπηρετητέον, καὶ εὐεργέτῃ ἀνταποδοτέον χάριν μᾶλλον ἢ ἑταίρῳ προετέον, ἐὰν ἄμφω μὴ ἐνδέχηται. On the other hand these questions are raised: whether a man ought to give preference to his father in all matters and obey him; or ought he when ill to obey his doctor; or ought he when a soldier to obey his general. Likewise, must someone aid a friend in preference to a virtuous man? Must a person return a favor to a benefactor or oblige a friend, if unable to satisfy both?
      2.   HE SOLVES THEM.
            a.   By a general answer. — 1774
ἆρ' οὖν πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα ἀκριβῶς μὲν διορίσαι οὐ ῥᾴδιον; πολλὰς γὰρ καὶ παντοίας ἔχει διαφορὰς καὶ μεγέθει καὶ μικρότητι καὶ τῷ καλῷ καὶ ἀναγκαίῳ. ὅτι δ' οὐ πάντα τῷ αὐτῷ ἀποδοτέον, οὐκ ἄδηλον· Certainly it is not easy to come to a decision in all such contingencies; for they vary greatly in degree, merit, and necessity. However, it is clear that all the deferences are not to be rendered to the same person.
            b.  By specific answers.
                   i.    He solves the third doubt.
                         x.   WHAT MUST BE OBSERVED GENERALLY. — 1775
καὶ τὰς μὲν εὐεργεσίας ἀνταποδοτέον ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ μᾶλλον ἢ χαριστέον ἑταίροις, ὥσπερ καὶ δάνειον ᾧ ὀφείλει ἀποδοτέον μᾶλλον ἢ ἑταίρῳ δοτέον. As a rule a man ought to recompense a benefactor rather than present gifts to friends, just as he ought to repay a loan rather than make one to a friend.
                         y. A CASE WHERE THIS STATEMENT DOES NOT HOLD. — 1776
ἴσως δ' οὐδὲ τοῦτ' ἀεί, οἷον τῷ λυτρωθέντι παρὰ λῃστῶν πότερα τὸν λυσάμενον ἀντιλυτρωτέον, κἂν ὁστισοῦν ᾖ, ἢ μὴ ἑαλωκότι ἀπαιτοῦντι δὲ ἀποδοτέον, ἢ τὸν πατέρα λυτρωτέον; δόξειε γὰρ ἂν καὶ ἑαυτοῦ μᾶλλον τὸν πατέρα. Perhaps this course is not always to be followed, for instance, in a case of ransom from robbers. Ought a man to ransom a person—whoever he may be—who has freed him from prison? Or ought he to repay the benefactor, who is not a captive, but asks repayment? Or ought he ransom his father even before himself?
                         z.   HOW WE MUST OBSERVE WHAT WAS SAID PREVIOUSLY.
                               aa. He explains his intention. — 1777-1778
ὅπερ οὖν εἴρηται, καθόλου μὲν τὸ ὀφείλημα ἀποδοτέον, ἐὰν δ' ὑπερτείνῃ ἡ δόσις τῷ καλῷ ἢ τῷ ἀναγκαίῳ, πρὸς ταῦτ' ἀποκλιτέον. ἐνίοτε γὰρ οὐδ' ἐστὶν ἴσον τὸ τὴν προϋπαρχὴν ἀμείψασθαι, ἐπειδὰν ὃ μὲν σπουδαῖον εἰδὼς εὖ ποιήσῃ, τῷ δὲ ἡ ἀνταπόδοσις γίνηται ὃν οἴεται μοχθηρὸν εἶναι. οὐδὲ γὰρ τῷ δανείσαντι ἐνίοτε ἀντιδανειστέον· ὃ μὲν γὰρ οἰόμενος κομιεῖσθαι ἐδάνεισεν ἐπιεικεῖ ὄντι, ὃ δ' οὐκ ἐλπίζει κομιεῖσθαι παρὰ πονηροῦ. εἴτε τοίνυν τῇ ἀληθείᾳ οὕτως ἔχει, οὐκ ἴσον τὸ ἀξίωμα· εἴτ' ἔχει μὲν μὴ οὕτως οἴονται δέ, οὐκ ἂν δόξαιεν ἄτοπα ποιεῖν. It is then a general rule that a debt should be paid, as we have stated. But if a gift has a special goodness or urgency it ought to be given. For sometimes previous benefits must not be returned equally, for example, when the benefit is bestowed on a person known to be virtuous but compensation is paid to the other who is considered wicked. Indeed a loan is not always to be made to a man who has given a loan; for the lender looks for profit from a good man, but the good man lends with no hope of gain from 10 ‘a bad man. Therefore, if all this is true, no equality is present; if it is not really true, but only thought to be then the action will not seem unreasonable.
                               bb.        He deduces a corollary from the discussion. — 1779
ὅπερ οὖν πολλάκις εἴρηται, οἱ περὶ τὰ πάθη καὶ τὰς πράξεις λόγοι ὁμοίως ἔχουσι τὸ ὡρισμένον τοῖς περὶ ἅ εἰσιν. As we have indicated many times, discussions about our passions and actions have that definiteness belonging to their subject matter.
                   ii.   He solves the first doubt.
                         x.   NOT ALL HONORS... TO A FATHER. — 1780-1781
ὅτι μὲν οὖν οὐ ταὐτὰ πᾶσιν ἀποδοτέον, οὐδὲ τῷ πατρὶ πάντα, καθάπερ οὐδὲ τῷ Διὶ θύεται, οὐκ ἄδηλον· ἐπεὶ δ' ἕτερα γονεῦσι καὶ ἀδελφοῖς καὶ ἑταίροις καὶ εὐεργέταις, ἑκάστοις τὰ οἰκεῖα καὶ τὰ ἁρμόττοντα ἀπονεμητέον. οὕτω δὲ καὶ ποιεῖν φαίνονται· εἰς γάμους μὲν γὰρ καλοῦσι τοὺς συγγενεῖς· τούτοις γὰρ κοινὸν τὸ γένος καὶ αἱ περὶ τοῦτο δὴ πράξεις· καὶ εἰς τὰ κήδη δὲ μάλιστ' οἴονται δεῖν τοὺς συγγενεῖς ἀπαντᾶν διὰ ταὐτό. It is obvious that the same honors are not to be paid everyone. Hence all homage is not given to a father, just as all sacrifices were not offered to Jove. Since different obligations are due parents, brothers, friends, and benefactors, what is proper and becoming ought to be rendered to each group. And such is apparently the custom. For people send wedding invitations to relatives belonging to the family and interested in its activities. For this reason they think that kindred particularly should meet at funerals.
                         y.   WHAT HONORS ARE TO BE GIVEN TO CERTAIN PERSONS.
                               aa. He explains his intention. — 1782-1783
δόξειε δ' ἂν τροφῆς μὲν γονεῦσι δεῖν μάλιστ' ἐπαρκεῖν, ὡς ὀφείλοντας, καὶ τοῖς αἰτίοις τοῦ εἶναι κάλλιον ὂν ἢ ἑαυτοῖς εἰς ταῦτ' ἐπαρκεῖν· καὶ τιμὴν δὲ γονεῦσι καθάπερ θεοῖς, οὐ πᾶσαν δέ· οὐδὲ γὰρ τὴν αὐτὴν πατρὶ καὶ μητρί, οὐδ' αὖ τὴν τοῦ σοφοῦ ἢ τὴν τοῦ στρατηγοῦ, ἀλλὰ τὴν πατρικήν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ μητρικήν. καὶ παντὶ δὲ τῷ πρεσβυτέρῳ τιμὴν καθ' ἡλικίαν, ὑπαναστάσει καὶ κατακλίσει καὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις· πρὸς ἑταίρους δ' αὖ καὶ ἀδελφοὺς παρρησίαν καὶ ἁπάντων κοινότητα. καὶ συγγενέσι δὲ καὶ φυλέταις καὶ πολίταις καὶ τοῖς λοιποῖς ἅπασιν ἀεὶ πειρατέον τὸ οἰκεῖον ἀπονέμειν, καὶ συγκρίνειν τὰ ἑκάστοις ὑπάρχοντα κατ' οἰκειότητα καὶ ἀρετὴν ἢ χρῆσιν. It seems that children should especially provide enough food for their parents; they are indebted to their parents for life itself, and should aid them rather than themselves in a spirit of honor similar to that given to the gods. However, a man should not render every honor to his parents nor the same honor to his father and mother, nor again to a philosopher and a general. To his father he ought to give the honor proper to a father, and to a mother honor belonging to a mother. Similarly, to all elderly persons he should show honor appropriate to age by rising for them, giving them seats, and so on. To friends and 30 brothers he should offer confidence and community of goods. Moreover, to kinsmen, fellow tribesmen, fellow citizens, and others of this standing, a person must always try to allot appropriate honor, and to accord each his due in conformity with propinquity and virtue or usefulness.
                               bb.        In what cases judgment is easy... — 1784
τῶν μὲν οὖν ὁμογενῶν ῥᾴων ἡ σύγκρισις, τῶν δὲ διαφερόντων ἐργωδεστέρα. οὐ μὴν διά γε τοῦτο ἀποστατέον, ἀλλ' ὡς ἂν ἐνδέχηται, οὕτω διοριστέον. Judgment in these matters is easy when people are of the same class, but difficult when they are of different classes. Nevertheless, we should not avoid the decision but make it as best we can.
Dubitationem autem habent et cetera. Postquam philosophus ostendit quod amicitia conservatur per recompensationem proportionalem, hic movet quasdam dubitationes circa beneficia amicorum et recompensationes eorundem. Et primo movet dubitationes. Secundo solvit eas, ibi, igitur omnia talia et cetera. Circa primum movet tres dubitationes. Quarum prima est: utrum circa omnia oportet magis beneficia patri (attribuere) et oboedire ei quam quibuscumque personis aliis, vel circa quaedam sit magis obediendum aliis: puta quod laborans, idest infirmus, magis debet obedire medico quam patri; et homo bellicosus magis debet ordinari praecepto ducis exercitus quam praecepto patris. Secunda dubitatio est, utrum aliquis magis debeat ministerium exhibere amico suo vel homini virtuoso. Tertia dubitatio est utrum homo debeat magis retribuere benefactori pro gratia suscepta quam dare amico, si ita contingat quod homo non possit utrique satisfacere. 1773. After the Philosopher has investigated the preservation of friendship by proportionate repayment, he now [III, B] raises doubts concerning benefits and repayments to friends. First [B, 1] he raises the doubts; then [B, 2], at “Certainly it is not etc.,” he solves them. In treating the initial point he presents three doubts. The first is whether a man must assist his father in all matters and obey him rather than anyone else, or whether he must obey other persons in some matters. For example, must a feverish or sick patient obey the doctor before his father; ought a soldier follow the general’s orders rather than his father’s? The second doubt: whether someone is bound to help his friend in preference to a virtuous person. The third doubt: whether a man ought to make a return to a benefactor for a favor before he makes a present to a friend, if unable to satisfy both.
Deinde cum dicit igitur omnia talia etc., solvit praedictas quaestiones. Et primo solvit in generali; secundo solvit in speciali, ibi: et beneficia quidem et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod omnia huiusmodi determinare per certitudinem non est facile, quia circa praedicta potest attendi differentia multipliciter et secundum omnem modum: scilicet secundum magnitudinem et parvitatem, puta quod aliquis est virtuosus, vel amicus, vel benefactor, vel multum vel parum. Et similiter quandoque est differentia secundum bonum et necessarium: puta ministrare virtuoso seu amico videtur esse melius, sed ministrare benefactori videtur esse magis necessarium. Hoc tamen in talibus est manifestum quod non omnia sunt eidem exhibenda; sed quaedam eis, quaedam aliis. 1774. Next [B, 2], at “Certainly it is not,” he solves these questions: first [2, a] by a general answer; second [2, b], at “As a rule a man ought etc.,” by specific answers. He remarks first that it is not easy to decide all these questions with certitude, because their many variations can be considered in all sorts of ways-for instance, the greater or less degree that someone is a good man or friend or benefactor. Likewise, there is a difference sometimes in goodness or necessity. Thus it seems to be better to help a virtuous person or a friend but more necessary to help a benefactor. However, in these matters all the deference is not to be given to the same person, but one kind to some and another kind to others.
Deinde cum dicit: et beneficia quidem etc., solvit praemissas quaestiones in speciali. Et primo solvit tertiam dubitationem. Secundo solvit primam, per quam etiam datur intelligi solutio secundae, ibi, quoniam quidem igitur non eadem et cetera. Circa primum tria facit. Primo docet quid sit communiter observandum. Et dicit quod ut in pluribus magis debet homo retribuere benefactori quam dare gratis amico, si utrumque fieri non possit: sicut etiam magis debet reddi mutuum quam gratis dari amico. Eodem enim modo homo tenetur secundum moralem honestatem ad retribuendum beneficia, sicut secundum legalem iustitiam ad mutuum reddendum. 1775. At “As a rule” [2, b] he solves previous questions by specific answers. First [b, i] he solves the third doubt. Then [b, ii], at “It is obvious etc.,” he solves the first doubt, and this is understood to include the solution to the second doubt. He treats the first point under three aspects. First [i, x] he teaches what must be observed generally. He notes that a man should make a return to a benefactor before making a present to a friend, if it is not possible to do both. The reason is that a person is bound in honor to return benefits in the same way he is bound to repay a loan in legal justice.
Secundo ibi: forte autem neque hoc etc., ponit casum in quo fallit hoc quod dicitur. Et dicit quod forte hoc quod dictum est non est semper observandum, puta in casu in quo aliquis potest liberari a latronibus, potest esse dubitatio quid horum trium sit potius faciendum. Quorum primum est, utrum scilicet homo debeat liberare de manu latronum eum qui quandoque ipsum solvit a vinculis, quicumque ille sit. Secundum est, si benefactor non sit captus et petat sibi in aliquo alio satisfieri, an sit ei retribuendum. Tertium est, utrum homo debeat liberare patrem a latronibus: et hoc tertium est prae omnibus magis eligendum. Videtur enim quod homo debeat magis liberare patrem etiam quam seipsum. 1776. Second [i, y], at “Perhaps this course etc.” he offers a case where this statement does not hold. He says that what has been affirmed is not always to be observed, for instance, in the event that someone can be freed from robbers. It can be uncertain which of three choices should be made. First, ought a man to liberate from robbers a person—whoever he may be—who ransomed him from prison at one time? Or, second. ought a man repay this benefactor who has not been captured but asks a return in some other form? Or, third, ought a man to ransom his father from robbers? The third choice must be made in preference to the others, because it seems that a man is bound to ransom his father even before himself.
Tertio ibi: quod igitur dictum est etc., ostendit qualiter sit observandum quod prius dictum est. Et primo ostendit propositum. Secundo infert quoddam corollarium ex dictis, ibi, quod quidem igitur et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod illud quod dictum est, scilicet quod debitum sit reddendum magis quam gratis dandum, est universaliter observandum. Sed si gratuita donatio excedat in bono virtutis, puta si sit alicui multum virtuoso ministrandum, vel si excedat in necessario, puta cum imminet alicui liberare patrem, debet magis ad hoc declinare. Quandoque enim contingit quod non potest aequiparari hoc quod aliquis retribuit beneficiis praeexistentibus alicui gratuitae dationi: puta cum ex una parte aliquis beneficium confert ei quem scit esse virtuosum, ex alia parte fit retributio ei quem aliquis aestimat malum esse. 1777. Third [i, z], at “It is then etc.,” he shows how we must observe what was said previously. First [z, aa] he explains his intention. Next [z, bb], at “As we have indicated etc.,” he deduces a corollary from the discussion. He remarks first that his preceding directive, that we must pay a debt rather than give presents, is to be generally observed. But if a gratuitous gift has a special goodness (say a very Virtuous an needs assistance) or urgency (for example, someone is in a position to ransom his father) it ought to be given preference. For the return, which a person makes for previous benefits, sometimes cannot be equalized by a gratuitous gift; for example, when on the one hand the benefit is bestowed on a man known to be virtuous, and on the other a return is made to him who is considered to be wicked.
Nec est mirum, si benefactori quandoque non est retribuendum, quia neque etiam accommodanti quandoque debet homo reaccommodare; contingit enim quandoque quod aliquis malus accommodet alicui virtuoso, aestimans se acquirere aliquod lucrum ex eo. Virtuosus autem non sperat lucrum si mutuet malo; si igitur secundum veritatem ita se habet quod ille sit malus, manifestum est quod non est aequalis dignitas quod retribuatur ei et quod detur bono. Si autem non ita se habet quod benefactor sit malus, sed ita existimat ille qui recepit beneficium, non videtur inconveniens facere, si magis det gratis studioso. 1778. Nor is it surprising that a benefactor must not be repaid sometimes, for a person is not always bound to accommodate someone who has accommodated him. Sometimes a bad man does a favor for a good man, thinking to make a profit out of it. But the good man does not expect gain from a loan to a bad man. If then the man is really bad, obviously there is no equality between what should be returned to him and to the virtuous person. If, however, the benefactor is not really bad but the recipient thinks so, it does not seem unreasonable to make a gift to the good man instead.
Deinde cum dicit: quod quidem igitur etc., infert quoddam corollarium ex dictis. Patet enim ex his quae nunc dicta sunt, verum esse id quod multotiens dictum est, scilicet quod rationes quae sunt circa actiones et passiones humanas non possunt habere aliquid determinatum secundum certitudinem, sicut nec ea circa quae sunt. 1779. Then [z, bb], at “As we have indicated,” he deduces a corollary from the discussion. Obvious from our present study (1774-1778) is the truth we have affirmed many times that discussions about human actions and passions cannot settle anything with certitude; likewise they cannot settle the matters treated by human actions and passions.
Deinde cum dicit: quoniam quidem igitur etc., solvit primam dubitationem. Et primo ostendit quod non omnia sunt patri exhibenda. Secundo determinat quae quibus exhibenda sint, ibi: videbitur autem utique et cetera. Dicit ergo primo non esse immanifestum quod non sunt eadem omnibus reddenda. Unde nec patri sunt reddenda omnia, sicut nec apud gentiles omnia sacrificantur Iovi, sed quaedam aliis diis. Quia ergo alia debentur parentibus et fratribus et amicis et benefactoribus singulis eorum sunt attribuenda ea quae sunt eis propria et quae ad eos pertinent. Et eadem ratio est de virtuosis. 1780. Next [b, ii], at “It is obvious,” he solves the first doubt. First [ii, x] he explains that not all honors are to be shown to a father. Second [ii, y], at “It seems that etc.,” he decides what honors are to be given to certain persons. He notes first that evidently not the same honors are to be paid everyone. Hence all homage is not to be offered to a father, just as all sacrifices among the pagans were not offered to Jove but some were given to the other gods. Different obligations are due to parents, brothers, friends, benefactors; hence those which are proper and belong to each group are to be attributed to them. Likewise, the same notion is applicable to virtuous persons.
Et hoc etiam homines observare videntur: quia ad nuptias, secundum quas fit propagatio generis, vocant homines cognatos, quibus est commune genus. Et similiter ad actiones quae sunt circa nuptias vocantur consanguinei. Et propter eamdem rationem aestimant homines quod consanguinei debeant occurrere in kedea, id est in conventione in qua tractatur de nuptiis agendis. 1781. In fact, people seem to act in this way; they send wedding invitations to all those who belong to the family, since, as a result of weddings, the family is increased. They also invite their kindred to activities connected with weddings. For the same reason men think that relatives should meet in kedea or council to discuss matrimonial matches.
Deinde cum dicit: videbitur autem etc., ostendit quae quibus sint attribuenda. Et primo manifestat propositum. Secundo ostendit in quibus hoc sit facile et in quibus difficile: ibi: eorum quidem igitur et cetera. Dicit ergo, quod in his quae pertinent ad sustentationem quae est per nutrimentum, videtur quod filii maxime debeant sufficientiam praebere parentibus. Sunt enim in hoc debitores eis, sicut causis essendi per generationem. Unde et circa haec quae pertinent ad conservationem ipsius esse, magis debent subvenire parentibus quam sibiipsis. Similiter etiam parentibus debent homines honorem tamquam causis essendi, sicut et diis. 1782. At “It seems that” [ii, y] he shows what honors are to be given to certain persons. First [y, aa] he explains his intention. Then [y, bb], at “Judgment in these matters etc.,” he shows in what cases judgment is easy and in which difficult. He says that in the matter of food, it seems that children ought to provide enough for their parents before all others. They are indebted in this way to their parents as the authors of their existence by generation. Consequently, in matters belonging to the conduct of life itself, they should aid their parents rather than themselves. Likewise, men owe honor to their parents, the authors of their existence, as to the gods.
Non tamen omnem honorem debent homines parentibus: quia neque eumdem honorem debent patri et matri, neque iterum patri debet homo honorem qui debetur sapienti vel qui debetur duci exercitus. Sed patri debet homo honorem paternum et matri maternum. Similiter etiam et cuilibet seni debetur honor propter aetatem in assurgendo et inclinando eis et in huiusmodi. Amicis autem et fratribus debet homo fiduciam et communicationem omnium. Et similiter consanguineis et his qui sunt unius tribus, et concivibus et reliquis huiusmodi semper tentandum est attribuere id quod est proprium unicuique, et adaptare singulis ea quae eis competunt secundum proprietatem, puta aetatis et virtutem, puta sapientiae, et usum officii, sicut duci exercitus. 1783. However, man is not bound to render every honor to his parents, since he neither owes the same honor to father and mother, nor does he owe his father the honor due a philosopher or a general. But a son ought to give his father the honor proper to a father, and to his mother the honor that belongs to a mother. Similarly, one should show honor to an elderly citizen on account of his age by rising and bowing to him and so on. Besides he ought to trust and share what he has with friends and brothers, and also with kinsmen, fellow tribesmen, fellow citizens and others of this standing. A person must always try to allot to everyone what is appropriate and to accord each his due in conformity with the dignity of age or virtue like wisdom, and with the exercise of an office like military commander.
Deinde cum dicit: eorum quidem igitur etc., ostendit in quibus hoc sit facile et difficile. Et dicit quod iudicium de talibus est facile in his quae sunt unius generis, puta quod magis est subveniendum magis consanguineo inter duos consanguineos, vel magis sapienti inter duos sapientes. Sed difficilius est iudicare de differentibus: puta utrum magis sit subveniendum sapientiori, vel magis consanguineo. Et quamvis hoc sit difficile determinare, non tamen oportet recedere ab huiusmodi consideratione; sed determinare id quod dictum est, sicut fieri potest. 1784. Then [y, bb], he shows where this is easy and where difficult. He remarks that judgment in such matters is easy when people belong to one class. For example, of two relatives we must help rather the closer; of two wise men, the wiser. But it is more difficult to make judgment if people are of different classes, for instance, whether we ought to help a wiser person in preference to a near relative. Although this matter is hard to decide, nevertheless we should not shirk its consideration but settle the problem as best we can.

Minor Doubts on the Dissolution of Friendship
Chapter 3
      A.  He examines the dissolution of friendship for those who have changed.
            1.   HE PROPOSES THE DOUBT. — 1785
ἔχει δ' ἀπορίαν καὶ περὶ τοῦ διαλύεσθαι τὰς φιλίας ἢ μὴ πρὸς τοὺς μὴ διαμένοντας. A question comes up—should or should not friendship be dissolved when people no longer remain the same?
                   a.   In what manner these friendships are destroyed. — 1786
ἢ πρὸς μὲν τοὺς διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον ἢ τὸ ἡδὺ φίλους ὄντας, ὅταν μηκέτι ταῦτ' ἔχωσιν, οὐδὲν ἄτοπον διαλύεσθαι; ἐκείνων γὰρ ἦσαν φίλοι· ὧν ἀπολιπόντων εὔλογον τὸ μὴ φιλεῖν. It is not surprising that friendship is broken off between people who are friends for utility or pleasure when these advantages no longer exist. Since the friendship was based on utility and pleasure that have ceased, it is reasonable for the friendship to cease.
                   b.   How just complaints may arise in them. — 1787-1788
ἐγκαλέσειε δ' ἄν τις, εἰ διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον ἢ τὸ ἡδὺ ἀγαπῶν προσεποιεῖτο διὰ τὸ ἦθος. ὃ γὰρ ἐν ἀρχῇ εἴπομεν, πλεῖσται διαφοραὶ γίνονται τοῖς φίλοις, ὅταν μὴ ὁμοίως οἴωνται καὶ ὦσι φίλοι. ὅταν μὲν οὖν διαψευσθῇ τις καὶ ὑπολάβῃ φιλεῖσθαι διὰ τὸ ἦθος, μηδὲν τοιοῦτον ἐκείνου πράττοντος, ἑαυτὸν αἰτιῷτ' ἄν· ὅταν δ' ὑπὸ τῆς ἐκείνου προσποιήσεως ἀπατηθῇ, δίκαιον ἐγκαλεῖν τῷ ἀπατήσαντι, καὶ μᾶλλον ἢ τοῖς τὸ νόμισμα κιβδηλεύουσιν, ὅσῳ περὶ τιμιώτερον ἡ κακουργία. But someone will justly complain of a friend who loves for gain or pleasure but pretends to love for virtue. As we remarked in the beginning,’ many differences arise when people are not friends in the way they think they are. If then a person deceives himself in thinking he is being loved for virtue—the other doing nothing of the sort—he has only himself to blame. But if he is deceived by the pretense of the other he can blame the deceiver even more justly than he could blame counterfeiters, because the wrongdoing is against a more precious good.
                   a.   This friendship should be broken off between those who do not remain virtuous.
                         i.    He repeats the question. — 1789
ἐὰν δ' ἀποδέχηται ὡς ἀγαθόν, γένηται δὲ μοχθηρὸς καὶ δοκῇ, ἆρ' ἔτι φιλητέον; If, however, a person is accepted as good but later becomes bad, and this is apparent, should he still be loved?
                         ii.   He answers the question again. — 1790
ἢ οὐ δυνατόν, εἴπερ μὴ πᾶν φιλητὸν ἀλλὰ τἀγαθόν; οὔτε δὲ φιλητὸν τὸ πονηρὸν οὔτε δεῖ· φιλοπόνηρον γὰρ οὐ χρὴ εἶναι, οὐδ' ὁμοιοῦσθαι φαύλῳ· εἴρηται δ' ὅτι τὸ ὅμοιον τῷ ὁμοίῳ φίλον. It is quite impossible, for not everything should be loved but only good. Neither is it reasonable to be a lover of evil nor to become like an evil man; and we have indicated that like makes friends with like.”
                   b.   How (this friendship) is to be broken off.
                         i.    He asks the question. — 1791
ἆρ' οὖν εὐθὺς διαλυτέον; ἢ οὐ πᾶσιν, ἀλλὰ τοῖς ἀνιάτοις κατὰ τὴν μοχθηρίαν; Should the friendship then be broken off immediately?
                         ii.   He answers (it). — 1792
ἐπανόρθωσιν δ' ἔχουσι μᾶλλον βοηθητέον εἰς τὸ ἦθος ἢ τὴν οὐσίαν, ὅσῳ βέλτιον καὶ τῆς φιλίας οἰκειότερον. δόξειε δ' ἂν ὁ διαλυόμενος οὐδὲν ἄτοπον ποιεῖν· οὐ γὰρ τῷ τοιούτῳ φίλος ἦν· ἀλλοιωθέντα οὖν ἀδυνατῶν ἀνασῶσαι ἀφίσταται. Not always, but only when friends are confirmed in evil. If they will accept guidance, we are even more bound to help them morally than we should be to assist them financially; for this is more noble and more proper to friendship. But when a man breaks off such a friendship he does nothing unreasonable; he was not a friend to such a person and consequently withdraws from the friendship of one who has changed and cannot be regenerated.
      B.  He examines the dissolution of friendship for those who remain in the same status.
            1.   HE RAISES THE QUESTION. — 1793
εἰ δ' ὃ μὲν διαμένοι ὃ δ' ἐπιεικέστερος γίνοιτο καὶ πολὺ διαλλάττοι τῇ ἀρετῇ, ἆρα χρηστέον φίλῳ; If, however, one friend remains the same but the other becomes better so that a greater difference in virtue exists between them, should the more advanced cultivate the other?
            2.   HE SOLVES (IT). — 1794
ἢ οὐκ ἐνδέχεται; ἐν μεγάλῃ δὲ διαστάσει μάλιστα δῆλον γίνεται, οἷον ἐν ταῖς παιδικαῖς φιλίαις· εἰ γὰρ ὃ μὲν διαμένοι τὴν διάνοιαν παῖς ὃ δ' ἀνὴρ εἴη οἷος κράτιστος, πῶς ἂν εἶεν φίλοι μήτ' ἀρεσκόμενοι τοῖς αὐτοῖς μήτε χαίροντες καὶ λυπούμενοι; οὐδὲ γὰρ περὶ ἀλλήλους ταῦθ' ὑπάρξει αὐτοῖς, ἄνευ δὲ τούτων οὐκ ἦν φίλους εἶναι· συμβιοῦν γὰρ οὐχ οἷόν τε. εἴρηται δὲ περὶ τούτων. No. He cannot. This becomes evident especially among friends of the remote past, for instance, in friendships begun in childhood. For, if one remains a child mentally and the other becomes very talented, they will have no way of being friends since they do not find satisfaction or delight or pain in the same things; they do not even share them with one another. And without this sharing, friendship is impossible. But we have already treated these questions.
      A.  He asks the question. — 1795
ἆρ' οὖν οὐθὲν ἀλλοιότερον πρὸς αὐτὸν ἑκτέον ἢ εἰ μὴ ἐγεγόνει φίλος μηδέποτε; Is a person then to behave toward him no differently than if he had not been a friend?
      B.  He answers (it). — 1796
ἢ δεῖ μνείαν ἔχειν τῆς γενομένης συνηθείας, καὶ καθάπερ φίλοις μᾶλλον ἢ ὀθνείοις οἰόμεθα δεῖν χαρίζεσθαι, οὕτω καὶ τοῖς γενομένοις ἀπονεμητέον τι διὰ τὴν προγενομένην φιλίαν, ὅταν μὴ δι' ὑπερβολὴν μοχθηρίας διάλυσις γένηται. He should remember the former intimacy; and as we think a man ought to act more kindly toward friends than strangers, so he should make some concessions to former friends by reason of past friendship, provided that the separation was not due to extreme wickedness.
Habet autem dubitationem et cetera. Postquam philosophus determinavit de his quae pertinent ad conservationem amicitiae, hic determinat ea quae spectant ad eius dissolutionem. Et circa hoc duo facit. Primo inquirit quando debeat dissolvi amicitia. Secundo ostendit qualiter homo se debeat habere ad amicum post amicitiae dissolutionem, ibi: utrum igitur nihil alienius et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo inquirit de dissolutione amicitiae ad eos qui mutantur a pristina conditione. Secundo de dissolutione amicitiae ad eos qui in eodem statu permanent, ibi, si autem hic quidem permaneat et cetera. Circa primum tria facit. Primo proponit dubitationem. Secundo ponit solutionem quantum ad amicitiam utilis et delectabilis, ibi: vel ad eos quidem etc.; tertio quantum ad amicitiam quae est propter virtutem, ibi, si autem acceptet et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod dubitatio est, utrum debeat dissolvi amicitia vel non debeat ad eos qui non permanent in eadem conditione secundum quam amici erant. 1785. After the Philosopher has investigated the questions pertaining to the preservation of friendship, he now treats the questions dealing with its dissolution. He discusses this point under two headings. First [I] he inquires when a friendship should be dissolved. Then [II], at “Is a person then etc,” he shows how a person should behave towards a friend after the dissolution of friendship. He treats the first point from two aspects. First [I, A] he examines the dissolution of friendship for those who have changed from their former status. Next [I, B], at “if, however, one etc.,” he examines the dissolution of friendship for those who remain in the same status. He handles the first point in a threefold manner. First [A, 1] he proposes the doubt. Second [A, 2], at “It is not surprising etc.,” he offers a solution for friendship based on utility and pleasure; and third [A, 3], at “If, however, a person etc.,” for friendship based on virtue. He says first that a question comes up—should or should not friendship be dissolved for those who do not remain in the same state in which they were friends?
Deinde cum dicit vel ad eos quidem etc., solvit dubitationem quantum ad amicitiam utilis vel delectabilis. Et primo ostendit qualiter huiusmodi amicitiae dissolvantur. Secundo ostendit quomodo circa eas fiant iustae accusationes, ibi, accusabit autem et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod non est inconveniens, si dissolvatur amicitia ad eos qui sunt amici propter utile vel propter delectabile cessante utilitate vel delectatione; quia secundum has amicitias homines amant delectationem et utilitatem, non personas hominum propter seipsas. Unde, deficiente utilitate vel delectatione, rationabile est quod desinat amicitia. 1786. Then [A, 2], at “It is not surprising,” he solves the doubt so far as it concerns useful or pleasurable friendship. First [2, a] he shows in what manner these friendships are destroyed. Next [2, b], at “But someone will etc.,” he explains how just complaints may irise in them. He observes first that it is not surprising for friendship to be broken up between people who are friends for utility or pleasure when the advantages no longer exist. The reason is that in these friendships men love pleasure and utility, and not the persons for themselves. Hence, when utility or pleasure ceases it is understandable that friendship should cease.
Deinde cum dicit: accusabit autem etc., ostendit quomodo circa huiusmodi amicitias oriantur iuste accusationes. Et dicit quod iuste aliquis accusabit illum qui cum amet propter utilitatem vel delectationem, simulat se amare propter moralem virtutem. Ut enim in principio huius tractatus dictum est, plures sunt differentiae amicitiae. Unde potest contingere quod non similiter, idest secundum unam amicitiae speciem, aliqui sunt amici et existimantur esse, puta si sunt amici propter utilitatem et existimantur esse propter virtutem. Et in hoc casu, si ille qui se existimat amari propter virtutem decipiatur ex seipso, ita quod ille qui eum amat nihil operetur ad huiusmodi deceptionem, ille qui deceptus est debet causari contra se ipsum. 1787. At “But someone will” [2, b] he shows how complaints may justly arise in these friendships. He remarks that someone will fairly complain of a friend who loves for gain or pleasure but pretends to love for virtue. We stated in the beginning of this treatise that there are several varieties of friendship. Hence it is possible that some are not friends in the way they think they are, i.e., according to the same kind of friendship. For instance, if they are friends for utility and think they are friends for the sake of virtue. In this case, if a man believes he is loved for virtue and deceives himself—the one who loves him contributing nothing to the deception—he ought to blame himself.
Sed quando decipitur per alterius simulationem, iustum est quod accuset decipientem, multo magis quam eos qui corrumpunt numismata, in quantum malignitas illius qui simulat virtutem consistit in operatione quae est circa rem honorabiliorem. Multo enim honorabilior virtus quam pecunia: unde qui falso simulant virtutem, maligniores sunt his qui fingunt falsam monetam. 1788. But when a person is deceived by the pretense of the other, he can accuse the deceiver even more justly than he could counterfeiters, for the malice of a person pretending virtue consists in an act against a more precious good. Certainly virtue is more precious than money. So people counterfeiting virtue are more wicked than those who forge money.
Deinde cum dicit: si autem acceptet etc., solvit praedictam quaestionem quantum ad amicitiam quae est secundum virtutem. Et primo ostendit quod ad eos qui non permanent in virtute est amicitia dissolvenda. Secundo quomodo sit dissolvenda, ibi, utrum igitur et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo iterat quaestionem. Si enim aliquis acceptet ad suam amicitiam quasi bonum et postea fiat malus, ita quod eius malitia videatur manifeste, quaestio est: utrum debeat postmodum amari. 1789. Next [A, 3], at “If, however, a person,” he answers the question as it concerns friendship based on virtue. First [3, a] he shows that this friendship should be broken off between those who do not remain virtuous; then [3, b], at “Should the friendship etc.,” how it is to be broken off. He treats the first point from two aspects. First [a, i] he repeats the question. if we should admit a person to our friendship as a good man and he later becomes so bad that his wickedness is obvious: should we still love him?
Secundo ibi: vel non possibile etc., solvit hanc quaestionem. Et dicit duo, quorum unum est: quod non est possibile quod ille cuius malitia manifestatur, ametur a virtuoso, quia virtuoso non potest esse amabile quodcumque, sed solum bonum honestum. Secundum est, quod non oportet eum qui iam factus est malus amari; idest non est utile neque decens, quia non oportet quod homo amet malum neque assimiletur pravo viro. Et hoc sequeretur si conservaretur amicitia ad eum qui est malus. Dictum est enim supra, quod simile simili est amicum: et ita non potest esse quod diu conservetur amicitia ad malum nisi sit aliqua similitudo malitiae. 1790. Then [a, ii], at “It is quite,” he answers the question again making two comments. One, it is impossible for the evildoer, whose wickedness is evident, to be loved by a virtuous man who cannot love everything but only the honorable good. Second, it is unreasonable to love a man who has become evil; it is neither useful nor fitting, since a person should not love evil nor become like a perverse man. This might follow if friendship were preserved with an evil man. We have indicated ( 1654) that like makes friends with like; thus it is impossible to maintain friendship with an evil person without becoming somewhat like him in evil.
Deinde cum dicit: utrum igitur etc., ostendit qualiter sit talis amicitia dissolvenda. Et primo proponit quaestionem: utrum scilicet homo statim debeat dissolvere amicitiam ad eum qui factus est malus. 1791. At “Should the friendship” [3, b] he shows how this friendship should be broken off. First [b, i] he asks the question: should a person immediately dissolve a friendship with a man who has become bad?
Secundo ibi: vel non omnibus etc., solvit quaestionem. Et dicit quod hoc non est faciendum in omnibus, ut statim amicitia dissolvatur; sed solum in illis qui propter magnitudinem malitiae sunt insanabiles, id est non possunt de facili reduci ad statum virtutis. Si autem aliqui sunt qui suscipiant directionem, ut scilicet possint reduci ad statum rectitudinis, magis est eis auxilium ferendum ad recuperandum bonos mores quam ad recuperandum substantiam amissam, inquantum virtus melior est et magis propria amicitiae quam pecunia. Cum autem dissolvit aliquis amicitiam ad eum qui factus est malus non videtur aliquid inconveniens facere: quia non erat amicus huic vel tali, idest vitioso, sed virtuoso. Et ideo, ex quo alteratur a prima dispositione, amicus qui non potest eum reducere ad salutem, convenienter recedit ab eius amicitia. 1792, Second [b, ii], at “Not always,” he answers the question, replying that we should not immediately break off this friendship with all persons but only with those who are incurable owing to their excessive wickedness (i.e., cannot be returned readily to the path of virtue). But if some would accept guidance so they could come back to a virtuous status, they ought to be given more assistance to regain good morals than lost possessions; for virtue is more noble and more proper to friendship than money. And when someone breaks off friendship with one who has become bad he does not seem to do anything unreasonable, because he was not a friend to a vicious but a virtuous person. Consequently, a friend reasonably withdraws from the friendship with a man who his changed from his previous condition and cannot he regenerated.
Deinde cum dicit: si autem hic quidem etc., agit de dissolutione amicitiae (ad eos qui in eodem statu permanent). Et primo movet quaestionem. Si enim unus amicorum permaneat in pristino statu; alius autem fiat magis virtuosus, ita quod fiat magna differentia virtutis inter utrumque; quaestio est utrum ille qui profecit in virtute debeat uti ut amico illo qui non profecit. 1793. Next [I, B], at “If, however, one,” he treats the dissolution of friendship. First [ B, 1] he raises the question. One friend may remain in his former condition but the other becomes more virtuous; and thus a great difference in virtue may exist between the two. Hence the question arises whether the person who has advanced in virtue ought to treat as a friend the other who has made no advance.
Secundo ibi: vel non contingit etc., solvit quaestionem. Et dicit quod hoc non est possibile, ut scilicet proficiens conservet amicitiam ad non proficientem. Et hoc maxime apparet in magna distantia amicorum: puta in amicitiis quae fiunt ex pueritia. Si enim unus permanet puer secundum mentem, alius autem fiat optimus vir, non poterunt remanere amici, cum non complaceant sibi in eisdem, neque etiam de eisdem gaudeant et tristentur. Et sine hoc non potest amicitia conservari, ad quam maxime requiritur quod amici convivant. Non possunt autem sibiinvicem convivere, nisi eadem eis placeant et de eisdem gaudeant et tristentur. Et de his dictum est supra. 1794. Second [B, 2], at “No. He cannot,” he solves the question, observing that it is impossible for the one who is advancing in virtue to continue friendship with him who is standing still. This is especially apparent among friends of the remote past, e.g., in friendships begun in childhood. For, if one remains a child mentally while the other becomes very talented they cannot go on being friends, since they do not have the same tastes, nor are they delighted and pained by the same things. And without this it is impossible to preserve friendship which requires most of all that friends live together. But they cannot live with one another unless they are pleased, delighted, and distressed by the same objects. These questions have been discussed already (1607-1623).
Deinde cum dicit: utrum igitur nihil etc., inquirit qualiter aliquis se debeat habere ad amicum post amicitiae dissolutionem. Et primo movet quaestionem, utrum scilicet post dissolutionem amicitiae nihil alienius vel familiarius se debeat homo habere ad amicum, quam si nunquam de praeterito fuisset amicus. 1795. Then [II], at “Is A person then,” he investigates how someone ought to behave towards a friend after the dissolution of the friendship. First [II, A] he asks the question whether, after severing the friendship, a person should no longer behave on rather friendly terms, just as if he had not been a friend in the past.
Secundo ibi: si autem memoriam etc., solvit quaestionem. Et dicit, quod, quia oportet habere memoriam praeteritae consuetudinis, sicut existimamus, quod magis debeat homo aliquid exhibere amicis quam extraneis, ita etiam et his qui in praeterito fuerunt amici debet homo se magis exhibere propter praeteritam amicitiam, nisi in uno casu, scilicet quando propter abundantem malitiam facta est dissolutio amicitiae; tunc enim nihil familiarius homo debet exhibere ei ad quem dissolvit amicitiam. 1796. Next [II, B], at “He should he answers the question in this way” man should remember a former intimacy, as we think he should act more kindly towards friends than strangers. So too because of a past friendship a man ought to act more kindly towards persons who were once his friends, except in the one case where separation from the friend was due to his excessive wickedness. For then a man should show no marks of friendliness to another whose friendship he has terminated.

The Acts or Effects of Friendship
Chapter 4
      A.  He lists the effects of friendship.
τὰ φιλικὰ δὲ τὰ πρὸς τοὺς πέλας, καὶ οἷς αἱ φιλίαι ὁρίζονται, ἔοικεν ἐκ τῶν πρὸς ἑαυτὸν ἐληλυθέναι. Kindly acts done for friends, and the determining factors in friendship, seem to be derived from a man’s attitude towards himself.
                   a.   One consists in the voluntary offering of benefits. — 1798
τιθέασι γὰρ φίλον τὸν βουλόμενον καὶ πράττοντα τἀγαθὰ ἢ τὰ φαινόμενα ἐκείνου ἕνεκα, A friend is defined: (a) as one who wills and does what is good (or apparently good) for the sake of his friend.
                   b.   The second... is proper to good will — 1799
ἢ τὸν βουλόμενον εἶναι καὶ ζῆν τὸν φίλον αὐτοῦ χάριν· ὅπερ αἱ μητέρες πρὸς τὰ τέκνα πεπόνθασι, καὶ τῶν φίλων οἱ προσκεκρουκότες. (b) Likewise as one who wills that his friend exist and live for the friend’s sake—mothers feel this toward their children, and former friends toward one another after a quarrel.
                   c.   The third... is proper to concord. — 1800-1801
οἳ δὲ τὸν συνδιάγοντα καὶ ταὐτὰ αἱρούμενον, ἢ τὸν συναλγοῦντα καὶ συγχαίροντα τῷ φίλῳ· μάλιστα δὲ καὶ τοῦτο περὶ τὰς μητέρας συμβαίνει. τούτων δέ τινι καὶ τὴν φιλίαν ὁρίζονται. (c) As one who lives with another and (d) has the same tastes, or (e) shares the same sorrows and joys with his friend. (This, too, happens especially with mothers.) Now friendship will be defined by some one of these characteristics.
      B.  He shows how good men are disposed towards (the effects of friendship).
                   a.   He proposes his intention. — 1802
πρὸς ἑαυτὸν δὲ τούτων ἕκαστον τῷ ἐπιεικεῖ ὑπάρχει τοῖς δὲ λοιποῖς, ᾗ τοιοῦτοι ὑπολαμβάνουσιν εἶναι· Each of these is the standard of the virtuous man in relation to himself, and of other men in relation to themselves inasmuch as they consider themselves virtuous.
                   b.   He gives his reason for his previous remark. — 1803
ἔοικε δέ, καθάπερ εἴρηται, μέτρον ἑκάστων ἡ ἀρετὴ καὶ ὁ σπουδαῖος εἶναι· As we have pointed out, virtue and the virtuous man seem to be a standard for everyone.
                   c.   He clarifies his principal proposition.
                         i.    The virtuous man himself suitably has what is proper to beneficence. — 1804-1805
οὗτος γὰρ ὁμογνωμονεῖ ἑαυτῷ, καὶ τῶν αὐτῶν ὀρέγεται κατὰ πᾶσαν τὴν ψυχήν· καὶ βούλεται δὴ ἑαυτῷ τἀγαθὰ καὶ τὰ φαινόμενα καὶ πράττει τοῦ γὰρ ἀγαθοῦ τἀγαθὸν διαπονεῖν καὶ ἑαυτοῦ ἕνεκα τοῦ γὰρ διανοητικοῦ χάριν, ὅπερ ἕκαστος εἶναι δοκεῖ· For he is consistent with himself, always desiring the same things with his whole soul; he wishes for himself both genuine and apparent goods, and produces them. Indeed it is the mark of a good man to take pains to achieve the good, and he does this for himself, i.e., for the sake of the intellectual part which seems to be a man’s real self.
                         ii.   What is proper to goodwill. — 1806-1807
καὶ ζῆν δὲ βούλεται ἑαυτὸν καὶ σώζεσθαι, καὶ μάλιστα τοῦτο ᾧ φρονεῖ. ἀγαθὸν γὰρ τῷ σπουδαίῳ τὸ εἶναι, ἕκαστος δ' ἑαυτῷ βούλεται τἀγαθά, γενόμενος δ' ἄλλος αἱρεῖται οὐδεὶς πάντ' ἔχειν [ἐκεῖνο τὸ γενόμενον] ἔχει γὰρ καὶ νῦν ὁ θεὸς τἀγαθόν ἀλλ' ὢν ὅ τι ποτ' ἐστίν· δόξειε δ' ἂν τὸ νοοῦν ἕκαστος εἶναι ἢ μάλιστα. Likewise, he desires his own life and preservation and especially that of his thinking faculty. For existence is a good to a virtuous man and everyone wishes what is good for him. No one would choose to have everything which exists at the price of becoming someone else. (God even now possesses the good, but he always is what he is at any time.) And it seems that the thinking part of man is the man himself or at least the most important part.
                         iii. What is proper to concord.
                               x.   IN REGARD TO COMPANIONSHIP. — 1808
συνδιάγειν τε ὁ τοιοῦτος ἑαυτῷ βούλεται· ἡδέως γὰρ αὐτὸ ποιεῖ· τῶν τε γὰρ πεπραγμένων ἐπιτερπεῖς αἱ μνῆμαι, καὶ τῶν μελλόντων ἐλπίδες ἀγαθαί, αἱ τοιαῦται δ' ἡδεῖαι. καὶ θεωρημάτων δ' εὐπορεῖ τῇ διανοίᾳ. Such a man wishes to converse with himself. He does this with pleasure, for memory of past triumphs is sweet, and hope for the future is encouraging. Besides, his mind is filled with topics for contemplation.
                               y.   THE VIRTUOUS MAN IS AT PEACE WITH HIS OWN PASSIONS. — 1809-1810
συναλγεῖ τε καὶ συνήδεται μάλισθ' ἑαυτῷ· πάντοτε γάρ ἐστι τὸ αὐτὸ λυπηρόν τε καὶ ἡδύ, καὶ οὐκ ἄλλοτ' ἄλλο· ἀμεταμέλητος γὰρ ὡς εἰπεῖν. τῷ δὴ πρὸς αὑτὸν ἕκαστα τούτων ὑπάρχειν τῷ ἐπιεικεῖ, He keenly feels his own sorrows and joys, for the same thing is painful or pleasant to his whole being, and not one thing to one part and another to another. To tell the truth, he has few regrets. Therefore, each of these characteristics is attributable to the virtuous man himself.
πρὸς δὲ τὸν φίλον ἔχειν ὥσπερ πρὸς αὑτόν ἔστι γὰρ ὁ φίλος ἄλλος αὐτός, καὶ ἡ φιλία τούτων εἶναί τι δοκεῖ, καὶ φίλοι οἷς ταῦθ' ὑπάρχει. However, he feels toward his friend as toward himself, for a friend is an other self. Consequently, friendship seems to consist in any of these characteristics, and people who have them are friends.
            3.   HE RAISES A QUESTION. — 1812
πρὸς αὑτὸν δὲ πότερον ἔστιν ἢ οὐκ ἔστι φιλία, ἀφείσθω ἐπὶ τοῦ παρόντος· δόξειε δ' ἂν ταύτῃ εἶναι φιλία, ᾗ ἐστὶ δύο ἢ πλείω, ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων, καὶ ὅτι ἡ ὑπερβολὴ τῆς φιλίας τῇ πρὸς αὑτὸν ὁμοιοῦται. But whether a person has friendship for himself is a question that must be dismissed for the present. Friendship seems to exist inasmuch as there are two or more having the characteristics mentioned; and if the b friendship excels it is similar to the love of a man for himself.
      C.  He shows how bad men are disposed towards (the effects of friendship).
                   a.   He proposes his intention. — 1813
φαίνεται δὲ τὰ εἰρημένα καὶ τοῖς πολλοῖς ὑπάρχειν, καίπερ οὖσι φαύλοις. ἆρ' οὖν ᾗ τ' ἀρέσκουσιν ἑαυτοῖς καὶ ὑπολαμβάνουσιν ἐπιεικεῖς εἶναι, ταύτῃ μετέχουσιν αὐτῶν; ἐπεὶ τῶν γε κομιδῇ φαύλων καὶ ἀνοσιουργῶν οὐδενὶ ταῦθ' ὑπάρχει, ἀλλ' οὐδὲ φαίνεται. σχεδὸν δὲ οὐδὲ τοῖς φαύλοις· The attributes discussed seem to belong to the greater part of mankind who, though wicked, apparently have a share of them insofar as they are satisfied with themselves and think themselves virtuous. But none of the thoroughly perverse or wicked either actually have these attributes or appear to have them; even the lesser evildoers hardly have them.
                   b.   He explains his proposition.
                         i.    Bad men are not suitable to have the work belonging to beneficence. — 1814
διαφέρονται γὰρ ἑαυτοῖς, καὶ ἑτέρων μὲν ἐπιθυμοῦσιν ἄλλα δὲ βούλονται, οἷον οἱ ἀκρατεῖς· αἱροῦνται γὰρ ἀντὶ τῶν δοκούντων ἑαυτοῖς ἀγαθῶν εἶναι τὰ ἡδέα βλαβερὰ ὄντα· οἳ δ' αὖ διὰ δειλίαν καὶ ἀργίαν ἀφίστανται τοῦ πράττειν ἃ οἴονται ἑαυτοῖς βέλτιστα εἶναι. They differ, though, from one another in desiring one pleasure and wishing for another; they are like the incontinent who choose harmful pleasures instead of those that they really think are good for them. Again, others from faintheartedness or laziness avoid doing what they are convinced is in their best interests.
                         ii.   Nor that belonging to good will. — 1815
οἷς δὲ πολλὰ καὶ δεινὰ πέπρακται καὶ διὰ τὴν μοχθηρίαν μισοῦνται, καὶ φεύγουσι τὸ ζῆν καὶ ἀναιροῦσιν ἑαυτούς. But those who commit many cruel deeds and are hated for their wickedness seek to avoid living, and take their own life.
                         iii. Nor that belonging to concord.
                               x.   REGARDING COMPANIONSHIP. — 1816
ζητοῦσί τε οἱ μοχθηροὶ μεθ' ὧν συνημερεύσουσιν, ἑαυτοὺς δὲ φεύγουσιν· ἀναμιμνήσκονται γὰρ πολλῶν καὶ δυσχερῶν, καὶ τοιαῦθ' ἕτερα ἐλπίζουσι, καθ' ἑαυτοὺς ὄντες, μεθ' ἑτέρων δ' ὄντες ἐπιλανθάνονται. οὐδέν τε φιλητὸν ἔχοντες οὐδὲν φιλικὸν πάσχουσι πρὸς ἑαυτούς. Wicked people therefore seek association with their own kind; they cannot stand themselves, being mindful of many unpleasant deeds in the past and believing, if alone, they will do the same in the future. But when in the company of others they are disposed to forget. Thus they do not experience friendship for themselves, having nothing in them worth loving.
                               y.   WITH THEIR PASSIONS. — 1817
οὐδὲ δὴ συγχαίρουσιν οὐδὲ συναλγοῦσιν οἱ τοιοῦτοι ἑαυτοῖς· στασιάζει γὰρ αὐτῶν ἡ ψυχή, καὶ τὸ μὲν διὰ μοχθηρίαν ἀλγεῖ ἀπεχόμενόν τινων, τὸ δ' ἥδεται, καὶ τὸ μὲν δεῦρο τὸ δ' ἐκεῖσε ἕλκει ὥσπερ διασπῶντα. People of this sort neither rejoice nor grieve with themselves, for their soul is at the same time delighted and distressed when abstaining from certain pleasures. Thus it is drawn this way and that as if by conflicting forces.
                               z.   HE ELIMINATES A DOUBT. — 1818
εἰ δὲ μὴ οἷόν τε ἅμα λυπεῖσθαι καὶ ἥδεσθαι, ἀλλὰ μετὰ μικρόν γε λυπεῖται ὅτι ἥσθη, καὶ οὐκ ἂν ἐβούλετο ἡδέα ταῦτα γενέσθαι αὑτῷ· μεταμελείας γὰρ οἱ φαῦλοι γέμουσιν. οὐ δὴ φαίνεται ὁ φαῦλος οὐδὲ πρὸς ἑαυτὸν φιλικῶς διακεῖσθαι διὰ τὸ μηδὲν ἔχειν φιλητόν. If it is impossible to grieve and rejoice at the same time, it is still true that a person can regret after a little while that he indulged in pleasures and wish that he had not acquired a taste for them. In fact a bad man is filled with remorse. It seems then that the evil person is not amicably inclined even towards himself, for he has nothing lovable about him.
            2.   HE DEDUCES A COROLLARY. — 1819
εἰ δὴ τὸ οὕτως ἔχειν λίαν ἐστὶν ἄθλιον, φευκτέον τὴν μοχθηρίαν διατεταμένως καὶ πειρατέον ἐπιεικῆ εἶναι· οὕτω γὰρ καὶ πρὸς ἑαυτὸν φιλικῶς ἂν ἔχοι καὶ ἑτέρῳ φίλος γένοιτο. If to be in such a state is wretched, a man ought to shun evil with great ardor and make every effort to be virtuous. In this way he will acquire friendship for himself and will become a friend of another.
Amicabilia autem et cetera. Postquam philosophus determinavit de conservatione et dissolutione amicitiae, hic agit de eius effectibus. Et primo ostendit, qui sunt effectus amicitiae. Secundo determinat de eis, ibi, benevolentia autem et cetera. Circa primum tria facit. Primo ponit, qui sunt amicitiae effectus; secundo ostendit quomodo ad eos se habeant boni, ibi, ad se ipsum autem etc.; tertio quomodo ad praedicta se habeant mali, ibi, videntur autem dicta et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo ponit originem effectuum sive actuum amicitiae. Secundo enumerat huiusmodi effectus vel actus, ibi, ponunt enim amicum et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod amicabilia id est amicitiae opera, quibus aliquis ad amicos utitur, et secundum quae determinantur amicitiae, videntur processisse ex his quae sunt homini ad seipsum. Sic enim videtur esse unus homo alteri amicus, si eadem agit ad amicum quae ageret ad seipsum. 1797. After the Philosopher has defined the preservation and dissolution of friendship, he now treats its effects. First [I] he indicates the effects of friendship. Then [Lect. 5; II], at “Goodwill resembles etc.” (B.1166 b 30), he describes them. He discusses the first point in a threefold manner. First [I, A] he lists the effects of friendship. Second [I, B], at “Each of these etc.,” he shows how good men are disposed towards them; third [I, C], how bad men are disposed towards them, at “The attributes discussed etc.” He treats the first point under two aspects. First [A, 1] he describes the origin of the effects or acts of friendship. Next [A, 2], at “A friend is defined etc.,” he lists these effects or acts. He says first that the kindnesses and friendly acts that are done by a man for a friend and are the determining factors in friendship seem to have their origin in his attitudes towards himself. Thus it seems that one person is a friend of another if he acts the same way for a friend as he might for himself.
Deinde cum dicit: ponunt enim amicum etc., enumerat opera amicitiae. Et ponit tria: quorum primum consistit in voluntaria exhibitione beneficiorum. Et dicit quod homines ponunt illum esse amicum qui vult et operatur ad amicum bona, vel apparentia, gratia ipsius amici. Dicit autem volentem et operantem, quia unum sine altero non sufficit ad amicitiam. Neque enim videtur esse amicabilis beneficientia si unus alteri benefaciat invitus, vel si voluntatem opere explere negligat. Dicit autem bona vel apparentia, quia interdum aliquis ex amicitia exhibet alteri, quae aestimat ei bona, etsi non sint. Dicit autem illius gratia, quia si homo exhiberet voluntarius alicui beneficia, non quasi intendens bonum illius, sed sui ipsius, non videretur esse vere amicus illius, sed sui ipsius, sicut cum aliquis nutrit equum propter commodum suum. 1798. Next [A, 2], at “A friend is defined,” he lists the works of friendship, which are three. One consists in the voluntary offering of benefits [2, a]. He observes that people consider someone a friend who wills and does what is good or apparently good for the sake of his friend. He says “wills and does” because one without the other is not enough for friendship. In fact the good deed does not seem to be friendly if a person unwillingly benefits another or neglects to do his will by action. He says “what is good or apparently good” because now and then someone for friendship gives another presents he thinks good for the other, though they are not. He says “for the sake of his friend” because if a man were voluntarily to give benefits to another not-as it were-intending the other’s good but his own (e.g., when an owner feeds a horse because he derives profit for himself), he does not seem to be a friend of that person but of himself.
Secundum pertinet ad benevolentiam: quod ponit ibi: vel volentem esse et cetera. Et dicit, quod amicus vult suum amicum esse, et vivere gratia ipsius amici et non propter seipsum, ut scilicet quaerat ex eo solum proprium commodum. Et hoc patiuntur matres ad filios, quod scilicet volunt eos esse et vivere; et similiter amici, cum intervenit aliqua amicitiae offensa. Etsi enim non velint propter offensam amicabiliter amicis convivere, saltem volunt eos esse et vivere. 1799. The second work, which he describes at “Likewise as one who wills etc.,” is proper to goodwill [2, b]. He remarks that a friend wills his friend to be and to live for his friend’s sake and not for his own, as would be the case were he to seek only personal gain from him. Mothers feel this way towards their children, i.e., will their existence and life. Friends, too, have a similar feeling toward one another when a misunderstanding occurs in their friendship. Even though they do not want to live together on friendly terms because of the misunderstanding, at least they wish their friends to exist and live.
Tertium pertinet ad concordiam: quod ponit ibi: hi autem et cetera. Quae quidem potest attendi quantum ad tria. Primo quantum ad exteriorem convictum. Secundo quantum ad electionem. Tertio quantum ad passiones, ad quas omnes sequitur gaudium et tristitia. Unde dicit, quod quidam determinant illum esse amicum qui convivit, quantum ad primum, et qui eadem eligit quantum ad secundum, et qui condolet et congaudet quantum ad tertium. Et haec etiam considerantur in matribus respectu filiorum. 1800. The third work is described at “As one who lives etc.,” and is proper to concord [2, c]. This can be considered in reference to three characteristics. The first refers to exterior association; the second to discrimination; the third to the emotional states which always end in joy or sorrow. Hence he observes that people call someone a friend who has close contact with another (the first characteristic), has the same tastes (the second), and shares sorrows and joys (the third). These are also noticed in mothers with respect to their children.
Subdit autem, quasi epilogando, quod per aliquod dictorum determinatur amicitia; aestimant enim homines inter illos esse amicitiam in quibus horum aliquod invenitur. 1801. He adds, by way of summary, so to speak, that friendship is defined by some one of these characteristics; for people think there is friendship in men having any one of these qualities.
Deinde cum dicit: ad se ipsum autem etc., ostendit qualiter circa haec se habeant boni. Et primo ostendit qualiter se habeat circa haec bonus ad se ipsum; secundo quomodo se habeat ad alterum, ibi, ad amicum autem etc.; tertio movet quandam quaestionem, ibi: ad se ipsum autem et cetera. Circa primum tria facit. Primo proponit quod intendit. Secundo assignat rationem cuiusdam quod dixerat, ibi, videtur enim et cetera. Tertio manifestat principale propositum, ibi, iste enim et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod unumquodque praedictorum convenit homini virtuoso respectu suiipsius. Aliis autem, qui non sunt virtuosi, in tantum praedicta conveniunt respectu suiipsorum, inquantum se aestimant virtuosos esse. 1802. Then [I, B], at “Each of these,” he shows how good men are constituted in this matter. First [B, 1] he shows how a virtuous person refers these effects to himself; next [B, 2], at “However, he feels etc.,” how he refers them to someone else. Last [B, 3] at “But whether a person etc.,” he raises a question. He considers the first point under three aspects. First [1, a] he proposes his intention. Second [ 1, b], at “As we have pointed out etc.,” he gives his reason for his previous remark. Third [i, c], at “For he is consistent etc.,” he clarifies his principal proposition. He says first that all these characteristics belong to a virtuous man in relation to himself, and they belong to other men who are not virtuous in relation to themselves at least inasmuch as they think they are virtuous.
Deinde cum dicit videtur enim etc., assignat rationem eius quod secundo dictum est. Ideo enim unusquisque amicabilia patitur ad seipsum, secundum quod aestimat se virtuosum, quia virtus et virtuosus videntur esse mensura unicuique homini. In unoquoque enim genere habetur pro mensura id quod est perfectum in genere illo, inquantum scilicet omnia alia iudicantur vel maiora vel minora, secundum propinquitatem vel remotionem a perfectissimo. Unde, cum virtus sit propria perfectio hominis, et homo virtuosus sit perfectus in specie humana, consequens est, ut ex hoc accipiatur mensura in toto humano genere. 1803. At “As we have pointed out” [1, b] he gives his reason for what is referred to under the second heading. Every man in fact does friendly acts for himself insofar as he considers himself virtuous, since virtue and the good man seem to be a standard for everyone. For what is the perfect being in any order of reality must be considered a measure in that order, because all other things are judged more or less perfect according as they approach or recede from what is most perfect. Consequently, since virtue is the proper perfection of man and the virtuous man is perfect in the human species, this should be taken as the measure in all man’s affairs.
Deinde cum dicit: iste enim etc., manifestat principale propositum. Et primo ostendit, quod virtuoso convenit respectu suiipsius id quod pertinet ad beneficientiam. Secundo id quod pertinet ad benevolentiam, ibi: et vivere autem vult etc.; tertio id quod pertinet ad concordiam, sed et convivere et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod virtuosus maxime vult sibiipsi bona et vera et apparentia. Eadem enim sunt apud ipsum vera et apparentia bona. Vult enim sibi bona virtutis, quae sunt vera hominis bona; nec huiusmodi voluntas in eo est vana, sed huiusmodi bona etiam operatur ad seipsum, quia boni hominis est ut laboret ad perficiendum bonum. 1804. Next [1, c], at “For he is consistent,” he clarifies his principal proposition. First [c, i] he shows that the virtuous man himself suitably has what is proper to beneficence; second [c, ii], what is proper to goodwill, at “Likewise, he desires etc.”; third [c, iii], what is proper to concord, at “Such a man etc.” He says first that the virtuous man desires for himself both genuine and apparent goods, for these latter are identical with genuine goods for him; the reason is that he wishes the goods of virtue, the real good of man. Nor is this desire ineffective in him, but he produces these goods for himself because it is a mark of a good man to labor for the achievement of good.
Dictum est enim in secundo, quod virtus facit habentem bonum, et opus eius etiam reddit bonum. Et hoc etiam vult et operatur gratia suiipsius, idest gratia intellectivae partis quae est principalis in homine. Unumquodque autem videtur id maxime esse, quod est principale in eo, virtuosus autem semper ad hoc tendit ut operetur id quod est conveniens rationi. Et sic patet, quod semper vult sibi bonum secundum seipsum. 1805. We said in the second book that virtue makes its possessor good and his work good (222, 307, 309)And the virtuous person wants this and acts for himself, i.e., for the sake of the intellectual element which is foremost in man. Indeed everything seems to be especially what is foremost in it. But the virtuous man strives always to do what is reasonable. It is evident then that he always wishes for himself the absolute good.
Deinde cum dicit: et vivere autem etc., ostendit, quomodo virtuoso respectu suiipsius conveniat id quod pertinet ad benevolentiam. Et dicit, quod virtuosus maxime vult vivere seipsum, et conservari in esse, et praecipue quantum ad illam animae partem, cui inest sapientia. Si enim homo est virtuosus, oportet quod velit id quod est sibi bonum, quia unusquisque vult sibiipsi bona. Bonum autem est virtuoso suum esse, quod scilicet sit virtuosus. 1806. Then [c, ii], at “Likewise, he desires,” he shows that the virtuous man himself suitably has what belongs to goodwill. The Philosopher remarks that the virtuous man especially wishes himself life and conservation in being chiefly for that part of the soul where wisdom resides. If a man is virtuous he must want what is good for him because everyone desires good things for himself. But the good of a virtuous man is that he be virtuous.
Si autem contingeret, quod aliquis homo fieret alius, puta si secundum fabulas homo transformaretur in lapidem vel asinum, nullus curaret an illud in quod transformaretur haberet omnia bona et ideo unusquisque vult se esse inquantum conservatur id quod ipse est. Id autem, quod maxime conservatur idem in suo esse, est Deus; qui quidem non vult sibi aliquod bonum, quod nunc non habeat, sed nunc habet in se perfectum bonum. Et ipse semper est quod aliquando est, quia est immutabilis. Deo autem maxime sumus similes secundum intellectum, qui est incorruptibilis et immutabilis. Et ideo esse uniuscuiusque hominis maxime consideratur secundum intellectum. Unde virtuosus, qui totus vivit secundum intellectum et rationem, maxime vult seipsum esse et vivere. Vult enim se esse et vivere secundum id quod in eo permanet. Qui autem vult se esse et vivere principaliter secundum corpus, quod transmutationi subiacet, non vere se vult esse et vivere. 1807. However, if a man were to become something else—e.g., if he were transformed into a stone or an ass as the fables relate—he would not trouble himself about whether he had all good things in his transformed state. For that reason everyone wishes himself to exist so that his identity is preserved. But the being that remains identical in his existence is God; he does not wish himself some good he does not now possess but possesses perfect good in himself. He always is what he is at any time, since he is unchangeable. Now we are like God most of all by our intellect which is incorruptible and unchangeable, Therefore every man’s existence is thought of in terms of his intellect. Hence, a virtuous ho lives entirely according to his intellect and reason especially wishes himself to exist and to live. He also wishes himself to exist and live according to what is permanent in him. On the other hand a person who wishes himself to exist and live chiefly in terms of his body, which is subject to change, does not really wish to be and to live.
Deinde cum dicit: sed et convivere etc., ostendit, quomodo virtuoso competat respectu suiipsius id quod pertinet ad concordiam. Et primo quantum ad convictum. Et dicit, quod virtuosus maxime vult convivere sibiipsi, scilicet revertendo ad cor suum, et secum meditando. Hoc enim facit delectabiliter: uno quidem modo quantum ad memoriam praeteritorum, quia memoria bonorum, quae operatus est, est sibi delectabilis. Secundo quantum ad spem futurorum. Habet enim spem bene operandi in futuro, quae est sibi delectabilis. Tertio quantum ad cognitionem praesentium. Abundat enim secundum mentem theorematibus, idest considerationibus veris et utilibus. 1808. At “Such a man etc.” [c, iii] he shows how a virtuous man appropriately has in himself what is proper to concord. First [iii, x] in regard to companionship; he remarks that the virtuous man wishes most of all to converse with himself by turning to his soul and meditating alone. He does this with pleasure: first regarding the memory of past events since the recollection of former triumphs is sweet to him; second regarding hope for the future, for he anticipates success and this is pleasant to him; third regarding present knowledge, for his mind is filled with reflections, i.e., true and useful deliberations.
Secundo ibi, condoletque etc., ostendit, quod virtuosus habet concordiam ad seipsum secundum passiones. Et dicit, quod ipse maxime condolet et condelectatur sibiipsi, quia toti sibi, idest quantum ad partem sensitivam et intellectivam, est idem triste et delectabile, et non aliud alii; quia videlicet pars sensitiva in eo adeo est rationi subiecta, quod sequitur motum rationis, vel saltem non vehementer renititur: non enim ducitur a passionibus sensitivae partis, ut postea passione cessante poeniteat de eo quod iam fecit contra rationem. Sed quia semper secundum rationem agit, non de facili poenitet, et ita maxime consentit sibiipsi. 1809. Second [iii, y], at “He keenly etc.” Aristotle shows that the virtuous man is at peace with his own passions. He keenly feels his own sorrows and joys since the same thing is painful or pleasant to his whole being (i.e., both the sensitive and intellectual part) and not one thing to one part and another to another. The reason is that his sensitive power is subject to reason to such an extent that it obeys reason’s prompting, or at least does not resist; for the virtuous man is not led by the passions of the sensitive part so that when passion subsides he must repent of having acted against reason. But he always acts according to reason and does not readily have regrets. Thus he is at peace with himself.
Ultimo autem epilogando concludit, quod praedicta conveniunt virtuoso respectu suiipsius. 1810. He concludes by way of epilogue that the characteristics discussed are appropriate to a virtuous man in relation to himself.
Deinde cum dicit ad amicum autem etc., ostendit, quomodo praedicta conveniant virtuoso respectu amici. Et dicit, quod virtuosus se habet ad amicum sicut ad seipsum, quia amicus secundum affectum amici est quasi alius ipse, quia scilicet homo afficitur ad amicum sicut ad seipsum. Videtur igitur, quod amicitia in aliquo praedictorum consistat, quae homines ad seipsos patiuntur; et quod illi vere sint amici quibus praedicta existunt. 1811. Next [B, 2], at “However, he feels,” he shows how a virtuous man should adapt these characteristics to his friend. Aristotle notes that a virtuous man is disposed to his friend as to himself because a friend is—so to speak—another self by affection, that is, a person feels for a friend what he feels for himself. Consequently, it seems that friendship consists in any of these characteristics that people experience toward themselves; and that those are real friends who have these characteristics.
Deinde cum dicit: ad se ipsum autem etc., movet quamdam dubitationem; utrum scilicet sit amicitia hominis ad seipsum. Et dicit quod ista quaestio relinquenda est in praesenti, quia magis pertinet ad nomen quam ad rei veritatem. Amicitia enim videtur esse inter quoscumque, secundum quod eis competunt duo vel tria ex praedictis. Et cum ad aliquos superabundanter amicitiam habemus, haec assimilatur dilectioni quam habet homo ad seipsum. Unde, cum aliquis vult commendare amicitiam suam ad alterum consuevit dicere: ego diligo eum sicut meipsum. Unde non refert, quantum ad rei veritatem, utrum nomen amicitiae dicatur respectu suiipsius, ex quo ipsa res amicitiae superabundanter competit homini ad seipsum. 1812. Then [ B, 3], at “But whether a person,” he raises a question—does a man have friendship toward himself? He observes that this question must be postponed since it is a semantic problem rather than a real one. Friendship seems to exist among any persons who possess two or three of the characteristics mentioned. And when the friendship for others excels, it is similar to the love a man has for himself. Consequently, someone wishing to prove his friendship for another is accustomed to say “I love you as myself.” Hence it doesn’t really make any difference whether the word friendship is applied to self, because the reality of friendship abundantly belongs to a man in regard to himself.
Deinde cum dicit: videntur autem etc., ostendit qualiter mali se habeant ad praedicta amicitiae opera. Et primo ostendit quod haec non possunt convenire malis. Secundo infert quoddam corollarium ex dictis, ibi, si utique et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo proponit quod intendit. Secundo manifestat propositum, ibi: differunt autem et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod praedicta amicitiae opera videntur multis convenire respectu suiipsorum quamvis sint pravi. Tamen considerandum est quod in tantum participant praedictis amicitiae operibus ad seipsos, inquantum placent sibiipsis et aestimant se esse virtuosos. Sed nulli eorum qui sunt valde pravi et nefarii, neque praedicta conveniunt, neque convivere videntur. Et fere nullis pravis videntur convenire praedicta. Raro enim inveniuntur homines pravi qui aestiment se virtuosos suam malitiam non cognoscentes. 1813. At “The attributes discussed” [I, C] he shows how bad men are disposed toward these works of friendship. First [C, 1] he shows that these works cannot belong to evil men. Second [C, 2], at “If to be in such etc.,” he deduces a corollary from the discussion. He treats the first point from two aspects. First [C, 1, a] he proposes his intention. Then [C, 1, b], at “They differ, though etc.,” he explains his proposition. He says first that these works of friendship seem to belong to many in respect to themselves in spite of the fact that they are evil men. However, we must understand that the more they share in these works of friendship for themselves the more they are satisfied with themselves and think they are virtuous. But those who are completely perverse or wicked neither resort to these works nor seem to live together; and scarcely any evil man finds such behavior agreeable to him. Indeed there are few evil men who think they are virtuous or who are unaware of their wickedness.
Deinde cum dicit: differunt autem etc., manifestat propositum. Et primo ostendit quod pravis non convenit respectu suiipsorum opus amicitiae quod pertinet ad beneficentiam. Secundo, quod neque illud quod pertinet ad benevolentiam, ibi, quibus autem multa etc.; tertio quod nec etiam illud quod pertinet ad concordiam, ibi: quaeruntque mali et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod mali differunt a seipsis, inquantum scilicet alia concupiscunt secundum partem sensitivam et alia volunt secundum rationem; sicut patet de incontinentibus, qui loco eorum quae secundum rationem iudicant esse sibi bona, appetunt delectabilia quae sunt eis nociva. Alii autem propter timiditatem et pigritiam praetermittunt operari ea quae secundum rationem iudicant sibi bona. Et sic dupliciter carent beneficentia ad seipsos: uno modo, inquantum operantur sibi nociva; alio modo, inquantum vitant sibi proficua. 1814. Next [C, 1, b], at “They differ, though,” he explains his proposition. First [b, i] he shows that bad men are not suitable to have the work of friendship belonging to beneficence; second, nor that belonging to goodwill, at “But those who etc.” [b, ii]; third, nor that belonging to concord, at “Wicked people, therefore etc.” [b, iii]. He remarks first that bad men are at odds with themselves because they desire some pleasures agreeing with their sensitive appetite at the same time that they wish others agreeing with their reason. Such is obviously the case with the incontinent who want harmful pleasures instead of those they reasonably judge good. Others from faintheartedness and laziness neglect to do what they know is good. Thus they are doubly lacking in beneficence towards themselves: in one way, so far as they do what is harmful; in the other, so far as they shun what is beneficial.
Deinde cum dicit: quibus autem etc., ostendit quod eis non convenit ad seipsos opus quod competit ad benevolentiam. Et dicit quod illi a quibus facta sunt multa et gravia mala, ita quod propter seipsos ab hominibus odiuntur, non volunt se esse et vivere; sed est eorum vita eis taediosa, cognoscentes se omnibus esse graves, et ita fugiunt vivere in tantum quod quandoque interimunt seipsos. 1815. Then [b, ii], at “But those who,” he shows that they are not suitable to have the work that belongs to goodwill. He observes that criminals who have perpetrated many frightful deeds-so that their very personalities are hated by men-do not want to exist or live. But life becomes a burden for them because they know that they are offensive. And they actually so flee from life that they sometimes do away with themselves.
Deinde cum dicit: quaeruntque mali etc., ostendit quod non conveniat malis opus pertinens ad concordiam. Et primo quantum ad convictum. Non enim possunt mali sibiipsis convivere revertendo ad cor suum, sed quaerunt alios cum quibus commorentur, colloquendo et cooperando eis secundum exteriora verba et facta. Et hoc ideo, quia statim secum cogitando de seipsis recordantur multa et gravia mala quae in praeterito commiserunt, et praesumunt se similia facturos in futurum, quod est eis dolorosum. Sed quando sunt cum aliis hominibus, diffundendo se ad exteriora, obliviscuntur suorum malorum. Et sic, cum nihil in seipsis habeant quod sit dignum amari nil amicabile patiuntur ad seipsos. 1816. At “Wicked people, therefore” [b, iii] he shows that evil men are not suitable to have the work that belongs to concord. First lb, iii, x] regarding companionship. Evil men cannot converse with themselves by turning to their soul but they seek to associate with others by speaking and co-operating with them in external words and works. They act in this way because when thinking alone about themselves they remember many distressing evils they committed in the past and they are convinced they will do the same in the future-this is painful to them. But when they are in company they forget their wrongdoings in the distraction of external activities. So, since they have nothing in themselves worth loving, they feel no love for themselves.
Secundo ibi: neque gaudent etc., manifestat quod non habent secum concordiam quantum ad passiones. Et dicit quod tales neque congaudent neque condolent sibiipsis. Anima enim eorum est in quadam contentione contra seipsam, inquantum scilicet pars sensitiva repugnat rationi; et ex una parte dolet si recedat a delectabilibus propter malitiam in eo dominantem, quae causat huiusmodi tristitiam in parte sensitiva: ex alia autem parte delectatur secundum rationem quae iudicat mala esse vitanda: et sic una pars animae trahit hominem malum ad unam partem, alia autem pars trahit eum ad partem contrariam, ac si anima eius in diversas partes discerperetur et contra seipsam discreparet. 1817. Second [b, iii, y], at “People of this sort,” be explains that they can not find internal peace with their passions. He observes that people of this sort are not conscious of their own joys and sorrows. In fact their soul struggles against itself, for the sensitive part resists the reason. On the one hand it grieves, when withdrawing from pleasures, because of evil that dominates it and causes distress in the sensitive part; and on the other hand it rejoices according to reason that judges evil pleasures are to be avoided. In this way one part of the soul draws an evil man one way, but the other part draws him the opposite way; just as if his soul were rent into conflicting drives and fought with itself.
Tertio ibi: si autem non possibile etc., removet quandam dubitationem. Posset enim aliquis dicere non esse possibile quod homo pravus simul de eodem doleat et delectetur: et hoc quidem verum est quantum ad sensum utriusque, quamvis causa utriusque simul inesse possit secundum diversas animae partes. Dicit ergo quod si non sit possibile quod homo pravus simul perfecte tristetur et delectetur, tamen parum post delectationem tristatur de hoc ipso quod delectatus est, et vellet quod huiusmodi delectabilia non recepisset. Homines enim pravi replentur poenitentia, quia videlicet impetu malitiae vel passionis cessante, quo mala faciunt, secundum rationem cognoscunt se mala egisse, et dolent. Et sic patet quod pravi non disponuntur amicabiliter ad seipsos, propter hoc quod non habent in seipsis aliquid amicitia dignum. 1818. Third [b, iii, z], at it is impossible’ he eliminates a doubt. Someone might contend that it is impossible for an evil person to grieve and rejoice at the same time about the same matter; and it is true so far as the two experiences are concerned, although each can be caused at the same time in different parts of the soul. He maintains then that if a wicked man cannot be pained and pleased at the same time, nevertheless shortly after the gratification he is saddened that he was delighted a moment ago, and wishes he had not indulged in such pleasures. Indeed evil men are filled with remorse because, after the impulse of evil or passion that caused the wickedness subsides, their reason tells them they did wrong and they are remorseful. It is obvious then that evil men are not inclined to friendship for themselves, for they have nothing in them worthy of friendship.
Deinde cum dicit: si utique sic habere etc., concludit ex praemissis, quod si valde miserum est sic se habere absque amicitia ad seipsum, intense, idest vehementi studio fugere debemus malitiam et conari ad hoc quod simus virtuosi. Per hunc enim modum se habebit aliquis amicabiliter ad seipsum, et fiet etiam aliis amicus. 18 19. At “If to be in such” [ C, 2 ] he concludes from the premises that, if it is so extremely wretched to live without friendship for oneself, we ought to shun evil with increased ardor, and make every effort to become virtuous. For in this way a person will have friendship for himself and be capable of becoming a friend to others.

Chapter 5
      A.  Concerning goodwill which consists in an interior affection for a person.
                   a.   In its habitual character.
                         i.    He states his intention. — 1820
ἡ δ' εὔνοια φιλικῷ μὲν ἔοικεν, οὐ μὴν ἔστι γε φιλία· Goodwill resembles but is not really friendship.
                         ii.   He proves his statement. — 1821
γίνεται γὰρ εὔνοια καὶ πρὸς ἀγνῶτας καὶ λανθάνουσα, φιλία δ' οὔ. καὶ πρότερον δὲ ταῦτ' εἴρηται. ἀλλ' οὐδὲ φίλησίς ἐστιν. For goodwill may be felt towards people who are unknown to us or who are unaware of it, but not friendship—questions we have discussed already.
                   b.   Nor is it love in terms of passion (for two reasons).
                         i.    First. — 1822
οὐ γὰρ ἔχει διάτασιν οὐδ' ὄρεξιν, τῇ φιλήσει δὲ ταῦτ' ἀκολουθεῖ· Nor is it love, for it does not include intensity or desire; and these effects follow love.
                         ii.   Second.
                               a.   He proves (it). — 1823
καὶ ἡ μὲν φίλησις μετὰ συνηθείας, ἡ δ' εὔνοια καὶ ἐκ προσπαίου, οἷον καὶ περὶ τοὺς ἀγωνιστὰς συμβαίνει· εὖνοι γὰρ αὐτοῖς γίνονται καὶ συνθέλουσιν, συμπράξαιεν δ' ἂν οὐδέν· ὅπερ γὰρ εἴπομεν, προσπαίως εὖνοι γίνονται καὶ ἐπιπολαίως στέργουσιν. Moreover, love is accompanied by familiarity while goodwill may arise suddenly, as it does toward athletes in contests; spectators become well disposed and sympathetic to the contestants but will take no active part, for they feel goodwill suddenly and love only superficially.
                   a.   He proves it. — 1824-1825
ἔοικε δὴ ἀρχὴ φιλίας εἶναι, ὥσπερ τοῦ ἐρᾶν ἡ διὰ τῆς ὄψεως ἡδονή· μὴ γὰρ προησθεὶς τῇ ἰδέᾳ οὐδεὶς ἐρᾷ, ὁ δὲ χαίρων τῷ εἴδει οὐδὲν μᾶλλον ἐρᾷ, ἀλλ' ὅταν καὶ ἀπόντα ποθῇ καὶ τῆς παρουσίας ἐπιθυμῇ· οὕτω δὴ καὶ φίλους οὐχ οἷόν τ' εἶναι μὴ εὔνους γενομένους, οἱ δ' εὖνοι οὐδὲν μᾶλλον φιλοῦσιν· βούλονται γὰρ μόνον τἀγαθὰ οἷς εἰσὶν εὖνοι, συμπράξαιεν δ' ἂν οὐδέν, οὐδ' ὀχληθεῖεν ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν. διὸ μεταφέρων φαίη τις ἂν αὐτὴν ἀργὴν εἶναι φιλίαν, χρονιζομένην δὲ καὶ εἰς συνήθειαν ἀφικνουμένην γίνεσθαι φιλίαν, Goodwill certainly seems to be the beginning of friendship, as pleasure derived from seeing is the beginning of love. For no one loves who has not been first delighted by what he has seen. However, a man who delights in the form of another does not therefore love him; but there is love if he desires the beloved when he is absent and longs for his presence. In a similar way people cannot become friends unless they first have goodwill. But they are not therefore friends, since the benevolent only wish good to others but are neither active in their behalf nor distressed by their misfortunes. Therefore, by extension of meaning, goodwill can be called an ineffective friendship, though it does develop into friendship from continual and habitual goodwill.
                   b.   Which friendship has goodwill as its beginning.
                         i.    Which... does not have.
                               x.   HE STATES HIS INTENTION. — 1826
οὐ τὴν διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον οὐδὲ τὴν διὰ τὸ ἡδύ· But it is not friendship based on utility nor that based on pleasure.
                               y.   HE PROVES HIS STATEMENT. — 1827-1828
οὐδὲ γὰρ εὔνοια ἐπὶ τούτοις γίνεται. ὁ μὲν γὰρ εὐεργετηθεὶς ἀνθ' ὧν πέπονθεν ἀπονέμει τὴν εὔνοιαν, τὰ δίκαια δρῶν· ὁ δὲ βουλόμενός τιν' εὐπραγεῖν, ἐλπίδα ἔχων εὐπορίας δι' ἐκείνου, οὐκ ἔοικ' εὔνους ἐκείνῳ εἶναι, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ἑαυτῷ, καθάπερ οὐδὲ φίλος, εἰ θεραπεύει αὐτὸν διά τινα χρῆσιν. For there is no place for goodwill in these friendships. In that for utility the recipient is merely acting justly when he returns goodwill for benefits received; and the person who wishes another to prosper in the hope of getting rich by means of him does not seem to have goodwill to the other but to himself. Likewise, a man is not a friend who is anxious about someone in order to make some use of him.
                         ii.   Which (friendship) does (have goodwill as its beginning). — 1829
ὅλως δ' εὔνοια δι' ἀρετὴν καὶ ἐπιείκειάν τινα γίνεται, ὅταν τῳ φανῇ καλός τις ἢ ἀνδρεῖος ἤ τι τοιοῦτον, καθάπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀγωνιστῶν εἴπομεν. As a general rule goodwill is created by reason of virtue and equity when a person seems to another to be good or brave or the like in the way competing athletes do, as we have pointed out.
Benivolentia autem et cetera. Postquam philosophus ostendit quae sunt opera amicitiae et quibus conveniant, hic determinat de singulis horum. Praedicta autem amicitiae opera reducuntur ad tria: scilicet beneficentiam, benevolentiam et concordiam, ut dictum est; et ideo de his tribus nunc determinat. Primo quidem de benevolentia, quae consistit in interiori affectu respectu personae. Secundo de concordia, quae etiam in affectu consistit, sed respectu eorum quae sunt personae, ibi, amicabile autem et cetera. Tertio de beneficentia, quae consistit in exteriori effectu, ibi, benefactores autem et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo ostendit quod benevolentia non est amicitia. Secundo ostendit quod est amicitiae principium, ibi, videtur utique et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo ostendit quod benevolentia non est amicitia, quae significatur per modum habitus. Secundo, quod non est amatio, quae significatur per modum passionis, ut in octavo dictum est, ibi, sed neque amatio et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo proponit quod intendit. Et dicit quod benevolentia videtur esse aliquid simile amicitiae, inquantum scilicet oportet omnes amicos esse benevolos. Non tamen est idem quod amicitia. 1820. After the Philosopher has shown what the works of friendship are and who does them, he now treats the works individually [II]. These works of friendship can be reduced to three: beneficence, goodwill, and concord-as we have indicated ( 1789-1801). So he now delineates the three of them. First [II, A], concerning goodwill that consists in an interior affection for a person. Second [Lect. 6; II B], at “Likewise, concord etc.” (B. 1167 a 21), concerning concord which consists also in affection but based on personal considerations. Third [Lect. 7; II, C], at “Benefactors seem etc.” (B.1167 b 16), concerning beneficence that consists in exterior proof of friendship. He considers two aspects of the first point. First [A, 1] he shows that goodwill is not friendship; then [A, 2], at “Goodwill certainly etc.,” that it is the beginning of friendship. He discusses the first point in a twofold manner. First [i, a] he shows that goodwill is not friendship in its habitual character; next [i, b], at Nor is it etc.,” nor is it love in terms here of passion, as noted in the eighth book (1602). He treats the first point under two headings. First [a, i] he states his intention, observing that goodwill seems to resemble friendship inasmuch as all friends must be of goodwill.
Secundo ibi: fit enim etc., probat propositum per duo media. Quorum primum est, quod benevolentia potest fieri ad homines ignotos, quorum scilicet experientiam aliquis non accepit cum eis familiariter conversando. Sed hoc non potest esse in amicitia. Secundum medium est, quod benevolentia potest esse latens eum ad quem benevolentiam habemus; quod de amicitia dici non potest; et haec supra in principio octavi dicta sunt. 1821. Second [a, ii], at “For goodwill may be,” he proves his statement by two arguments. The first is that goodwill can be felt for strangers whose acquaintance one does not have from familiar association. But this is impossible in friendship. The second argument is that goodwill can be unknown to the person who has our goodwill—this cannot be said of friendship. These questions were discussed in the beginning of the eighth book (1560).
Deinde cum dicit: sed neque amatio etc., ostendit quod benevolentia non sit amatio, duplici ratione. Quarum prima est, quod benevolentia non habet distensionem animi, neque appetitum, idest passionem in appetitu sensitivo, quae animum suo impetu distendit quasi cum quadam violentia ad aliquid movens. Quod quidem accidit in passione amationis; non autem in benevolentia, quae consistit in simplici motu voluntatis. 1822. Then [1, b], at “Nor is it love,” he shows that goodwill is not love for two reasons. The first [1, b, i] is that goodwill does not include intensity of soul or desire, i.e., passion of the sensitive appetite which by its impulse extends the soul with a kind of violence towards an enticing object. This occurs in the passions of love but not in goodwill, which consists in a simple movement of the will.
Secundam rationem ponit ibi, et amatio quidem et cetera. Et dicit quod amatio fit cum consuetudine. Importat enim amatio, ut dictum est, quemdam vehementem impetum animi. Non autem consuevit animus statim vehementer ad aliquid moveri; sed paulatim ad maius perducitur. Et ideo per quamdam consuetudinem amatio crescit: sed quia benevolentia importat simplicem motum voluntatis, potest repente fieri, sicut accidit hominibus videntibus pugnas agonistarum. Fiunt enim benevoli ad alterum pugnantium; et placeret aspicientibus quod hic vel ille vinceret; tamen nullam operam ad hoc darent, quia ut dictum est, homines fiunt repente benivoli et diligunt superficialiter idest secundum solum et debilem motum voluntatis, non prorumpentem in opus. 1823. He assigns the second reason at “Moreover, love” [1, b, ii]. He remarks that love is accompanied by familiarity, for it indicates a vehement impulse of the soul, as was just stated. But the soul is not accustomed to be moved instantly and with vehemence towards an object, but is led gradually to what is greater. Therefore, love increases by means of familiarity. But, since goodwill implies a simple movement of the will, it can arise suddenly, for instance, when people watch athletic contests. The spectators become kindly disposed to one of the two contestants and would be pleased if this particular athlete won. However, they would do nothing to bring this about, because men are instantly benevolent and love superficially, i.e., according to a mere feeble movement of the will that does not break forth into action.
Deinde cum dicit: videtur utique etc., ostendit, quod benevolentia sit principium amicitiae. Et circa hoc duo facit. Primo ostendit benevolentiam esse amicitiae principium. Secundo ostendit cuius amicitiae principium sit, ibi: non eam quae propter utile et cetera. Dicit ergo primo quod benivolentia videtur esse principium amicitiae, sicut delectari in aspectu alicuius mulieris, est principium amationis eius. Nullus enim incipit amare aliquam mulierem nisi prius fuerit delectatus in eius pulcritudine, nec tamen statim tunc cum gaudet in aspectu formae mulieris amat eam; sed hoc est signum amationis completae, quando si sit absens desiderat eam, quasi graviter ferens eius absentiam, et praesentiam concupiscens. Et similiter se habet de amicitia et benevolentia. Non enim possibile est aliquos esse amicos, nisi prius facti fuerint benevoli. 1824. Next [A, 2], at “Goodwill certainly,” he shows that goodwill is the beginning of friendship. He handles this point in a twofold manner. First [2, a] he proves that goodwill is the beginning of friendship. Second [2, b], at “But it is not etc.,” he shows which friendship has goodwill as its beginning. He observes that goodwill is called the beginning of friendship, as pleasure at the sight of a woman is the beginning of love for her. For no one begins to love a woman unless he has been first delighted by her beauty. However, when a man is pleased at the sight of a woman’s form he does not immediately love her. But it is sign of complete love that he desires her, as if he feels her absence keenly and longs for her presence when she is absent. The same is true of friendship and goodwill, for it is impossible for people to be friends unless they have goodwill first.
Nec tamen propter hoc, quod sunt benevoli, possunt dici amici: quia ad benevolos pertinet hoc solum, quod velint bona illis quibus sunt benevoli; ita tamen, quod nihil pro eis facerent, neque pro eorum malis turbarentur. Unde potest aliquis translative loquendo dicere, quod benevolentia est quaedam amicitia otiosa, quia scilicet non habet operationem amicabilem adiunctam. Sed quando diu durat homo in benevolentia, et consuescit bene velle alicui, firmatur animus eius ad volendum bonum, ita quod voluntas non erit otiosa, sed efficax; et sic fit amicitia. 1825. Nevertheless, they cannot be called friends from the fact that they have goodwill, because people of goodwill merely wish good to the objects of their benevolence; but not to the extent of doing good deeds for them nor of being distressed by their misfortunes. Consequently, it can be said, changing our way of speaking, that goodwill is a kind of lazy friendship because it is not joined with any friendly activity. But when a person continues a long time in goodwill and becomes used to wishing well to anyone, his soul is strengthened in willing good, so that his will is not idle but active. In this way friendship arises.
Deinde cum dicit: non eam quae propter utile etc., ostendit cuius amicitiae benevolentia sit principium. Et primo ostendit cuius non sit principium. Secundo cuius sit principium, ibi, totaliter autem et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo ponit quod intendit. Et dicit, quod benevolentia per diuturnitatem et consuetudinem non perducitur ad veram speciem amicitiae, quae est propter utile aut delectabile. 1826. At “But it is not” [2, b] he shows which friendship has goodwill as its beginning. First [2, b, i] which friendship does not have goodwill as its beginning; then [2, b, ii], at “As a general rule,” which does. He discusses the first point in a twofold manner. First [i, x] he states his intention. He notes that goodwill is not raised by length of time and habit to the genuine kind of friendship that is based on utility or pleasure.
Secundo ibi: non enim etc., probat propositum. Non enim benevolentia in illam amicitiam transit, in qua benevolentia locum non habet; non autem habet benivolentia locum in praedictis amicitiis. Et hoc quidem manifeste apparet in amicitia delectabilis, in qua uterque amicorum vult sibi ex altero delectationem, quae quandoque est cum malo alterius, et sic tollitur benevolentia. Sed in amicitia utilis potest esse benivolentia quantum ad eum qui iam recepit beneficia; qui si iuste operetur, retribuit saltem benevolentiam pro beneficiis quae recepit. 1827. Second [i, y], at “For there is no place,” he proves his statement. Goodwill does not develop into that friendship which has no room for it. But goodwill has no place in the friendships just mentioned. This is obvious in pleasurable friendship where each friend desires from the other his own enjoyment—a thing that is sometimes accompanied by harm to the other, thus destroying goodwill. However, goodwill is possible in useful friendship, so far as concerns the recipient of benefits; for he returns goodwill at least for the benefits he has received, if he acts justly.
Sed si aliquis de aliquo velit quod bene se habeat et bene operetur propter spem quam habet ut per illum in bonis abundet, non videtur esse benevolus ad illum, per quem sperat se abundare; sed magis ad se ipsum, sicut etiam non videtur esse amicus alicuius qui aliquam curam apponit ad bonum eius propter aliquam sui utilitatem, ut scilicet ad aliquid ipso utatur. 1828. If one wishes another to be healthy and prosperous because he hopes to have an abundance of possessions through the other, he does not seem to have goodwill toward that other, from whom he hopes to become rich, but towards himself. Likewise a person does not seem to be a friend of someone who is anxious about that person’s good for his own advantage, i.e., in order to make some use of him.
Deinde cum dicit: totaliter autem etc., ostendit cuius amicitiae benevolentia sit principium. Et dicit, quod universaliter benevolentia videtur esse ad aliquem propter aliquam eius virtutem et epiichiam, cum scilicet alicui videatur, quod ille ad quem est benevolus sit bonus aut fortis aut aliquid huiusmodi, propter quae homines consueverunt laudari; sicut dictum est de agonistis, quibus efficimur benevoli propter fortitudinem quae apparet in eis, vel propter aliquid huiusmodi. 1829. Then [2, b, ii], at “As a general rule,” he shows which friendship has goodwill as its beginning. Aristotle remarks that in general goodwill seems to exist for a person because of his virtue and equity; it seems to someone that the person, towards whom he is benevolent, is good or brave or the like—qualities which people are accustomed to praise. He notes this reaction we have manifested toward athletes for whom we have goodwill on account of the courage or similar virtue they seem to possess.

Chapter 6
(II) B. He now considers concord.
            a.   The category of concord. — 1830
φιλικὸν δὲ καὶ ἡ ὁμόνοια φαίνεται. διόπερ οὐκ ἔστιν ὁμοδοξία· τοῦτο μὲν γὰρ καὶ ἀγνοοῦσιν ἀλλήλους ὑπάρξειεν ἄν· Likewise, concord seems to belong to friendship, and for this reason it is not identity of opinion that can exist among people unknown to one another.
            b.  Its subject matter.
                   i.    What ... it does not concern. — 1831
οὐδὲ τοὺς περὶ ὁτουοῦν ὁμογνωμονοῦντας ὁμονοεῖν φασίν, οἷον τοὺς περὶ τῶν οὐρανίων οὐ γὰρ φιλικὸν τὸ περὶ τούτων ὁμονοεῖν, Nor do we say that people are in concord who agree on any subject whatsoever, for example, the heavenly bodies. For common agreement on these questions does not pertain to the notion of friendship.
                   ii.   The matters within concord’s competence.
                         x.   IN GENERAL — 1832
ἀλλὰ τὰς πόλεις ὁμονοεῖν φασίν, ὅταν περὶ τῶν συμφερόντων ὁμογνωμονῶσι καὶ ταὐτὰ προαιρῶνται καὶ πράττωσι τὰ κοινῇ δόξαντα. περὶ τὰ πρακτὰ δὴ ὁμονοοῦσιν, But we do say that citizens of a state are in concord when they agree on what is useful and vote for the same measures, and work together to achieve them. Therefore they have concord about things to be done,
                         y.   IN PARTICULAR — 1833-1835
καὶ τούτων περὶ τὰ ἐν μεγέθει καὶ ἐνδεχόμενα ἀμφοῖν ὑπάρχειν ἢ πᾶσιν, οἷον αἱ πόλεις, ὅταν πᾶσι δοκῇ τὰς ἀρχὰς αἱρετὰς εἶναι, ἢ συμμαχεῖν Λακεδαιμονίοις, ἢ ἄρχειν Πιττακὸν ὅτε καὶ αὐτὸς ἤθελεν. ὅταν δ' ἑκάτερος ἑαυτὸν βούληται, ὥσπερ οἱ ἐν ταῖς Φοινίσσαις, στασιάζουσιν· οὐ γάρ ἐστιν ὁμονοεῖν τὸ αὐτὸ ἑκάτερον ἐννοεῖν ὁδήποτε, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ, οἷον ὅταν καὶ ὁ δῆμος καὶ οἱ ἐπιεικεῖς τοὺς ἀρίστους ἄρχειν· οὕτω γὰρ πᾶσι γίνεται οὗ ἐφίενται. which concern important matters capable of achievement by both or all parties. Thus the citizens are in concord when they all think that public officials should be elected, or that they should become allies of the Spartans, or that Pittacus should be their ruler (when he is also willing to rule). But when two rivals want power, like the rivals in the Phoenissae [Euripides, The Phoenician Maidens, 588], they introduce discord. For there is no concord when each of the parties wants something for himself, but only when they want it for the same person, as the common people and the upper classes wish the best men to rule. In this case everyone gets what he strives after.
πολιτικὴ δὴ φιλία φαίνεται ἡ ὁμόνοια, καθάπερ καὶ λέγεται· περὶ τὰ συμφέροντα γάρ ἐστι καὶ τὰ εἰς τὸν βίον ἥκοντα. Concord then seems to be friendship among citizens, as is commonly held. For it deals with affairs that advance their interests and concern their lives.
            a.   It is found among virtuous men. — 1837-1838
ἔστι δ' ἡ τοιαύτη ὁμόνοια ἐν τοῖς ἐπιεικέσιν· οὗτοι γὰρ καὶ ἑαυτοῖς ὁμονοοῦσι καὶ ἀλλήλοις, ἐπὶ τῶν αὐτῶν ὄντες ὡς εἰπεῖν τῶν τοιούτων γὰρ μένει τὰ βουλήματα καὶ οὐ μεταρρεῖ ὥσπερ εὔριπος, βούλονταί τε τὰ δίκαια καὶ τὰ συμφέροντα, τούτων δὲ καὶ κοινῇ ἐφίενται. Now this kind of concord is found among virtuous men, for they are in accord with themselves and with one another, being, so to speak, of one mind. Their wills remain constant and do not ebb and flow, like Euripos. They desire what is just and useful, and work together for these goals.
            b.  (It) is not found among bad men. — 1839
τοὺς δὲ φαύλους οὐχ οἷόν τε ὁμονοεῖν πλὴν ἐπὶ μικρόν, καθάπερ καὶ φίλους εἶναι, πλεονεξίας ἐφιεμένους ἐν τοῖς ὠφελίμοις, ἐν δὲ τοῖς πόνοις καὶ ταῖς λειτουργίαις ἐλλείποντας· ἑαυτῷ δ' ἕκαστος βουλόμενος ταῦτα τὸν πέλας ἐξετάζει καὶ κωλύει· μὴ γὰρ τηρούντων τὸ κοινὸν ἀπόλλυται. συμβαίνει οὖν αὐτοῖς στασιάζειν, ἀλλήλους μὲν ἐπαναγκάζοντας, αὐτοὺς δὲ μὴ βουλομένους τὰ δίκαια ποιεῖν. But it is impossible for vicious men to agree—except in a trifling way—just as it is impossible for them to be friends; for they desire a full share of the advantages but shirk their portion of labor and service. And while each man is intent on gaining these profits he watches his neighbor to prevent him from obtaining them (the public good is destroyed by lack of vigilance!). Consequently, contention arises when they force each other to give way but are unwilling to render justice them selves.
Amicabile autem et cetera. Postquam philosophus determinavit de benevolentia, hic determinat de concordia. Et primo ostendit quid sit concordia; secundo ostendit quibus conveniat, ibi: est autem talis et cetera. Circa primum duo facit: primo ostendit quid sit concordia; secundo quomodo se habeat ad amicitiam politicam, ibi: politica autem amicitia et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo determinat genus concordiae. Secundo materiam ipsius, ibi: neque circa quodcumque et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod concordia videtur ad genus amicitiae pertinere. Dictum est enim supra, quod ad amicos pertinet, quod eadem eligant, in quo consistit ratio concordiae. Et ex hoc patet, quod concordia non est homodoxia, per quod significatur unitas opinionis. Potest enim contingere, quod sint eiusdem opinionis etiam illi qui se invicem non cognoscunt, inter quos tamen non est concordia, sicut nec amicitia. 1830, After the Philosopher has defined goodwill, he now [II, B] considers concord. First [B, 1] he explains its nature; then 113, 21, at “Concord then etc how it is related to friendship among citizens. He discusses the first point under two aspects. First [1, a] he investigates the category of concord; second [1, b], at “Nor do we say etc.,” its subject matter. He says first that concord seems to belong to the category of friendship. We have already pointed out (1800) that friends characteristically make the same choices, and the formal reason of concord consists in this. obviously then concord is not homodoxia, meaning identity of opinion. It can happen that people who do not know one another hold the same opinion, although there is no concord among them, as there is no friendship.
Deinde cum dicit: neque circa quodcumque etc., inquirit materiam concordiae. Et primo ostendit circa quae non sit concordia. Et dicit, quod non dicuntur concordare homines, qui concordant circa quodcumque, sicut illi qui consentiunt sibiipsis in speculativis, puta de his quae pertinent ad corpora caelestia. Consentire enim sibi invicem in his non pertinet ad rationem amicitiae, quia amicitia ex electione est, iudicium autem de rebus speculativis est ex necessitate conclusionis et ideo nihil prohibet aliquos amicos diversa circa huiusmodi sentire, et aliquos inimicos in his sibi consentire. Unde patet concordiam, quae ad rationem amicitiae pertinet, circa talia non esse. 1831. Then [1, b], at “Nor do we say,” he examines the subject matter of concord. First [b, i] he shows what matters it does not concern. He observes that men are not said to be in concord who agree on any subject whatsoever, like people who hold the same opinion about speculative questions, the heavenly bodies for instance. Common agreement on these truths does not pertain to the concept of friendship, because friendship arises from preference; but judgment in speculative problems is not derived from compulsory preference. Consequently, nothing prevents some friends from holding different views and others the same view& on these questions. It is evident then that concord, which pertains to the notion of friendship, does not deal with matters of this kind.
Secundo ibi: sed civitates etc., ostendit circa quae sit concordia. Et primo ostendit in generali, quod est circa operabilia. Et dicit, quod civitates dicuntur concordare sibiinvicem quando consentiunt circa utilia, ita quod eadem eligunt, et communiter operantur ea quae opinantur esse utilia. Et sic patet, quod concordia est circa operabilia. 1832. Second [b, ii], at “But we do,” he shows the matters within concord’s competence. First [ii, x] he explains in general that it is concerned with things to be done. He remarks that citizens of a state are said to have concord among themselves when they agree on what is useful, so that they vote for the same measures and work together on projects they consider for their interests. Thus it is evident that concord deals with things to be done.
Secundo ibi: et horum circa quae etc., ostendit in speciali circa quae operabilia sit concordia. Et ponit duo. Quorum unum est, quod concordia attenditur circa ea quae habent aliquam magnitudinem. Non enim tollitur concordia aliquorum ex hoc quod in aliquibus minimis dissentiunt. Aliud autem est, quod illa, circa quae est concordia, sint talia, quae possint convenire utrique concordantium, vel etiam omnibus, sive hominibus, sive civibus unius civitatis. Si enim aliquis consentiat alicui, quod habeat id quod nullus alius potest habere, non multum pertinet ad concordiam. 1833. Then [ii, y], at “which concern,” he explains in particular with what practicable matters concord is concerned. He indicates two kinds. One, that it refers to affairs having some importance; for people do not disrupt concord because of disagreement over minor points. The other, that matters of concord are of such a nature that they can belong to both agreeing parties, or even to all men or citizens of a state. if someone agrees with another that he may have what no one can possibly have, it is not of much concern to concord.
Et ponit exemplum de civitatibus, in quibus dicitur esse concordia, quando omnibus civibus idem videtur; puta, quod principes assumantur per electionem, non autem sorte vel per successionem, vel cum videtur Atheniensibus, quod ineant societatem cum Lacedaemoniis ad simul pugnandum contra hostes; vel quando omnibus civibus videtur, quod talis homo, puta Putacus, principetur, si tamen et ipse voluerit principari. Tunc enim, qui hoc volunt ei concordant. 1834. He offers as an illustration states that are said to have concord, for example, when all the citizens hold the same opinion, that rulers should be determined by election and not by lot or succession; when the Athenians think they should form a military alliance with the Spartans to fight together against common enemies; when all the citizens agree that a particular man, Pindar, let us say, should be ruler (if however he be willing to rule). At such times people who have these wishes are said to be in concord.
Sed cum quilibet vult seipsum principari, sequitur, quod contendant, sicut de quibusdam recitatur in Formistis, id est in quibusdam poematibus. Non enim consistit concordia in hoc quod uterque velit sibiipsi bonum, quamvis videatur similitudo voluntatis secundum proportionem, quia uterque vult bonum sibi. Quinimo hoc est contentionis causa. Sed oportet, ad hoc quod sit concordia, quod consentiant in eodem secundum numerum: sicut cum in aliqua civitate tam plebs quam virtuosi in hoc concordent, quod optimi principentur. Per hunc enim modum omnibus fit illud quod desiderant, quando in eodem omnes consentiunt. 1835. But when each wishes to rule they begin to quarrel, like the characters in the play Phoenissae. Indeed concord does not consist in the fact that both should wish good for themselves, however much there may seem to be a similarity to an equitable will, since everyone wishes good to himself. On the contrary it is a cause of discord. But in order to have concord, men must agree on the same numerical thing. For example, the common people and the upper classes are in agreement that the best men should rule. In this way, when everyone concurs in the same objective, all get what they are striving for.
Deinde cum dicit: politica autem etc., ostendit qualiter se habeat concordia ad amicitiam politicam. Et dicit, quod amicitia politica, sive sit civium unius civitatis adinvicem, sive sit inter diversas civitates, videtur idem esse quod concordia. Et ita etiam homines dicere consueverunt; scilicet quod civitates, vel cives concordes, habent amicitiam adinvicem. Est enim amicitia politica circa utilia et circa ea quae conveniant ad vitam humanam, circa qualia dicimus esse concordiam. 1836. Next [B, 2], at “Concord then,” he shows how concord is related to friendship among citizens. He notes that political friendship, either between citizens of the same state or between different states, seems to be identical with concord. And people usually speak of it in this way: that states or citizens of one mind have friendship for one another.
Deinde cum dicit: est autem talis etc., ostendit in quibus inveniatur concordia. Et primo ostendit quod invenitur in bonis. Secundo ostendit quod non invenitur in pravis, ibi, pravos autem et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod concordia talis, qualis determinata est, invenitur in his qui sunt virtuosi. Huiusmodi enim homines sic se habent, quod quilibet eorum, et sibiipsi concordat, et etiam concordant adinvicem inquantum immobiliter permanent in eisdem, et electionibus, et operibus; quia sicut supra dictum est, boni sunt quasi impoenitibiles. Sed addit ut est dicere quia non est possibile, quod homines in hac vita omnimodam immutabilitatem habeant. 1837. At “Now this kind” [B, 3] he indicates the possessor of concord. First [3, a] he shows that it is found among virtuous men; then [3, b], at “But it is impossible etc.,” that it is not found among bad men. He observes first that concord of the sort we have defined is found among those who are virtuous. These men behave in such a way that they are in accord with themselves and one another inasmuch as they do not change their mind either regarding choices or works. The reason is that good men seemingly are not given to regrets; we have already noted this (1592). He adds “so to speak” because it is impossible for men to have absolute immutability in this life.
Et ad expositionem dictorum subdit, quod ideo dicuntur in eisdem existentes, quia voluntates talium hominum manent fixae in bono et non transfluunt ex uno in aliud, sicut Euripus, idest quidam locus maritimus in Graecia, in quo aqua fluit et refluit. Et huiusmodi homines virtuosi volunt iusta et utilia, et talia communiter appetunt. 1838. To explain the statement, he subjoins that they are of the same mind because the wills of these men remain fixed in good and do not change from one object to another, like Euripos, a strait along the coast of Greece where the water ebbs and flows. Such virtuous men wish what is just and useful, and they work together for these goals.
Deinde cum dicit: pravos autem etc., ostendit quod in pravis non est concordia. Et dicit quod pravi non possunt concordare, nisi forte parum, sicut et parum possunt esse amici. Ideo autem concordare non possunt, quia volunt superabundanter habere in bonis utilibus, sed volunt deficere, idest minus habere, in laboribus qui communiter imminent sustinendi vel etiam in ministrationibus, idest quibuscumque tributis vel servitiis. Et, dum sibi unusquisque vult haec, scilicet superabundare in bonis et deficere in malis, inquirit de proximo suo et impedit eum ne hoc adipiscatur quod ipse cupit. Et ita dum non servant bonum commune quod est iustitia, destruitur inter eos communitas concordiae. Et sic accidit inter eos contentio, dum unus cogit alium ad hoc quod servet ei id quod est iustum, sed tamen ipse non vult alteri iustitiam facere, sed vult superabundare in bonis et deficere in malis, quod est contra aequalitatem iustitiae. 1839. Then [3, b], at “But it is impossible,” he shows that concord is not found among vicious men. He remarks that bad men cannot agree, except perhaps in a trifling way, any more than they can be friends. Consequently, they cannot be of one mind because they want more than their share of all the advantages but are unwilling to bear the labors-performed by the community and incumbent on them-and administrations, i.e., expenses or services of any kind. And while each one wishes this: to have more of the benefits and less of the burdens, he inquires about his neighbor and prevents him from obtaining what he himself covets. Thus while the common good of justice is not preserved, the common possession of concord among them is destroyed. In this way contention arises when a person forces another to observe justice towards him while he himself is not willing to render justice to the other but wants more advantages and less disadvantages—a condition that is against the equality of justice.

Chapter 7
(II) C. He now considers beneficence.
οἱ δ' εὐεργέται τοὺς εὐεργετηθέντας δοκοῦσι μᾶλλον φιλεῖν ἢ οἱ εὖ παθόντες τοὺς δράσαντας, Benefactors seem to love those they have benefited, more than those who are well treated love their benefactors.
      2.   HE RAISES A QUESTION. — 1841
καὶ ὡς παρὰ λόγον γινόμενον ἐπιζητεῖται. This seems unreasonable and we look for an explanation.
            a.   He gives an apparent reason. — 1842-1843
τοῖς μὲν οὖν πλείστοις φαίνεται ὅτι οἳ μὲν ὀφείλουσι τοῖς δὲ ὀφείλεται· καθάπερ οὖν ἐπὶ τῶν δανείων οἱ μὲν ὀφείλοντες βούλονται μὴ εἶναι οἷς ὀφείλουσιν, οἱ δὲ δανείσαντες καὶ ἐπιμελοῦνται τῆς τῶν ὀφειλόντων σωτηρίας, οὕτω καὶ τοὺς εὐεργετήσαντας βούλεσθαι εἶναι τοὺς παθόντας ὡς κομιουμένους τὰς χάριτας, τοῖς δ' οὐκ εἶναι ἐπιμελὲς τὸ ἀνταποδοῦναι. Ἐπίχαρμος μὲν οὖν τάχ' ἂν φαίη ταῦτα λέγειν αὐτοὺς ἐκ πονηροῦ θεωμένους, ἔοικε δ' ἀνθρωπικῷ· ἀμνήμονες γὰρ οἱ πολλοί, καὶ μᾶλλον εὖ πάσχειν ἢ ποιεῖν ἐφίενται. Many people think the reason is that beneficiaries are debtors while benefactors are creditors. Just as in the case of loans, borrowers wish that the lenders did not exist, but the latter worry about the welfare of their debtors; so the bestowers of benefits wish the recipients to live in order to receive their thanks, but the recipients care little about giving thanks. Epicharmus would perhaps say that people who are of this opinion look at things in a bad light. But it does have the appearance of being very human, for most men are forgetful and more desirous of getting benefits than giving them.
            b.  He gives the real reasons.
                   i.    The first argument.
                         x.   HE PREFERS THIS ARGUMENT TO THAT GIVEN EARLIER. — 1844
δόξειε δ' ἂν φυσικώτερον εἶναι τὸ αἴτιον, καὶ οὐδ' ὅμοιον τὸ περὶ τοὺς δανείσαντας· οὐ γάρ ἐστι φίλησις περὶ ἐκείνους, ἀλλὰ τοῦ σώζεσθαι βούλησις τῆς κομιδῆς ἕνεκα· οἱ δ' εὖ πεποιηκότες φιλοῦσι καὶ ἀγαπῶσι τοὺς πεπονθότας κἂν μηδὲν ὦσι χρήσιμοι μηδ' εἰς ὕστερον γένοιντ' ἄν. But perhaps the reason is more in the nature of things and there is no parallel in the case of lenders. For they do not love their debtors but wish them to be preserved for the sake of gain. On the other hand benefactors love and feel friendship for those who receive their benefactions even when the recipients are of no use now and may never be.
                         y.   HE OFFERS THE FIRST ARGUMENT. — 1845-1847
ὅπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν τεχνιτῶν συμβέβηκεν· πᾶς γὰρ τὸ οἰκεῖον ἔργον ἀγαπᾷ μᾶλλον ἢ ἀγαπηθείη ἂν ὑπὸ τοῦ ἔργου ἐμψύχου γενομένου· μάλιστα δ' ἴσως τοῦτο περὶ τοὺς ποιητὰς συμβαίνει· ὑπεραγαπῶσι γὰρ οὗτοι τὰ οἰκεῖα ποιήματα, στέργοντες ὥσπερ τέκνα. τοιούτῳ δὴ ἔοικε καὶ τὸ τῶν εὐεργετῶν· τὸ γὰρ εὖ πεπονθὸς ἔργον ἐστὶν αὐτῶν· τοῦτο δὴ ἀγαπῶσι μᾶλλον ἢ τὸ ἔργον τὸν ποιήσαντα. τούτου δ' αἴτιον ὅτι τὸ εἶναι πᾶσιν αἱρετὸν καὶ φιλητόν, ἐσμὲν δ' ἐνεργείᾳ τῷ ζῆν γὰρ καὶ πράττειν, ἐνεργείᾳ δὲ ὁ ποιήσας τὸ ἔργον ἔστι πως· στέργει δὴ τὸ ἔργον, διότι καὶ τὸ εἶναι. τοῦτο δὲ φυσικόν· ὃ γάρ ἐστι δυνάμει, τοῦτο ἐνεργείᾳ τὸ ἔργον μηνύει. This happens with craftsmen, for each one loves his product more than he would be loved by it were the product alive. Likewise, it occurs especially with poets who love their own poems doting on them as their children. A similar situation exists with benefactors, for the person benefited is the result of their efforts and they love him more than he loves them. The reason for this is that for all men their existence is a thing to be chosen and cherished. But our existence consists in an actuality, i.e., in living and operating, and the operation is in a way the agent in action. For this reason craftsmen love their products because they love their existence; and this is natural, for the product manifests in actuality what the agent is in potentiality.
                   ii.   He presents his second argument.
                         x.   THE ARGUMENT. — 1848
ἅμα δὲ καὶ τῷ μὲν εὐεργέτῃ καλὸν τὸ κατὰ τὴν πρᾶξιν, ὥστε χαίρειν ἐν ᾧ τοῦτο, τῷ δὲ παθόντι οὐδὲν καλὸν ἐν τῷ δράσαντι, ἀλλ' εἴπερ, συμφέρον· τοῦτο δ' ἧττον ἡδὺ καὶ φιλητόν. Then, too, for the benefactor his action is morally good, therefore he finds joy in its object. But to the recipient there is nothing noble in his relation to the giver. If any good exists, it is utilitarian and has less of pleasure and friendship.
                         y.   HE PROVES IN TWO WAYS WHAT HE HAS SUBJOINED.
                               aa. In general. — 1849
ἡδεῖα δ' ἐστὶ τοῦ μὲν παρόντος ἡ ἐνέργεια, τοῦ δὲ μέλλοντος ἡ ἐλπίς, τοῦ δὲ γεγενημένου ἡ μνήμη· ἥδιστον δὲ τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἐνέργειαν, καὶ φιλητὸν ὁμοίως. However, there is pleasure about the present in activity, about the future in hope, and about the past in memory. But the most delightful of these is activity, and it is more lovable too. For the benefactor then his activity remains since good is enduring; but for the recipient the utility passes away.
                               bb.        He proves the same point again. — 1850-1851
τῷ μὲν οὖν πεποιηκότι μένει τὸ ἔργον τὸ καλὸν γὰρ πολυχρόνιον, τῷ δὲ παθόντι τὸ χρήσιμον παροίχεται. ἥ τε μνήμη τῶν μὲν καλῶν ἡδεῖα, τῶν δὲ χρησίμων οὐ πάνυ ἢ ἧττον· ἡ προσδοκία δ' ἀνάπαλιν ἔχειν ἔοικεν. Likewise, the memory of noble things is pleasant but that of useful things is either not at all or, at best, to a less degree pleasant. On the other hand, the opposite seems to be true with expectation.
                   iii. Third argument. — 1852
καὶ ἡ μὲν φίλησις ποιήσει ἔοικεν, τὸ φιλεῖσθαι δὲ τῷ πάσχειν· τοῖς ὑπερέχουσι δὲ περὶ τὴν πρᾶξιν ἕπεται τὸ φιλεῖν καὶ τὰ φιλικά. Moreover, loving resembles activity, but being loved resembles passivity. Assuredly then those who excel in activity love and have the concomitants of love.
                   iv.  Fourth argument. — 1853-1854
ἔτι δὲ τὰ ἐπιπόνως γενόμενα πάντες μᾶλλον στέργουσιν, οἷον καὶ τὰ χρήματα οἱ κτησάμενοι τῶν παραλαβόντων· δοκεῖ δὲ τὸ μὲν εὖ πάσχειν ἄπονον εἶναι, τὸ δ' εὖ ποιεῖν ἐργῶδες. διὰ ταῦτα δὲ καὶ αἱ μητέρες φιλοτεκνότεραι· ἐπιπονωτέρα γὰρ ἡ γέννησις, καὶ μᾶλλον ἴσασιν ὅτι αὑτῶν. δόξειε δ' ἂν τοῦτο καὶ τοῖς εὐεργέταις οἰκεῖον εἶναι. Besides, people have greater love for things they get as a result of labor. Thus, those who earn wealth value it more than those who inherit it. Now there is nothing burdensome about receiving a benefit but bestowing one involves much labor. For this reason mothers are fonder than fathers of their children; they suffer more pains in giving them birth; and they know better than fathers who their children are. And this, too, seems to be applicable to benefactors.
Benefactores autem et cetera. Postquam philosophus determinavit de benevolentia et concordia, hic determinat de beneficentia. Et primo proponit id quod circa eam accidit. Et dicit quod benefactores magis videntur amare eos quibus benefaciunt, quam illi qui bene patiuntur ab eis ament operantes sibi bona. 1840. After the Philosopher has defined goodwill and concord, he now [II, C] considers beneficence. First [C, 1] he states an incident connected with it, observing that benefactors seem to love those they benefit, more than those who are well treated love their benefactors.
Secundo ibi: et ut praeter rationem etc., movet super hoc quaestionem. Et dicit, quod hoc quod dictum est habet quaestionem, quia videtur praeter rationem contingere. Beneficiati enim ex debito obligantur ad amandum benefactores, sed non e converso. 1841. Second [C, 2], at “This seems,” he raises a question on this point, remarking that the statement is puzzling because it seems contrary to reason. For beneficiaries are bound because of debt to love their benefactors but not conversely.
Tertio ibi: pluribus quidem igitur etc., solvit praedictam quaestionem, assignans rationem praedicti accidentis. Et primo ponit rationem apparentem. Secundo assignat rationes veras, ibi, videbitur autem et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod pluribus videtur ratio praedicti accidentis esse, quia beneficiati debent aliquid benefactoribus: sed benefactoribus aliquid debetur, sicut et mutuantibus. Hoc autem videmus in mutuis accidere, quod illi qui debent vellent non esse illos quibus debent, ad hoc quod essent immunes a debito. Sed accommodantes, quibus debetur, curam gerunt de salute debentium eis, ne perdant id quod eis debetur; ita etiam videtur quod benefactores velint esse et vivere illos qui ab ipsis bene passi sunt ut acquirant ab eis gratiarum actionem. Sed illi qui beneficia receperunt non curant reddere gratias, sed magis vellent absolvi ab hoc debito. Et ideo non multum amant benefactores. 1842. Third [C, 3], at “Many people,” he answers the question, assigning the reason for this phenomenon. First [3, a] he gives an apparent reason; then [3, b], at “But perhaps etc.,” he gives the real reasons. He says many think the reason is that beneficiaries are in debt to their benefactors. But a debt is owed to benefactors as to lenders. Now we see in the case of loans that borrowers wish their lenders did not exist, so as to be free of debt. On the other hand, lenders, who have payments coming, take care of the welfare of their debtors for fear of losing what is owed to them. So too benefactors wish existence and life to those they have benefited for the sake of receiving thanks from them. But beneficiaries are not solicitous about returning thanks but wish to be excused from this duty. For that reason they love their benefactors very little.
Et hanc quidem rationem Eppicarinus, id est quidam philosophus vel poeta, approbans: (hanc rationem) forte dicet quod hanc rationem dicant quidam considerantes malitiam hominum; assimilatur enim humanae consuetudini quae apud plures invenitur. Multi enim sunt immemores beneficiorum et magis appetunt bene recipere ab aliis quam benefacere. 1843. The philosopher-poet Epicharmus in approving this reason might say that people who accept it consider men’s bad qualities; but it seems a common practice. In fact most people forget benefits and want to get more than they give.
Deinde cum dicit: videbitur autem etc., assignat veras rationes quatuor. Circa quarum primam duo facit. Primo praefert hanc rationem ei quam supra posuit. Et dicit quod causa eius quod dictum est naturalior esse videtur ea quae nunc dicetur, quia videlicet sumitur ab ipsa natura beneficii, nec est similis rationi supra assignatae quae sumpta est ex parte accommodantium. Accommodantes enim non amant illos quibus accommodant; sed quod volunt eos conservari in esse non est ex amore, sed propter lucrum. Sed benefactores amant secundum appetitum sensitivum, et diligunt secundum electionem eos qui ab eis bona recipiunt, etiam si in nullo sint eis utiles in praesenti, nec exspectent aliquam utilitatem in futuro. 1844. Then [3, b], at “But perhaps,” he assigns four real arguments. He makes two observations on the first argument [b, i]. First [i, x] he prefers this argument to that given earlier (1842-1843). He says that the reason for the statement just made seems to be the more natural one that is now offered, because it is taken from the nature of a benefit—unlike the reason assigned previously which is taken on the part of the lender. Lenders do not indeed love the people they oblige, but wish them preservation not for love but for profit. Benefactors, however, feel love and real affection for those who receive their benefactions even when the recipients are not at all useful now and without promise of usefulness later.
Secundo ibi: quod et in artificibus etc., ponit primam rationem. Et dicit quod idem accidit de benefactoribus ad beneficiatos, quod accidit in artificibus respectu suorum operum. Omnis enim artifex diligit proprium opus magis quam diligatur ab eo, etiam si esset possibile quod opus illud fieret animatum. Et hoc maxime videtur accidere circa poetas qui superabundanter diligunt propria poemata, sicut parentes amant filios. Poemata enim magis ad rationem pertinent secundum quam homo est homo, quam alia mechanica opera. Et huic assimilatur hoc quod accidit circa benefactores diligentes eos quibus benefaciunt. Quia ille qui bene patitur ab aliquo est quasi opus eius. Et ideo magis diligunt benefactores opus suum, scilicet beneficiatos, quam e converso. 1845. Next [i, y], at “This happens,” he offers the first argument, observing that benefactors feel toward their beneficiaries the same way as artists feel towards their creations. Every craftsman loves his own product more than he would be loved by it were the product living by any chance. Apparently this is especially true of poets doting on their poems as parents on their children. Indeed, poems partake of reason—by which man is man to a greater degree than other mechanical works. There is a similarity here to what occurs when benefactors love those they have benefited; for a person who is well treated by another is in a way his product. For this reason benefactors love their product, i.e., the beneficiaries, more than the reverse.
Positis autem exemplis subiungit omnium rationem. Et dicit quod causa praedictorum est, quia omnibus hominibus est eligibile et amabile suum esse. Unumquodque enim in quantum est bonum est, bonum autem est eligibile et amabile. Esse autem nostrum consistit in quodam actu. Esse enim nostrum est vivere, et per consequens operari. Non est enim vita absque vitae operatione quacumque. Unde unicuique est amabile operari opera vitae. Faciens autem in actu est quodammodo ipsum opus facientis. Actus enim moventis et agentis est in moto et patiente. Ideo itaque diligunt opus suum et artifices et poetae et benefactores, quia diligunt suum esse. Hoc autem est naturale, scilicet quod unumquodque suum esse amet. 1846. After giving the illustrations, he adds a general argument. The reason behind these statements is that existence is something chosen and cherished by everyone—to the extent that a thing exists it is good, and good is worthy of choice and lovable. But this existence consists in an actuality, for to exist is to live and consequently to operate. There can be no life without vital action of some kind. Hence the performance of vital actions is desirable to everyone. But the producer actually producing is in some way the work produced, for the action of the mover and cause is in the thing moved and caused. For that reason craftsmen, poets, and benefactors love their productions because they love their own existence; and it is natural that everything should love its own being.
Rationem autem huius consequentiae, scilicet quod diligant opus, quia diligunt esse: manifestat subdens quod est potentia hoc actu opus nunciat. Homo enim est inquantum habet animam rationalem: anima autem est actus primus corporis physici potentia vitam habentis, id est quod est in potentia ad opera vitae. Sic igitur primum esse hominis consistit in hoc quod habeat potentiam ad opera vitae. Huius autem potentiae reductionem in actu denunciat ipsum opus quod homo facit exercendo actu opera vitae. 1847. He clarifies his argument for this deduction that men love their creations, when he adds “the product manifests in actuality what the agent is in potentiality.” For a man exists inasmuch as he has a rational soul; the soul is the first act of a physical body having life potentially, i.e., being in potentiality to vital operations. So then man’s first esse consists in the fact that he has the capacity for vital actions. And the handiwork that a man produces in the actual exercise of vital activity indicates the reduction of this potentiality to actuality.
Secundam rationem ponit ibi simul autem et cetera. Circa quod duo facit. Primo proponit rationem dicens quod unusquisque (enim) diligit proprium bonum. Bonum autem benefactoris consistit in suo actu, quo scilicet beneficia tribuit. Est enim actus virtutis. Et ideo benefactor delectatur in beneficiato sicut in eo in quo invenitur eius bonum; sed bene patiens, qui scilicet recipit beneficium, non habet aliquod bonum honestum in operante, id est in benefactore non enim est virtutis actus recipere ab alio beneficia. Sed si habet aliquod bonum, hoc est bonum utile, quod est minus delectabile et amabile quam bonum honestum. Et ita patet quod minus est amabilis benefactor beneficiato quam e converso. 1848. He presents his second argument [ b, ii ] at “Then, too, for the benefactor,” and treats it from two aspects. First [ii, x] he gives the argument, stating that everyone loves his own good. But the benefactor’s good consists in his very act of bestowing benefits. For this reason the benefactor takes joy in his beneficiary, as the person in whom his good it attained. But the recipient, who accepts the benefit, finds nothing noble in the giver or benefactor; for it is not a virtuous act to receive benefits from another. But if he sees any good it is utilitarian, and this is less pleasing and lovable than a noble good. Thus, obviously, the benefactor is less worthy of love in the eyes of the beneficiary than conversely.
Secundo ibi delectabilis autem etc., probat quod supposuerat, dupliciter. Primo quidem quia delectabile quidem circa praesens est ipse actus sive operatio; circa futurum autem spes; circa factum autem sive praeteritum memoria: inter quae tria delectabilissimum est actus, et similiter magis amabile quam spes vel memoria. Benefactori autem manet honestas proprii operis, quia bonum honestum non cito transit, sed est diuturnum; et ita delectatur in eo cui benefecit sicut in praesenti suo bono. Sed utilitas quam patiens recepit de facili transit. Et ita beneficiatus delectatur in benefactore secundum memoriam praeteriti. Magis ergo est delectabile et amabile benefactori bonum honestum quod habet in beneficiato, quam beneficiato bonum utile quod habet in benefactore. 1849. Second [ii, y], at “However, there is etc.,” he proves in two ways what he has subjoined. First [y, aa], in general. What is pleasurable about the present is activity itself or operation; about the future, hope; about the past, memory. The most pleasurable of these is activity that is also more lovable than hope or memory. But for the benefactor the honorableness of his own activity remains, because an honorable good does not pass away quickly but is enduring. In this way he delights in the person he benefits as in a present good. But the utility that the recipient gets passes away easily. Thus the beneficiary delights in his benefactor as a memory of the past. Consequently, the honorable good that the benefactor finds in the beneficiary is more delightful and lovable than the useful good that the beneficiary sees in his benefactor.
Secundo ibi: et memoria etc., probat idem dicens quod memoria bonorum, idest honestorum, quae quis in praeterito fecit, est delectabilis. Sed memoria bonorum utilium quae quis quandoque habuit, vel omnino non est delectabilis, puta cum circa eorum amissionem est quis contristatus; vel minus est delectabilis, quam memoria honestorum, puta quando aliquid ex eis remanet; sed circa expectationem futurorum videtur e converso se habere, scilicet quod magis est delectabile expectare utilia quam expectare honesta. 1850. Next [y, bb], at “Likewise, the memory,” he proves the same point again; he observes that the memory of virtuous or honorable deeds, which a person performed in the past, is pleasant. But the memory of useful goods, which a person possessed at one time, is either not pleasant at all (as when he grieves over their loss) or is pleasant (as when he retains some) to a degree less than the memory of honorable goods. However, the contrary seems to be true about the expectation of future goods; it is more pleasant to look forward to useful than honorable goods.
Huius autem diversitatis ratio est, quia bonum ignotum non delectat, sed solum bonum cognitum; honesta autem nemo cognoscit nisi qui habet. Unde cognoscuntur si sint praeterita, non autem si solum sint futura. Bona autem utilia cognoscuntur et praeterita et futura; sed auxilium praeteritorum iam pertransiit. Auxilium autem quod ex eis in futurum expectatur delectat quasi remedium quoddam contra futuras necessitates. Unde plus delectatur homo in spe utilium quam in memoria eorumdem, vel etiam quam in spe honestorum. Sed in memoria honestorum plus delectatur homo, quam in memoria utilium. Benefactor autem habet in beneficiato memoriam boni honesti, beneficiatus autem in benefactore memoriam boni utilis. Delectabilior ergo et amabilior est benefactori beneficiatus, quam e converso. 1851. The reason for this diversity is that only a known good gives pleasure, not an unknown one. But no one knows an honorable good except the person who has it. Consequently, honorable goods are known if they are in the past but not if they are merely in the future. On the other hand, useful goods both past and future are known, but help from past goods has vanished. However, help from them in the future gives pleasure as a remedy against tomorrow’s needs. Hence a man is more delighted with the hope of useful goods than with their memory or even the hope of honorable goods. But he takes more pleasure in the memory of honorable goods than useful goods. Now a benefactor remembers an honorable good but a beneficiary a useful one. Therefore, the beneficiary is more pleasing and lovable to the benefactor than the other way round.
Tertiam rationem ponit ibi, et amatio quidem et cetera. Et dicit, quod amare assimilatur ei quod est facere. Pertinet enim ad amantem, quod velit et operetur bonum ei quem amat, sed amari assimilatur ei quod est pati. Faciens autem superexcellit patienti. Et ideo rationabiliter his qui superexcellunt in agendo, scilicet benefactoribus, et artificibus et poetis consequitur, quod ament et habeant ea quae ad amorem consequuntur. 1852. He presents the third argument at “Moreover, loving” [b, iii], remarking that loving is like activity; for it is characteristic of a lover to wish and to do good for the beloved. On the other hand, being loved is more like passivity. But the agent excels the patient. Consequently, it is reasonable that those excelling in activity—such as benefactors, artists and poets—should love and have the consequent acts of love.
Quartam rationem ponit ibi, adhuc autem et cetera. Illa enim, quae laboriose fiunt ab omnibus magis diliguntur. Sicut illi, qui proprio studio et labore possident divitias magis amant eas quam illi qui accipiunt eas ex successione parentum, vel ex gratuito dono alicuius, unde sic accipientes magis sunt liberales, ut in quarto dictum est. Quod autem aliquis recipiat beneficium ab aliquo est sine eius labore. Sed quod aliquis alteri benefaciat est operosum, idest requirens operam et laborem. Unde rationabile est, quod benefactores magis ament beneficiatos, quam e converso. 1853. He assigns the fourth argument at “Besides, people have” [b, iv]. Everyone prefers the results of his own work. So, those who by their own zeal and labor earn riches value them more highly than people who receive them as an inheritance from their parents or a donation from a benefactor—hence those receiving them in this manner are more generous, as we have pointed out in the fourth book (674). Now, for a person to receive a benefit requires no labor on his part. But for a person to confer a benefit is a laborious task demanding work and toil. It is reasonable then that benefactors love their beneficiaries more than the reverse.
Et hanc rationem confirmat per exemplum matrum, quae magis amant filios quam patres. Tum quia magis laborant circa eorum generationem portando et pariendo eos, quam patres. Tum etiam quia matres magis possunt scire, quod sint earum filii quam patres. Et hoc etiam videtur esse proprium benefactorum, ut scilicet ament beneficiatos inquantum circa eos laborant. 1854. He strengthens his argument by giving the example of mothers who love their children more than fathers do: both because mothers bear heavier burdens than fathers in the generation of children by carrying and giving them birth and because mothers can know better than fathers who their children are. Likewise, it seems to be characteristic of benefactors to love their beneficiaries inasmuch as they labor for them.

Doubt Concerning Love of Self
Chapter 8
      A.  He objects on one side. — 1855
ἀπορεῖται δὲ καὶ πότερον δεῖ φιλεῖν ἑαυτὸν μάλιστα ἢ ἄλλον τινά. Likewise the question arises whether a person should love himself most or someone else.
      A.  He objects on one side.
ἐπιτιμῶσι γὰρ τοῖς ἑαυτοὺς μάλιστ' ἀγαπῶσι, καὶ ὡς ἐν αἰσχρῷ φιλαύτους ἀποκαλοῦσι, For men criticize those who love themselves most, and call them self-lovers, as if this were a term of disgrace.
δοκεῖ τε ὁ μὲν φαῦλος ἑαυτοῦ χάριν πάντα πράττειν, καὶ ὅσῳ ἂν μοχθηρότερος ᾖ, τοσούτῳ μᾶλλονἐγκαλοῦσι δὴ αὐτῷ οἷον ὅτι οὐδὲν ἀφ' ἑαυτοῦ πράττειὁ δ' ἐπιεικὴς διὰ τὸ καλόν, καὶ ὅσῳ ἂν βελτίων ᾖ, μᾶλλον διὰ τὸ καλόν, καὶ φίλου ἕνεκα, τὸ δ' αὑτοῦ παρίησιν. The bad man apparently does everything for himself, and the more he acts this way, the worse he is. Therefore people complain that he does nothing unrelated to himself. On the other hand the virtuous man does what is honorable. And the better he is the more he works for the good and for his friend’s sake, even overlooking his own interests.
      B.  (He objects) on the other side.
            1.   FIRST... WE MUST LOVE BEST... OUR BEST FRIEND. — 1858
τοῖς λόγοις δὲ τούτοις τὰ ἔργα διαφωνεῖ, οὐκ ἀλόγως. φασὶ γὰρ δεῖν φιλεῖν μάλιστα τὸν μάλιστα φίλον, φίλος δὲ μάλιστα ὁ βουλόμενος ᾧ βούλεται τἀγαθὰ ἐκείνου ἕνεκα, καὶ εἰ μηδεὶς εἴσεται· ταῦτα δ' ὑπάρχει μάλιστ' αὐτῷ πρὸς αὑτόν, But the facts are not in agreement with the arguments presented, and this is hardly surprising. It is commonly held that we ought to love best the person who is our best friend. But that man who most wishes good to another for his sake is his best friend, even if no one will know about it. Certainly a man, in his attitude toward himself, best fulfills these conditions,
καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ δὴ πάνθ' οἷς ὁ φίλος ὁρίζεται· εἴρηται γὰρ ὅτι ἀπ' αὐτοῦ πάντα τὰ φιλικὰ καὶ πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους διήκει. and indeed all other conditions which enter into the definition of a friend. For, as has been pointed out, all the attributes of friendship are derived from this relationship, and are extended to other men.
            3.   THIRD, HE OFFERS SEVERAL PROVERBS. — 1860
καὶ αἱ παροιμίαι δὲ πᾶσαι ὁμογνωμονοῦσιν, οἷον τὸ μία ψυχή καὶ κοινὰ τὰ φίλων καὶ ἰσότης φιλότης καὶ γόνυ κνήμης ἔγγιον· πάντα γὰρ ταῦτα πρὸς αὑτὸν μάλιστ' ἂν ὑπάρχοι· μάλιστα γὰρ φίλος αὑτῷ· καὶ φιλητέον δὴ μάλισθ' ἑαυτόν. Likewise, all the proverbs are in accord with this position. For example, “Friends are of one mind and heart”; “Friends share alike”; “Friendship is equality”; and “Friends are near as knee and shin.” Now all these sayings are verified especially of a person in relation to himself, for he is his own best friend, and therefore ought to love himself best.
      C.  He finishes doubting on the question. — 1861
ἀπορεῖται δὴ εἰκότως ποτέροις χρεὼν ἕπεσθαι, ἀμφοῖν ἐχόντοιν τὸ πιστόν. It is questionable then which opinion we ought to follow, since both seem plausible.
      A.  He determines the method of solution. — 1862
ἴσως οὖν τοὺς τοιούτους δεῖ τῶν λόγων διαιρεῖν καὶ διορίζειν ἐφ' ὅσον ἑκάτεροι καὶ πῇ ἀληθεύουσιν. Perhaps in such discussions we must distinguish and determine both to what extent and in what way each side is expressing the truth. If we understand how each uses the expression “lover of self,” the truth may then be evident.
      B.  He gives the solution.
                   a.   He explains his intention. — 1863-1864
εἰ δὴ λάβοιμεν τὸ φίλαυτον πῶς ἑκάτεροι λέγουσιν, τάχ' ἂν γένοιτο δῆλον. οἱ μὲν οὖν εἰς ὄνειδος ἄγοντες αὐτὸ φιλαύτους καλοῦσι τοὺς ἑαυτοῖς ἀπονέμοντας τὸ πλεῖον ἐν χρήμασι καὶ τιμαῖς καὶ ἡδοναῖς ταῖς σωματικαῖς· τούτων γὰρ οἱ πολλοὶ ὀρέγονται, καὶ ἐσπουδάκασι περὶ αὐτὰ ὡς ἄριστα ὄντα, διὸ καὶ περιμάχητά ἐστιν. οἱ δὴ περὶ ταῦτα πλεονέκται χαρίζονται ταῖς ἐπιθυμίαις καὶ ὅλως τοῖς πάθεσι καὶ τῷ ἀλόγῳ τῆς ψυχῆς· τοιοῦτοι δ' εἰσὶν οἱ πολλοί· διὸ καὶ ἡ προσηγορία γεγένηται ἀπὸ τοῦ πολλοῦ φαύλου ὄντος· δικαίως δὴ τοῖς οὕτω φιλαύτοις ὀνειδίζεται. People using it as a term of reproach call those self-loving who assign to themselves more than their share of money, honors, and physical pleasures. For these goods are desired and zealously sought as being best by most men, and as a result become a source of contention. Hence those who are plentifully supplied with such things gratify their desires and passions in general and the irrational part of their soul. But most men are like this, and so the epithet has been taken from the generally existing type that is evil. Men then, who are lovers of self in this sense, are justly condemned.
                   b.   He proves his statement. — 1865
ὅτι δὲ τοὺς τὰ τοιαῦθ' αὑτοῖς ἀπονέμοντας εἰώθασι λέγειν οἱ πολλοὶ φιλαύτους, οὐκ ἄδηλον· εἰ γάρ τις ἀεὶ σπουδάζοι τὰ δίκαια πράττειν αὐτὸς μάλιστα πάντων ἢ τὰ σώφρονα ἢ ὁποιαοῦν ἄλλα τῶν κατὰ τὰς ἀρετάς, καὶ ὅλως ἀεὶ τὸ καλὸν ἑαυτῷ περιποιοῖτο, οὐδεὶς ἐρεῖ τοῦτον φίλαυτον οὐδὲ ψέξει. Obviously, it is the people who amass these goods for themselves who are usually called self-loving; for if a person were zealous above all else to do works of justice, or temperance, or any other virtue, devoting himself entirely to the acquisition of good, no one would censure such a man as a lover of self.
Dubitatur autem et cetera. Postquam philosophus determinavit de conservatione et dissolutione amicitiae, et iterum de amicitiae operibus, hic movet quasdam dubitationes circa amicitiam. Et primo ex parte amantis. Secundo ex parte amatorum, ibi, utrum igitur quam plurimos et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo solvit dubitationem de amore amantis quem habet ad seipsum. Secundo de amore amantis quem habet ad alterum, ibi, dubitatur autem, et circa felicem et cetera. Circa primum tria facit. Primo proponit dubitationem. Secundo ostendit eam esse rationabilem, ibi, increpant enim et cetera. Tertio solvit, ibi, forte igitur tales et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod dubitatio est, utrum oporteat quod aliquis diligat seipsum maxime, vel aliquem alium magis quam se. 1855. After the Philosopher has treated the preservation and dissolution of friendship along with the works of friendship, he now raises some difficulties concerning it. First, on the part of the one who loves; then [Lect. 12], at “Should a man then etc.” (B. 1170 b 20), on the part of those who are loved. He discusses the first point from two aspects. First he solves the doubt concerning the love a person has for himself. Next [Lect. 11, at “Some doubt whether etc.” (B.1169 b 3), concerning the love a person has for others. He considers the first point in a threefold manner. First [I] he states the doubt. Second [II], at “For men criticize etc.,” he shows its plausibility. Third [III], at “Perhaps in such etc.,” he offers the solution. He remarks first that a doubt exists whether a person should love himself most, or someone else more than himself.
Deinde cum dicit increpant enim etc., ostendit dubitationem esse rationabilem. Et primo obiicit pro una parte. Secundo pro alia, ibi, rationibus autem his et cetera. Tertio concludit dubitabilitatem quaestionis, ibi, dubitatur autem et cetera. Circa primum primo inducit hoc quod homines increpant illos, qui maxime amant seipsos. Et hoc, quod aliqui sint amatores sui, reputatur quasi ad malum. 1856. Then [II], at “For men criticize,” he shows that the doubt is plausible. First [II, A] he objects on one side; next [II, B], at “But the facts etc.,” on the other side. Last [II, C], at “It is questionable then etc.,” he finishes doubting on the question. He treats the first point under two headings. First [A, 1] he introduces the fact that men criticize those who love themselves most; and it is accounted as evil that some people are self-lovers,
Secundo ibi: videturque etc., inducit, quod homo pravus omnia facit propter suam utilitatem; et tanto hoc magis observat quanto peior est, et quanto hoc magis facit, magis accusatur ab hominibus, velut qui nihil facit extra seipsum, idest quod sit propter bonum aliorum, sed solum propter suum. Sed homines virtuosi non agunt solum propter se ipsos, sed magis agunt propter bonum honestum et propter amicos, propter quae plerumque praetereunt suas utilitates. 1857. Second [A, 2], at “The bad man” he observes that the evil person does everything for gain; and the more he follows this, the worse he is. And the more consistently he does this, the more severely people blame him as one who does nothing unrelated to himself, i.e., nothing for the good of others but only for his own. However, virtuous men do not act for themselves alone; rather they do what is honorable both for themselves and their friends. For this reason they frequently overlook their own advantages.
Deinde cum dicit rationibus autem etc., obiicit pro parte contraria. Et dicit, quod a praemissis rationibus dissonant opera, secundum quae homines maxime ostenduntur amare seipsos. Et hoc non irrationabiliter. Primo quidem, quia sicut communiter homines dicunt, oportet hominem maxime amare, eum qui maxime est nobis amicus; ille autem est alicui maxime amicus qui maxime vult ei bonum eius gratia, etiam si nullus alius sciret. Quae quidem maxime existunt homini ad seipsum. Unusquisque enim maxime vult sibi bona. Sic ergo patet, quod homo maxime debet amare seipsum. 1858. At “But the facts” [II, B] he objects on the opposite side. He states that the facts are not in agreement with the reasons just presented, according to which men are shown to love, themselves most. And this is not in a way unlikely. First (B, 1] because, according to the general opinion, we must love best the person who is our best friend. But that man who most wishes good to another for his sake is his best friend, even if no one else might know it. Certainly these conditions exist especially in a man’s attitude towards himself, for everyone especially wishes good to himself. Evidently then a man ought to love himself most of all.
Secundo ibi: et reliqua etc., inducit pro hac parte id quod dictum est. Et dicit, quod reliqua omnia quibus determinatur et definitur quid sit amicus, maxime existunt homini ad se ipsum, unde supra dictum est quod omnia amicabilia quae considerantur in comparatione ad alios, proveniunt ex amicabilibus quae patitur homo ad seipsum. 1859, Second [B, 2], at “and indeed,” he introduces in favor of this view the point he has just made (1858)He observes that all the other conditions determining and defining the nature of friendship are found in a man’s attitude toward himself, as he noted there. The reason is that all the attributes of friendship, which are considered in reference to others, are derived from the amicable relation a person bears towards himself .
Tertio ibi: sed et proverbia etc., inducit ad idem quaedam proverbia. Et dicit, quod omnia proverbia quae vulgariter dicuntur, consentiunt in hanc partem, quod homo maxime diligat se ipsum, sicut quod dicitur unam esse animam duorum amicorum. Et quod, ea quae sunt amicorum sunt communia. Et quod, amicitia est quaedam aequalitas. Et quod, amicus se habet ad amicum sicut genu ad tibiam, quae habent maximam propinquitatem. Per haec autem omnia datur intelligi, quod amicitia in quadam unitate consistit, quae maxime est alicuius ad seipsum. Et sic omnia praedicta proverbia maxime verificantur de aliquo respectu suiipsius. Et hoc ideo, quia homo maxime est amicus sibiipsi, et sic homo maxime debet seipsum amare. 1860. Third [B, 3], at “Likewise, all,” he offers several proverbs to the same purpose. He notes that a current proverbs are in accord with this position, that a man should love himself most of all. For example, “Friends are of one mind and heart”; “Friends share alike”; “Friendship is equality”; and “Friends are akin as knee and shin” (which are very close). All these sayings show us that friendship consists in a kind of oneness that especially belongs to a man in relation to himself. Thus all the quoted proverbs are verified particularly of a person towards himself. And this because a man is his own best friend, and so a person ought to love himself most of all.
Deinde cum dicit dubitatur autem etc., concludit dubitabilitatem quaestionis. Et dicit quod convenienter dubitatur quas rationes praedictorum sit debitum sequi, cum ambae habeant aliquid credibile. 1861. Next [II, C], at “It is questionable,” he finishes doubting on the question. He remarks that there is a reasonable doubt which of these arguments we ought to accept, since both appear to have some plausibility.
Deinde cum dicit: forte igitur etc., solvit praemissam dubitationem. Et primo determinat modum solvendi. Secundo solvit, ibi, in opprobrium quidem igitur et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod tales sermones, qui habent rationes probabiles pro utraque parte, oportet distinguere et determinare quantum ex utraque parte verum dicatur, et in quo. Et sic si accipiamus qualiter aliquis dicatur amator sui secundum utramque partem obiectionum, fiet manifestum illud quod quaeritur. 1862. At “Perhaps in such” [III] he solves the doubt he has discussed. First [III, A] he determines the method of solution; then [III, B], at “People using etc.,” he gives the solution. He observes that in such discussions which marshal probable reasons for each side, we must distinguish and define to what extent and in what way each is expressing the truth. In this way, if we understand how a love of self is used in both parts of the objections, the truth we seek will appear.
Deinde cum dicit: in opprobrium quidem igitur etc., solvit distinguendo praedictam dubitationem. Et primo ostendit qualiter dicatur amator sui, secundum quod vituperatur. Secundo qualiter dicatur, secundum quod laudatur, ibi, videbitur autem utique et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo manifestat propositum. Secundo probat quod dixerat, ibi, quoniam autem talia et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod illi qui in opprobrium reputant esse amatorem sui, illos vocant sui amatores, qui tribuunt sibiipsis plus in bonis corporalibus, scilicet in pecuniis, et honoribus, et in delectationibus corporalibus, quales sunt ciborum et venereorum. Huiusmodi enim bona multitudo hominum appetit. Et attendunt ad ipsa homines, ac si essent optima. 1863. Then [III, B], at “People using,” he solves this doubt by making a distinction. First [B, 1] he shows how a man may be called a lover of self in the blameworthy sense; next [Lect. 9; B, 2], at “But such a man” (B.1168 b 29), in the praiseworthy sense. He considers the first point in a twofold manner. First [i, a] he explains his intention. Second [i, b], at “Obviously, it is the people etc,” he proves his statement. He says first that people, who consider “lover of self” a term of reproach, call those self-loving who assign themselves more than their share of material goods, like money, honors, and physical pleasures (of food and sex, for instance), for the majority desire goods of this nature, and men give their attention to them as though they were best.
Et quia multi quaerunt in his superabundantiam, quam non possunt omnes simul habere, sequitur, quod circa huiusmodi bona fiant pugnae et contentiones. Illi autem qui circa talia plus abundant, horum abundantiam convertunt ad satisfaciendum concupiscentiis, et universaliter aliis passionibus; et per consequens irrationali parti animae, ad quam pertinent passiones. Et sic illi, qui talia bona appetunt, amant seipsos secundum partem animae irrationalem, scilicet sensitivam. Multitudo autem hominum talis est, quod magis sequitur sensum quam intellectum. Et ideo ipsa appellatio amantis seipsum, sumpta est ab eo quod est pravum, quod multis convenit. Et sic patet quod philautus, id est amator sui ipsius, secundum hanc acceptionem prout in pluribus invenitur, iuste exprobratur. 1864, Because most people try to acquire an excessive amount of them, which everyone is unable to have, strife and contention arise over these goods. Besides, those who are more plentifully supplied with them utilize this abundance to satisfy their desires and all passions in general, and accordingly the irrational part of the soul to which the passions belong. Thus men who seek goods of this sort love themselves according to the irrational or sensitive part of their soul. Most men are such that they follow sense rather than reason. Therefore, the epithet “lover of self” has been taken from what is evil-this is appropriate to many people. Thus, philautos, i.e., lover of self in this sense can be frequently found among men, and is rightly condemned.
Deinde cum dicit: quoniam autem etc., probat quod dixerat. Et dicit manifestum esse quod multi consueverunt illos dicere philautos, idest amatores suiipsorum, qui plus tribuunt sibi de bonis praedictis, quae pertinent ad partem irrationalem; quia si aliquis velit superabundare in bonis rationis, quae sunt opera virtutum, puta si velit inter alios maxime agere opera iustitiae vel temperantiae vel quaecumque alia virtutis opera, ita quod semper velit sibi bonum honestum acquirere, nullus de praedicta multitudine vocabit eum philautum, idest amatorem sui; vel si aliquis sapiens vocet eum philautum, hoc non dicet in eius vituperium. 1865. At “Obviously, it is the people, [i, b] he proves his statement. He notes that, obviously, most people usually call philautoi or lovers of self those who amass for themselves these goods pertaining to the irrational side of man. For, if a person should wish to abound in goods of reason, i.e., virtuous actions—for example, if he wishes among other things to do especially the works of justice or temperance or any other virtue—so that he always wants to acquire honorable good for himself, no one from the crowd will call him philautos or lover of self. Or if some wise man should call him self-loving, he will not say this in censure.

A Virtuous Man’s Love of Self
Chapter 8
      a.   There exists a way, different from the preceding.
            i.    That man is self-loving who takes... the goods of reason.
                   x.   HE PROPOSES HIS INTENTION. — 1866
δόξειε δ' ἂν ὁ τοιοῦτος μᾶλλον εἶναι φίλαυτος· But such a man rather than his vicious counterpart seems to be a lover of self,
                   y.   HE PROVES HIS PROPOSITION.
                         aa. First. — 1867
ἀπονέμει γοῦν ἑαυτῷ τὰ κάλλιστα καὶ μάλιστ' ἀγαθά, for he assigns to himself the noblest and best goods.
                         bb.      Second reason. — 1868
καὶ χαρίζεται ἑαυτοῦ τῷ κυριωτάτῳ, καὶ πάντα τούτῳ πείθεται· He yields to the leading principle in him and makes everything obey it.
                   z.   HE PROVES WHAT HE HAD TAKEN FOR GRANTED.
                         aa. First. — 1869
ὥσπερ δὲ καὶ πόλις τὸ κυριώτατον μάλιστ' εἶναι δοκεῖ καὶ πᾶν ἄλλο σύστημα, οὕτω καὶ ἄνθρωπος· καὶ φίλαυτος δὴ μάλιστα ὁ τοῦτο ἀγαπῶν καὶ τούτῳ χαριζόμενος. As a state, or any other society, seems to be identical with the most dominant element in it, so too does a man. Consequently, a person who loves and yields to this part will be a lover of self in a marked degree.
                         bb.      Second argument. — 1870
καὶ ἐγκρατὴς δὲ καὶ ἀκρατὴς λέγεται τῷ κρατεῖν τὸν νοῦν ἢ μή, ὡς τούτου ἑκάστου ὄντος· Furthermore, a person is called continent or incontinent inasmuch as this element is in control or not, which supposes that it is man himself.
                         cc. Third argument. — 1871
καὶ πεπραγέναι δοκοῦσιν αὐτοὶ καὶ ἑκουσίως τὰ μετὰ λόγου μάλιστα. And the actions that men do according to reason seem to be their own in the most proper sense, and to be voluntary.
            ii.   He shows that the virtuous person is of this nature. — 1872
ὅτι μὲν οὖν τοῦθ' ἕκαστός ἐστιν ἢ μάλιστα, οὐκ ἄδηλον, καὶ ὅτι ὁ ἐπιεικὴς μάλιστα τοῦτ' ἀγαπᾷ. διὸ φίλαυτος μάλιστ' ἂν εἴη, It is evident then that everyone is, or chiefly is, this part; that the just man loves it exceedingly. He is therefore singularly a lover of self.
            iii. This manner of loving oneself differs from that previously discussed. — 1873
καθ' ἕτερον εἶδος τοῦ ὀνειδιζομένου, καὶ διαφέρων τοσοῦτον ὅσον τὸ κατὰ λόγον ζῆν τοῦ κατὰ πάθος, καὶ ὀρέγεσθαι ἢ τοῦ καλοῦ ἢ τοῦ δοκοῦντος συμφέρειν. in a sense other than that of the man who is censured. The difference is between living according to reason and according to passion, between desiring what is good and desiring what seems advantageous.
      b.   To be a lover of self in this sense is praiseworthy.
            i.    He presents his proposition.
τοὺς μὲν οὖν περὶ τὰς καλὰς πράξεις διαφερόντως σπουδάζοντας πάντες ἀποδέχονται καὶ ἐπαινοῦσιν· But those who busy themselves with good works in an exceptional manner receive the approval and praise of all.
                   y.   (HE) IS ALSO HELPFUL BOTH TO HIMSELF AND OTHERS. — 1875
πάντων δὲ ἁμιλλωμένων πρὸς τὸ καλὸν καὶ διατεινομένων τὰ κάλλιστα πράττειν κοινῇ τ' ἂν πάντ' εἴη τὰ δέοντα καὶ ἰδίᾳ ἑκάστῳ τὰ μέγιστα τῶν ἀγαθῶν, εἴπερ ἡ ἀρετὴ τοιοῦτόν ἐστιν. And if everyone strives for what is good and aims at doing what is best, the whole community will satisfy its needs and each member will possess the best of goods, since virtue is the best good.
                         aa. First. — 1876
ὥστε τὸν μὲν ἀγαθὸν δεῖ φίλαυτον εἶναι καὶ γὰρ αὐτὸς ὀνήσεται τὰ καλὰ πράττων καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ὠφελήσει, τὸν δὲ μοχθηρὸν οὐ δεῖ· βλάψει γὰρ καὶ ἑαυτὸν καὶ τοὺς πέλας, φαύλοις πάθεσιν ἑπόμενος. Therefore, it is reasonable for the virtuous man to love himself, because in doing good he will help both him self and others. But it is unfortunate for the bad man, because he injures both himself and his neighbors by following his passions.
                         bb.      Second. — 1877
τῷ μοχθηρῷ μὲν οὖν διαφωνεῖ ἃ δεῖ πράττειν καὶ ἃ πράττει· ὁ δ' ἐπιεικής, ἃ δεῖ, ταῦτα καὶ πράττει· πᾶς γὰρ νοῦς αἱρεῖται τὸ βέλτιστον ἑαυτῷ, ὁ δ' ἐπιεικὴς πειθαρχεῖ τῷ νῷ. As a result, what the evil man ought to do is in conflict with what he does, for the reason always chooses good for itself. But the good man obeys his reason.
            ii.   He excludes... that for which the lover of self is blamed.
                   x.   HE STATES HIS INTENTION. — 1878
ἀληθὲς δὲ περὶ τοῦ σπουδαίου καὶ τὸ τῶν φίλων ἕνεκα πολλὰ πράττειν καὶ τῆς πατρίδος, κἂν δέῃ ὑπεραποθνήσκειν· προήσεται γὰρ καὶ χρήματα καὶ τιμὰς καὶ ὅλως τὰ περιμάχητα ἀγαθά, περιποιούμενος ἑαυτῷ τὸ καλόν· It is true of the virtuous man that he does many actions for the sake of his friends—and country—and if necessary dies for them. He will sacrifice money, honor, and all the goods men strive for, gaining for himself an honorable good.
                   y.   HE EXPLAINS (IT).
                         aa. Concerning death for his friend. — 1879-1880
ὀλίγον γὰρ χρόνον ἡσθῆναι σφόδρα μᾶλλον ἕλοιτ' ἂν ἢ πολὺν ἠρέμα, καὶ βιῶσαι καλῶς ἐνιαυτὸν ἢ πόλλ' ἔτη τυχόντως, καὶ μίαν πρᾶξιν καλὴν καὶ μεγάλην ἢ πολλὰς καὶ μικράς. τοῖς δ' ὑπεραποθνήσκουσι τοῦτ' ἴσως συμβαίνει· αἱροῦνται δὴ μέγα καλὸν ἑαυτοῖς. For he will prefer a short period of intense delight to a long period of quiet existence, an illustrious life of a year to an ordinary life of many years, a single notable good deed to many insignificant ones. Certainly those who die for others seem to obtain this result; thus, they choose a great good for themselves.
                         bb.      Concerning... external goods for his friend.
                               a’. In respect to money. — 1881
καὶ χρήματα προοῖντ' ἂν ἐφ' ᾧ πλείονα λήψονται οἱ φίλοι· γίνεται γὰρ τῷ μὲν φίλῳ χρήματα, αὐτῷ δὲ τὸ καλόν· τὸ δὴ μεῖζον ἀγαθὸν ἑαυτῷ ἀπονέμει. Likewise, they throw away money so that their friends may gain more. This way a friend gets the money but the virtuous man acquires an honorable good and thus assigns to himself what is better.
                               b’. In respect to honors and dignities. — 1882
καὶ περὶ τιμὰς δὲ καὶ ἀρχὰς ὁ αὐτὸς τρόπος· πάντα γὰρ τῷ φίλῳ ταῦτα προήσεται· καλὸν γὰρ αὐτῷ τοῦτο καὶ ἐπαινετόν. εἰκότως δὴ δοκεῖ σπουδαῖος εἶναι, ἀντὶ πάντων αἱρούμενος τὸ καλόν. He acts in the same manner toward honors and position. For the good man readily sacrifices all preferments for a friend, since this action seems a laudable good. It is reasonable then to consider him virtuous when he prefers what is honorable to all other goods.
                         cc. Concerning virtuous actions... entrusted to his friend. — 1883
ἐνδέχεται δὲ καὶ πράξεις τῷ φίλῳ προΐεσθαι, καὶ εἶναι κάλλιον τοῦ αὐτὸν πρᾶξαι τὸ αἴτιον τῷ φίλῳ γενέσθαι. ἐν πᾶσι δὴ τοῖς ἐπαινετοῖς ὁ σπουδαῖος φαίνεται ἑαυτῷ τοῦ καλοῦ πλέον νέμων. He may even defer to his friend in performing actions; for it is better to be the cause of a friend’s acting than to act himself. In all praiseworthy activity, the good man assigns to himself the larger share of virtue.
                   z.   HE SUMS UP. — 1884
οὕτω μὲν οὖν φίλαυτον εἶναι δεῖ, καθάπερ εἴρηται· ὡς δ' οἱ πολλοί, οὐ χρή. A person then ought to be a lover of self in this sense, as we said before but not in the sense that most are lovers of self.
Videbitur autem utique talis et cetera. Postquam philosophus ostendit qualiter dicatur aliquis amator sui secundum quod est exprobrabile, hic ostendit qualiter aliquis dicatur amator sui secundum quod est laudabile. Et circa hoc duo facit. Primo ostendit esse quemdam modum quo aliquis est amator sui, alium a praedicto. Secundo ostendit quod secundum hunc modum esse amatorem sui est laudabile, ibi, circa bonas quidem igitur et cetera. 1866. After the Philosopher has shown how a man may be called a lover of self in the blameworthy sense, he now [B, 2] shows how a man may be called a lover of self in the praiseworthy sense. He discusses this point from two aspects. First [2, a] he shows that there exists a way, different from the preceding, in which someone is a lover of self. Then [2, b], at “But those who etc.,” he shows that to be a lover of self in this sense is praiseworthy.
Circa primum tria facit. Primo ostendit illum esse amatorem sui qui sibi tribuit abundantiam bonorum rationis. Secundo ostendit quod virtuosus est talis, ibi quoniam quidem igitur et cetera. Tertio ostendit hunc modum amandi se esse differentem a praemisso, ibi, secundum alteram speciem et cetera. Circa primum tria facit. Primo proponit quod intendit. Et dicit quod talis, qui scilicet studet excellere in operibus virtutis, magis videtur esse philautus, idest amator sui, quam ille qui tribuit sibi superabundantiam bonorum sensibilium. He considers the first point under three headings. First [a, i] he shows that man is self-loving who takes for himself an abundant share of the goods of reason. Next [a, ii], at “It is evident then etc.,” he shows that the virtuous person is of this nature. Finally [a, iii], at “in a sense other than etc.,” he shows that this manner of loving oneself differs from that previously discussed. He treats the first point in a threefold fashion. First [a, i, x] he proposes his intention. He says that this man, who is anxious to excel in the works of virtue, seems to be philautos or a lover of self, rather than the man who assigns to himself an excessive amount of physical goods.
Secundo ibi: tribuit enim etc., probat propositum duabus rationibus. Quarum prima est quia tanto aliquis magis amat seipsum, quanto maiora bona sibi attribuit. Sed ille qui studet superexcedere in operibus virtutis, tribuit sibi optima, quae scilicet sunt maxime bona, scilicet bona honesta. Ergo talis maxime diligit seipsum. 1867. Second [a, i, y], at “for he assigns,” he proves his proposition by two arguments. The first [a, i, y, aa] is that a person loves himself more, to the extent that he assigns to himself greater goods. But he, who makes it his business to excel in virtuous works, assumes for himself the goods that are noblest and best, i.e., the honorable kind. Therefore, such a one especially loves himself.
Secundam rationem ponit ibi: et largitur et cetera. Quia scilicet talis largitur bona ei quod est principalissimum in ipso, scilicet intellectui. Et facit quod omnes partes animae intellectui oboediunt; tanto autem aliquis magis amat se ipsum quanto magis amat id quod est principalius in eo. Et ita patet quod ille qui vult superexcellere in operibus virtutis maxime amat seipsum. 1868. He offers the second reason at “He yields” [a, i, y, bb]. A person of this type bestows good things on the principal element in him, namely, the intellect; and he induces all parts of the soul to obey the intellect. But the more someone loves an object, the more he loves what is more principal in it. It is evident then that the man who wishes to be eminent in good works loves himself in a high degree.
Tertio ibi, quemadmodum autem etc., probat quod supposuerat: scilicet quod ille qui amat id quod est principalissimum in ipso scilicet intellectum vel rationem, maxime amat seipsum. Et hoc ostendit tribus rationibus. Quarum prima est, quod civitas maxime videtur esse id quod est principalissimum in ea, unde illud quod faciunt in ea rectores civitatis dicitur tota civitas facere, et eadem ratio est de omni alia re ex pluribus constituta. Unde et homo maxime est id quod est principale in eo, scilicet ratio vel intellectus; et sic ille qui diligit intellectum vel rationem et ei largitur bona, maxime videtur esse philautus, idest amator sui. 1869. Third [a, i, z], at “As a state,” he proves what he had taken for granted: that the person who loves the most dominant element in him, the intellect or reason, particularly loves himself. He proves this by three arguments. The first [a, i, z, aa] is: in the state it is the most authoritative part that especially seems to be the state. Hence what the rulers of a state do is said to be done by the whole state; and the same reason holds for any other composite of several parts. Consequently, in man it is his reason or intellect, his principal element, that especially seems to be man. Therefore, he who loves his intellect or reason, and treats it well seems to be philautos or a lover of self most of all.
Secundam rationem ponit ibi: et continens et cetera. Dicitur enim aliquis continens quasi se tenens et incontinens quasi se non tenens, et hoc inquantum homo retinet intellectum sedendo (ad) eius iudicium per continentiam vel non retinet per incontinentiam, quasi unusquisque homo sit hoc, idest suus intellectus. Et ita videtur quod ille homo vere se amet qui amat intellectum. 1870. He presents the second argument [a, i, z, bb] at “Furthermore.” Someone is said to be continent because he controls himself and incontinent because he does not. It is to the extent that a man observes reason by following its judgment, rather than repudiates reason on account of incontinence that he is this element, i.e., his intellect. So it seems that such a man truly loves himself who loves his intellect.
Tertiam rationem ponit ibi, et egisse videntur et cetera. Et dicit, quod illa quae homines faciunt per rationem maxime videntur ipsimet fecisse et voluntarie facta esse: quae autem homo facit per concupiscentiam vel iram quasi non videtur ipse fecisse propria voluntate, sed extraneo motu ductus. Et sic patet quod homo est praecipue id quod est secundum intellectum et rationem. Unde maxime se amat, quando amat intellectum et rationem. 1871. He states the third argument [a, i, z, cc] at “And the actions.” He observes that men’s reasoned actions seem to be theirs in the most proper sense and to be done voluntarily. What a man does because of concupiscence or anger he does not seem to do by his own will but under the direction of an external impulse. It is evident then that man is in a particular fashion what conforms to his intellect and reason. Hence he especially loves himself when he loves his intellect and reason.
Deinde cum dicit: quoniam quidem igitur etc., ostendit cui competit secundum praedictum modum esse amatorem sui. Et dicit, manifestum esse ex praedictis, quod unusquisque est hoc, scilicet intellectus vel ratio. Vel quia aliqua alia concurrunt ad esse hominis, potest dici quod homo maxime est hoc, scilicet intellectus vel ratio, quia hoc est formale et completivum speciei humanae. Manifestum est etiam quod virtuosus maxime diligit hoc, scilicet intellectum et rationem, quia totaliter conservat ipsum et in omnibus obedit ei. Unde manifestum est quod virtuosus maxime est philautus, id est amator sui. 1872. Next [a, ii], at “It is evident then,” he shows who is properly a lover of self in this sense. He remarks that it is obvious from the discussion (1869, 1870, 1870 that everyone is his intellect or reason, or rather (since several other ingredients concur in the essence of man) it can be said that man is especially this part, i.e., intellect or reason because it is the formal and perfective element of the human species. Obviously, the virtuous person loves his intellect or reason exceedingly, because he perfectly preserves and universally obeys it. Hence it is clear that the virtuous person is philautos or a lover of self.
Deinde cum dicit secundum alteram speciem etc., ostendit hunc modum amandi se, differre specie a praemisso. Et dicit quod virtuosus est amator sui secundum alteram speciem amandi se ab eo quod exprobratur, ut supra dictum est. Et assignat duas differentias: quarum una est ex parte actionis. Virtuosus enim amat seipsum inquantum vivit secundum rationem. Sed ille qui vituperatur vivit secundum passionem. Sequitur enim passiones irrationabilis animae, ut supra dictum est. Alia vero differentia est ex parte finis. Nam virtuosus amat se ipsum in quantum sibi appetit id quod est simpliciter bonum, ille autem qui vituperatur amat seipsum, inquantum appetit sibi id quod apparet bonum utile, cum tamen sit nocivum. 1873. Then [a, iii], at “in a sense other than” he explains that this manner of loving oneself differs in kind from that previously discussed. He notes that the virtuous person is a lover of self according to a kind of self-love that differs from the brand censured before (1863-1865). He gives two differences: one, on the part of the activity, for the good man loves himself inasmuch as he lives according to reason. For the man who is blamed lives according to passion, following the irrational desires of his soul, as has been pointed out (1864). The other difference exists on the part of the motive. For the good man loves himself inasmuch as he seeks for himself what is the absolute good. But the man who is blamed loves himself inasmuch as he seeks what seems a useful good but is really harmful.
Deinde cum dicit: circa bonas quidem igitur actiones etc., ostendit quod amare seipsum hoc secundo modo est laudabile. Et primo ostendit propositum. Secundo excludit ab eo qui secundo modo amat seipsum id propter quod amator sui vituperatur, ibi: verum enim quod de studioso et cetera. Circa primum tria facit. Primo ostendit, quod ille qui amat seipsum secundum rationem est laudandus. Talis enim, ut dictum est, ad hoc studet, ut superexcellat in operibus virtutum. Manifestum est autem quod omnes acceptant et laudant illos qui student ad bonas actiones differenter ab aliis, idest superabundantius aliis: et sic patet quod ille qui amat se secundum virtutem est laudabilis. 1874. At “But those who” [2, b] he shows that to love oneself in the second way is praiseworthy. First [b, i] he presents his proposition. Then [b, ii], at “It is true etc.,” he excludes from the person who loves himself in the second way that for which the lover of self is blamed. He discusses the first point under three headings. First [b, i, x] he shows that the man who loves himself according to reason is worthy of praise. For this man is anxious to excel in good works, as we have indicated (1867). But it is evident that everyone approves and praises those who busy themselves with virtuous activity in a manner different from other men, i.e., in a more extensive manner. It is obvious, therefore, that the person who loves himself according to virtue is to be praised.
Secundo ibi: omnibus autem etc., ostendit quod etiam est utilis et sibi et aliis. Dictum enim est quod ille qui amat se ipsum secundum virtutem studet superexcellenter bene agere. Si autem omnes contenderent ad bonum, ita scilicet quod unusquisque intenderet excellere alium in bonitate optime agendo, sequeretur quod omnes communiter haberent ea quibus indigent; quia unus alteri subveniret, et propria uniuscuiusque fierent illa quae sunt maxima bonorum, scilicet virtutes. 1875. Second [b, i, y], at “And if everyone,” Aristotle shows that this person is also helpful both to himself and others. We just said that he who loves himself according to virtue is eager to perform exceptionally good actions. But if all strove for what is good so that everyone aimed to excel his neighbor in virtue by doing his best the whole community would have its needs satisfied. The reason is that one would come to the assistance of another and the goods that are best, viz., virtues, would become the property of each.
Tertio ibi: quare bonum etc., infert duo corollaria ex praedictis. Quorum primum est oportunum esse quod bonus amet se ipsum, quia bona agendo et se et alios iuvabit. Sed non oportet quod malus amet seipsum; quia sequendo pravas passiones, et seipsum laedet privando se virtutibus, et proximos privando eos bonis sensibilibus. 1876. Third [b, i, z], at “Therefore, it is reasonable,” Aristotle deduces two corollaries from the discussion. The first [b, i, z, aa] is that it is best for the good man to love himself because in doing good he helps both himself and others. But it is unfortunate that the bad man loves himself because in following his evil desires he will injure both himself and his neighbors by depriving himself of virtue and them of physical goods.
Secundo ponit ibi, malo quidem igitur et cetera. Dicit quod in malo homine contraria sunt ea quae agit et quae oportet ipsum agere. Agit enim contra intellectum et rationem. Omnis autem intellectus eligit id quod est optimum sibiipsi. Et ita malus non agit ea quae oportet ipsum agere. Sed hoc convenit virtuoso qui in omnibus obedit intellectui. 1877. He states the second corollary at “As a result” [b, i, z, bb], noting that what the evil man does is opposed to what he ought to do; he is acting against his intellect or reason. Rut the intellect always chooses what is best for itself. Thus the bad man does not do what he should do. On the other hand it is characteristic of the virtuous man to obey his reason always.
Deinde cum dicit verum enim quod de studioso etc., excludit ab eo qui amat se secundum virtutem id quod supra positum est in accusationem amantis seipsum, scilicet quod nihil facit propter alium. Et circa hoc tria facit. Primo proponit quod intendit. Secundo manifestat propositum, ibi, paucum enim tempus et cetera. Tertio epilogando concludit veritatem quaestionis, ibi, sic quidem igitur et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, verum esse quod dicitur de virtuoso, quod multa faciet gratia amicorum et prime, id est maxime inter omnes alios, et etiam si oporteat eum mori, non deseret amicum. Pecunias vero et honores et omnia exteriora bona circa quae homines pugnant quasi proiiciet et contemnet propter amicum: per quae omnia procurat sibiipsi bonum, scilicet honestum quod est eminentius. Unde et in hoc etiam magis amat seipsum, quod sibi maius bonum procurat. 1878. Then [b, ii], at “It is true,” he excludes from the person who loves himself according to virtue the complaint previously lodged (1855-1865) against a lover of self, that he does nothing for anyone else. He treats this point in a threefold manner. First [ii, x] he states his intention. Next [ii, y], at “For he will prefer etc.,” he explains his intention. Finally [ii, z], at “A person then ought etc.,” he sums up the truth of the question in an epilogue. He notes first the truth of the statement about the good man, that he, far beyond all other men, will do many acts for the sake of his friends and country. Even if it is necessary to die for a friend he will not forsake him. He will, as it were, cast aside and disdain wealth, honor, and all other external goods for which men strive, for the sake of a friend; by means of all this he procures for himself an honorable good that is more excellent. Hence even in this way he shows more love for himself and procures his greater good.
Deinde cum dicit paucum enim tempus etc., manifestat quod dixerat. Et primo quantum ad mortem quam virtuosus sustinet pro amico. Secundo quantum ad hoc quod propter amicum contemnit exteriora bona, ibi, et pecunias et cetera. Tertio quantum ad actiones virtuosas quas quandoque virtuosus amico concedit, ibi, contingit autem et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod ideo moriens pro amico procurat sibiipsi bonum, quia magis eligit per paucum tempus multum delectari in magno opere virtutis, quam per multum tempus quiete, idest mediocriter delectari in mediocribus operibus virtutis. 1879. Next [ii, y], at “For he will he explains his statement. First [ii, y, aa], concerning death that a good man will undergo for his friend. Then [ii, y, bb], at “Likewise, they throw away etc.,” concerning the fact that he contemns external goods for his friend. Finally [ii, y, cc], at “He may even etc.,” concerning virtuous actions which a good man sometimes entrusts to his friends. He remarks first that the good man dying for his friend procures good for himself, because he chooses to delight for a short time in a brilliant work of virtue rather than for a long time in a quiet existence, i.e., indifferently in mediocre works of virtue.
Et magis eliget excellenter bene vivere per unum annum, quam per multos annos mediocriter. Et similiter etiam magis eliget unam actionem bonam et magnam, quam multas bonas et parvas. Hoc autem accidit his qui moriuntur propter virtutem; quia licet minus vivant, in una tamen sola actione, qua se pro amico exponunt, maius bonum faciunt, quam in aliis multis actionibus. Et ita in hoc quod se exponunt morti pro amicis virtuose agendo, magnum bonum sibiipsis eligunt. Et in hoc manifestum est quod maxime se amant. 1880. He prefers an illustrious life of a year to an ordinary life of many years. Similarly, he prefers a single notable good deed to many insignificant ones. Although those who die for virtue may live more briefly, nevertheless by endangering themselves for a friend they do a greater good in this one action than in many other actions. Thus, in acting virtuously by exposing their lives for a friend they choose a great good for themselves. From this it is clear that they love themselves very much.
Deinde cum dicit: et pecunias etc., manifestat idem quantum ad contemptum exteriorum bonorum. Et primo quantum ad pecuniam. Et dicit quod virtuosi causa amicorum proiiciunt, idest contemnunt vel dispergunt pecunias, ita scilicet quod eorum amici plura circa pecunias accipiant, et in hoc etiam magis se amant secundum veritatem. Dum enim aliquis pecuniam concedit amico et sibiipsi acquirit bonum honestum, manifestum est quod maius bonum sibiipsi attribuit, et hic magis se amat. 1881. At “Likewise, they throw away” [ii, y, bb] he explains this point concerning contempt for external goods. First [bb, a’] in respect to money. He says that virtuous people throw away, i.e., despise or disperse, money for the sake of friends so that their friends gain more with the money. This way also they really love themselves more; for when a person gives money to a friend and acquires an honorable good for himself, obviously he assigns the greater good to himself, and under these circumstances loves himself more.
Secundo ibi: et circa honores etc., ostendit idem circa honores et dignitates. Et dicit quod eodem modo se habet circa honores et principatus: omnia enim haec virtuosus de facili derelinquet amico, quia hoc ipsum est quoddam bonum: (id est) opus virtutis et laudabile. Et sic patet quod virtuosus convenienter facit pro omnibus: (id est) loco omnium exteriorum bonorum, eligens bonum virtutis, quod est maximum, et sic maxime diliget se ipsum. 1882. Second [bb, b’], at “He acts,” he explains the same point in respect to honors and dignities, noting that the good man behaves in the same way towards honors and position. For he readily gives up all these preferments for a friend, since this very action is a virtuous and laudable work. Clearly then the virtuous person acts in a reasonable manner when he chooses the great good of virtue instead of all external goods; and so he loves himself most.
Deinde cum dicit: contingit autem etc., ostendit idem quantum ad ipsas actiones virtutis. Et dicit, quod contingit quandoque quod virtuosus etiam actiones virtuosas concedat suo amico: puta si sit aliquod opus virtutis faciendum per ipsum vel per alterum, concedit quod fiat per amicum, ut ex hoc proficiat et laudetur. Et tamen in hoc etiam accipit sibi id quod est melius. Melius est enim et magis virtuosum, quod ipse sit causa amico suo talia faciendi, quam etiam si ipse facit, praesertim cum sibi remaneat opportunitas, alias talia vel maiora faciendi. Sic igitur patet quod virtuosus plus sibi tribuit de bono quantum ad omnia laudabilia, et sic maxime amat seipsum. 1883. Then [ii, y, cc], at “He may even,” he shows the same point about virtuous actions themselves. He observes that the virtuous man sometimes even defers to his friend in doing good actions. For instance, if a virtuous work is to be done by him or another person, he lets his friend do it to derive profit and praise in this way. However, even here the virtuous person takes what is better for himself; for it is better and more virtuous to cause his friend to do these actions than to do them himself. This is particularly true when the opportunity remains for him to do the same or greater deeds at another time. Thus it is evident that the good man assigns to himself the larger share of virtue in praiseworthy activity, and so has much love for himself.
Ultimo autem epilogando concludit, quod oportet esse amatorem sui sic, sicut dictum est de virtuoso; non autem sicut multi homines, qui scilicet non sunt virtuosi, amant seipsos. 1884. He concludes by way of summary [ii, z] that a person ought to be a lover of self as we said the good man is, but not as most men, who are not virtuous, are lovers of themselves.

A Doubt on a Happy Man’s Need of Friends
Chapter 9
ἀμφισβητεῖται δὲ καὶ περὶ τὸν εὐδαίμονα, εἰ δεήσεται φίλων ἢ μή. Some doubt whether or not a happy man needs friends.
      A.  He objects for the negative.
            1.   BY AN ARGUMENT. — 1886
οὐθὲν γάρ φασι δεῖν φίλων τοῖς μακαρίοις καὶ αὐτάρκεσιν· ὑπάρχειν γὰρ αὐτοῖς τἀγαθά· αὐτάρκεις οὖν ὄντας οὐδενὸς προσδεῖσθαι, τὸν δὲ φίλον, ἕτερον αὐτὸν ὄντα, πορίζειν ἃ δι' αὑτοῦ ἀδυνατεῖ· ὅθεν It is said that because happy people are self-sufficient they do not need friends; since they have all good things, being self-sufficing, they need nothing else. Now a friend is looked upon as another self who provides what a man himself cannot.
            2.   A PROVERB IN FAVOR OF THE SAME VIEW. — 1887
ὅταν ὁ δαίμων εὖ διδῷ, τί δεῖ φίλων;
Hence the saying: “If fortune favors us, what need of friends?”
      B.  (He objects) for the affirmative.
            1.   (HE OFFERS THE FIRST ARGUMENT.) — 1888
ἔοικε δ' ἀτόπῳ τὸ πάντ' ἀπονέμοντας τἀγαθὰ τῷ εὐδαίμονι φίλους μὴ ἀποδιδόναι, ὃ δοκεῖ τῶν ἐκτὸς ἀγαθῶν μέγιστον εἶναι. There seems to be an inconsistency in attributing to a happy man all goods but not friends since a friend seems to be the greatest of external goods.
                   a.   He presents (it). — 1889
εἴ τε φίλου μᾶλλόν ἐστι τὸ εὖ ποιεῖν ἢ πάσχειν, καὶ ἔστι τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς τὸ εὐεργετεῖν, κάλλιον δ' εὖ ποιεῖν φίλους ὀθνείων, τῶν εὖ πεισομένων δεήσεται ὁ σπουδαῖος. If it is more characteristic of a friend to give than to receive a benefit, more proper to virtue and a virtuous man to do good for others, and better to be kind to friends than strangers, then the virtuous person will need friends whom he can benefit.
                   b.   He deduces a doubt from the premises. — 1890
διὸ καὶ ἐπιζητεῖται πότερον ἐν εὐτυχίαις μᾶλλον δεῖ φίλων ἢ ἐν ἀτυχίαις, ὡς καὶ τοῦ ἀτυχοῦντος δεομένου τῶν εὐεργετησόντων καὶ τῶν εὐτυχούντων οὓς εὖ ποιήσουσιν. This is why the related question arises: does a man need friends more in prosperity or in adversity? Undoubtedly, the unfortunate man needs them to help him, and the fortunate man needs friends he can help.
            3.   HE PRESENTS THE THIRD ARGUMENT. — 1891
ἄτοπον δ' ἴσως καὶ τὸ μονώτην ποιεῖν τὸν μακάριον· οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἕλοιτ' ἂν καθ' αὑτὸν τὰ πάντ' ἔχειν ἀγαθά· πολιτικὸν γὰρ ὁ ἄνθρωπος καὶ συζῆν πεφυκός. καὶ τῷ εὐδαίμονι δὴ τοῦθ' ὑπάρχει· τὰ γὰρ τῇ φύσει ἀγαθὰ ἔχει, δῆλον δ' ὡς μετὰ φίλων καὶ ἐπιεικῶν κρεῖττον ἢ μετ' ὀθνείων καὶ τῶν τυχόντων συνημερεύειν. δεῖ ἄρα τῷ εὐδαίμονι φίλων. It seems strange indeed to make the happy man a solitary. For no one would choose to have the whole world if he had to live alone, since man is naturally a social animal and fitted by nature to live with others. Therefore, the happy man lives in this way because he has what is naturally good. But obviously it is better to live with friends and virtuous men than with strangers and chance acquaintances. Therefore the happy man needs friends.
      A.  He shows how those who deny that a happy man needs friends may be saying what is true. — 1892-1893
τί οὖν λέγουσιν οἱ πρῶτοι, καὶ πῇ ἀληθεύουσιν; ἢ ὅτι οἱ πολλοὶ φίλους οἴονται τοὺς χρησίμους εἶναι; τῶν τοιούτων μὲν οὖν οὐδὲν δεήσεται ὁ μακάριος, ἐπειδὴ τἀγαθὰ ὑπάρχει αὐτῷ· οὐδὲ δὴ τῶν διὰ τὸ ἡδύ, ἢ ἐπὶ μικρόν ἡδὺς γὰρ ὁ βίος ὢν οὐδὲν δεῖται ἐπεισάκτου ἡδονῆς· οὐ δεόμενος δὲ τῶν τοιούτων φίλων οὐ δοκεῖ δεῖσθαι φίλων. What then are the followers of the first opinion holding, and to what extent is their opinion true? Do they, like the majority, look upon friends as useful people? Certainly the happy man will not need such friends for he has useful goods already; nor will he need those whom one chooses for their pleasantness, except to a slight extent. Indeed the happy man does not require pleasure from the outside, for his life is pleasant in itself. Since then he does not stand in need of friends of this sort, he seems not to need friends at all.
      B.  How they may be saying what is false.
                   a.   It is not true that... (he) does not need friends... — 1894-1896
τὸ δ' οὐκ ἔστιν ἴσως ἀληθές. ἐν ἀρχῇ γὰρ εἴρηται ὅτι ἡ εὐδαιμονία ἐνέργειά τις ἐστίν, ἡ δ' ἐνέργεια δῆλον ὅτι γίνεται καὶ οὐχ ὑπάρχει ὥσπερ κτῆμά τι. εἰ δὲ τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν ἐστὶν ἐν τῷ ζῆν καὶ ἐνεργεῖν, τοῦ δ' ἀγαθοῦ ἡ ἐνέργεια σπουδαία καὶ ἡδεῖα καθ' αὑτήν, καθάπερ ἐν ἀρχῇ εἴρηται, ἔστι δὲ καὶ τὸ οἰκεῖον τῶν ἡδέων, θεωρεῖν δὲ μᾶλλον τοὺς πέλας δυνάμεθα ἢ ἑαυτοὺς καὶ τὰς ἐκείνων πράξεις ἢ τὰς οἰκείας, αἱ τῶν σπουδαίων δὲ πράξεις φίλων ὄντων ἡδεῖαι τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς ἄμφω γὰρ ἔχουσι τὰ τῇ φύσει ἡδέα· ὁ μακάριος δὴ φίλων τοιούτων δεήσεται, εἴπερ θεωρεῖν προαιρεῖται πράξεις ἐπιεικεῖς καὶ οἰκείας, τοιαῦται δ' αἱ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ φίλου ὄντος. Certainly this is not true. For we said in the beginning that happiness is an activity; and activity obviously is a coming into being and is not like something in one’s possession. But happiness consists in living and doing, and the activity of the good man is virtuous and pleasurable in itself, as we noted earlier; of all pleasures, happiness is proper to a virtuous man. Now we can study our neighbors better than ourselves and their actions better than our own. Evidently then virtuous persons find pleasure in the actions of friends who are good men, since they have both qualities that are naturally pleasurable. The happy man, therefore, will need such friends inasmuch as he wants to study actions that are good and his own, and the actions of the virtuous man who is his friend are of this nature.
                   b.   He presents the second argument. — 1897-1898
οἴονταί τε δεῖν ἡδέως ζῆν τὸν εὐδαίμονα. μονώτῃ μὲν οὖν χαλεπὸς ὁ βίος· οὐ γὰρ ῥᾴδιον καθ' αὑτὸν ἐνεργεῖν συνεχῶς, μεθ' ἑτέρων δὲ καὶ πρὸς ἄλλους ῥᾷον. ἔσται οὖν ἡ ἐνέργεια συνεχεστέρα, ἡδεῖα οὖσα καθ' αὑτήν, ὃ δεῖ περὶ τὸν μακάριον εἶναι· ὁ γὰρ σπουδαῖος, ᾗ σπουδαῖος, ταῖς κατ' ἀρετὴν πράξεσι χαίρει, ταῖς δ' ἀπὸ κακίας δυσχεραίνει, καθάπερ ὁ μουσικὸς τοῖς καλοῖς μέλεσιν ἥδεται, ἐπὶ δὲ τοῖς φαύλοις λυπεῖται. Besides, people think that a happy man should live pleasantly. Now the man who lives alone does have a hard life, since it is not easy to keep up a continuous activity by oneself. But with others and in relation to others it is less difficult. Therefore, his activity will be more continuous and delightful in itself, as it ought to be for the happy man. Indeed the good man, as such, rejoices in virtuous actions but is distressed by those which arise from wickedness; he is like a musician pleased by good music but irritated by bad.
                   c.   He presents the third argument. — 1899
γίνοιτο δ' ἂν καὶ ἄσκησίς τις τῆς ἀρετῆς ἐκ τοῦ συζῆν τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς, καθάπερ καὶ Θέογνίς φησιν. Then too a companionship in virtue results from living with good men, as Theognis remarks.
Dubitatur autem et circa felicem et cetera. Postquam philosophus solvit quaestionem quae movebatur ex parte amantis respectu suiipsius, hic solvit dubitationem quae movetur ex parte amantis respectu alterius. Et primo proponit dubitationem. Secundo ostendit dubitationem esse rationabilem, ibi, nihil enim aiunt et cetera. Tertio solvit, ibi, quid igitur et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod dubitatio est circa felicem, utrum indigeat amicis vel non. 1885. After the Philosopher has investigated and solved the question that was raised about a person loving himself, he now solves the question that was raised of a person loving another. First [I] he proposes the doubt. Then [II], at “it is said etc.,” he shows that the doubt is reasonable. Finally [III], at “What then are etc.,” he solves it. He notes first that there is a doubt whether or not the happy man needs friends.
Deinde cum dicit nihil enim aiunt etc., ostendit dubitationem esse rationabilem, obiiciendo ad utramque partem. Et primo obiicit ad partem negativam. Secundo ad partem affirmativam, ibi, assimilatur autem et cetera. Circa primum obiicit dupliciter. Primo quidem per rationem. Dicunt enim quidam, quod beati, cum sint sibi per se sufficientes, non indigent amicis. Cum enim omnia bona ipsis existant habentes per se bonorum sufficientiam, nullo alio videntur indigere. Amicus autem videtur esse necessarius, quia cum sit alter ipse, tribuit ea quae homo per seipsum habere non potest; et sic videtur quod (felix) sive beatus non indigeat amicis. 1886. Then [II], at “It is said,” he shows that the doubt is reasonable by raising difficulties for both sides. First [II, A] he objects for the negative; next [II, B], at “There seems to etc.,” for the affirmative. He objects in a twofold manner for the initial position. First [A, 1] by an argument. Some say that happy people are self-sufficing and do not need friends; they have all good things, and so, being complete in themselves, they seem to need nothing else. But a friend, inasmuch as he is another self, seems to be necessary to provide what a man cannot obtain by himself. So, apparently, a happy person does not need friends.
Secundo ibi: unde: cum Daemon etc., inducit ad idem quoddam proverbium quod tempore gentilium dicebatur, scilicet quod cum Daemon aliquid boni det, non est opus amicis. Ponebant enim gentiles, et maxime Platonici, hunc esse providentiae ordinem quod res humanae mediantibus Daemonibus per divinam providentiam gubernarentur; Daemonum tamen dicebant quosdam esse bonos et quosdam malos; est ergo sensus proverbii quod, cum per divinam providentiam homini proveniunt bona, sicut videtur contingere felicibus, non indiget homo humano auxilio amicorum. 1887. Second [A, 2], at “Hence the saying,” he offers a pagan proverb in favor of the same view: “When the spirit is benign there is no need of friends.” The pagans, especially the Platonists, believed the order of providence was such that human affairs were governed by divine dispensation through intermediary spirits. Some of the spirits, they held, were favorable; others malevolent. Therefore, the proverb says that when a man enjoys the favor of divine providence, as happy people seem to do, he has no need of friends.
Deinde cum dicit assimilatur autem etc., obiicit ad partem contrariam tribus rationibus. Videtur enim esse inconveniens, quod omnia exteriora bona dentur felici, et amici non sibi dentur, cum tamen amicus sit aliquid maximum inter exteriora bona. 1888. At “There seems to be” [II, B] be objects for the opposite side by three arguments. (He offers the first [II, B, 1].) It seems unreasonable to assign all external goods to a happy man, and not assign him friends, since a friend is the greatest of external goods.
Secundam rationem ponit ibi: sique amici et cetera. Et circa hoc duo facit. Primo ponit rationem. Ut enim supra dictum est: magis pertinet ad amicum benefacere, quam benepati. Proprium autem est virtutis benefacere. Felicitas autem consistit in operatione virtutis, ut in primo dictum est. Et sic necesse est felicem esse virtuosum, et per consequens, quod benefaciat. Melius autem est quod homo benefaciat amicis quam extraneis, ceteris paribus; quia hoc homo delectabilius et promptius facit. Ergo felix cum sit virtuosus indiget amicis, quibus benefaciat. 1889. He treats the second argument at “If it is more characteristic” [II, B, 2], handling it in a twofold manner, First [2, a] he presents the argument. We have pointed out already that it is more characteristic of a friend to give than to receive a benefit. But it is proper to virtue to impart benefits; and happiness consists in virtuous action, as indicated in the first book (127-128). Ile happy man then is necessarily virtuous and beneficent, But it is better for a man to be good to friends than strangers, other things being equal, because he does this with more pleasure and alacrity. Consequently, since a happy person is virtuous he needs friends whom he can benefit.
Secundo ibi, propter quod et quaeritur etc., concludit ex praemissis quamdam dubitationem: utrum scilicet homo magis indigeat amicis in bonis fortunis, quam (in) infortuniis: in utraque enim fortuna videtur homo indigere amicis; infortunatus enim indiget amicis, qui ei benefaciant, sed bene fortunatus indiget amicis quibus ipse benefaciat. Hanc autem dubitationem inferius prosequetur. 1890. Second [2, b], at “This is why,” he deduces a doubt from the premises: whether a man has need of friends more in adversity than in prosperity. He seems to need friends in both circumstances, for the unfortunate man needs friends to help him, and the fortunate man needs friends he can help. But this doubt will be pursued later (1925-1943).
Tertiam rationem ponit ibi, inconveniens autem et cetera. Et dicit, quod hoc videtur esse inconveniens, quod beatus sit solitarius. Hoc enim est contra communem omnium electionem: nullus enim eligeret ut semper viveret secundum se ipsum, scilicet solus, etsi omnia alia bona haberet; quia homo naturaliter est animal politicum et aptus natus convivere aliis. Quia igitur felix habet ea quae sunt naturaliter bona homini, conveniens est quod habeat cum quibus convivat. Manifestum est autem, quod melius est ipsum convivere amicis et virtuosis, quam extraneis et quibuscumque. Sic ergo manifestum est, quod felix indiget amicis. 1891. He presents the third argument at “It seems strange indeed” [II, B, 3], saying that it appears unreasonable for the happy man to be a solitary; for this is contrary to everyone’s choice. No one would choose to live alone all the time, even after he had all other goods, because man is naturally a social animal and fitted by nature to live with others. Since, therefore, the happy person has what is naturally good for man, he should have people to live with. Obviously it is better for him to live with friends and virtuous men than strangers and others. Thus, it is clear that the happy man needs friends.
Deinde cum dicit: quid igitur dicunt etc., solvit praedictam dubitationem. Et primo ostendit, quomodo verum dicant qui negant felicem indigere amicis. Secundo quomodo dicant falsum, ibi, hoc autem non est et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod cum probatum sit, quod felix indigeat amicis, oportet considerare, quid sit quod primi dicunt, negantes felicem indigere amicis, et quantum ad quid verum dicant. 1892. Next [III], at “What then arc,” he solves the preceding doubt. First [III, A] he shows how those, who deny that a happy man needs friends, may be saying what is true; then [III, B], at “Certainly this is not etc.,” how they may be saying what is false. He says first that since we have just proved that the happy man does need friends we must consider what the followers of the first opinion are holding, when they deny the happy man’s need of friends, and to what extent their opinion may be true.
Circa quod considerandum est quod multi existimant illos esse amicos, qui sunt eis utiles in collatione exteriorum bonorum, quae sola populares homines cognoscunt. Talibus ergo amicis non indiget beatus, quia sufficit sibi in bonis quae habet. Similiter etiam non indiget amicis propter delectabile, nisi parum, inquantum scilicet in conversatione humana necesse est quandoque uti ludicris ad quietem, sicut in quarto dictum est. Felicis enim vita cum sit delectabilis secundum seipsam, ut in primo dictum est, non indiget superinducta delectatione, propter quam sint sibi necessarii amici. Et, cum non indigeat talibus amicis, scilicet utilibus et delectabilibus, videtur non indigere amicis. 1893. On this question we should note that most men consider as friends those useful to them in the bestowal of external goods—and these alone are appreciated by the common run of men. Therefore, the happy man does not need friends like this, for the goods he has are enough. Likewise, he does not need friends for pleasantness, except in that minor way-that we need jests for relaxation. Cf. the fourth book (844-845), Indeed, the happy man does not require external pleasure for which such friends are absolutely necessary, for his life is pleasant in itself, as we have indicated in the first book (145)Since then he does not stand in need of these useful and pleasant friends, it seems that he has no need of friends.
Deinde cum dicit: hoc autem non est forte verum etc., ostendit non esse omnino verum quod dicunt. Et primo hoc ostendit quibusdam rationibus moralibus. Secundo per quamdam rationem magis naturalem, ibi, naturalius autem intendentibus et cetera. Circa primum ponit tres rationes, primo dicens non esse verum quod dictum est, scilicet quod si felix non indiget amicis utilibus et delectabilibus, quod propter hoc non indigeat amicis. Sunt enim amici quidam propter virtutem quibus indiget. Cuius prima ratio est, quia sicut in primo dictum est, felicitas est operatio quaedam. 1894. Then [III, B], at “Certainly this is not,” he shows that their statement is not entirely true. First [III, B, 1] he proves this by moral arguments; next [Lect. 11; III, B, 2], at “Looking more profoundly etc.” (B.1170 a 13), by a more intrinsic reason. He offers three reasons for the initial point. First [1, a] it is not true that, if the happy man does not need useful and pleasant friends, he does not therefore need any friends at all, as affirmed previously (1892-1893). For there are virtuous friends whom he does need. The primary reason for this is that happiness is an operation (144, 145, 180, 1267).
Manifestum est autem, quod operatio consistit in fieri et non est quiddam existens ad modum rerum permanentium, sicut si esset aliqua possessio, qua habita, esset homo felix, ita quod non oporteret eum aliquid operari. Sed esse felicem consistit in vivere et operari continue. Oportet autem, quod operatio boni viri sit bona et delectabilis secundum seipsam, quia est per se bona, sicut in primo libro dictum est. Est autem operatio bona inter delectabilia proprium delectabile virtuosi non enim esset virtuosus qui non delectaretur in operatione virtutis, ut in primo dictum est. Requiritur ergo ad felicitatem, quod felix delectetur in opere virtutis. 1895. It is evident that operation consists in doing; it is not an entity existing in the manner of permanent things, as if it were a possession that, once obtained, a man would be happy without the necessity of doing anything. But happiness consists in continual living and doing. Now the operation of the virtuous man must be good and pleasurable in itself because it is essentially good, as indicated in the first book (156). But among pleasures good operation is the pleasure proper to the virtuous man, for the person who would not delight in virtuous operation would not be virtuous, as we stated in the first book (158).
Non autem possumus delectari nisi in eo quod cognoscimus, magis autem possumus speculari proximos, quam nos ipsos; et actiones illorum quam nostras, quia uniuscuiusque iudicium in propriis magis deficit propter privatum affectum, quem habet ad seipsum. Sic igitur patet, quod bonis hominibus delectabiles sunt actiones eorum, qui sunt et boni et amici, in quibus inveniuntur ambo, quae sunt secundum naturam delectabilia, scilicet bonum et amatum. Sic igitur beatus indigebit talibus amicis, scilicet virtuosis, in quantum quaerit considerare bonas actiones et sibi appropriatas, quales quidem sunt actiones viri boni, qui est amicus. Quia enim amicus hominis est quasi alter ipse, actiones amici sunt sibi quasi propriae. 1896. We can have pleasure only in what we know. But we can examine our neighbors better than ourselves and their actions better than our own be cause every man is a bad judge of his own case on account of the private affection he has for himself. Evidently then virtuous persons find pleasure in the actions of those who are both virtuous men and friends of theirs; in them are found both qualities pleasurable by nature, namely, the good and the lovable. In this way, therefore, the happy man will need these virtuous friends inasmuch as he seeks to study the virtuous actions of the good man who is his friend. Since a man’s friend is another self, so to speak, the friend’s actions will be his own in a sense.
Secundam rationem ponit ibi existimant autem et cetera. Dicit quod communiter existimatur quod felicem oportet delectabiliter vivere. Est enim delectatio unum eorum quae requiruntur ad felicitatem, ut in primo dictum est. Ille autem qui solitarius vivit, patitur difficilem, idest gravem vitam. Oportet enim quod interrumpatur sua delectatio quae operationem consequitur. Non enim est facile quod homo secundum seipsum, idest solitarius existens, continue operetur; sed hoc est facile si cum alteris existat, fit enim quaedam vicissitudo operationum, dum ad seinvicem bona operantur. Et sic continuatur delectatio. 1897. He presents the second argument at “Besides, people think” [1, b]. it is generally thought, he says, that the happy man should live pleasantly; for pleasure is one of the conditions for happiness-we have noted this in the first book (158). But he who lives by himself experiences a hard and burdensome life; pleasure that he enjoys following upon activity must be interrupted, for it is not easy for a man to be continuously active by himself, i.e., when living alone. But it is easy if he lives with another, since a kind of interchange of activities takes place while they perform good actions for one another. In this way pleasure is continued.
Si igitur homo cum amicis moretur, operatio eius quae est delectabilis secundum seipsam, scilicet virtuosa, erit magis continua. Et hoc oportet existere circa beatum, ut scilicet continue delectetur in operibus virtutis. Virtuosus enim, inquantum huiusmodi, gaudet in actionibus virtuosis, sive a se, sive ab aliis factis. Et contristatur in operibus contrariis quae ex malitia alicuius procedunt, sicut musicus delectatur in bonis melodiis et offenditur in malis. 1898. If then a man lives with friends, his virtuous activity delightful in itself will be more continuous. And this ought to be true for the happy man so that he may have uninterrupted pleasure in works of virtue. For the good man as such rejoices in virtuous actions performed either by himself or others. Moreover, he is grieved by contrary actions arising from another’s wickedness, like a musician who is pleased by good music but irritated by bad.
Tertiam rationem ponit ibi, fiet autem et cetera. Et dicit quod ex hoc quod virtuosus convivit amicabiliter bonis viris, (fiet) askesis, id est consociatio in virtute, sicut dixit Theonis, quidam poeta. Et talis societas opportuna est cuilibet virtuoso, sicut et alia humana opera melius perficiuntur in societate. 1899. He presents the third argument at “Then too” [1, c]. Here he observes that because the virtuous person lives on friendly terms with good men there results ascesis or a companionship in virtue, as the poet Theognis has remarked. Such an association is advantageous for anyone disposed to virtue, just as other human activities also are more satisfactorily accomplished in partnership.

Why a Happy Man Needs Friends
Chapter 9
      a.   It is desirable for a happy man to have a friend.
            i.    He proposes his intention. — 1900
φυσικώτερον δ' ἐπισκοποῦσιν ἔοικεν ὁ σπουδαῖος φίλος τῷ σπουδαίῳ τῇ φύσει αἱρετὸς εἶναι. Looking more profoundly into the matter it seems that a virtuous friend is naturally desirable to a virtuous man.
            ii.   He proves his proposition.
                         aa. Existence and life are naturally... desirable.
                               a’  He offers this reason. — 1901
τὸ γὰρ τῇ φύσει ἀγαθὸν εἴρηται ὅτι τῷ σπουδαίῳ ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἡδύ ἐστι καθ' αὑτό. For, as has been noted, what is naturally good is in itself good and desirable to the virtuous person.
                               b’  He states the minor.
                                     a.    THE NATURE OF LIFE. — 1902
τὸ δὲ ζῆν ὁρίζονται τοῖς ζώοις δυνάμει αἰσθήσεως, ἀνθρώποις δ' αἰσθήσεως ἢ νοήσεως· ἡ δὲ δύναμις εἰς τὴν ἐνέργειαν ἀνάγεται, τὸ δὲ κύριον ἐν τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ· ἔοικε δὴ τὸ ζῆν εἶναι κυρίως τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι ἢ νοεῖν. Now life in animals is defined by capacity for perception, in men by capacity for perception and thought. But capacity is reduced to operation, and what is principal consists in operation. Life, therefore, seems to be principally an act of perception or thought.
                                     b.    LIFE IS NATURALLY GOOD AND PLEASANT. — 1903-1905
τὸ δὲ ζῆν τῶν καθ' αὑτὸ ἀγαθῶν καὶ ἡδέων· ὡρισμένον γάρ, τὸ δ' ὡρισμένον τῆς τἀγαθοῦ φύσεως· τὸ δὲ τῇ φύσει ἀγαθὸν καὶ τῷ ἐπιεικεῖ· διόπερ ἔοικε πᾶσιν ἡδὺ εἶναι· Likewise, life is numbered among the things that are good and pleasant in themselves; for it is a determinate entity, and what is determinate pertains to the nature of the good. Now what is good naturally is good to the virtuous person. This is the reason why life seems delightful to all men.
                                     c.    HE REMOVES A DOUBT. — 1906
οὐ δεῖ δὲ λαμβάνειν μοχθηρὰν ζωὴν καὶ διεφθαρμένην, οὐδ' ἐν λύπαις· ἀόριστος γὰρ ἡ τοιαύτη, καθάπερ τὰ ὑπάρχοντα αὐτῇ. However, we must not argue from an evil and corrupt life, or one passed in pain, because such life is indeterminate as are the attributes connected with it. This will be made clearer in the following discussion on pain.
                                     d.    HE DEDUCES A CONCLUSION. — 1907
ἐν τοῖς ἐχομένοις δὲ περὶ τῆς λύπης ἔσται φανερώτερον. εἰ δ' αὐτὸ τὸ ζῆν ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἡδύ ἔοικε δὲ καὶ ἐκ τοῦ πάντας ὀρέγεσθαι αὐτοῦ, καὶ μάλιστα τοὺς ἐπιεικεῖς καὶ μακαρίους· τούτοις γὰρ ὁ βίος αἱρετώτατος, καὶ ἡ τούτων μακαριωτάτη ζωή, If life itself is good and pleasant (and this is apparent from the fact that all men desire it) then it will be especially so to virtuous and happy people. For life is most desirable to such men and their existence happy in the highest degree.
                         bb.      It is delightful and desirable to feel (that existence and life are desirable). — 1908
ὁ δ' ὁρῶν ὅτι ὁρᾷ αἰσθάνεται καὶ ὁ ἀκούων ὅτι ἀκούει καὶ ὁ βαδίζων ὅτι βαδίζει, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὁμοίως ἔστι τι τὸ αἰσθανόμενον ὅτι ἐνεργοῦμεν, ὥστε ἂν αἰσθανώμεθ', ὅτι αἰσθανόμεθα, κἂν νοῶμεν, ὅτι νοοῦμεν, τὸ δ' ὅτι αἰσθανόμεθα ἢ νοοῦμεν, ὅτι ἐσμέν τὸ γὰρ εἶναι ἦν αἰσθάνεσθαι ἢ νοεῖν, τὸ δ' αἰσθάνεσθαι ὅτι ζῇ, τῶν ἡδέων καθ' αὑτό φύσει γὰρ ἀγαθὸν ζωή, τὸ δ' ἀγαθὸν ὑπάρχον ἐν ἑαυτῷ αἰσθάνεσθαι ἡδύ, αἱρετὸν δὲ τὸ ζῆν καὶ μάλιστα τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς, ὅτι τὸ εἶναι ἀγαθόν ἐστιν αὐτοῖς καὶ ἡδύ συναισθανόμενοι γὰρ τοῦ καθ' αὑτὸ ἀγαθοῦ ἥδονται, When a man sees, he is aware that he is seeing; when he hears, he is aware that he hears; when he walks, he is aware that he walks. Similarly in all other activities there is a faculty in us that is aware that we are active; we perceive that we perceive, we understand that we understand, and in this we perceive and understand that we exist. For existence was defined as perception or thought. But perceiving that one is alive is numbered among the b goods that are delightful in themselves because life is by its nature a good, and to perceive the good existing in oneself is pleasurable. Now life is desirable especially for the virtuous because for them it is good and pleasant at the same time; and when they perceive what is good in itself they rejoice.
                   y.   WHAT IS DESIRABLE RESPECTING HIS FRIEND. — 1909-1911
ὡς δὲ πρὸς ἑαυτὸν ἔχει ὁ σπουδαῖος, καὶ πρὸς τὸν φίλον ἕτερος γὰρ αὐτὸς ὁ φίλος ἐστίν· καθάπερ οὖν τὸ αὐτὸν εἶναι αἱρετόν ἐστιν ἑκάστῳ, οὕτω καὶ τὸ τὸν φίλον, ἢ παραπλησίως. τὸ δ' εἶναι ἦν αἱρετὸν διὰ τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι αὑτοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ὄντος, ἡ δὲ τοιαύτη αἴσθησις ἡδεῖα καθ' ἑαυτήν. συναισθάνεσθαι ἄρα δεῖ καὶ τοῦ φίλου ὅτι ἔστιν, τοῦτο δὲ γίνοιτ' ἂν ἐν τῷ συζῆν καὶ κοινωνεῖν λόγων καὶ διανοίας· οὕτω γὰρ ἂν δόξειε τὸ συζῆν ἐπὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων λέγεσθαι, καὶ οὐχ ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῶν βοσκημάτων τὸ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ νέμεσθαι. εἰ δὴ τῷ μακαρίῳ τὸ εἶναι αἱρετόν ἐστι καθ' αὑτό, ἀγαθὸν τῇ φύσει ὂν καὶ ἡδύ, παραπλήσιον δὲ καὶ τὸ τοῦ φίλου ἐστίν, κἂν ὁ φίλος τῶν αἱρετῶν εἴη. But the good man feels toward his friend as toward himself, since his friend is another self. Therefore, just as his own existence is desirable to everyone, so, or nearly so, is his friend’s existence. Now a virtuous person’s existence is desirable because he perceives that it is good, and the perception is desirable in itself. Consequently, he ought to be conscious of his friend’s existence too; this takes place in associating with one another and sharing conversation and thoughts. In this way we understand living together as applied to men; we do not understand it in the sense of feeding together as applied to cattle. If then a happy man’s existence is desirable in itself, inasmuch as it is naturally good and pleasant, and his friend’s existence is much the same, then a friend will be one of the desirable goods.
      b.   He concludes... that the happy man needs friends. — 1912
ὃ δ' ἐστὶν αὐτῷ αἱρετόν, τοῦτο δεῖ ὑπάρχειν αὐτῷ, ἢ ταύτῃ ἐνδεὴς ἔσται. δεήσει ἄρα τῷ εὐδαιμονήσοντι φίλων σπουδαίων. But what is desirable for the happy man he must have, or else he will be in want. To be happy, therefore, a man needs virtuous friends.
Naturalius autem intendentibus et cetera. Postquam philosophus assignavit quasdam rationes morales ex quibus apparet quod felix indiget amicis, nunc ostendit idem per quamdam rationem magis naturalem. Et primo ostendit quod felici eligibile est habere amicum. Secundo concludit ulterius quod felix amico indiget, ibi: quod autem est ipsi eligibile et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo proponit quod intendit. Et dicit quod si quis velit considerare per rationem magis naturalem, manifeste apparebit quod virtuoso et felici amicus virtuosus est naturaliter eligibilis, etiam magis quam alia et exteriora bona. 1900. After the Philosopher has given the moral reasons indicating that the happy man needs friends, he now [III, B, 2] shows the same point by a more fundamental reason. First [2, a] he shows that it is desirable for a happy man to have a friend. Then [2, b], at “But what is etc., he concludes in addition that the happy man needs friends. He treats the first point from two aspects. First [a, i] he proposes his intention. He observes that if someone wishes to judge by a more fundamental reason it will be very evident that for a good and happy man a virtuous friend is naturally even more desirable than other external goods.
Secundo ibi, natura enim etc., probat propositum. Et primo ostendit quid sit naturaliter eligibile et delectabile virtuoso respectu suiipsius. Secundo ostendit quid sit sibi eligibile et delectabile respectu amici, ibi, ut autem ad seipsum et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo ostendit quod virtuoso naturaliter est eligibile esse et vivere. Secundo ostendit quod est sibi delectabile et eligibile hoc sentire, ibi, videns autem quia videt et cetera. Circa primum ponit talem rationem. Omne quod est bonum naturaliter, est virtuoso bonum et delectabile secundum seipsum, ut patet in his quae supra in septimo dicta sunt. Sed esse et vivere naturaliter bonum est et delectabile viventibus. Ergo esse et vivere est bonum et delectabile virtuoso. 1901. Second [a, ii], at “For, as has been noted etc.,” he proves his proposition. First [ii, x] he shows what is naturally desirable and pleasant to the virtuous person respecting himself. Then [ii, y], at “But the good man etc.,” he shows what is desirable and pleasant respecting his friend. He discusses the first point under two headings. First [x, aa] he shows that existence and life are naturally desirable to the good man. Next [x, bb], at “When a man sees etc.,” he shows that it is delightful and desirable to feel this. For the first statement he offers this reason [aa, a]. Whatever is naturally good is in itself good and desirable to the good man, as is clear from the discussion in the seventh book (1533). But existence and life are naturally good and desirable to living creatures. Therefore, existence and life are good and desirable to the virtuous person.
Maior per se patet in litera. Minorem ponit ibi: vivere autem et cetera. Circa quam tria facit. Primo enim manifestat in quo consistat vivere. Et dicit quod in omnibus animalibus communiter determinatur vivere secundum potentiam sensus. In hominibus autem determinatur secundum potentiam sensus quantum ad id quod habet commune cum aliis animalibus, vel secundum potentiam intellectus quantum ad id quod est proprium sibi. Omnis autem potentia reducitur ad operationem sicut ad propriam perfectionem; unde id quod est principale consistit in operatione, et non in potentia nuda. Actus enim est potior quam potentia, ut probatur in IX metaphysicae, et ex hoc patet quod principaliter vivere animalis vel hominis, est sentire vel intelligere. Dormiens enim, quia non actu sentit vel intelligit, non perfecte vivit, sed habet dimidium vitae, ut in primo dictum est. 1902. The major is self-evident in the text. He states the minor at “Now life etc.” [aa, b’], and makes three observations on it. First [b’, a] he shows the nature of life, remarking that in all animals life is defined in general by the capacity for sensation. But in man it is defined by the capacity for perception relative to what he has in common with other animals or by capacity for thought relative to what he has proper to himself. Now every capacity is reduced to operation as to its proper perfection. Consequently, what is principal is operation and not mere capacity, for act is more excellent than potency, as is proved in the ninth book of the Metaphysics (Ch. 8, 1049 b 4-1050 b 6; St. Th. Lect. 7-8, 1844-1866). From this it is evident that for animal or man life in the full sense is an act of sensation or thought. Indeed a slumbering individual—since he does not actually feel or think—does not live completely but has a half a life, as was stated in the first book (234-235).
Secundo ibi: vivere autem etc., ostendit quod vivere sit naturaliter bonum et delectabile. Et dicit quod ipsum vivere est de numero eorum quae sunt secundum se bona et delectabilia, et hoc probat per hoc quod est determinatum. Illud autem quod est determinatum pertinet ad naturam boni. 1903. Second [b’, b], at “Likewise, life,” he shows that life is naturally good and pleasant. He notes that life itself is numbered among the things which are good and pleasant in themselves. He proves this from the fact that life is something determinate; and what is determinate pertains to the nature of the good.
Ad cuius evidentiam considerandum est, quod potentia quantum est de se indeterminata est, quia se habet ad multa; determinatur autem per actum, sicut patet in materia et forma. Potentia autem sine actu est potentia cum privatione, quae facit rationem mali, sicut perfectio quae est per actum facit rationem boni; et ideo, sicut aliquid quando est indeterminatum est malum, ita determinatum, inquantum huiusmodi, est bonum. 1904. To understand this we should hear in mind that potentiality, considered in itself, is indeterminate because it can be many things; but it becomes determinate by means of act, as is obvious with matter and form. Potentiality, however, without act is potentiality with privation which constitutes the nature of evil; just as perfection achieved by activity constitutes the nature of good. For that reason, as a thing is evil to the extent that it is indeterminate, so it is good to the extent that it is determinate.
Vivere autem determinatum est, praesertim secundum quod principaliter in operatione consistit, ut dictum est. Unde patet quod vivere est naturaliter bonum. Id autem quod est naturaliter bonum est etiam virtuoso bonum, ut dictum est, cum virtuosus sit mensura in genere humano, ut dictum est. Et ideo, quia vivere est naturaliter bonum, videmus quod omnibus est delectabile. 1905. But life is something determinate especially as it principally consists in an operation, as we just pointed out (11902). So it is evident that life is naturally good. Now what is naturally good is also good to the virtuous person, since the good man is the norm in human kind, as we have indicated (1898). Consequently, since life is naturally good, we see that it is pleasant to all men.
Tertio ibi: non oportet autem etc., removet dubium; dicens quod in eo quod dictum est, quod vivere est naturaliter bonum et delectabile, non oportet accipere vitam malam, idest vitiosam et corruptam, idest recedentem a naturae ordine, neque etiam vitam quae est in tristitiis. Talis enim vita non est naturaliter bona, quia est indeterminata, idest debita perfectione carens, sicut et ea quae circa ipsam existunt. Quia enim unumquodque determinatur per id quod in eo existit, si illud fuerit indeterminatum, et ipsum indeterminatum erit: puta si aegritudo est indeterminatum et corpus aegrum erit indeterminatum; et sic vita quae est cum malitia seu tristitia est indeterminata et mala sicut et ipsa malitia et corruptio seu tristitia. Et hoc magis erit manifestum in habitis, idest in consequentibus, in quibus de tristitia agetur. 1906. Third [b’, c], at “However, we,” he removes a doubt. He points out that in stating life is naturally good and pleasant (1901, 1903-1905) we must not include evil, i.e., vicious and corrupt, life that departs from the right order, nor life lived in pain. Such life is not naturally good because it is indeterminate, i.e., lacking in proper perfection, just as the attributes connected with it are indeterminate. Everything is made determinate by what exists in it; hence, if this is indeterminate, then the thing itself will be indeterminate. For example, if sickness is indeterminate, the sick body will be indeterminate and ill, as also will be moral evil and corruption or pain. This will be made clearer in the pertinent questions following, where pain will be discussed (2048-2049).
Deinde cum dicit: si autem ipsum vivere etc., infert conclusionem praedictae rationis. Et dicit, quod si ipsum vivere est naturaliter bonum et delectabile (quod non solum apparet ex ratione praedicta, sed etiam ex hoc quod omnes appetunt ipsum), sequetur quod maxime virtuosis et beatis sit bonum et delectabile vivere. Quia enim horum vita est perfectissima et beatissima, ideo est ab eis magis eligenda. 1907. Then [b’, d], at “If life,” he deduces a conclusion from this argument. He remarks that if life itself is naturally good and pleasant (this is apparent not only from the foregoing argument but also because all men desire it) then life will be good and pleasing to virtuous and happy people most of all. Since their existence is fullest and happiest, it must be most desirable to them.
Deinde cum dicit: videns autem etc., ostendit quod sentire se vivere est eligibile et delectabile virtuoso. Ille enim qui videt se videre sentit suam visionem, et similiter est de illo qui audit se audire; et similiter contingit in aliis quod aliquis sentit se operari. In hoc autem quod nos sentimus nos sentire et intelligimus nos intelligere, sentimus et intelligimus nos esse: dictum est enim supra quod esse et vivere hominis principaliter est sentire vel intelligere. Quod autem aliquis sentiat se vivere est de numero eorum quae sunt secundum se delectabilia; quia, sicut supra probatum est, vivere est naturaliter bonum. Quod autem aliquis sentiat bonum esse in se ipso est delectabile. Et sic patet quod cum vivere sit eligibile, et maxime bonis quibus est bonum esse et delectabile, quod etiam percipere se sentire et intelligere est eis delectabile; quia simul cum hoc sentiunt id quod est eis secundum se bonum, scilicet esse et vivere; et in hoc delectantur. 1908. Next [x, bb], at “When a man,” he shows that perception of being alive is desirable and pleasant to the virtuous person. For a man who knows that he sees is conscious of his seeing, and the same is true with someone who knows that he hears. Likewise in other cases a person is conscious that he is active. In this reflective act in which we perceive that we perceive and understand that we understand, we perceive and understand that we exist. We have said before (1902) that man’s existence and life are in the fullest sense perception or thought. But that someone should be conscious he is alive is numbered among the goods which are delightful in themselves, because life is by its nature good, as we have already proved (1903-1905); and the consciousness that he possesses good is delightful. Since life is desirable especially to the virtuous for whom existence is good and pleasurable, evidently then the realization that they perceive and understand is delightful to them. The reason is that simultaneously in the very act (by which they are aware that they perceive and understand) they recognize what is good in itself, viz., existence and life; and they are delighted by this.
Deinde cum dicit: ut autem ad se ipsum etc., ostendit ex praemissis, quid sit virtuoso et felici eligibile et delectabile respectu amici. Et dicit quod virtuosus ita se habet ad amicum sicut ad seipsum, quia amicus quodammodo est alter ipse. Sicut igitur unicuique virtuoso est eligibile et delectabile quod ipse sit, sic est ei eligibile et delectabile quod amicus sit. Et si non aequaliter, tamen propinque. Maior est enim unitas naturalis quae est alicuius ad seipsum, quam unitas affectus quae est ad amicum. Dictum est autem supra quod virtuoso est eligibile et delectabile suum esse et vivere propter hoc quod sentit suum esse et vivere esse bonum. Talis autem sensus est delectabilis secundum seipsum, quo scilicet aliquis sentit bonum sibi inesse. Sicut ergo aliquis delectatur in suo esse et vivere sentiendo ipsum, ita ad hoc quod delectetur in amico, oportet quod simul sentiat ipsum esse. 1909. At “But the good man” [ii, y] he shows from the premises what is desirable and pleasant to the virtuous and happy person with regard to his friend. He observes that the good man feels for his friend as if he were himself, since his friend is in a way another self. Therefore, just as his own existence is desirable and delightful to existence desirable and delightful to him—if not equally, at least very nearly so. For the natural unity a man has with himself is greater than the unity of affection he has with his friend. We have just noted (1907, 1908) that the good man’s existence and life are desirable to him because he perceives that they are good. But this perception, by which someone perceives good existing in him, is delightful in itself. Consequently, as a person rejoices in the perception of his own existence and life’ so it is simply necessary for him to perceive them in his friend in order to rejoice in him.
Quod quidem continget convivendo sibi secundum communicationem sermonum et considerationum mentis; hoc enim modo homines dicuntur proprie sibi convivere, secundum scilicet vitam quae est homini propria, non autem secundum hoc quod simul pascantur, sicut contingit in pecoribus. 1910. This takes place through constant association and the exchange of ideas and reflection. In this way men are said to dwell with one another in an appropriate manner, not as cattle feeding together, but as human beings living a life that is proper to them.
Sic ergo ex omnibus praemissis concludit id quod proposuerat; dicens quod si beato est secundum se eligibile suum esse, inquantum est naturaliter bonum et delectabile; cum esse et vita amici sint quantum ad eius affectum propinqua propriae vitae, consequens est quod etiam amicus sit eligibilis virtuoso et felici. 1911. Thus he concludes from the premises what he had set out to do. He declares that a happy man’s own existence is desirable in itself inasmuch as it is naturally good and pleasant; since the existence and life of a friend are close to the life of a virtuous and happy man by affection, the friend too will be desirable to him.
Deinde cum dicit: quod autem est etc., ostendit ulterius quod felici sint necessarii amici. Quod enim est felici eligibile, oportet ei inesse, alioquin remanebit in indigentia, quod est contra rationem felicitatis, quae requirit sufficientiam. Requiritur ergo quod ille qui est in statu felicitatis opus habeat amicis virtuosis. Loquitur autem hic de felicitate qualis potest esse in hac vita, sicut in primo dictum est. 1912. Then [2, b], at “But what is,” he shows in addition that friends are necessary for the happy man. What is desirable for the happy man he must have, or else a deficiency will remain; and this is contrary to the notion of happiness which calls for a sufficiency. Therefore it is necessary that the man, who is in a state of happiness, should have virtuous friends. Here he is discussing the kind of happiness that is possible in this life, as we have indicated in the first book (113).

Limitation of the Number of Friends
Chapter 10
      A.  He proposes the doubt. — 1913
ἆρ' οὖν ὡς πλείστους φίλους ποιητέον, ἢ καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῆς ξενίας ἐμμελῶς εἰρῆσθαι δοκεῖ
μήτε πολύξεινος μήτ' ἄξεινος,
Should a man then make as many friends as possible? or, just as it has been wisely said about traveling: “May I be called neither a great traveler nor a homebody,” perhaps it will be fitting in friendship that a man should be neither without friends nor with an excessive number.
      B.  He solves (it).
            1.   AS IT CONCERNS USEFUL FRIENDSHIP. — 1914-1915
καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς φιλίας ἁρμόσει μήτ' ἄφιλον εἶναι μήτ' αὖ πολύφιλον καθ' ὑπερβολήν; τοῖς μὲν δὴ πρὸς χρῆσιν κἂν πάνυ δόξειεν ἁρμόζειν τὸ λεχθέν· πολλοῖς γὰρ ἀνθυπηρετεῖν ἐπίπονον, καὶ οὐχ ἱκανὸς ὁ βίος αὐτὸ [τοῦτο] πράττειν. οἱ πλείους δὴ τῶν πρὸς τὸν οἰκεῖον βίον ἱκανῶν περίεργοι καὶ ἐμπόδιοι πρὸς τὸ καλῶς ζῆν· οὐθὲν οὖν δεῖ αὐτῶν. This statement seems to be quite applicable to those who make friends for utility. For it is burdensome to repay the services of many people and a man’s life is not long enough for the task. Therefore, more friends than are sufficient for our own life distract and prevent us from noble living, and there is no need for them.
καὶ οἱ πρὸς ἡδονὴν δὲ ἀρκοῦσιν ὀλίγοι, καθάπερ ἐν τῇ τροφῇ τὸ ἥδυσμα. Likewise, a few friends for pleasantness are enough, as a little seasoning is enough in food.
                   a.   He proves his proposition by a reason.
                         i.    He repeats the question. — 1917
τοὺς δὲ σπουδαίους πότερον πλείστους κατ' ἀριθμόν, ἢ ἔστι τι μέτρον καὶ φιλικοῦ πλήθους, ὥσπερ πόλεως; οὔτε γὰρ ἐκ δέκα ἀνθρώπων γένοιτ' ἂν πόλις, οὔτ' ἐκ δέκα μυριάδων ἔτι πόλις ἐστίν. τὸ δὲ ποσὸν οὐκ ἔστιν ἴσως ἕν τι, ἀλλὰ πᾶν τὸ μεταξὺ τινῶν ὡρισμένων. But a question arises concerning virtuous friends, whether we should have as many as possible, or is there a limit to the number of one’s friends as there is to the population of a city? Ten men do not make a city and with one hundred thousand men it is no longer a city. Perhaps, the exact size is not a particular number, it might well be any mean between definite limits.
                         ii.   He solves the question... by three arguments.
                               x.   FIRST. — 1918
καὶ φίλων δή ἐστι πλῆθος ὡρισμένον, καὶ ἴσως οἱ πλεῖστοι μεθ' ὧν ἂν δύναιτό τις συζῆν τοῦτο γὰρ ἐδόκει φιλικώτατον εἶναι· ὅτι δ' οὐχ οἷόν τε πολλοῖς συζῆν καὶ διανέμειν ἑαυτόν, οὐκ ἄδηλον. The number of one’s friends too should be limited; they may be as numerous as the people with whom a man can associate and divide himself, for this attribute seems to belong in a special way to friendship. That one cannot live and share himself with great numbers is all too evident.
                               y.   SECOND. — 1919
ἔτι δὲ κἀκείνους δεῖ ἀλλήλοις φίλους εἶναι, εἰ μέλλουσι πάντες μετ' ἀλλήλων συνημερεύειν· τοῦτο δ' ἐργῶδες ἐν πολλοῖς ὑπάρχειν. Besides, one’s friends must be friends of one another, if they are all to spend their time together. But with a large number this is hard to achieve.
                               z.   THIRD. — 1920
χαλεπὸν δὲ γίνεται καὶ τὸ συγχαίρειν καὶ τὸ συναλγεῖν οἰκείως πολλοῖς· εἰκὸς γὰρ συμπίπτειν ἅμα τῷ μὲν συνήδεσθαι τῷ δὲ συνάχθεσθαι. It is difficult also to share intimately in the joys and sorrows of a great number of people. Indeed a man may very likely be called upon to rejoice with one and grieve with another at the same time.
                         iii. He concludes what he proposed for discussion. — 1921
??? [from following paragraph] διόπερ οὐδ' ἐρᾶν πλειόνων· ὑπερβολὴ γάρ τις εἶναι βούλεται φιλίας, τοῦτο δὲ πρὸς ἕνα· καὶ τὸ σφόδρα δὴ πρὸς ὀλίγους. It does not seem possible to have a great many friends for the reason that one cannot love several persons. Indeed love is a kind of excess of friendship, and this is possible with one person only, or with a very few.
                   b.   (He proves his proposition) from experience. — 1922-1923
ἴσως οὖν εὖ ἔχει μὴ ζητεῖν ὡς πολυφιλώτατον εἶναι, ἀλλὰ τοσούτους ὅσοι εἰς τὸ συζῆν ἱκανοί· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐνδέχεσθαι δόξειεν ἂν πολλοῖς εἶναι φίλον σφόδρα. διόπερ οὐδ' ἐρᾶν πλειόνων· ὑπερβολὴ γάρ τις εἶναι βούλεται φιλίας, τοῦτο δὲ πρὸς ἕνα· καὶ τὸ σφόδρα δὴ πρὸς ὀλίγους. οὕτω δ' ἔχειν ἔοικε καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν πραγμάτων· οὐ γίνονται γὰρ φίλοι πολλοὶ κατὰ τὴν ἑταιρικὴν φιλίαν, αἱ δ' ὑμνούμεναι ἐν δυσὶ λέγονται. οἱ δὲ πολύφιλοι καὶ πᾶσιν οἰκείως ἐντυγχάνοντες οὐδενὶ δοκοῦσιν εἶναι φίλοι, πλὴν πολιτικῶς, οὓς καὶ καλοῦσιν ἀρέσκους. Perhaps then it is not well to seek as many friends as possible but as many as are sufficient for living We see that this is so in practice, for people do not have many friendships of the comradely type-comrades are said to sing in pairs. Those who have a host of friends and are on familiar terms with everybody seem to be real friends of no one; they are, though, friends in the way proper to fellow citizens, and are generally called obsequious.
      C.  He shows the kind of friendship people have who are said to be friends with many. — 1924
πολιτικῶς μὲν οὖν ἔστι πολλοῖς εἶναι φίλον καὶ μὴ ἄρεσκον ὄντα, ἀλλ' ὡς ἀληθῶς ἐπιεικῆ· δι' ἀρετὴν δὲ καὶ δι' αὐτοὺς οὐκ ἔστι πρὸς πολλούς, ἀγαπητὸν δὲ καὶ ὀλίγους εὑρεῖν τοιούτους. One may have friendship with many as fellow citizens and not be obsequious but really virtuous. But it is not possible to be friends to a large number for their own and for virtue’s sakes. A man should be satisfied to find a few such friends.
Utrum igitur quam plurimos amicos et cetera. Postquam philosophus prosecutus est quasdam dubitationes circa amicitiam ex parte amantium, hic prosequitur dubitationes ex parte eorum qui amantur. Ponit autem circa hoc tres dubitationes. Quarum prima est de numero amicorum. Secunda de necessitate ipsorum ibi, utrum autem in bonis fortunis etc.; tertia de convictu eorum, ibi, utrum igitur quemadmodum et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo proponit dubitationem, utrum scilicet aliquis debeat sibi facere quam plurimos amicos vel non: sed sicut prudenter videtur esse dictum de peregrinatione in proverbio cuiusdam dicentis: non vocer multum peregrinus, neque non peregrinus, idest non dicatur de me quod nimis discurram per diversas terras inutiliter, neque etiam quod nunquam extra domum exeam causa peregrinationis, ita etiam congruit et circa amicitiam esse; ut scilicet neque aliquis nulli sit amicus, neque etiam sit amicus multis secundum superabundantiam. 1913. After the Philosopher has discussed doubts concerning friendship on the part of those who love, he now discusses doubts on the part of those who are loved. He states three doubts concerning the initial point. The first [I] concerns the number of friends; the second doubt [Lect. 13; II], at “Are friends more etc.,” concerns the need of friends (B. 1171 a 21); the third [Lect. 14; III], at “May we say then etc.,” concerns the companionship of friends (B. 1171 b 29). He treats the first point in a twofold manner. First [I, A] he proposes the doubt, whether or not a man ought to make as many friends as possible. A sound point seems to have been made about traveling in someone’s proverb: “May I be called neither a gadabout nor a stay-at-home,” that is, let it not be said of me that I wander aimlessly through many countries nor that I never leave home for the purpose of traveling. The same is appropriately applied to friendship, thus that a man should be neither without friends nor with an excessive number.
Secundo ibi: his quidem igitur etc., solvit praedictam quaestionem. Et primo quantum ad amicitiam utilis. Et dicit quod id quod dictum est de vitanda superflua multitudine amicorum, totaliter videtur congruere in amicis qui sunt ad opportunitatem, idest ad utilitatem: quia si homo habeat multos tales amicos a quibus recipiat obsequia, oportet etiam quod e converso multis obsequatur. Et hoc est valde laboriosum, ita quod non sufficit tempus vitae his qui hoc volunt agere. 1914. Second [I, B], at “This statement,” he solves the question. First [B, 1] as it concerns useful friendship. He remarks that the statement about avoiding a superfluous number of friendships seems to be quite applicable to those who are friends for convenience or utility, because if a man has many such friends from whom he receives favors, conversely he must bestow many favors. This is excessively burdensome so that those who wish to act in such a way do not have enough time.
Si igitur sint plures amici utiles, quam sint necessarii ad propriam vitam, nimis distrahunt hominem et impediunt ipsum a bona vita, quae consistit in operatione virtutis, quia dum homo superflue intendit negotiis aliorum, consequens est quod non possit debitam curam gerere de seipso. Et ita patet quod non est opus homini habere plurimos amicos utiles. 1915. Therefore, if a man’s useful friends are more numerous than necessary for his own life, they distract and hinder him from the blessings of a life which consists in virtuous activity. The reason is that while a person gives extra attention to the business of others, he cannot properly care for himself. Evidently then a man has no need of many useful friends.
Secundo ostendit idem in amicitia delectabilis. Et dicit quod etiam ad delectationem sufficiunt pauci amici. Delectatio enim exterior quae per tales amicos exhibetur, quaeritur in vita humana sicut condimentum in cibo quod, etiam si parum sit, sufficit. Unde et pauci amici sufficiunt homini ad delectationem, ut cum eis per aliquod tempus recreetur. 1916. Second [B, 2], at “Likewise, a few,” he observes that a few friends are enough also for pleasantness. External pleasantness which is provided by friends of this kind is sought in human living, like seasoning in food which suffices even when very little is used. Hence even a few pleasant friends are sufficient for a man that he may relax with them for a short time.
Tertio ibi: studiosos autem etc., solvit quaestionem quantum ad amicos secundum virtutem. Et primo ostendit propositum per rationem. Secundo per experimentum, ibi, sic autem videtur habere et cetera. Circa primum tria, facit. Primo resumit quaestionem. Et dicit quod remanet considerandum, utrum aliquis debeat sibi facere amicos virtuosos plures numero, ita quod quanto plures habet melius sit, vel oporteat quamdam mensuram adhibere circa multitudinem amicorum, sicut patet de multitudine civitatis quae neque constat ex decem hominibus tantum et, si constat ex decem miriadibus, idest centum millibus (nam myrias, idem est quod decem milia, iam prae multitudine non erit civitas, sed quaedam regio. Sed quanta multitudo sit necessaria ad civitatem, non est determinatum secundum aliquid unum; quia potest esse civitas maior et minor. Sed possunt accipi duo extrema, inter quae quicquid est medium potest determinari ut congruens multitudini civitatis. 1917. Third [B, 3], at “But a question,” he solves a question regarding virtuous friends. First [3, a] he proves his proposition by a reason; then [3, b], at “We see etc.,” from experience. He discusses the first point in a threefold manner. First [a, i] he repeats the question. He says that it remains to be considered whether someone ought to make as many virtuous friends as possible so that the more he has the better he is. Or should he set some limit to the number of friends, as is evident concerning the number in a city, which is not composed of only ten men, neither on the other hand is it composed of ten myriads (a myriad equals ten thousand), for such a number of citizens forms not a city but a country. But how great a multitude is required for a city has not been determined according to a particular number, because a city can be large or small. However, there can be two extremes, and whatever is a mean between these can be determined as a suitable population for a city.
Secundo ibi: et amicorum etc., solvit quaestionem dicens quod etiam non oportet esse immensa multitudo amicorum, sed debet esse quaedam determinata multitudo eorum. Et hoc probat tribus rationibus. Quarum prima est, quod plures possunt esse amici cum quibus tamen possit homo convivere; hoc enim inter cetera magis videtur esse amicabile, idest congruens amicitiae quae est secundum virtutem. Manifestum est autem quod non est possibile quod homo convivat immoderate multitudini hominum, et quod quodammodo distribuat se inter multos. Et sic patet quod non possunt esse multi amici secundum virtutem. 1918. Second [a, ii], at “The number of,” he solves the question, saying there should not be an immense number of friends but the number ought to be limited. He proves this by three arguments. The first [ii, x] is that friends can be as numerous as the people with whom a man can closely associate, for this attribute seems to belong to friendship more than others, i.e., seems suitable to virtuous friendship. Obviously it is not possible for a person to associate with a vast multitude and share himself among many people. Clearly then one cannot have a great number of virtuous friends.
Secundam rationem ponit ibi, adhuc autem et cetera. Manifestum est enim, quod amicos oportet adinvicem convivere. Et ita, si aliquis habeat multos amicos, oportet quod omnes etiam illi sint amici sibiinvicem. Aliter enim non possunt adinvicem commorari, et per consequens neque convivere amico. Hoc autem est difficile quod in multis servetur, scilicet ut sint amici adinvicem. Et ita, non videtur possibile quod unus homo habeat plures amicos. 1919. He offers the second argument at “Besides, one’s friends” [ii, y]. It is evident that friends ought to live with one another. So, if a man has many friends, it is likewise necessary that all these should be mutual friends. Otherwise they cannot pass their time in each other’s company, nor consequently live on friendly terms. But it is difficult to arrange this among a great many so that they may be friends of one another. Thus it is apparently impossible for one man to have a multitude of friends.
Tertiam rationem ponit ibi, difficile autem et cetera. Dictum est enim supra, quod amicus congaudet amico. Difficile est autem quod aliquis familiariter congaudeat et condoleat multis. Verisimiliter enim simul concidet quod oporteat cum uno delectari et cum alio tristari, quod est impossibile. Et ita non est possibile habere plures amicos. 1920. He presents the third argument at “It is difficult also” [ii, z]. We said above (1894-1898) that a friend rejoices with a friend. But it is difficult for anyone to share intimately in the joys and sorrows of a great number of people. It may very likely happen that a person must at the same time rejoice with one and grieve with another, which is impossible. Therefore, it is out of the question for a man to have a vast number of friends.
Tertio ibi: forte igitur bene habet etc., concludit propositum ex dictis: scilicet quod non bene se habet quod homo inquirat fieri amicissimus multis, sed tot quot potest sufficere ad convictum: quia etiam hoc non videtur esse contingens quod homo sit valde amicus multis (unde etiam nec secundum amorem libidinosum unus homo amat plures mulieres intenso amore). Quare perfecta amicitia in quadam superabundantia amoris consistit, quae non potest observari nisi ad unum, vel ad valde paucos. Semper enim id quod est abundans, paucis competit; quia non potest in multis contingere quod ad summam perfectionem perveniatur propter multiplices defectus et impedimenta. 1920. Third [a, iii], at “Perhaps then,” he concludes what he proposed for discussion, that it is well for a man not to seek as many friends as possible but as many as are enough for living together, because it does not seem possible for a man to be very friendly to great numbers. So, likewise, one man cannot love many women by an intense sexual love because perfect friendship consists in a kind of excess of love which can be felt for only one or a very few persons. For what is superlative always belongs to the few, since achievement of the highest perfection cannot take place in most cases due to a multiplicity of defects and hindrances.
Deinde cum dicit: sic autem videtur etc., ostendit propositum per experientiam. Ita enim videmus in rebus contingere, quod unus ad paucos habet amicitiam. Non enim inveniuntur esse multi amici unius secundum amicitiam etayricam, id est sodalium vel connutritorum. Quod probat quodam proverbio quo dicuntur aliqui hymnizare in duobus. 1922. Then [3, b], at “We see,” he proves his proposition from experience. We see in practice that a person has friendship for a few, for one does not have many friends according to the friendship of comrades, i.e., companions or partners. This is shown by a proverb according to which comrades are said to sing in pairs.
Consuetum est enim ut plurimum, quod iuvenes socialiter bini incedunt cantantes. Sed polyphili, idest amatores multorum, qui scilicet omnibus familiariter potiuntur, non videntur esse vere amici alicui, quia nulli diu convivunt sed pertranseunter se habent familiariter ad unumquemque. Sed tamen tales vocantur amici politice, idest secundum quod est consuetum in civitatibus, in quibus amicitia ex talibus applausibus et familiaritatibus iudicatur. Hos autem qui sic sunt amici multorum vocant homines placidos, quod sonat in vitium superabundantiae in condelectando, ut supra in quarto dictum est. 1923. It is a widespread custom for young people to stroll two by two singing in good fellowship. But polyphiloi, i.e., those who have a host of friends or are on familiar terms with everybody seem to be real friends of no one, for they do not associate long with any particular person but are friendly with everyone in passing. However, such persons are said to be friends in a civil way as is usual among citizens who judge friendship according to compliments and familiarities of this sort. Those who are friendly with a great number of people in this fashion are generally called obsequious, which means an excess of external pleasantness, as was explained in the fourth book (816, 828).
Deinde cum dicit: politice quidem igitur etc., ostendit secundum quam amicitiam dicuntur aliqui esse amici multorum. Et dicit, quod hoc contingit esse secundum amicitiam politicam, non solum eo modo quo aliquis placidus est amicus multorum, sed etiam hoc potest competere alicui vere virtuoso. Dictum est enim supra, quod politica amicitia videtur idem esse quod concordia. Virtuosus autem cum multis concordat in his quae pertinent ad vitam politicam. Non tamen contingit quod virtuosus habeat amicitiam ad multos propter virtutem, ita quod diligat eos propter seipsos, et non solum propter utile vel delectabile. Quinimo multum debet esse homini amabile et carum, si paucos tales amicos possit invenire, scilicet propter virtutem et secundum seipsos. 1924. Finally [I, C], at “One may,” he shows the kind of friendship people have who are said to be friends with many. He observes that this is possible according to political friendship not only in the sense that an obsequious person is a friend of many but also in the sense proper to a virtuous person. It has been indicated above (1836) that friendship between citizens seems to be identified with concord. But the good man is of one mind with many in affairs pertaining to civic life. However, it is not possible for a virtuous man to have friendship for a great number so that he loves them for themselves and not only for utility or pleasure. But rather it ought to be pleasing and dear to a man if he can have a few such friends for the sake of virtue and themselves.

Friends Needed in Both Prosperity and Adversity
Chapter III
      A.  He presents the doubt. — 1925
πότερον δ' ἐν εὐτυχίαις μᾶλλον φίλων δεῖ ἢ ἐν δυστυχίαις; ἐν ἀμφοῖν γὰρ ἐπιζητοῦνται· οἵ τε γὰρ ἀτυχοῦντες δέονται ἐπικουρίας, οἵ τ' εὐτυχοῦντες συμβίων καὶ οὓς εὖ ποιήσουσιν· βούλονται γὰρ εὖ δρᾶν. Are friends more necessary in good fortune or bad? They are sought in both situations; for the unfortunate need help, and the fortunate need friends to live with and benefit, since they want to do good to others.
      B.  He solves it. — 1926
ἀναγκαιότερον μὲν δὴ ἐν ταῖς ἀτυχίαις, διὸ τῶν χρησίμων ἐνταῦθα δεῖ, κάλλιον δ' ἐν ταῖς εὐτυχίαις, διὸ καὶ τοὺς ἐπιεικεῖς ζητοῦσιν· τούτους γὰρ αἱρετώτερον εὐεργετεῖν καὶ μετὰ τούτων διάγειν. Friendship then is more necessary in adversity because we need useful friends to help us. But it is more honorable in prosperity; hence we seek virtuous friends, as it is preferable to benefit and live with men of this character.
      C.  He proves an assumption.
            1.   HE PROPOSES HIS INTENTION. — 1927
ἔστι γὰρ καὶ ἡ παρουσία αὐτὴ τῶν φίλων ἡδεῖα καὶ ἐν ταῖς εὐτυχίαις καὶ ἐν ταῖς δυστυχίαις. Indeed, the very presence of friends is pleasant in both good and bad fortune;
                   a.   As it concerns adversity.
                         i.    He explains his proposition. — 1928
κουφίζονται γὰρ οἱ λυπούμενοι συναλγούντων τῶν φίλων. and sorrow is assuaged by the presence of sympathetic friends.
                         ii.   The reason for this observation. — 1929-1932
διὸ κἂν ἀπορήσειέν τις πότερον ὥσπερ βάρους μεταλαμβάνουσιν, ἢ τοῦτο μὲν οὔ, ἡ παρουσία δ' αὐτῶν ἡδεῖα οὖσα καὶ ἡ ἔννοια τοῦ συναλγεῖν ἐλάττω τὴν λύπην ποιεῖ. εἰ μὲν οὖν διὰ ταῦτα ἢ δι' ἄλλο τι κουφίζονται, ἀφείσθω· συμβαίνειν δ' οὖν φαίνεται τὸ λεχθέν. Therefore, someone may question whether friends actually assume the burden of grief as it were, or—this not being the case—the pain is diminished by their comforting presence and the consciousness of their sympathy. Whether sorrows are alleviated for these or some other reasons need not be discussed; at any rate what we have described seems to take place.
                         iii. The presence of a sympathetic friend has... sorrow.
                               x.   HE EXPLAINS HIS PROPOSITION. — 1933
ἔοικε δ' ἡ παρουσία μικτή τις αὐτῶν εἶναι. αὐτὸ μὲν γὰρ τὸ ὁρᾶν τοὺς φίλους ἡδύ, ἄλλως τε καὶ ἀτυχοῦντι, καὶ γίνεταί τις ἐπικουρία πρὸς τὸ μὴ λυπεῖσθαι παραμυθητικὸν γὰρ ὁ φίλος καὶ τῇ ὄψει καὶ τῷ λόγῳ, ἐὰν ᾖ ἐπιδέξιος· οἶδε γὰρ τὸ ἦθος καὶ ἐφ' οἷς ἥδεται καὶ λυπεῖται· τὸ δὲ λυπούμενον αἰσθάνεσθαι ἐπὶ ταῖς αὑτοῦ ἀτυχίαις λυπηρόν· πᾶς γὰρ φεύγει λύπης αἴτιος εἶναι τοῖς φίλοις. But the presence of sympathetic friends seem to have a mixed effect. The very sight of them is a comfort, especially when we are in distress, and a help in assuaging sorrow; for a friend, if he is sympathetic, is a consolation both by his countenance and his words, as he knows our feelings and what grieves and comforts us. On the other hand, it is painful to be aware that misfortunes cause the friend sorrow, since everyone avoids causing pain to his friends.
                               y.   HE DEDUCES A COROLLARY. — 1934-1935
διόπερ οἱ μὲν ἀνδρώδεις τὴν φύσιν εὐλαβοῦνται συλλυπεῖν τοὺς φίλους αὑτοῖς, κἂν μὴ ὑπερτείνῃ τῇ ἀλυπίᾳ, τὴν ἐκείνοις γινομένην λύπην οὐχ ὑπομένει, ὅλως τε συνθρήνους οὐ προσίεται διὰ τὸ μηδ' αὐτὸς εἶναι θρηνητικός· γύναια δὲ καὶ οἱ τοιοῦτοι ἄνδρες τοῖς συστένουσι χαίρουσι, καὶ φιλοῦσιν ὡς φίλους καὶ συναλγοῦντας. μιμεῖσθαι δ' ἐν ἅπασι δεῖ δῆλον ὅτι τὸν βελτίω. Hence persons of a manly bent naturally fear lest their friends be saddened on their account. And, unless a man is excessively insensitive to pain, he can hardly bear the sorrow that his sorrow causes his friends; nor is he willing to have others weep with him, for he is not given to lamenting. However, men of a womanish disposition are pleased to have fellow-mourners, and love as friends those who sympathize with them. But in all things we ought to imitate the man of noble character.
                   b.   As it concerns prosperity. — 1936
ἡ δ' ἐν ταῖς εὐτυχίαις τῶν φίλων παρουσία τήν τε διαγωγὴν ἡδεῖαν ἔχει καὶ τὴν ἔννοιαν ὅτι ἥδονται ἐπὶ τοῖς αὑτοῦ ἀγαθοῖς. However, in prosperity the presence of friends provides both pleasant conversation and the consciousness that our friends are pleased with our benefactions.
                   c.   He deduces a corollary (which contains some moral doctrines).
                         i.    In reference to those who call their friends together. — 1937-1939
διὸ δόξειεν ἂν δεῖν εἰς μὲν τὰς εὐτυχίας καλεῖν τοὺς φίλους προθύμως εὐεργετικὸν γὰρ εἶναι καλόν, εἰς δὲ τὰς ἀτυχίας ὀκνοῦντα· μεταδιδόναι γὰρ ὡς ἥκιστα δεῖ τῶν κακῶν, ὅθεν τὸ ἅλις ἐγὼ δυστυχῶν. μάλιστα δὲ παρακλητέον ὅταν μέλλωσιν ὀλίγα ὀχληθέντες μεγάλ' αὐτὸν ὠφελήσειν. For this reason a man ought to press his friends to share his good fortune (for a noble man should be generous) but be reluctant to ask them to share his misfortune (for he should impart to them as little as possible of his troubles). Hence the saying: “No more than I need burdened be.” A man should ask his friends especially when they can furnish him great assistance with little inconvenience to themselves.
                         ii.   Who of their own accord approach their friends. — 1940-1943
ἰέναι δ' ἀνάπαλιν ἴσως ἁρμόζει πρὸς μὲν τοὺς ἀτυχοῦντας ἄκλητον καὶ προθύμως φίλου γὰρ εὖ ποιεῖν, καὶ μάλιστα τοὺς ἐν χρείᾳ καὶ [τὸ] μὴ ἀξιώσαντας· ἀμφοῖν γὰρ κάλλιον καὶ ἥδιον, εἰς δὲ τὰς εὐτυχίας συνεργοῦντα μὲν προθύμως καὶ γὰρ εἰς ταῦτα χρεία φίλων, πρὸς εὐπάθειαν δὲ σχολαίως· οὐ γὰρ καλὸν τὸ προθυμεῖσθαι ὠφελεῖσθαι. δόξαν δ' ἀηδίας ἐν τῷ διωθεῖσθαι ἴσως εὐλαβητέον· ἐνίοτε γὰρ συμβαίνει. ἡ παρουσία δὴ τῶν φίλων ἐν ἅπασιν αἱρετὴ φαίνεται. Conversely, a man even uninvited should go promptly to friends in distress. For it is the part of a friend to be of service especially to those who are in need and do not think it becoming to ask. This is more honorable and pleasing to both. On the other hand, a man should readily join with his friends in prosperity, for even here friends are necessary. But he ought to approach them tardily to receive their kindness, for it is not becoming to show eagerness in accepting the help of friends. However, he should at all costs beware of a reputation for repudiating their advances-a thing that happens at times. Consequently, the presence of friends seems desirable in all circumstances.
Utrum autem in bonis et cetera. Postquam philosophus solvit dubitationem de multitudine amicorum, hic proponit dubitationem de necessitate eorum. Et circa hoc tria facit. Primo proponit dubitationem. Secundo solvit eam, ibi: necessarium magis quidem etc.; tertio probat quiddam quod supposuerat, ibi: est enim et praesentia et cetera. Dicit ergo primo quod dubitari potest utrum homo habeat opus amicis magis in bonis fortunis vel infortuniis. Manifestum est enim, quod in utraque fortuna requiruntur amici. In infortuniis enim homo habet opus amicis, qui ei ferant auxilia contra infortunia. In bonis autem fortunis homines habent opus amicis, quibus convivant et quibus benefaciant. Si enim virtuosi sint, volunt bene operari. 1925. Now that the Philosopher has solved the doubt on the number of friends, he here [II] proposes a doubt about the need for friends. He discusses this point under three headings. First [II, A] he presents the doubt. Then [II, B], at “Friendship then etc.,” he solves it. Finally [II, C], at “Indeed, the very presence etc.,” he proves an assumption. He says first it can be questioned whether a man needs friends more in prosperity or adversity, for obviously friends are necessary in both situations. In adversity a man needs friends to help him overcome misfortunes. But in prosperity men need friends to live with and to benefit, for they want to do good to others.
Deinde cum dicit necessarium magis etc., ponit solutionem quaestionis; concludens ex praemissis, quod habere amicos est homini magis necessarium in infortuniis, in quibus indiget auxilio, quod fit per amicos, ut dictum est. Et inde est, quod in tali statu homo habet opus amicis utilibus qui ei auxilium ferant. Sed in bonis fortunis est melius, idest magis honestum habere amicos. Et inde est, quod in hoc statu quaerunt homines amicos virtuosos. Quia eligibilius est talibus benefacere, et cum eis conversari. 1926. Then [II, B], at “Friendship then,” he offers the solution to the question. He concludes from the premises that friends are necessary for a man in those reverses where he needs the help which friends supply, as was just noted (1925). Consequently, in this condition a man needs useful friends to help him. But in prosperity it is better and more honorable to have friends. So in these circumstances men seek virtuous friends, because it is more desirable to benefit and associate with persons of this character.
Deinde cum dicit est enim et praesentia etc., probat quod supposuerat; scilicet quod amicis in utraque fortuna sit opus. Et primo proponit quod intendit. Et dicit, quod ipsa praesentia amicorum est delectabilis, tam in bonis fortunis quam in infortuniis. 1927. At “Indeed, the very presence” [II, C] he proves an assumption, viz., that friends are needed in both circumstances. First [C, 1] he proposes his intention, saying that the very presence of friends is pleasant in both good and bad fortune.
Secundo ibi, alleviantur enim etc., probat propositum. Et primo quantum ad infortunia. Secundo quantum ad bonas fortunas, ibi: in bonis fortunis et cetera. Tertio infert quoddam correlarium ex dictis. Circa primum tria facit. Primo manifestat propositum. Et dicit, quod homines qui sunt in tristitia, alleviationem quamdam sentiunt ex praesentia amicorum eis condolentium. 1928. Next [C, 2], at “and sorrow is,” he proves his proposition. First [2, a] as it concerns adversity; second [2, b], at “However, in prosperity etc.,” as it concerns prosperity; third [2, c], at “For this reason etc.,” he deduces a corollary from the discussions. He treats the first point in a threefold manner. First [a, i] he explains his proposition, observing that people in sorrow feel consolation from the presence of sympathetic friends.
Secundo ibi, propter quod etc., inquirit, quae sit causa huius, quod dictum est. Et ponit duas causas sub dubitatione, quae earum potior sit. Quarum prima sumitur ex exemplo eorum, qui portant aliquod pondus grave; quorum unus alleviatur ex societate alterius onus illud secum sumentis. Et similiter videtur, quod onus tristitiae melius ferat unus amicorum, si alius secum idem onus tristitiae ferat. 1929. Second [a, ii], at “Therefore, someone,” he seeks the reason for this observation (1928). He offers two reasons, hesitating to decide which is stronger. The first is taken from the example of people who carry a heavy weight; one of these is relieved by another who joins in lifting that load with him. In a similar way it seems that one person may more easily bear the burden of sorrow if another bears the same burden with him.
Sed haec similitudo non videtur congruere quantum ad ipsam tristitiam. Non enim eiusdem tristitiae numero, quam quis patitur, alius partem sibi assumit, ut ex hoc alterius tristitia minuatur. Potest tamen congruere quantum ad tristitiae causam: puta si aliquis tristatur ex damno, quod passus est, dum amicus partem damni subit minuitur damnum alterius, et per consequens tristitia. 1930. But this similarity does not seem to apply to sorrow itself, for the other does not take on himself a part of the same numerical sorrow which someone feels, so that his sorrow may be lightened. However, it can apply to the cause of the sorrow. For example, if a man grieves because of damage that he suffered while a friend undergoes part of the damage, the injury of the other-and consequently the sorrow is diminished.
Secunda causa melior est, et competit quantum ad ipsam tristitiam. Manifestum est enim, quod quaelibet delectatio superveniens tristitiam minuit: amicus autem praesens et condolens delectationem ingerit dupliciter. Uno modo, quia ipsa praesentia amici est delectabilis. Alio modo, quia dum intelligit eum sibi condolere, delectatur in eius amicitia, et sic eius tristitia minoratur. 1931. The second reason is better and belongs to the sorrow itself. It is evident that every extraneous pleasure lightens sorrow. But the presence of a sympathetic friend brings gladness in two ways. In one way, because the very presence of a friend is delightful. In the other way because, perceiving that his friend sympathizes with him, he delights in his friendship; and thus his sorrow is lessened.
Et quia hoc est praeter principale propositum, subiungit, quod ad praesens dimittendum est inquirere, utrum propter hoc quod dictum est, vel propter aliquid aliud alleviantur homines tristati ex praesentia amicorum condolentium. Manifeste tamen apparet accidere, hoc, quod dictum est. 1932. Since it is outside his principal intention, he adds that we must dismiss for the present the question whether, because of these observations (1929-1931) or some other reason, our griefs are assuaged by the presence of sympathetic friends. Nevertheless, what we have described certainly happens (1931).
Tertio ibi: videtur autem etc., ostendit, quod praesentia amici condolentis habet quamdam tristitiam admixtam. Et primo ostendit propositum. Secundo infert quoddam corollarium ex dictis, ibi, propter quod viriles quidem et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod praesentia amicorum condolentium videtur quamdam mixtionem habere ex delectabili et tristabili. Ipsa enim visio amicorum est delectabilis, et propter aliam rationem communem, et specialiter homini infortunato, qui ab amico adiuvatur ad hoc quod non contristetur, inquantum amicus consolatur suum amicum, et ex visione, et etiam ex sermone si sit epidexius, idest idoneus ad consolandum. Cognoscit enim unus amicus morem alterius et in quibus amicus suus delectatur et tristatur; et sic potest ei conveniens remedium adhibere contra tristitiam. Per hunc igitur modum praesentia amici condolentis est delectabilis. Sed ex alia parte est tristis, inquantum homo sentit amicum suum contristari in suis infortuniis. Quilibet enim homo bene dispositus refugit quantum potest esse causa tristitiae suis amicis. 1933. Third [a, iii ],at “But the presence,” he shows that the presence of a sympathetic friend has an admixture of sorrow. First [iii, x] he explains his proposition. Next [iii, y], at “Hence persons etc.,” he deduces a corollary from the discussions. He remarks first that the presence of sympathetic friends seems to have an admixture of pleasure and pain. The very sight of a friend is comforting for the other general reason, and especially to an unfortunate person whose sorrow is assuaged by the friend; to this extent a man consoles his friend both by his countenance and his word if he is epidexios, i.e., apt at offering sympathy. For one friend knows the feeling of another, and what comforts and distresses his friend; thus he can apply a fitting remedy for sorrow. In this way then the presence of a sympathetic friend is pleasing. But on the other hand it is distressing inasmuch as a man feels that his friend is saddened in his misfortunes. Indeed every rightly disposed person avoids, as much as he can, being the cause of pain to his friend.
Deinde cum dicit propter quod viriles etc., concludit ex praemissis, quod homines, qui sunt viriles animi naturaliter verentur et cavent ne amici eorum propter ipsos contristentur. Est enim de natura amicitiae, quod amicus velit benefacere amico, non autem esse ei causa alicuius mali. Et nullo modo sustinent viriles homines, quod amici eorum propter eos contristentur nisi superexcedat auxilium, quod ab amicis sibi praebetur ad non contristandum tristitiam amicorum. Sustinent enim, quod per modicam amicorum tristitiam sua tristitia sublevetur. Et universaliter, virilibus hominibus non complacet habere comploratores, quia ipsi viriles homines non sunt plorativi. 1934. Then [iii, y], at “Hence persons,” he concludes from the premises that people, who have a manly soul, naturally fear and take care lest their friends be saddened on account of themselves. It is of the nature of friendship that a person should wish to benefit a friend and not be the cause of some evil to him. Manly people do not allow their friends to be saddened for them in any way unless the help, which is provided by their friends to overcome their sorrow, should far outweigh the distress of the friends. For they permit their suffering to be alleviated by a modicum of suffering on the part of their friends. In all cases manly natures are unwilling to have others weep with them, for they themselves are not given to lamenting.
Sunt autem quidam viri muliebriter dispositi, qui delectantur in hoc, quod habeant aliquos simul secum angustiatos, et amant eos qui sibi condolent quasi amicos. Sed in hac diversitate hominum oportet imitari quantum ad omnia meliores, videlicet viriles. 1935. However, there are some men of a womanish disposition who are pleased to have others sorrowing with them at the same time, and love as friends those who mourn with them. But among the different types of individuals we ought to imitate in everything men of nobler or more manly character.
Deinde cum dicit: in bonis fortunis autem etc., ostendit secundam partem propositi, scilicet quod praesentia amicorum in bonis fortunis sit laudabilis. Et dicit, quod in bonis fortunis praesentia amicorum duo delectabilia habet. Primo quidem conversationem amicorum. Quia delectabile est cum amicis conversari. Secundo hoc quod homo intelligit amicos suos delectari in propriis bonis. Quaerit enim unusquisque esse amicis suis delectationis causa. 1936. Next [2, b], at “However, in prosperity” he explains the second part of his proposition, viz., that the presence of friends in prosperity is praiseworthy. He remarks that the presence of friends in prosperity affords two pleasures. First, conversation with friends, because it is pleasant to converse with one’s friends. Second, the fact that he now sees that his friends are pleased by his benefactions. For everyone seeks to be a cause of delight to his friends.
Deinde cum dicit propter quod videbitur etc., infert quoddam corollarium ex dictis, continens in se quaedam documenta moralia. 1937. At “For this reason” [2, C] he deduces a corollary from the discussion, which contains some moral
Et primo quantum ad eos, qui convocant amicos. Secundo quantum ad eos, qui sponte ad amicos accedunt, ibi: ire autem e converso et cetera. Circa primum ponit tria documenta moralia. Primo quidem concludens ex praemissis, quod quia delectabile est quod homo intelligat amicos in propriis bonis delectari, oportet, quod homo prompte vocet amicos ad suas bonas fortunas, ut eas scilicet amico communicet; oportet enim quod bonus homo benefaciat amico. doctrines. First [c, i] in reference to those who call their friends together. Then [c, ii], at “Conversely,” in reference to those who of their own accord approach their friends. He presents three moral principles touching on the first point. First Aristotle concludes from the premises that, since it is pleasing for a man to see his friends find pleasure in his own opulence, he ought promptly to invite his friends to share his prosperity. For a good man should benefit his friends.
Secundum documentum est, quod homo tarde et cum quadam pigritia vocet amicum ad sua infortunia. Debet enim homo tradere amico de suis malis quantum minimum potest. Et ad hoc inducit proverbium cuiusdam dicentis: sufficienter ego infortunans, quasi dicat: sufficit quod ego infortunium patiar, non oportet quod etiam amici mei haec patiantur. 1938. The second principle is that a man should tardily and reluctantly summon his friend to share his misfortunes. For he ought to transfer to his friend as little as possible of his troubles. As proof he offers the proverb of one who said: “None other than I need burdened be.” As if to say: “It is enough that I suffer misfortune; my friends need not bear them.”
Tertium documentum est, quod tunc maxime sunt amici ad infortunia vocandi, quando cum pauca sua turbatione possunt amico magnum iuvamen praestare. 1939. The third principle is that friends should be asked to participate in misfortunes when they can, with little trouble, furnish great assistance and the like to a person.
Deinde cum dicit: ire autem e converso etc., ponit tria documenta ex parte sponte euntium ad amicos. Quorum primum est, quod ad amicos in infortuniis existentes oportet aliquem prompte ire, etiam non vocatum; quia amici est benefacere amicis et maxime illis qui sunt in necessitate, et qui non dignificant, idest qui non dignum ducunt hoc requirere ab amico. Sic enim dum auxilium praestatur non requirenti, ambobus, scilicet praestanti et recipienti, fit melius, id est honestius, quia et ille qui dat maius opus virtutis facit et etiam ille qui recipit: (ille enim qui dat) videtur magis sponte dare et ille qui recipit, virtuose agit, nolendo gravare amicum. Est etiam ambobus delectabilius, quia et recipienti parcitur a verecundia, quam quis patitur in requirendo amicum et dans magis delectatur quasi ex seipso non provocatus faciens opus virtutis. 1940. Then [c, ii], at “Conversely,” he offers three principles on the part of people going of their own accord to friends. The first is that sometimes a man, even uninvited, ought to go readily to friends who are suffering misfortunes. For a friend appropriately confers benefits especially on those who are in need and are ashamed, or think it unbecoming to ask this of a friend. In this way, when assistance is given to a person not requesting it, the action is performed in a better or more honorable way both for the donor and the petitioner. The reason is that the giver seems to bestow more spontaneously and the beneficiary to act more virtuously in being reluctant to burden a friend. This is also more satisfying to both, since the recipient does not feel the embarrassment that a man suffers in making a request of a friend; and the giver is more pleased that unasked he does a good turn as of his own accord.
Secundum documentum est, quod ad bonas fortunas amici prompte se debet homo offerre ad cooperandum ei, cum necesse fuerit; quia ad hoc indiget homo amicis, ut scilicet ei cooperentur. 1941. The second principle is that a man should readily offer to join with his friends in prosperity (and this is necessary) for a person needs friends to co-operate with him.
Tertium documentum est, quod ad hoc quod homo bene patiatur ab amico bene fortunato, debet homo accedere quiete, id est remisse, et non de facili. Non enim est bonum, quod homo reddat se promptum ad suscipiendum iuvamen ab amico. Sed homo debet vereri et cavere opinionem indelectationis, idest ne hanc famam incurrat, quod ipse non sit delectabilis amico in hoc, quod est onerosum esse, idest propter hoc quod ipse se reddit onerosum amico. Quod manifestum est quandoque accidere: dum enim aliqui nimis se ingerunt beneficiis recipiendis, reddunt se onerosos, et indelectabiles suis amicis. Vel secundum aliam literam, debet homo revereri, id est cavere, opinionem delectationis in morari, id est ne amicus eius opinetur de eo quod delectetur in morari circa ipsum propter beneficia. 1942. The third principle is: if someone wishes to be kindly received by a well-to-do friend, he ought to approach the friend modestly, i.e., reluctantly and not readily. For it is not proper to show oneself eager to accept help from a friend. But a man ought to fear and beware of a reputation for (un)pleasantness, i.e., lest he get the name of being displeasing to his friend because he is troublesome or makes himself a nuisance. This obviously happens sometimes; for, when people occupy themselves too much in accepting favors, they become burdensome and displeasing to their friends. Or, according to another reading, a man should fear, i.e., beware of, the reputation for pleasure in lingering: so that his friend gets the impression that he likes to stay on with him for the sake of benefits.
Ultimo autem ex praemissis concludit, quod praesentia amicorum in omnibus, videtur esse eligibilis. 1943. Finally, he concludes from the premises that the presence of friends is desirable in all circumstances.

Friends’ Pleasure in Living Together
Chapter 12
      A.  He proposes the question. — 1944-1945
ἆρ' οὖν, ὥσπερ τοῖς ἐρῶσι τὸ ὁρᾶν ἀγαπητότατόν ἐστι καὶ μᾶλλον αἱροῦνται ταύτην τὴν αἴσθησιν ἢ τὰς λοιπὰς ὡς κατὰ ταύτην μάλιστα τοῦ ἔρωτος ὄντος καὶ γινομένου, οὕτω καὶ τοῖς φίλοις αἱρετώτατόν ἐστι τὸ συζῆν; May we say then that, as lovers delight especially in seeing the persons they love and prefer this sense to all others because love begins and is preserved by this sense, so friends desire companionship of each other most of all?
      B.  He indicates the truth.
            1.   FIRST. — 1946
κοινωνία γὰρ ἡ φιλία, καὶ ὡς πρὸς ἑαυτὸν ἔχει, Friendship is in fact a partnership.
            2.   SECOND. — 1947
οὕτω καὶ πρὸς τὸν φίλον· περὶ αὑτὸν δ' ἡ αἴσθησις ὅτι ἔστιν αἱρετή, καὶ περὶ τὸν φίλον δή· ἡ δ' ἐνέργεια γίνεται αὐτῆς ἐν τῷ συζῆν, ὥστ' εἰκότως τούτου ἐφίενται. And as a man is to himself so is he to his friend. But the consciousness of his own existence is desirable; and so, of his friend’s existence. Now the activity of this consciousness takes place in living together—a thing, therefore, they naturally desire.
            3.   THIRD. — 1948-1949
καὶ ὅ ποτ' ἐστὶν ἑκάστοις τὸ εἶναι ἢ οὗ χάριν αἱροῦνται τὸ ζῆν, ἐν τούτῳ μετὰ τῶν φίλων βούλονται διάγειν· διόπερ οἳ μὲν συμπίνουσιν, οἳ δὲ συγκυβεύουσιν, ἄλλοι δὲ συγγυμνάζονται καὶ συγκυνηγοῦσιν ἢ συμφιλοσοφοῦσιν, ἕκαστοι ἐν τούτῳ συνημερεύοντες ὅ τι περ μάλιστ' ἀγαπῶσι τῶν ἐν τῷ βίῳ· συζῆν γὰρ βουλόμενοι μετὰ τῶν φίλων, ταῦτα ποιοῦσι καὶ τούτων κοινωνοῦσιν οἷς οἴονται συζῆν. Every man wishes to share with his friends whatever constitutes his existence or whatever makes his life worth living. Hence some drink or play at dice together, others join in athletic sports or in the study of philosophy; each class taking part in the activity they love best in life. Since they want to live with their friends, they engage in those occupations whose sharing gives them a sense of living together.
      C.  He deduces a corollary.
            1.   CONCERNING EVIL MEN. — 1950
γίνεται οὖν ἡ μὲν τῶν φαύλων φιλία μοχθηρά κοινωνοῦσι γὰρ φαύλων ἀβέβαιοι ὄντες, καὶ μοχθηροὶ δὲ γίνονται ὁμοιούμενοι ἀλλήλοις, Thus friendship of evil men is bad; for, being unstable, they associate 10 in wickedness and are made evil by becoming like each other.
            2.   CONCERNING THE GOOD. — 1951-1952
ἡ δὲ τῶν ἐπιεικῶν ἐπιεικής, συναυξανομένη ταῖς ὁμιλίαις· δοκοῦσι δὲ καὶ βελτίους γίνεσθαι ἐνεργοῦντες καὶ διορθοῦντες ἀλλήλους· ἀπομάττονται γὰρ παρ' ἀλλήλων οἷς ἀρέσκονται, ὅθεν
ἐσθλῶν μὲν γὰρ ἄπ' ἐσθλά.
περὶ μὲν οὖν φιλίας ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον εἰρήσθω· ἑπόμενον δ' ἂν εἴη διελθεῖν περὶ ἡδονῆς.
But the friendship of virtuous men is good and is increased by their conversation. Indeed they seem to become better by working and living together, for they see in each other what is at the same time pleasing to them. Hence the saying: “Noble deeds from noble men.” So much then for our treatment of friendship; next we will begin to treat pleasure.
Utrum igitur, quemadmodum et cetera. Pertractatis quaestionibus de multitudine et necessitate amicorum, hic inquirit de convictu eorum. Et circa hoc tria facit. Primo proponit quaestionem. Secundo manifestat veritatem, ibi: communicatio enim et cetera. Tertio infert corollarium ex dictis, ibi, fit igitur et cetera. Quaestio igitur, prima fundatur in quadam assimulatione amicitiae ad amationem libidinosam: in qua quidem videmus, quod amantibus est maxime appetibile videre illas quas amant. Et magis eligunt hunc sensum, videlicet visus, quam alios exteriores sensus; quia, sicut supra dictum est, per visionem incipit fieri maxime passio amoris, et secundum hunc sensum conservatur. Provocatur enim talis amor praecipue ex pulchritudine quam visus percipit. 1944. Now that he has completed the treatise on the number and need of friends, he here [III] inquires about their living together. He discusses this question in a threefold manner. First [III, A] he proposes the question. Then [III, B], at “Friendship is etc.,” he indicates the truth. Finally [III, C], at “Thus friendship etc.,” he deduces a corollary from the discussion. He says that living together is based on a likeness of friendship to sensual love, in which we observe that lovers desire most of all to see the persons they love. They prefer this sense, sight, to the other external senses because the passion of love begins especially by seeing—as has been noted (1822-1823)—and is preserved by this sense. In fact, this love is stimulated in a particular way by beauty that is perceived by sight.
Est ergo quaestio quid sit proportionale visioni in amicitia: utrum scilicet ipsum convivere; ut scilicet, sicut amantes maxime delectantur in mutuo aspectu: (ita) amici maxime delectentur in mutuo convictu. Secundum tamen aliam literam non inducitur hoc per modum quaestionis, sed per modum conclusionis: quae quidem litera sic habet: iam igitur quemadmodum et cetera. Et potest hoc concludi ex eo quod supra probatum est praesentiam amicorum in omnibus esse delectabilem. 1945. The question then is, what in friendship is analogous to seeing? Is it companionship itself? thus that, as lovers delight most in seeing one another, so friends in living with one another. In a different text this point is presented not as a question but as a conclusion. The text reads: “Accordingly then as lovers etc.” This can be concluded from what has already been proved (1936, 1943), that the presence of friends is pleasing in all circumstances.
Deinde cum dicit communicatio enim etc., manifestat veritatem praemissae, sive quaestionis sive conclusionis, triplici ratione. Quarum prima est, quia amicitia in communicatione consistit, ut patet ex his quae dicta sunt in octavo. Maxime autem seipsos sibiinvicem communicant in convictu. Unde convivere videtur esse maxime proprium et delectabile in amicitia. 1946. Then [III, B], at “Friendship is,” he indicates the truth in this question or conclusion by three reasons. The first [B, 1] is that friendship consists in a partnership (communicatione), as is clear from our discussion in the eighth book (1698, 1702, 1724). But people share themselves with one another especially by living together. Hence living together seems to be most proper and pleasing to friendship.
Secundam rationem ponit ibi: et ut ad se ipsum et cetera. Sicut enim homo se habet ad amicum, ut ex supra dictis patet. Ad seipsum autem ita se habet, quod est sibi eligibile et delectabile quod sentiat se ipsum esse; ergo hoc etiam est ei delectabile circa amicum. Sed hoc fit in convivendo. Quia per mutuas operationes quas vident, seinvicem esse sentiunt. Convenienter ergo amici appetunt adinvicem convivere. 1947. He offers the second reason at “And as a man” [B, 2]. As a man is to himself so is he to his friend-this is obvious from previous statements (1797). But in reference to himself a man is so constituted that the consciousness of his own existence is desirable and delightful to him. Therefore it is also delightful to him to be conscious of his friend’s existence. But this is present in living together, since they are conscious of one another by reason of the mutual activity they perceive. Consequently, friends naturally desire to live together.
Tertiam rationem ponit ibi, et quod aliquando est et cetera. Quae sumitur ab experimento. Videmus enim quod homines volunt cum suis amicis conversari secundum actionem in qua principaliter delectantur, quam reputant suum esse, et cuius gratia eligunt suum vivere, quasi ad hoc totam vitam suam ordinantes. 1948. He presents the third reason, at “Every man wishes” [B, 3], taken from experience. We see that men wish to share with their friends the activity they most enjoy, which they consider their existence and choose to live for as it were ordering their whole life to it.
Et inde est quod quidam cum amicis volunt simul potare. Quidam autem simul ludere ad aleas, quidam autem simul exercitari, puta in torneamentis, luctationibus et aliis huiusmodi, vel etiam simul venari vel simul philosophari, ita quod singuli in illa actione volunt commorari cum amicis, quam maxime diligunt inter omnia huius vitae. Quasi enim volentes convivere cum amicis, huiusmodi actiones faciunt in quibus maxime delectentur et in quibus reputant consistere totam vitam suam. Et in talibus actionibus communicant amicis, quarum communicationem existimant esse convivere. Et sic patet quod convivere est eligibilissimum in amicitia. 1949. Consequently, some wish to drink with their friends; others, to play together at dice; still others, to take exercise with them in tournaments, wrestling and so on; or even to hunt or study philosophy together. In this way each class wishes to remain with his friends in that activity which they love best among all the pursuits of this life. As they want to live with their friends, they mutually engage in occupations of this kind which they greatly enjoy, and which they think constitute their whole life. They take part in these activities whose sharing gives them the sense of living together. Thus it is clear that living together is most desirable in friendship.
Deinde cum dicit: fit igitur pravorum etc., concludit ex praemissis primo quidem circa pravos, quod eorum amicitia est mala. Delectantur enim maxime in pravis operibus. Et in his sibiinvicem communicant. Et cum sint instabiles, semper de malo in peius procedunt, quia unus efficitur malus accipiendo similitudinem malitiae alterius. 1950. Next [III, C], at “Thus friendship,” he draws a conclusion from the premises about the friendship of good and evil men. First [C, I] concerning evil men, that their friendship is bad; for they find pleasure in evil deeds most of all, and take part in them with one another. Being unstable, they always go from bad to worse since one becomes evil by imitating the other.
Secundo ibi: quae autem eorum etc., concludit quantum ad bonos, quod amicitia virtuosorum est bona, et semper bonis colloquiis in virtute coaugetur. Et ipsi amici fiunt meliores in hoc quod simul operantur et seinvicem diligunt. Unus enim ab alio recipit exemplum virtuosi operis in quo sibi complacet. Unde in proverbio dicitur, quod bona homo sumit a bonis. 1951. Second [C, 2], at “But the friendship,” he draws a conclusion concerning the good, that friendship between virtuous men is good and is always increased in goodness by exemplary conversation. Friends become better by working together and loving each other. For one receives from the other an example of virtuous work which is at the same time pleasing to him. Hence it is proverbial that man adopts noble deeds from noble men.
Ultimo autem epilogando concludit, quod de amicitia in tantum dictum est, et quod consequenter dicendum est de delectatione. Et sic terminatur sententia noni libri. 1952. Finally, he concludes with the epilogue that such is our treatment of friendship and that next we must discuss pleasure (1953-2064). Thus he terminates the teaching of the ninth book.