Censurable Moral Dispositions and Their Opposites
Chapter 1
      A.  He distinguishes continence from other things belonging to the same genus.
                   a.   He enumerates the censurable habits or dispositions in moral matters. — 1292-1296
μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα λεκτέον, ἄλλην ποιησαμένους ἀρχήν, ὅτι τῶν περὶ τὰ ἤθη φευκτῶν τρία ἐστὶν εἴδη, κακία ἀκρασία θηριότης. Now, making a new start, we must indicate that there are three kinds of dispositions in moral practice to be avoided, viz., vice, incontinence and brutishness.
                   b.   He gives their contraries.
                         i.    He points out two ... about which there is no question. — 1297
τὰ δ' ἐναντία τοῖς μὲν δυσὶ δῆλα· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἀρετὴν τὸ δ' ἐγκράτειαν καλοῦμεν· And the contraries of two of them are obvious, for the one we call virtue and the other continence.
                         ii.   He shows what is opposed to the third.
                               x.   HE SETS FORTH HIS PROPOSITION. — 1298-1299
πρὸς δὲ τὴν θηριότητα μάλιστ' ἂν ἁρμόττοι λέγειν τὴν ὑπὲρ ἡμᾶς ἀρετήν, ἡρωικήν τινα καὶ θείαν, The contrary of brutishness very properly is said to be above us and is called a heroic and divine virtue.
                               y.   HE EXPLAINS IT.
                                     aa.  In man there is a kind of heroic... virtue. — 1300
ὥσπερ Ὅμηρος περὶ τοῦ Ἕκτορος πεποίηκε λέγοντα τὸν Πρίαμον ὅτι σφόδρα ἦν ἀγαθός,
οὐδὲ ἐώκει
ἀνδρός γε θνητοῦ πάις ἔμμεναι ἀλλὰ θεοῖο.
In this manner Homer [Iliad, xxiv. 258] presents Priam as boasting that his son Hector was so exceedingly virtuous that he did not seem to be an offspring of mortal man but of God. If then, as it is said, men become divine it will be because of the excellence of virtue of this kind, viz., a habit opposed to brutishness.
                                     bb. This virtue is the opposite of brutishness.

                                            a’  First. — 1301

ὥστ' εἰ, καθάπερ φασίν, ἐξ ἀνθρώπων γίνονται θεοὶ δι' ἀρετῆς ὑπερβολήν, τοιαύτη τις ἂν εἴη δῆλον ὅτι ἡ τῇ θηριώδει ἀντιτιθεμένη ἕξις· καὶ γὰρ ὥσπερ οὐδὲ θηρίου ἐστὶ κακία οὐδ' ἀρετή, οὕτως οὐδὲ θεοῦ, ἀλλ' ἣ μὲν τιμιώτερον ἀρετῆς, ἣ δ' ἕτερόν τι γένος κακίας. In fact neither vice nor virtue is attributed to either dumb animals or God. But the one (divine virtue) is more honorable than virtue while the other (brutishness) is a kind of vice.
                                            b’  Second. — 1302-1303
ἐπεὶ δὲ σπάνιον καὶ τὸ θεῖον ἄνδρα εἶναι, καθάπερ οἱ Λάκωνες εἰώθασι προσαγορεύειν, οἳ ὅταν ἀγασθῶσι σφόδρα του, σεῖος ἀνήρ φασιν, οὕτω καὶ ὁ θηριώδης ἐν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις σπάνιος· μάλιστα δ' ἐν τοῖς βαρβάροις ἐστίν, γίνεται δ' ἔνια καὶ διὰ νόσους καὶ πηρώσεις· καὶ τοὺς διὰ κακίαν δὲ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ὑπερβάλλοντας οὕτως ἐπιδυσφημοῦμεν. Just as it is rare for men to be godlike—when the Spartans greatly admired someone, they used to exclaim: “This man is divine”—so also is it rare for men to be brutish; it is especially among the barbarians that brutishness is found. Men become brutish both on account of sickness and loss of loved ones, and on account of the prevalence of vice among them (for this reason they receive a bad name).
                   a.   He connects the preceding with what follows. — 1304
ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τῆς διαθέσεως τῆς τοιαύτης ὕστερον ποιητέον τινὰ μνείαν, περὶ δὲ κακίας εἴρηται πρότερον· περὶ δὲ ἀκρασίας καὶ μαλακίας καὶ τρυφῆς λεκτέον, καὶ περὶ ἐγκρατείας καὶ καρτερίας· οὔτε γὰρ ὡς περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν ἕξεων τῇ ἀρετῇ καὶ τῇ μοχθηρίᾳ ἑκατέραν αὐτῶν ὑποληπτέον, οὔθ' ὡς ἕτερον γένος. But later we will have to review this habit—vice in general was discussed previously. Now we must investigate incontinence together with effeminacy and voluptuousness. Likewise it will be necessary to treat b continence and perseverance, for these habits must not be understood as identical with virtue and vice, nor as different in kind.
                   b.   He explains his method of procedure. — 1305
δεῖ δ', ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων, τιθέντας τὰ φαινόμενα καὶ πρῶτον διαπορήσαντας οὕτω δεικνύναι μάλιστα μὲν πάντα τὰ ἔνδοξα περὶ ταῦτα τὰ πάθη, εἰ δὲ μή, τὰ πλεῖστα καὶ κυριώτατα· ἐὰν γὰρ λύηταί τε τὰ δυσχερῆ καὶ καταλείπηται τὰ ἔνδοξα, δεδειγμένον ἂν εἴη ἱκανῶς. Here, however, we must proceed as in other subjects, stating what appears probable and then presenting the difficulties. In this way we will show everything that is most probable about these movements of the soul-well, if not everything, at least many of the principal things. Indeed a sufficient exposition will be given when the difficulties are solved and the probabilities remain.
      B.  He investigates (continence and incontinence, perseverance, and effeminacy).
                   a.   Concerning continence and incontinence. — 1306
δοκεῖ δὴ ἥ τε ἐγκράτεια καὶ καρτερία τῶν σπουδαίων καὶ [τῶν] ἐπαινετῶν εἶναι, ἡ δ' ἀκρασία τε καὶ μαλακία τῶν φαύλων καὶ ψεκτῶν, καὶ ὁ αὐτὸς ἐγκρατὴς καὶ ἐμμενετικὸς τῷ λογισμῷ, καὶ ἀκρατὴς καὶ ἐκστατικὸς τοῦ λογισμοῦ. καὶ ὁ μὲν ἀκρατὴς εἰδὼς ὅτι φαῦλα πράττει διὰ πάθος, ὁ δ' ἐγκρατὴς εἰδὼς ὅτι φαῦλαι αἱ ἐπιθυμίαι οὐκ ἀκολουθεῖ διὰ τὸν λόγον. It surely seems that continence and perseverance are good and laudable; that incontinence and effeminacy are evil and censurable. The continent man seems to be identified with one who abides by reason; but the incontinent man, with one who disregards reason. Knowing that certain of his actions are evil, the incontinent man nevertheless does them because of passion. On the other hand, the continent man, knowing that his desires are evil, refuses to follow them because of the judgment of reason.
                   b.   From a comparison... with other dispositions. — 1307-1308
καὶ τὸν σώφρονα μὲν ἐγκρατῆ καὶ καρτερικόν, τὸν δὲ τοιοῦτον οἳ μὲν πάντα σώφρονα οἳ δ' οὔ, καὶ τὸν ἀκόλαστον ἀκρατῆ καὶ τὸν ἀκρατῆ ἀκόλαστον συγκεχυμένως, οἳ δ' ἑτέρους εἶναί φασιν. τὸν δὲ φρόνιμον ὁτὲ μὲν οὔ φασιν ἐνδέχεσθαι εἶναι ἀκρατῆ, ὁτὲ δ' ἐνίους φρονίμους ὄντας καὶ δεινοὺς ἀκρατεῖς εἶναι. Likewise the temperate man seems to be continent and persevering and, according to some philosophers, every continent man is temperate, but according to others he is not. Some even maintain that all intemperate men are incontinent and all incontinent men intemperate, without distinction; others distinguish them. Sometimes they say that the prudent man cannot be incontinent; sometimes that certain prudent and godlike men are incontinent.
                   c.   He proposes what is probable about their matter. — 1309
ἔτι ἀκρατεῖς λέγονται καὶ θυμοῦ καὶ τιμῆς καὶ κέρδους. τὰ μὲν οὖν λεγόμενα ταῦτ' ἐστίν. Besides, men are said to be incontinent in regard to anger, honor, and gain. Such then are the statements made about these subjects.
Post haec autem dicendum, aliud facientes principium et cetera. Postquam philosophus supra determinavit de virtutibus moralibus et intellectualibus, hic incipit determinare de quibusdam quae consequuntur ad virtutem. Et primo de continentia, quae est quiddam imperfectum in genere virtutis. Secundo de amicitia, quae est quidam effectus virtutis, in octavo libro, ibi, post haec autem de amicitia et cetera. Tertio de fine virtutis, in X libro, ibi: post haec autem de delectatione et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo determinat de continentia et eius opposito. Secundo de delectatione et tristitia quae sunt earum materia, ibi: de delectatione autem et tristitia et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo distinguit continentiam ab aliis quae sunt eiusdem generis. Secundo de ea determinat, ibi: videtur utique continentia et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo distinguit continentiam et eius oppositum ab his quae sunt eiusdem generis. Secundo ostendit de quibus eorum sit dictum, et de quibus restet dicendum, ibi, sed de hac quidem dispositione et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo enumerat habitus seu dispositiones circa moralia vituperabiles. Secundo ponit eorum opposita, ibi: contraria autem duobus et cetera. 1292. After the Philosopher has defined the moral and intellectual virtues, he now begins to consider certain things that follow from them. First [Lect. 1] he treats continence, which is something imperfect in the genus of virtue. Next [Bk. VIII, Lect. 1], at “After the previous discussions etc.” (B. 1155), he treats friendship, which is a particular effect of virtue. Finally [Bk. X, Lect. 1], at “After these matters etc.” (B.1172 a 18), he treats the end of virtue. On the first point he does two things. First [I] he discusses continence and its contrary. Then [Lect. 11], at “The investigation of pleasure etc.” (B. 1152 b), he discusses pleasure and pain, which are their matter. He treats the first point from two aspects. First [I, A] he distinguishes continence from other things belonging to the same genus. Second [I, B], at “It surely seems etc.,” he investigates them. On the first point he does two things. First [I, A, 1] he distinguishes continence and its contrary from other things belonging to the same genus. Second [I, A, 2], at “But later we will have etc.,” he shows which of these have been discussed and which remain to be discussed. He handles the first point in a twofold manner. First [I, A, 1, a] he enumerates the censurable habits or dispositions in moral matters. Then [1, A, 1, b], at “And the contraries etc.,” he gives their contraries.
Dicit ergo primo, quod post ea quae dicta sunt de virtutibus moralibus et intellectualibus, ad hoc quod nihil moralium praetermittatur, oportet ab alio principio resumere, ut dicamus, quod eorum quae sunt circa mores fugienda, tres species sunt: scilicet malitia, incontinentia et bestialitas. 1293. He says first that, after the treatment of the moral and intellectual virtues (245-1291)—so that nothing in moral may be passed over—we must make another start, stating that there are three kinds of states to be avoided in moral practice: vice, incontinence, and brutishness.
Et horum quidem differentiam sic oportet accipere. Cum enim, ut in VI dictum est, bona actio non sit sine ratione practica vera et appetitu recto, per hoc quod aliquid horum duorum pervertitur, contingit quod aliquid sit in moribus fugiendum. Si quidem igitur sit perversitas ex parte appetitus ut ratio practica remaneat recta, erit incontinentia, quae scilicet est, quando aliquis rectam aestimationem habet de eo quod est faciendum vel vitandum, sed propter passionem appetitus in contrarium trahit. Si vero intantum invalescat appetitus perversitas ut rationi dominetur, ratio sequetur id in quod appetitus corruptus inclinat, sicut principium quoddam existimans illud ut finem et optimum; unde ex electione operabitur perversa, ex quo aliquis dicitur malus, ut dictum est in quinto. Unde talis dispositio dicitur malitia. 1294. So it is necessary to understand the difference between these things. As a good action is not without practical reason and right desire—we pointed this out in the sixth book (1269)—a perversion of these two faculties can bring about an act to be avoided in moral matters. If then perversity occurs on the part of the appetitive faculty so that the practical reason remains right, there will be incontinence-a condition that is present when a man has correct evaluation of what he ought to do or avoid but draws away to the contrary by reason of the passion of desire. But if the perversity of the appetitive faculty becomes so strong that it dominates reason, reason follows that to which the perverted desire inclines, as a kind of principle, considering it to be the ultimate end. Hence a man will perform evil actions by choice and for this reason he is called bad, as was noted in the fifth hook (1058). Therefore a disposition of this kind is given the name of vice.
Est autem considerandum ulterius quod perversitas in unaquaque re contingit ex eo quod corrumpitur contemperantia debita illius rei, sicut aegritudo corporalis in homine provenit ex hoc quod corrumpitur humorum debita harmonia huic homini; et similiter perversitas appetitus quae interdum rationem pervertit in hoc consistit quod corrumpitur commensuratio affectionum humanarum. Talis autem corruptio dupliciter contingit: consonantia enim sive contemperantia alicuius rei non consistit in indivisibili, sed habet latitudinem quandam, sicut patet de contemperantia humorum in corpore humano, salvatur enim natura humana et cum maiori vel cum minori caliditate, et similiter contemperantia humanae vitae salvatur secundum diversas maneries affectionum. 1295. But we must consider that the perversion of a thing happens from the fact that the natural disposition of that thing is destroyed. Thus physical sickness occurs in man because the proportion of humors belonging to this man is destroyed. In a similar way perversion of the appetite, which sometimes perverts the reason, consists in the destruction of the commensuration of man’s desires. But a destruction of this kind does not consist in a thing that cannot be added to or taken from another, but it has a certain latitude, as is evident in the natural disposition of humors in the human body, for human nature can be kept in good health with more or less warmth. Likewise, a correct relation in human living is preserved by various degrees of desire.
Uno igitur modo potest contingere perversitas in tali consonantia, ita quod non exeatur extra limites humanae vitae: et tunc dicetur simpliciter incontinentia vel malitia humana, sicut aegritudo humana corporalis, in qua salvari potest natura humana. Alio modo potest corrumpi contemperantia humanarum affectionum, ita quod progrediatur ultra limites humanae vitae in similitudinem affectionum alicuius bestiae, puta leonis, ursi aut porci, et hoc est quod vocatur bestialitas. Et est simile, sicut si ex parte corporis complexio alicuius mutaretur in complexionem leoninam vel porcinam. 1296. In one way an upset in harmony of this kind can arise without exceeding the limits of a human mode of living. Then it will simply be called incontinence or human vice, like sickness of the human body in which human nature is preserved. In another way the correct relation in human desires can be so corrupted that it exceeds the limits of a human mode of living like the inclinations of a dumb animal, a lion, or a pig. This is what is called brutishness. It is just as if the temperament of a man’s body had been changed into the temperament of a lion or a pig.
Deinde cum dicit: contraria autem etc., ponit contrarias dispositiones praedictis. Et primo proponit duo de quibus est manifestum. Et dicit quod contraria duobus praedictorum sunt manifesta: nam malitiae contrariatur virtus, incontinentiae autem continentia. 1297. Next [I, A, 1, b], at “And the contraries,” he gives the dispositions contrary to the qualities just mentioned. First [I, A, 1, b, i] he points out two dispositions about which there is no question, noting that the contraries of two of these are obvious, since to vice virtue is opposed and to incontinence, continence.
Secundo ibi: ad bestialitatem autem etc., ostendit quid opponatur tertio, scilicet bestialitati. Et primo proponit quod intendit. Secundo manifestat propositum, ibi, quemadmodum Homerus et cetera. Dicit ergo primo quod bestialitati congruenter dicitur opponi quaedam virtus, quae communem hominum modum excedit et potest vocari heroica vel divina; heroas enim gentiles vocabant animas defunctorum aliquorum virorum insignium, quos etiam deificatos dicebant. 1298. Second [I, A, 1, b, ii], at “The contrary” he shows what is opposed to the third, viz., brutishness. First [ii, x], he sets forth his proposition. Then [ii, y], at “In this manner etc.,” he explains it. He says first that a virtue, which exceeds the usual human mode and can be called heroic or divine, is appropriately said to be opposed to brutishness. Indeed the pagans gave the name hero to the souls of their illustrious dead who, to their way of thinking, were even deified.
Ad cuius evidentiam considerandum est, quod anima humana media est inter superiores substantias et divinas, quibus communicat per intellectum, et animalia bruta quibus communicat in sensitivis potentiis. Sicut ergo affectiones sensitivae partis aliquando in homine corrumpuntur usque ad similitudinem bestiarum et hoc vocatur bestialitas supra humanam malitiam et incontinentiam; ita etiam rationalis pars quandoque in homine perficitur et confortatur ultra communem modum humanae perfectionis, quasi in similitudinem substantiarum separatarum, et hoc vocatur virtus divina supra humanam virtutem et continentiam; ita enim se habet rerum ordo, ut medium ex diversis partibus attingat utrumque extremum. Unde et in humana natura est aliquid quod attingit ad id quod est superius, aliquid vero quod coniungitur inferiori, aliquid vero quod medio modo se habet. 1299. To understand this we must remember that the human soul is the middle substance between the higher or divine substances, with which it shares intelligence, and dumb animals with which it shares sensitive powers. Consequently: (1) the affections of the sensitive part are sometimes perverted in man almost like dumb animals (and this is called brutishness, exceeding human vice and incontinence); (2) the rational part in man is perfected and formed beyond the usual mode of human perfection after a likeness to separated substances (and this is called a divine virtue exceeding ordinary human virtue). Indeed the order of things is so arranged that the mean between different parts touches the two extremes. Likewise, then, in human nature there is something that comes into contact with what is above and something that comes into contact with what is below; yes, and something that occupies the middle.
Deinde cum dicit quemadmodum Homerus etc., manifestat quod dixerat. Et primo manifestat, quod sit in hominibus quaedam virtus heroica vel divina. Secundo ostendit, quod talis virtus opponatur bestialitati, ibi, etenim quemadmodum et cetera. Primum autem manifestat dupliciter. Uno modo per dictum Homeri, qui introducit Priamum de filio suo Hectore dicentem, quod erat excellenter bonus, ita quod non videbatur mortalis hominis existere filius, sed Dei, quia scilicet quiddam divinum apparebat in eo ultra communem hominum modum. Secundo manifestat idem per commune dictum gentilium, qui dicebant quosdam homines deificari, quod Aristoteles non dicit esse credendum, quantum ad hoc quod homo vertatur in naturam divinam, sed propter excellentiam virtutis supra communem modum hominum. Ex quo patet esse in hominibus aliquibus quamdam virtutem divinam, et concludit hanc virtutem esse bestialitati oppositam. 1300. Then [ii, y], at “In this manner,” he clarifies his statement. First [y, aa] he explains that in man there is a kind of heroic or divine virtue. Next [y, bb] at “In fact neither vice etc.,” he shows that this virtue is the opposite of brutishness. He illustrates his first point with two examples. The first example is taken from Homer’ who presents Priam as claiming his son Hector was so exceedingly virtuous that he seemed rather a child of God than of man-beyond the ordinary ways of man something divine appeared in him. His second example illustrates the same point by a pagan proverb believing in the deification of heroes. This is not to be understood, Aristotle says, in the sense that human nature is changed into divine nature but in the sense that the excellence of virtue exceeds the usual hum-an mode. Obviously, then, there is in some men a kind of divine virtue, and he draws the conclusion that this virtue is the opposite of brutishness.
Deinde cum dicit: et enim quemadmodum etc., probat propositum duplici ratione. Primo quidem quia malitiam vel virtutem dicimus quasi propriam homini. Unde neque malitia attribuitur bestiae quae est infra hominem, neque virtus Deo qui est supra hominem. Sed virtus divina est honorabilior virtute humana quam simpliciter virtutem nominamus. Perversitas autem bestiae est quoddam alterum genus malitiae a malitia humana quae simpliciter malitia dicitur. 1301. Next [y, bb], at “In fact neither vice,” he proves his proposition by two arguments. The first [bb, a’] is that vice and virtue are said to be proper to man. Hence, neither vice is attributed to a dumb animal who is inferior to man, nor virtue to God who is superior to man. But divine virtue is more noble than human virtue, which for us is called virtue in the fullest sense. On the other hand, brutish perversity is a kind of vice different from human vice, which is vice in the unqualified sense.
Secundam rationem ponit ibi, quia autem et cetera. Et dicit quod homines in quibus invenitur tanta bonitas quod raro invenitur in hominibus videntur esse divini viri, unde Lacones, scilicet quidam Graeciae cives, quando valde admirantur alicuius hominis bonitatem, dicunt iste est vir divinus. Et similiter ex parte malitiae, bestialis raro invenitur inter homines. 1302. He gives his second argument, at “Just as it is rare” [bb, b’], by asserting that people rarely have such great virtue, and those who do seem to be divine. Hence, when the Spartans—citizens of a particular section of Greece—marvelled at the virtue of someone, they exclaimed: “This man is divine.” Likewise in regard to the vice, brutishness is rarely found among men.
Et ponit tres modos secundum quos aliqui fiunt bestiales. Quorum primus est ex conversatione gentis, sicut apud barbaros qui rationabilibus legibus non reguntur, propter malam convivendi consuetudinem aliqui incidunt in malitiam bestialem. Secundo contingit aliquibus propter aegritudines et orbitates, idest amissiones carorum, ex quibus in amentiam incidunt et quasi bestiales fiunt. Tertio propter magnum augmentum malitiae, ex quo contingit quod quosdam superexcellenter infamamus dicentes eos bestiales. Quia igitur, sicut virtus divina raro in bonis invenitur, ita bestialitas raro in malis: videntur sibi per oppositum respondere. 1303. He presents three ways by which men become brutish. The first from a pagan manner of life, e.g., some of the barbarians, who are not accustomed to reasonable laws, fall into the vice of brutishness because of general vicious habits; the second way, from sickness and privations, i.e., loss of loved ones, which makes them lose their minds and. become animals; the third way, from an excessive growth in vice, which shamefully stigmatizes them with the name of beast. Since this is true, as divine virtue is rarely found among the good, so brutishness is rarely found among the vicious, it seems that the two things correspond by opposition to one another.
Deinde cum dicit sed de hac quidem etc., ostendit quid de talibus dictum sit et quid restet dicendum. Et primo continuat se ad praecedentia et sequentia; secundo determinat modum agendi, ibi, oportet autem et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod de hac dispositione, scilicet bestiali, posterius fiet quaedam recordatio, scilicet in hoc eodem libro. De malitia autem virtuti opposita dictum est prius, ubi determinatum est de virtutibus sed de incontinentia, quae vituperatur circa delectationes, et mollitie et delitiis quae vituperantur circa tristitias, dicendum est nunc, similiter et de continentia, quae laudatur circa delectationes; et perseverantia quae laudatur circa tristitias: ita tamen quod non existimemus hos habitus, neque eosdem virtuti et malitiae, neque ut genere diversos. 1304. Then [I, A, 2], at “But later we will have,” he shows what kind of matters has been discussed and what yet remains. First [I, A, 2, a] he connects the preceding with what follows. Next [I, A, 2, b], at “Here, however, we must etc.,” he explains his method of procedure. He says first that, later in this book (1401-1403), he will review this habit of brutishness. Previously in the treatment of the moral virtues (528-1108) he discussed vice, the opposite of virtue. But now (1306-1468) he must investigate incontinence, which is censured when concerned with pleasures, and effeminacy and voluptuousness, which are censured when concerned with pain. Likewise he must investigate continence, which is commendable when concerned with pleasure, and perseverance, which is commendable when concerned with pain, in such a way, however, that we do not consider these to be habits—either identified with virtue and vice, or different in kind.
Deinde cum dicit: oportet autem etc., ostendit modum procedendi. Et dicit quod oportet hic procedere sicut in aliis rebus, ut scilicet positis his quae videntur probabilia circa praedicta, primo inducamus dubitationes de eis et sic ostendemus omnia quae sunt maxime probabilia circa praedicta: et si non omnia, quia non est hominis ut nihil a mente eius excidat, ostendemus plurima et principalissima. Quia si in aliqua materia dissolvantur difficultates et derelinquantur quasi vera illa quae sunt probabilia, sufficienter est determinatum. 1305. At “Here, however, we must” [I, A, 2, b] he explains his method of procedure. Here we must proceed in the usual way, i.e., after stating what seems probable in the preceding discussions, the difficulties should be presented. In this way everything that is most probable in the matters discussed will be explained; or if not everything—no human mind is capable of this—at least many of the principal things, The reason is that when difficulties are resolved in any question and probabilities appear as true, a sufficient study has been made.
Deinde cum dicit: videtur utique etc., determinat de continentia et incontinentia, et perseverantia, et mollitie. Et, secundum id quod determinatum est, primo ponit probabilia; secundo inducit dubitationes, ibi, dubitabit autem utique aliquis etc.; tertio solvit, ibi: primum quidem igitur et cetera. Circa primum tria facit. Primo proponit probabilia circa ipsam continentiam et incontinentiam. Secundo circa comparationem eorum ad alia, ibi, et temperatum quidem et cetera. Tertio circa eorum materiam, ibi, adhuc incontinentes et cetera. Circa primum ponit tria probabilia. Quorum primum pertinet ad bonitatem et malitiam praedictorum. Et dicit quod probabiliter videtur quod continentia et perseverantia sint studiosa et laudabilia, incontinentia autem et mollities sint prava et vituperabilia. Secundum pertinet ad rationes definitivas ipsorum. Et dicit quod idem videtur esse continens quod ille qui permanet in ratione, idest in eo quod secundum rationem iudicat esse agendum, incontinens autem videtur ille qui egreditur a iudicio rationis. Tertium pertinet ad operationes eorum. Et dicit quod incontinens scit aliqua esse prava, et tamen agit ea propter passionem. Continens autem patitur quidem concupiscentias quas scit esse pravas unde non sequitur eas propter iudicium rationis. Et haec duo sunt etiam extendenda ad perseverantiam et mollitiem, sed circa tristitias. 1306. Next [I, B], at “it surely seems,” he investigates continence and incontinence, perseverance, and effeminacy. According to his plan, [I, B, 1] he first proposes what is probable. Then [Lect. 2: I, B, 2], at “Someone can raise a doubt” (B.1145 b 22), he brings forward the difficulties. Last [Lect. 3: I], at “First then we must try,” he solves the difficulties (B. 1146 b 8). On the initial point he does three things. First [B, 1, a] he proposes what is probable concerning continence and incontinence themselves. Second [B, 1, b], at “Likewise the temperate man etc,,” he proposes what is probable from a comparison of them with other dispositions. Finally, [B, 1, c], at “Besides, men are etc.,” he proposes what is probable about this matter. On the first point he makes three probable statements. The first pertains to the goodness and the badness of these dispositions. He says it is probable that continence and perseverance are good and laudable while incontinence and effeminacy are evil and censurable. The second statement pertains to the definitions of the things themselves. He says that the continent man seems to be identical with the reasonable person who judges what ought to be done reasonably; but the incontinent man seems to depart from reasonable judgment. The third pertains to the operations of these dispositions; he says that the incontinent man knows these particular actions are evil, and nevertheless does them out of passion. On the other hand, the continent man experiences desires that he knows are evil, and does not pursue them because of the judgment of reason. These two remarks are to be extended also to perseverance and effeminacy in connection with pains.
Deinde cum dicit: et temperatum quidem etc., ponit duo probabilia circa comparationem eorum ad alia. Quorum primum accipitur secundum comparationem continentiae ad temperantiam. Et dicit quod videtur temperatus esse continens et perseverativus. Sed quidam dicunt quod omnis continens et perseverativus est temperatus, quidam autem dicunt quod non; circa opposita vero horum, quidam dicunt quod omnis intemperatus est incontinens et e converso confuse, idest absque aliqua distinctione. Quidam autem dicunt eos esse alteros. 1307. Then [B, 1, b], at “Likewise the temperate etc.,” he makes two probable statements from a comparison of these with other dispositions. The first is taken from a comparison of continence with temperance. He says that the temperate man seems to be continent and persevering. Some philosophers even hold that every continent and persevering man is temperate, but others hold that he is not. Regarding the opposites of these, some were of the opinion that all intemperate men are incontinent, conversely, in a confused way, i.e., without any distinction; but others, that these differ one from another.
Secundum accipitur per comparationem ad prudentiam. Et dicit quod quandoque dicunt homines quod non contingit prudentem esse incontinentem, quandoque autem dicunt quod quidam prudentes et divini, idest ingeniosi, sunt incontinentes. 1308. The second statement is taken from a comparison with prudence. He says that sometimes it is maintained that the prudent man cannot be incontinent; sometimes, that certain prudent and godlike, i.e., gifted, men are incontinent.
Deinde cum dicit: adhuc incontinentes etc., ponit unum probabile circa materiam praedictorum. Et dicit quod quandoque dicuntur aliqui incontinentes, non solum concupiscentiarum, sed etiam irae, honoris et lucri. Ista igitur sunt sex quae communiter solent dici de continentia et incontinentia et perseverantia et mollitie. 1309. Last [B, 1, c], at “Besides, men,” he states what is probable about their matter, remarking that at times some are called incontinent not only for their concupiscence but also in connection with anger, honor, and gain. These then are the six statements that are usually made about continence and incontinence, perseverance, and effeminacy.

Doubts Concerning Continence
Chapter 2
      a.   He first submits what is more doubtful. — 1310-1312
ἀπορήσειε δ' ἄν τις πῶς ὑπολαμβάνων ὀρθῶς ἀκρατεύεταί τις. Someone can raise a doubt on how a man who judges correctly is incontinent.
      b.   He places six doubts. The first.
            i.    He objects to one part. — 1313
ἐπιστάμενον μὲν οὖν οὔ φασί τινες οἷόν τε εἶναι· δεινὸν γὰρ ἐπιστήμης ἐνούσης, ὡς ᾤετο Σωκράτης, ἄλλο τι κρατεῖν καὶ περιέλκειν αὐτὴν ὥσπερ ἀνδράποδον. Σωκράτης μὲν γὰρ ὅλως ἐμάχετο πρὸς τὸν λόγον ὡς οὐκ οὔσης ἀκρασίας· οὐθένα γὰρ ὑπολαμβάνοντα πράττειν παρὰ τὸ βέλτιστον, ἀλλὰ δι' ἄγνοιαν. Certain philosophers, therefore, say this is not possible for a man with knowledge. It is strange, as Socrates thought, that something else should control and enslave a man’s knowledge. Indeed Socrates completely defended this line of reasoning, so that for him incontinence did not exist, for he maintained that no one rightly judging does anything but the best, except out of ignorance.
            ii.   He objects to the other part. — 1314
οὗτος μὲν οὖν ὁ λόγος ἀμφισβητεῖ τοῖς φαινομένοις ἐναργῶς, καὶ δέον ζητεῖν περὶ τὸ πάθος, εἰ δι' ἄγνοιαν, τίς ὁ τρόπος γίνεται τῆς ἀγνοίας. ὅτι γὰρ οὐκ οἴεταί γε ὁ ἀκρατευόμενος πρὶν ἐν τῷ πάθει γενέσθαι, φανερόν. This teaching of Socrates casts doubt on much that is clearly evident. So it will be best to examine passion; and, if man sins only through ignorance, the kind of ignorance operating here. Obviously, before the onslaught of passion, an incontinent man knows he ought not to do what he actually does.
            iii. He rejects the solution of certain philosophers.
                   x.   HE PROPOSES (IT). — 1315
εἰσὶ δέ τινες οἳ τὰ μὲν συγχωροῦσι τὰ δ' οὔ· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐπιστήμης μηθὲν εἶναι κρεῖττον ὁμολογοῦσιν, τὸ δὲ μηθένα πράττειν παρὰ τὸ δόξαν βέλτιον οὐχ ὁμολογοῦσιν, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο τὸν ἀκρατῆ φασὶν οὐκ ἐπιστήμην ἔχοντα κρατεῖσθαι ὑπὸ τῶν ἡδονῶν ἀλλὰ δόξαν. Some accept one saying of Socrates and reject another. They admit that nothing is more powerful than knowledge but they do not admit that man can do nothing other than what he thinks is better. For this reason they say that the incontinent man, who is overcome by lust, does not have knowledge but only opinion.
                   y.   HE REJECTS THIS SOLUTION. — 1316
ἀλλὰ μὴν εἴγε δόξα καὶ μὴ ἐπιστήμη, μηδ' ἰσχυρὰ ὑπόληψις ἡ ἀντιτείνουσα ἀλλ' ἠρεμαία, καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς διστάζουσι, συγγνώμη τῷ μὴ μένειν ἐν αὐταῖς πρὸς ἐπιθυμίας ἰσχυράς· τῇ δὲ μοχθηρίᾳ οὐ συγγνώμη, οὐδὲ τῶν ἄλλων οὐδενὶ τῶν ψεκτῶν. But if it is opinion and not knowledge nor a strong supposition tending to the contrary but an ineffective belief held by people who are uncertain, it deserves tolerance because a man does not adhere to weak opinions in the fact of vigorous concupiscence. However, tolerance is not extended either to vice or to any other of the censurable dispositions.
      c. The second doubt.
            i.    He objects to one part. — 1317
φρονήσεως ἄρα ἀντιτεινούσης; αὕτη γὰρ ἰσχυρότατον. Therefore (the incontinent man has) prudence contending against desire, and prudence is the strongest of opinions.
            ii.   He shows that this argument is not tenable for two reasons.
                   x.   THE FIRST. — 1318
ἀλλ' ἄτοπον· ἔσται γὰρ ὁ αὐτὸς ἅμα φρόνιμος καὶ ἀκρατής, φήσειε δ' οὐδ' ἂν εἷς φρονίμου εἶναι τὸ πράττειν ἑκόντα τὰ φαυλότατα. This, however, is unreasonable, for a man will be prudent and incontinent at the same time. But no one will maintain that it pertains to a prudent man willingly to perform the basest acts.
                   y.   THE SECOND. — 1319
πρὸς δὲ τούτοις δέδεικται πρότερον ὅτι πρακτικός γε ὁ φρόνιμος τῶν γὰρ ἐσχάτων τις καὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἔχων ἀρετάς. In this connection it was explained previously that a prudent man not only is concerned with ultimates, but also has the other virtues.
      d.   The third doubt. — 1320
ἔτι εἰ μὲν ἐν τῷ ἐπιθυμίας ἔχειν ἰσχυρὰς καὶ φαύλας ὁ ἐγκρατής, οὐκ ἔσται ὁ σώφρων ἐγκρατὴς οὐδ' ὁ ἐγκρατὴς σώφρων· οὔτε γὰρ τὸ ἄγαν σώφρονος οὔτε τὸ φαύλας ἔχειν. ἀλλὰ μὴν δεῖ γε· εἰ μὲν γὰρ χρησταὶ αἱ ἐπιθυμίαι, φαύλη ἡ κωλύουσα ἕξις μὴ ἀκολουθεῖν, ὥσθ' ἡ ἐγκράτεια οὐ πᾶσα σπουδαία· εἰ δ' ἀσθενεῖς καὶ μὴ φαῦλαι, οὐθὲν σεμνόν, οὐδ' εἰ φαῦλαι καὶ ἀσθενεῖς, οὐδὲν μέγα. Besides, if the continent man is so called from the fact that he has vehement evil desires, the temperate man will not be continent, nor the continent man temperate; for one who is completely temperate does not have evil desires. However, it is necessary for the continent man to have evil desires, for if his desires are good, the habit forbidding him to follow them is evil. Therefore, not every kind of continence is desirable. But if the desires are weak and not evil, then to be continent is not something worthy of respect; if they are weak and evil (to resist them) will not be remarkable either.
      e.   The fourth doubt.
            i.    He presents a difficulty about the nature of continence. — 1321
ἔτι εἰ πάσῃ δόξῃ ἐμμενετικὸν ποιεῖ ἡ ἐγκράτεια, φαύλη, οἷον εἰ καὶ τῇ ψευδεῖ· Moreover, if continence makes a man hold all opinions, then a kind of continence can be evil-in case the opinions are also false.
            ii.   He makes three objections.
                   x.   THE FIRST. — 1322
καὶ εἰ πάσης δόξης ἡ ἀκρασία ἐκστατικόν, ἔσται τις σπουδαία ἀκρασία, οἷον ὁ Σοφοκλέους Νεοπτόλεμος ἐν τῷ Φιλοκτήτῃ· ἐπαινετὸς γὰρ οὐκ ἐμμένων οἷς ἐπείσθη ὑπὸ τοῦ Ὀδυσσέως διὰ τὸ λυπεῖσθαι ψευδόμενος. Likewise if incontinence disposes a man to abandon any and every opinion, it will follow that a kind of incontinence is desirable. Neoptolemus in Sophocles’ Philoctetes is an example of this. For he is to be praised for not retaining the opinion of which he had been persuaded by Ulysses, because lying saddened him.
                   y.   THE SECOND OBJECTION. — 1323
ἔτι ὁ σοφιστικὸς λόγος [ψευδόμενος] ἀπορία· διὰ γὰρ τὸ παράδοξα βούλεσθαι ἐλέγχειν, ἵνα δεινοὶ ὦσιν ὅταν ἐπιτύχωσιν, ὁ γενόμενος συλλογισμὸς ἀπορία γίνεται· δέδεται γὰρ ἡ διάνοια, ὅταν μένειν μὴ βούληται διὰ τὸ μὴ ἀρέσκειν τὸ συμπερανθέν, προϊέναι δὲ μὴ δύνηται διὰ τὸ λῦσαι μὴ ἔχειν τὸν λόγον. Further, the sophistic argument is a cause of doubt. Some men want to argue to indubitable conclusions so that they may appear wise when they attain them; and the syllogism they devise gives rise to doubt. As a result the mind (of the hearer) remains in suspense, since it does not want to admit the conclusion because it is not acceptable, but neither can it rest in the opposite conclusion because it is not able to solve the argument.
                   z.   THE THIRD OBJECTION. — 1324
συμβαίνει δὴ ἔκ τινος λόγου ἡ ἀφροσύνη μετ' ἀκρασίας ἀρετή· τἀναντία γὰρ πράττει ὧν ὑπολαμβάνει διὰ τὴν ἀκρασίαν, ὑπολαμβάνει δὲ τἀγαθὰ κακὰ εἶναι καὶ οὐ δεῖν πράττειν, ὥστε τἀγαθὰ καὶ οὐ τὰ κακὰ πράξει. It would appear from this then that imprudence joined with incontinence is a virtue. That a man performs actions contrary to what he judges is due to incontinence. But he judges that good actions are bad and ought not to be done. Therefore, he will be doing good and not bad actions.
      f.   The fifth doubt. — 1325
ἔτι ὁ τῷ πεπεῖσθαι πράττων καὶ διώκων τὰ ἡδέα καὶ προαιρούμενος βελτίων ἂν δόξειεν τοῦ μὴ διὰ λογισμὸν ἀλλὰ δι' ἀκρασίαν· εὐιατότερος γὰρ διὰ τὸ μεταπεισθῆναι ἄν. ὁ δ' ἀκρατὴς ἔνοχος τῇ παροιμίᾳ ἐν ᾗ φαμὲν ὅταν τὸ ὕδωρ πνίγῃ, τί δεῖ ἐπιπίνειν; εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἐπέπειστο ἃ πράττει, μεταπεισθεὶς ἂν ἐπαύσατο· νῦν δὲ ἄλλα πεπεισμένος οὐδὲν ἧττον [ἄλλα] πράττει. Furthermore, the man who from persuasion and personal choice pursues pleasures will appear better than one who acts from incontinence rather than reasoning. The persuaded man is more corrigible because he can be dissuaded. On the other hand, to the incontinent man is applicable the proverb: “When water chokes, what can we drink?” If a person performs evil actions because of conviction, he will cease from them when dissuaded; but the incontinent person will do them notwithstanding.
      g.   The sixth doubt. — 1326
ἔτι εἰ περὶ πάντα ἀκρασία ἐστὶ καὶ ἐγκράτεια, τίς ὁ ἁπλῶς ἀκρατής; οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἁπάσας ἔχει τὰς ἀκρασίας, φαμὲν δ' εἶναί τινας ἁπλῶς. In addition, if continence and incontinence are concerned with all dispositions, who will be continent without qualification? No one really has all the species of incontinence, but we do say that some are absolutely incontinent.
3.   HE SUMS UP. — 1327
Chapter 3
αἱ μὲν οὖν ἀπορίαι τοιαῦταί τινες συμβαίνουσιν, τούτων δὲ τὰ μὲν ἀνελεῖν δεῖ τὰ δὲ καταλιπεῖν· ἡ γὰρ λύσις τῆς ἀπορίας εὕρεσίς ἐστιν. Such then are the doubts occurring in this matter; some of them should be solved and some allowed to remain, for the solution of a doubt is found in the truth.
Dubitabit autem (utique) aliquis et cetera. Postquam philosophus posuit ea quae videntur esse probabilia circa continentiam et incontinentiam, hic movet dubitationes contra omnia praedicta, non tamen eodem ordine quo ea proposuit. Proposuit enim ea eo ordine quo cadunt in prima hominis consideratione, qui primo considerat circa aliquid id quod est commune, puta an sit bonum vel malum. Secundo considerat propriam rationem rei. Tertio operationem eius. Quarto comparationem eius ad alia cum quibus convenientiam habet. Quinto comparationem eius ad illa a quibus differt; et ultimo ea quae exterius circumstant. 1310. After the Philosopher has stated the conclusions that seem probable concerning continence and incontinence, he now brings up doubts about all that he has said [I, B, 2], not, however, in the same order in which he has presented them. In fact, he proposed the doubts in that order in which they first fall under consideration. But on any subject a man first considers the general aspect, for example, whether it is good or bad. Next, he considers the peculiar nature of the thing; third, its operation. Fourth, he compares it to other things with which it agrees; fifth, to those things from which it differs. Finally he considers its external surroundings.
In ponendo autem dubitationes praemittit illud quod est magis dubitabile. Sic ergo contra sex praedicta ponit sex dubitationes; primam quidem contra tertium probabile, de actu continentis et incontinentis. Secundo ponit aliam contra quintum, quod erat de comparatione ad prudentiam, ibi, prudentia ergo contratendente etc.; tertia dubitatio est circa quartum dubitabile quod erat de comparatione ad temperantiam, et hoc ibi: adhuc si quidem etc.; quarta dubitatio est contra secundum probabile, quod erat de diffinitione continentiae, et hoc ibi: adhuc, si omni opinioni etc.; quinta dubitatio est contra primum probabile, quod erat de bonitate et malitia continentiae et incontinentiae, et hoc ibi: adhuc in persuaderi etc.; sexta dubitatio est contra sextum probabile, de materia continentiae et incontinentiae, ibi, adhuc si circa omnia et cetera. 1311. But in presenting the doubts he first submits what is more doubtful [2, a]. So, then, contrary to these six considerations [2, b], he places six doubts. The first doubt concerns the third probable statement about the act of the continent and the incontinent man. Next [2, c], at “Therefore... prudence,” he places the second doubt concerned with the fifth probable statement, which referred to a comparison with prudence. The third doubt [2, d], given at “Besides, if the continent etc.,” deals with the fourth probable statement, which relates to a comparison with temperance. The fourth doubt [2, e], given at “Moreover, if continence etc.,” concerns the second probable statement, which had to do with the definition of continence and incontinence. The fifth doubt [2, f], given at “Furthermore, he who does etc.,” is concerned with the first probable statement which treated the goodness and badness of continence and incontinence. The sixth doubt [2, g], given at “In addition, if continence etc.,” regards the sixth probable statement dealing with the matter of continence and incontinence.
Circa primum duo facit. Primo proponit dubitationem. Et dicit quod aliquis potest de hoc dubitare, quomodo aliquis qui habet rectam existimationem est incontinens operando contraria. 1312. In regard to the initial point he first proposes the doubt [2, a]. On this he remarks that someone can doubt how a man who judges correctly is incontinent in doing the contrary.
Secundo ibi, scientem quidem igitur etc., prosequitur dubitationem. Et primo obiicit ad unam partem. Secundo obiicit ad aliam, ibi, iste quidem igitur et cetera. Tertio excludit quorumdam solutionem, ibi, sunt autem quidam et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod quidam dicunt non esse possibile quod aliquis existimans recte, ita quod sit sciens, sit incontinens. Non enim fortius vincitur a debiliori. Cum igitur scientia sit quid fortissimum in homine, difficile videtur quod, existente scientia in homine, aliquid aliud imperet scientiae et trahat ipsam quasi servam, cum magis ratio cuius perfectio est scientia, dominetur et imperet sensibili parti sicut servae. Et haec fuit ratio Socratis. Unde totaliter insistebat huic rationi, quasi incontinentia non sit; putabat enim quod nullus qui recte aestimat operaretur aliquid praeter id quod est optimum; sed quod omne peccatum accidat propter ignorantiam. 1313. Then [2, b], at “Certain philosophers,” he pursues the doubt. First he objects to one part [b, i]. Next [b, ii], at “This teaching etc.,” he objects to the other part. Last [b, iii], at “Some accept etc.,” he rejects the solution of certain philosophers. He says first that some hold that it is impossible for a man to be incontinent when he judges correctly as a result of knowledge, because the stronger is not overcome by the weaker. Since then knowledge is a very powerful principle in man, it seems that, with knowledge present, something other would command knowledge and drag it along as a slave, although reason—of which knowledge is a perfection—should rather be in control and command the sensitive part as a slave (so the objection runs). This was the argument of Socrates. So rigidly did Socrates follow his own argument that incontinence might seem impossible. Indeed, he thought that no one who judges correctly does anything except : what is best; but that all sin occurs through ignorance.
Deinde cum dicit: iste quidem igitur etc., obiicit in contrarium. Et dicit quod iste sermo Socratis dubitationem inducit contra ea quae sunt apparentia manifeste, manifeste enim videntur aliqui operari illud quod sciunt esse malum. Et si ita sit quod peccent propter ignorantiam quae adveniat eis dum sunt in passione, puta concupiscentiae vel irae, optimum est quaerere qualis ignorantia sit ista. Manifestum est enim quod incontinens antequam passio superveniat, non existimat faciendum illud quod per passionem postea facit. 1314. Next [b, ii], at “This teaching,” he objects on the contrary that Socrates’ doctrine on this point calls into question matters that are evident. Obviously some people do what they know is wrong. If they really sin through ignorance, which happens while they are under passion’s influence, whether concupiscence or anger, an investigation of the kind of ignorance involved is highly desirable. Obviously, before passion supervenes, the incontinent man does not judge he should do what he later actually does in the heat of passion.
Deinde cum dicit: sunt autem quidam etc., excludit solutionem quorumdam. Et primo ponit eam, dicens quod quidam concedunt quaedam dictorum a Socrate, scilicet quod scientia non trahitur, quaedam autem non concedunt, scilicet quod nullus peccet nisi propter ignorantiam. Confitentur enim quod nihil est melius et fortius quam scientia, quod scilicet possit eam trahere. Non tamen confitentur quod nullus possit operari praeter id quod opinatur esse melius. Et inde est, quod dicunt quod incontinens qui superatur a voluptatibus non habet scientiam, sed opinionem. 1315. At “Some accept”. [b, iii] he rejects the solution of certain philosophers. First [b, iii, x] he proposes their solution-that some accept one saying of Socrates, that “Knowledge is not influenced; but reject another, that “the only cause of sin is ignorance.” They admit nothing can conquer knowledge, as being better and more powerful. However, they do not admit that man can do nothing other than what he thinks is better. Consequently, their position is that the incontinent person overcome by sensual pleasures does not have knowledge but opinion.
Secundo ibi: sed tamen etc., excludit solutionem praedictam. Et dicit quod incontinens, aut habet opinionem fortem aut debilem. Si fortem, eadem ratio videtur de ea et de scientia, quia non minus inhaeretur uni quam alii, ut infra dicetur. Si autem non sit fortis opinio tendens contra concupiscentias, sed est quieta idest remissa et debilis, sicut accidit in his qui dubitant, videtur hoc non esse imputandum, sed venia dignum, quod scilicet homo non immaneat debiliter opinatis contra concupiscentias fortes. Non autem datur venia neque malitiae, neque alicui aliorum vituperabilium, inter quae est incontinentia, ita scilicet quod totaliter ei non imputetur. 1316. Then [b, iii, y], at “But if it is opinion,” he rejects this solution by saying that such an incontinent person has either a firm or a weak opinion. If firm, then the same argument seems valid for it and for knowledge, because we do not adhere to one less than to the other—more on this later (1137). On the other hand, if the opinion against concupiscence is not firm but irresolute, i.e., remiss and weak, happening to people who are dubious, it seems this should not be imputed a fault but rather deserves tolerance. The reason is that in the face of vigorous concupiscence a man does not cling to opinions feebly held. However, tolerance is not extended to vice or to any of the other censurable dispositions. Incontinence is one of these but fault is not entirely imputed to it.
Deinde cum dicit prudentia ergo etc., movet dubitationem circa comparationem continentiae ad prudentiam, quod erat quintum probabile. Et primo obiicit ad unam partem: concludens ex praemissis, quod aliquis potest esse incontinens licet habeat prudentiam quae in contrarium tendat. Si enim incontinens habet opinionem contra tendentem concupiscentiis pravis et non habet debilem, quia sic non esset ei imputandum, relinquitur ergo quod habeat fortem opinionem contra tendentem. Sed inter opiniones prudentia est fortissima. Ergo incontinens maxime habet prudentiam contra tendentem. 1317. Next [2, c], at “Therefore” he raises a doubt about the comparison of continence with prudence, which was the fifth probable statement. First [c, i] he objects to one part, concluding from the premises that a man can be incontinent although he has prudence directing him to virtue. If the incontinent man has an opinion contending against evil desires—and the opinion is not weak, since in this way they would not be charged as a fault—it remains then that he has a strong opinion maintaining the contrary. But prudence is the strongest of opinions. Therefore, the incontinent person in a special way has prudence contending contrary to desire.
Secundo ibi: sed inconveniens etc., ostendit hoc esse inconveniens, duplici ratione. Quarum prima est, quod secundum hoc sequetur quod idem simul sit prudens et incontinens, quod videtur esse impossibile; nullus enim dicet ad prudentem pertinere quod volens operetur pravissima. Dictum est enim supra in VI quod circa prudentiam peior est qui voluntarius peccat. 1318. Second [c, ii], at “This, however,” he shows that this argument is not tenable for two reasons. First [c, ii, x], according to these lines of thought it will follow that a man may be prudent and incontinent at the same time. This seems impossible, for no one holds that to perform the basest actions willingly is an act of prudence. It was noted previously in the sixth book (1173) that a person who voluntarily sins in the matter of prudence is more blameworthy.
Secundam rationem ponit ibi, cum his autem et cetera. Est enim supra ostensum quod prudens non solum est cognoscitivus, sed est etiam activus, quia est aliquis extremorum, id est habens aestimationem rectam circa operabilia singularia quae supra in VI dixit esse extrema, et est etiam habens alias virtutes, scilicet morales, ut in sexto ostensum est. Unde non videtur possibile quod aliquis prudens contra virtutes operetur. 1319. He presents the second reason [C, ii, y] at “In this connection.” It was explained previously (1208-1212) that the prudent man is not only cognizant that a particular is an ultimate, i.e., has a correct evaluation of individual practicables which he called ultimates in the sixth book (1214).but also has the other virtues, namely, the moral, as was likewise indicated in the sixth book (1172). Consequently it does not seem possible for any prudent person to act contrary to the virtues.
Deinde cum dicit: adhuc si quidem etc., movet dubitationem circa comparationem continentiae et temperantiae, quod erat quartum probabile. Oportet enim alterum trium dicere. Quorum primum est quod continens dicatur aliquis ex eo quod habet concupiscentias pravas et fortes a quibus non deducatur contra rationem. Et si hoc est verum, temperatus non erit continens, neque continens erit temperatus. Ille enim qui est perfecte temperatus, non habet pravas concupiscentias. Et sic habere pravas concupiscentias vehementes repugnat ei quod est esse temperatum; oporteret autem quod temperatus haberet pravas concupiscentias si esset continens, facta priori suppositione. Secundum autem trium est quod continens habeat concupiscentias non pravas, sed bonas; et sic sequetur quod quicumque habitus prohibet eas sequi, sit pravus. Talis autem habitus est continentia. Ergo non omnis continentia erit studiosa. Tertium trium est quod concupiscentiae quas habet continens non sint vehementes, sed infirmae et debiles; et tunc, si non sunt pravae sed indifferentes, esse continentem non erit venerabile vel laudabile, et si sint pravae et tantum debiles, non erit magnum eis resistere. Et tamen continentia habetur tamquam aliquid magnum et venerabile. Videtur ergo sequi inconveniens, quidquid horum trium dicatur. 1320. After this, at “Besides, if the continent man” [2, d], he gives advice on the comparison between continence and temperance, which was the fourth probable statement. To make this clear, he must discuss three other observations he has made. The first is that a man is called continent from the fact that he has vehement evil desires and, notwithstanding these, is not led astray contrary to reason. If this is true, the temperate man will not be continent, nor the continent man temperate, for the man who is completely temperate does not have evil desires in any vehemence. So, to have vehement evil desires is inconsistent with being temperate. However, once the preceding supposition be made, it would be necessary that the temperate man have evil desires if he were continent. The second of the three is that the continent man may have not evil desires but good ones. This being the case, it would follow that whatever habit forbids the pursuit of these is evil. But such a habit is continence. Therefore, not every kind of continence is desirable. The third of the three is that the desires the continent man has might not be vehement but weak and feeble. Then, if the desires are evil, to be continent will be worthy neither of respect nor praise; if they are evil and nevertheless weak, it will not be remarkable to resist them. Yet continence is looked upon as something great and worthy of respect. Therefore something unreasonable seems to follow, whatever one of the three positions be maintained.
Deinde cum dicit adhuc si omni opinioni etc., movet dubitationem contra ipsam definitionem continentiae, quod erat secundum probabilium propositorum. Et primo movet dubitationem contra rationem continentiae, prout supra dictum est quod idem est continens et permansivus in ratione. Et dicit quod si continentia facit permansivum omni opinioni, idest si facit homini esse persuasum quod omni opinioni immoretur non recedens ab ea, sequetur quod quaedam continentia sit prava. Contingit enim aliquam opinionem esse falsam, a qua discedere est bonum. Unde ab ea detineri est pravum: cum tamen continentia laudetur quasi aliquid bonum. 1321. Then [2, e], at “Moreover, if continence,” he raises a doubt about the very definition of continence, which was the second probable statement. First [e, i] he presents a difficulty about the nature of continence as stated above (1306): that the continent person is also the man who lives by reason. He says that if continence makes a man embrace every opinion, i.e., persuades him to abide by every opinion and not depart from any, it will follow that some kind of continence is evil; for an opinion can be false. And it is good to reject such a view. Hence it is evil to be governed by it, although continence should be praised as something good.
Secundo ibi, et si ab omni etc., obiicit contra rationem incontinentiae, prout supra dictum est quod incontinens est egressivus a ratione. Et hoc tribus rationibus. Quarum prima est: quod si incontinentia sit egressiva a quacumque opinione sive ratione, sequetur quod aliqua incontinentia sit bona, cum tamen semper vituperetur ut mala. Et hoc ideo, quia aliqua opinativa ratio persuadet aliquod malum fieri, quod vitare est bonum. Et ponit exemplum de hoc quod quidam poeta, nomine Sophocles, narrat quod Neoptolemus qui fuit in bello Troiano, persuasus fuit ab Odrisco quod mentiretur Philotethi propter quamdam causam quae videbatur honesta: qui tamen postea non permansit in opinione quae sibi fuerat persuasa, propter hoc quod erat ei triste et grave mentiri; et in hoc est laudabilis. 1322. Next [e, ii], at “Likewise, if,” he makes three objections to the notion of incontinence he has already given (1306), namely, that the incontinent man is inclined to abandon reason. The first [e, ii, x] is that if incontinence abandons every opinion or reason, it will follow that some kind of incontinence is good; nevertheless incontinence should always be censured as an evil thing. This is so because a conjectural reason may prompt the doing of an evil action which it is good to avoid. He gives an illustration. The poet Sophocles narrates that Neoptolemus, who fought in the Trojan war, was persuaded by Ulysses to lie to Philoctetes for a reason that seemed honorable. Afterwards, however, he did not retain the opinion, of which he had been persuaded, because lying was grievous and painful to him; and in this there is something praiseworthy.
Secundam rationem ponit ibi: adhuc sophisticus sermo et cetera. Et dicit quod ratio sophistica mentiens, idest concludens falsum, est dubitatio, idest dubitationis causa. Quia enim sophistae ad hoc quod appareant sapientes volunt concludere inopinabilia, cum ad hoc pertingant syllogizando, syllogismus factus inducit dubitationem: mens enim audientis manet ligata, cum ex una parte non velit permanere in eo quod ratio concludit, propter id quod conclusio ei non placet, et ex alia parte non potest procedere ad contrarium, quia non habet in sua potestate solutionem argumentationis. Nec tamen propter hoc quod iste non permanet in ratione, quam solvere nescit, est vituperabilis. Non ergo videtur quod egredi a quacumque ratione sit incontinentia. 1323. He presents the second objection [e, ii, y], at “Further, the sophistic,” stating that the sophistic argument, because misleading, i.e., concluding falsely, is itself a doubt or rather a cause of doubt. The explanation is that the sophists, in order to appear wise, want to infer indubitable conclusions. But when they succeed by argument, the syllogism they devise causes doubt; for the mind of the hearer remains in suspense, since on the one hand the mind does not wish to abide by what reason infers, because the conclusion is not acceptable, and on the other hand, it cannot proceed to the opposite because it does not have the solution of the argument within its power. Nevertheless, the mind is not to be blamed because it did not abide by the reasoning which it did not know how to resolve. Therefore, it does not seem there is incontinence in abandoning any reason whatsoever.
Tertiam rationem ponit ibi, accidit autem et cetera. Si enim egredi a quacumque ratione sit incontinentia, sequetur per quandam rationem quod imprudentia incontinentiae iuncta sit virtus. Et sic virtus componetur ex duobus vitiis: quod est impossibile. Et quod sequatur id quod dictum est, videtur per hoc quod, secundum hoc quod dictum est, quod aliquis operetur contraria his quae opinatur, est propter incontinentiam; opinatur autem quod bona sint mala, et quod non oporteat ea operari; quod est imprudentiae. Unde sequetur quod operetur bona et non mala, quod videtur esse virtutis. 1324. He gives the third objection at “It would appear” [e, ii, z]. If to abandon any reason whatever is incontinent, it follows from this argument that imprudence joined to incontinence is a virtue. Thus virtue will be composed of two vices, which is impossible; and it seems that what was said will follow, that incontinence is the reason why someone performs actions contrary to his judgment. But the judgment he makes that good actions are bad and that he ought not to do them, is the fruit of imprudence. Hence it will follow that he performs good and not evil actions, which seems to belong to virtue.
Deinde cum dicit adhuc in persuaderi etc., movet dubitationem circa bonitatem et malitiam continentiae et incontinentiae. Videtur enim quod ille qui operatur mala ex eo quod est sibi persuasum quod sint bona, et inde est quod persequitur et eligit delectabilia tamquam per se bona (quod facit intemperatus) sit melior eo qui operatur mala non propter ratiocinationem qua sit deceptus, sed propter incontinentiam. Ille enim qui est persuasus videtur esse sanabilior propter hoc quod de facili potest sibi dissuaderi quod credit. Sed incontinens non videtur iuvari ex aliqua bona suasione. Quinimmo videtur esse reus proverbii, quod dicimus quod quando aqua, cuius scilicet potus reficit sitientem, suffocat bibentem, quid adhuc valet ei bibere? Et similiter si aliquis ageret mala quasi persuasus, idest deceptus, desisteret agere dissuasus, idest remota illa suasione, sicut sitis cessat adhibito potu aquae. Nunc autem incontinens suasus est et credit ea quae recta sunt et nihilominus alia agit; unde aqua bonae suasionis eum non iuvat, sed suffocat. 1325. Then [2, f], at “Furthermore, he who does evil,” he raises a doubt about the goodness and badness of continence and incontinence. It seems that one who performs evil actions because he is persuaded they are good and consequently pursues and chooses pleasures as good in themselves (as the intemperate man does) is better than another who performs evil actions, not because of reasoning by which he is deceived, but because of incontinence. The man who has been persuaded seems to be more corrigible because he can easily be dissuaded from his present view. But the incontinent man does not seem to be helped by any good advice. Nay rather he seems to be indicated in the proverb that if water, whose drinking refreshes the thirsty, chokes the drinker, what can he drink? In a similar way, if a man performs evil actions as a result of conviction or deception, he will cease to do them when dissuaded, i.e., when the persuasion is withdrawn, as thirst ceases when a drink of water is taken. But in the present case the counselled incontinent man even believes some actions are right, and notwithstanding does different things. Hence the good water of advice does not help but chokes him.
Deinde cum dicit: adhuc si circa omnia etc., movet dubitationem circa materiam continentiae et incontinentiae, quod erat sextum propositorum. Et dicit, quod si continentia et incontinentia non solum sunt circa concupiscentias, sed circa iras et lucrum, et omnia huiusmodi, non poterit determinari quis sit simpliciter incontinens. Nullus enim invenitur, qui habeat omnes incontinentias. Dicimus autem esse quosdam simpliciter incontinentes. Non ergo videtur esse verum quod supra dictum est, quod continentia et incontinentia sit circa omnia. 1326. At “In addition, if incontinence” [2, g], he raises a doubt about the matter of continence and incontinence, which was the sixth probable statement. He affirms that if continence and incontinence concern not only concupiscence but anger, wealth, and everything of this kind, he will be unable to determine who is incontinent without qualification. Indeed, no one can be found who will have all the varieties of incontinence. But we do say that some are absolutely incontinent. Therefore, the assertion previously made (1225), that continence and incontinence concern everything does not seem to be true.
Ultimo autem epilogando concludit quod tales quaedam dubitationes accidunt contra prius proposita, et quasdam harum dubitationum oportet interimere quasi falsum concludentes et quasdam relinquere quasi concludentes verum. Haec est enim vera solutio dubitationis, cum invenitur quid sit verum, circa id quod dubitatur. 1327. Last [3], at “Such then,” he sums up in conclusion by indicating that such are the doubts occurring in the matter under discussion. We must solve some of these doubts by showing that they tend to falsehood; others we can leave inasmuch as they are quasi conclusions. When we find the truth about a doubtful point, then we have a genuine solution to a doubt.

The Solution of Doubts
Chapter 3
I.    HE STATES HIS INTENTION. — 1328-1329
πρῶτον μὲν οὖν σκεπτέον πότερον εἰδότες ἢ οὔ, καὶ πῶς εἰδότες· εἶτα περὶ ποῖα τὸν ἀκρατῆ καὶ τὸν ἐγκρατῆ θετέον, λέγω δὲ πότερον περὶ πᾶσαν ἡδονὴν καὶ λύπην ἢ περί τινας ἀφωρισμένας, καὶ τὸν ἐγκρατῆ καὶ τὸν καρτερικόν, πότερον ὁ αὐτὸς ἢ ἕτερός ἐστιν· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὅσα συγγενῆ τῆς θεωρίας ἐστὶ ταύτης. First then we must try to find out whether or not some people can be knowingly incontinent; if so, in what way. Next we must determine in what kind of matter a man is continent or incontinent: whether in every form of pleasure and pain or only in some specific forms; whether the continent man and the persevering man are identical or different. Likewise, we must give our attention to whatever matters are related to this investigation.
      A.  He settles the question on the existence of continence and incontinence.
                   a.   He states his intention.
                         i.    Our primary effort... directed toward... two points. — 1330-1334
ἔστι δ' ἀρχὴ τῆς σκέψεως, πότερον ὁ ἐγκρατὴς καὶ ὁ ἀκρατής εἰσι τῷ περὶ ἃ ἢ τῷ ὣς ἔχοντες τὴν διαφοράν, λέγω δὲ πότερον τῷ περὶ ταδὶ εἶναι μόνον ἀκρατὴς ὁ ἀκρατής, ἢ οὒ ἀλλὰ τῷ ὥς, ἢ οὒ ἀλλ' ἐξ ἀμφοῖν· ἔπειτ' εἰ περὶ πάντ' ἐστὶν ἀκρασία καὶ ἐγκράτεια ἢ οὔ. In the beginning of our inquiry we ask whether the continent and the incontinent differ specifically, by reason of the matter with which they are concerned, or in the manner of dealing with the matter. We ask whether a man may be called incontinent only because he is concerned with particular matter (or also because concerned with any sort of matter); whether only from one or the other, or from both (i.e., limited manner and limited matter). Again, we ask whether or not incontinence and continence deal with all kinds of matter.
                         ii.   He determines his statements.
                               x.   FIRST, THE SECOND STATEMENT. — 1335
οὔτε γὰρ περὶ ἅπαντ' ἐστὶν ὁ ἁπλῶς ἀκρατής, ἀλλὰ περὶ ἅπερ ὁ ἀκόλαστος, Incontinence in the unqualified sense is not predicated of a man in all matters but only in that limited matter in which he may be intemperate.
                               y.   SECOND.... THE FIRST STATEMENT. — 1336
                   b.   He carries... out (his intention)
οὔτε τῷ πρὸς ταῦτα ἁπλῶς ἔχειν ταὐτὸν γὰρ ἂν ἦν τῇ ἀκολασίᾳ, ἀλλὰ τῷ ὡδὶ ἔχειν. ὃ μὲν γὰρ ἄγεται προαιρούμενος, νομίζων ἀεὶ δεῖν τὸ παρὸν ἡδὺ διώκειν· ὃ δ' οὐκ οἴεται μέν, διώκει δέ. Neither is a man said to be continent or incontinent only in this (for then continence would be the same as intemperance), but in conducting himself in a certain way. One (the intemperate man) is led as a result of choice, judging that he must always pursue the present pleasure. But the other (the incontinent man) does not so judge, but pursues the pleasure notwithstanding.
            2.   HE REJECTS A FALSE SOLUTION. — 1337
περὶ μὲν οὖν τοῦ δόξαν ἀληθῆ ἀλλὰ μὴ ἐπιστήμην εἶναι παρ' ἣν ἀκρατεύονται, οὐδὲν διαφέρει πρὸς τὸν λόγον· ἔνιοι γὰρ τῶν δοξαζόντων οὐ διστάζουσιν, ἀλλ' οἴονται ἀκριβῶς εἰδέναι. εἰ οὖν διὰ τὸ ἠρέμα πιστεύειν οἱ δοξάζοντες μᾶλλον τῶν ἐπισταμένων παρὰ τὴν ὑπόληψιν πράξουσιν, οὐθὲν διοίσει ἐπιστήμη δόξης· ἔνιοι γὰρ πιστεύουσιν οὐδὲν ἧττον οἷς δοξάζουσιν ἢ ἕτεροι οἷς ἐπίστανται· δηλοῖ δ' Ἡράκλειτος. It makes no difference in the present argument to say that it is real opinion and not objectively verified knowledge against which people act incontinently, for there are some who have only opinion yet are not in doubt, for they think they know with certitude. If then it is said that men with opinion rather than objectively verified knowledge act contrary to conviction because they cling feebly to their views, we answer that this knowledge does not differ from opinion in this matter. There are some people who assent no less firmly to matters of opinion than others to matters of objectively verified knowledge. Heraclitus is an example of this.
            3.   HE GIVES THE TRUE SOLUTION.
                   a.   He solves the doubt by some distinctions.
                         i.    The first. — 1338
ἀλλ' ἐπεὶ διχῶς λέγομεν τὸ ἐπίστασθαι καὶ γὰρ ὁ ἔχων μὲν οὐ χρώμενος δὲ τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ καὶ ὁ χρώμενος λέγεται ἐπίστασθαι, διοίσει τὸ ἔχοντα μὲν μὴ θεωροῦντα δὲ καὶ τὸ θεωροῦντα ἃ μὴ δεῖ πράττειν [τοῦ ἔχοντα καὶ θεωροῦντα]· τοῦτο γὰρ δοκεῖ δεινόν, ἀλλ' οὐκ εἰ μὴ θεωρῶν. Since we say that a man knows in two ways (for he is said to know both when he uses his knowledge and when he has the habit of knowledge without using it), it makes a great deal of difference in doing what he should not: whether a man has the habit of knowledge, but is not using it; or has the habit, and is using it. His situation seems difficult in the latter case, but not if actual consideration is lacking.
                         ii.   His second distinction. — 1339-1341
ἔτι ἐπεὶ δύο τρόποι τῶν προτάσεων, ἔχοντα μὲν ἀμφοτέρας οὐδὲν κωλύει πράττειν παρὰ τὴν ἐπιστήμην, χρώμενον μέντοι τῇ καθόλου ἀλλὰ μὴ τῇ κατὰ μέρος· πρακτὰ γὰρ τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα. διαφέρει δὲ καὶ τὸ καθόλου· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ τὸ δ' ἐπὶ τοῦ πράγματός ἐστιν· οἷον ὅτι παντὶ ἀνθρώπῳ συμφέρει τὰ ξηρά, καὶ ὅτι αὐτὸς ἄνθρωπος, ἢ ὅτι ξηρὸν τὸ τοιόνδε· ἀλλ' εἰ τόδε τοιόνδε, ἢ οὐκ ἔχει ἢ οὐκ ἐνεργεῖ· κατά τε δὴ τούτους διοίσει τοὺς τρόπους ἀμήχανον ὅσον, ὥστε δοκεῖν οὕτω μὲν εἰδέναι μηδὲν ἄτοπον, ἄλλως δὲ θαυμαστόν. Yet, since we must use two modes of propositions, there is nothing to hinder a man who knows both from operating against the knowledge he uses about the universal but not against the knowledge he has about the particular. This is so because operations concern particulars. But the universal is understood differently: in one way as it is in itself and in another as it is in a particular case. Thus “Dry foods are good for all men,” and “I am a man,” or “Such and such a food is dry.” But it is possible that a man may not know such a universal either habitually or in a particular case. There is so much difference in the modes of knowing that it should not seem unreasonable for one who acts incontinently to know in one manner, yet it would be astonishing for him to know in another.
                         iii. A third distinction.
                               x.   HE SETS FORTH A DIFFERENCE. — 1342
ἔτι τὸ ἔχειν τὴν ἐπιστήμην ἄλλον τρόπον τῶν νῦν ῥηθέντων ὑπάρχει τοῖς ἀνθρώποις· ἐν τῷ γὰρ ἔχειν μὲν μὴ χρῆσθαι δὲ διαφέρουσαν ὁρῶμεν τὴν ἕξιν, ὥστε καὶ ἔχειν πως καὶ μὴ ἔχειν, οἷον τὸν καθεύδοντα καὶ μαινόμενον καὶ οἰνωμένον. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὕτω διατίθενται οἵ γε ἐν τοῖς πάθεσιν ὄντες· θυμοὶ γὰρ καὶ ἐπιθυμίαι ἀφροδισίων καὶ ἔνια τῶν τοιούτων ἐπιδήλως καὶ τὸ σῶμα μεθιστᾶσιν, ἐνίοις δὲ καὶ μανίας ποιοῦσιν. δῆλον οὖν ὅτι ὁμοίως ἔχειν λεκτέον τοὺς ἀκρατεῖς τούτοις. In addition, a mode of knowing different from those already discussed is found in man, for we see a difference in one knowing by way of habit and in a particular situation. Hence a man seems in some way to have and not to have knowledge, as is evident in one who is asleep or drunk. It is in this manner that those under the influence of the passions react. Indeed, anger, sexual desires, and certain passions of this kind clearly change the body; some even lead men to madness. Obviously then we must say that the incontinent are disposed in a similar way.
                               y.   HE REFUTES AN OBJECTION. — 1343-1344
τὸ δὲ λέγειν τοὺς λόγους τοὺς ἀπὸ τῆς ἐπιστήμης οὐδὲν σημεῖον· καὶ γὰρ οἱ ἐν τοῖς πάθεσι τούτοις ὄντες ἀποδείξεις καὶ ἔπη λέγουσιν Ἐμπεδοκλέους, καὶ οἱ πρῶτον μαθόντες συνείρουσι μὲν τοὺς λόγους, ἴσασι δ' οὔπω· δεῖ γὰρ συμφυῆναι, τοῦτο δὲ χρόνου δεῖται· ὥστε καθάπερ τοὺς ὑποκρινομένους, οὕτως ὑποληπτέον λέγειν καὶ τοὺς ἀκρατευομένους. The use of learned terms by the incontinent is not a sign that they operate by a habit of knowledge. In fact men under the influence of these passions mouth demonstrations and declaim the sayings of Empedocles; and youths beginning to learn prate doctrine but do not really know what they are talking about, for doctrine must become connatural to be known and this takes time. So then we must conclude that the incontinent in speaking this way are, as it were, pretending.
                   b.   (He solves the doubt) by the nature of practical science.
                         i.    He determines the true sense of the question.
                               x.   HE SETS FORTH THE NATURAL PROCESS OF PRACTICAL SCIENCE IN ACTION. — 1345-1346
ἔτι καὶ ὧδε φυσικῶς ἄν τις ἐπιβλέψειε τὴν αἰτίαν. ἣ μὲν γὰρ καθόλου δόξα, ἡ δ' ἑτέρα περὶ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστά ἐστιν, ὧν αἴσθησις ἤδη κυρία· ὅταν δὲ μία γένηται ἐξ αὐτῶν, ἀνάγκη τὸ συμπερανθὲν ἔνθα μὲν φάναι τὴν ψυχήν, ἐν δὲ ταῖς ποιητικαῖς πράττειν εὐθύς· οἷον, εἰ παντὸς γλυκέος γεύεσθαι δεῖ, τουτὶ δὲ γλυκὺ ὡς ἕν τι τῶν καθ' ἕκαστον, ἀνάγκη τὸν δυνάμενον καὶ μὴ κωλυόμενον ἅμα τοῦτο καὶ πράττειν. Furthermore, someone may want to consider the reason in terms of man’s nature. There is one judgment that is universal; and another concerned with particulars that are properly the objects of sense. However, since one formal reason is present in such judgments, the mind necessarily comes to a conclusion, while in the practical order it must immediately be directed to operation. Thus, if a man must taste everything sweet, and this thing is sweet, such as wine or something of the sort, he will at the same time have to taste it when he is able, unless he be prevented from doing so.
                               y.   HE SHOWS THE OBSTACLE THAT FACES THE INCONTINENT MAN.
                                     aa.  He shows... a restraining factor in this man. — 1347-1348
ὅταν οὖν ἡ μὲν καθόλου ἐνῇ κωλύουσα γεύεσθαι, ἣ δέ, ὅτι πᾶν γλυκὺ ἡδύ, τουτὶ δὲ γλυκύ αὕτη δὲ ἐνεργεῖ, τύχῃ δ' ἐπιθυμία ἐνοῦσα, ἣ μὲν οὖν λέγει φεύγειν τοῦτο, ἡ δ' ἐπιθυμία ἄγει· κινεῖν γὰρ ἕκαστον δύναται τῶν μορίων· ὥστε συμβαίνει ὑπὸ λόγου πως καὶ δόξης ἀκρατεύεσθαι, Now one universal judgment may say “You must not taste,” and another that “Every sweet is pleasant.” At the same time a particular judgment may say “This is sweet.” In such a case the sweet can be taken when appetite is present. Reason indeed declares that the particular thing is to be avoided but the appetite leads to it because the appetite can move any part of the soul. Hence it happens that a man may act incontinently contrary to reason and judgment.
                                     bb. He explains the reason. — 1349-1350
οὐκ ἐναντίας δὲ καθ' αὑτήν, ἀλλὰ κατὰ συμβεβηκόσἡ γὰρ ἐπιθυμία ἐναντία, ἀλλ' οὐχ ἡ δόξατῷ ὀρθῷ λόγῳ· ὥστε καὶ διὰ τοῦτο τὰ θηρία οὐκ ἀκρατῆ, ὅτι οὐκ ἔχει καθόλου ὑπόληψιν ἀλλὰ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστα φαντασίαν καὶ μνήμην. But this contrariety is not on the part of the reason itself but is incidental. It is appetite and not judgment which is in opposition to right reason. Because of this, dumb animals are not said to be incontinent since they do not have universal judgment but only imagination and memory of particulars.
                                     cc.  He explains how this restraint ceases. — 1351
πῶς δὲ λύεται ἡ ἄγνοια καὶ πάλιν γίνεται ἐπιστήμων ὁ ἀκρατής, ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος καὶ περὶ οἰνωμένου καὶ καθεύδοντος καὶ οὐκ ἴδιος τούτου τοῦ πάθους, ὃν δεῖ παρὰ τῶν φυσιολόγων ἀκούειν. How this ignorance is dissipated and an incontinent man recovers correct knowledge is the same problem in the case of one inebriated or asleep. This, however, is not properly our problem but ought to be solved by physiologists.
                         ii.   He answers Socrates’ objection. — 1352-1353
ἐπεὶ δ' ἡ τελευταία πρότασις δόξα τε αἰσθητοῦ καὶ κυρία τῶν πράξεων, ταύτην ἢ οὐκ ἔχει ἐν τῷ πάθει ὤν, ἢ οὕτως ἔχει ὡς οὐκ ἦν τὸ ἔχειν ἐπίστασθαι ἀλλὰ λέγειν ὥσπερ ὁ οἰνωμένος τὰ Ἐμπεδοκλέους. καὶ διὰ τὸ μὴ καθόλου μηδ' ἐπιστημονικὸν ὁμοίως εἶναι δοκεῖν τῷ καθόλου τὸν ἔσχατον ὅρον καὶ ἔοικεν ὃ ἐζήτει Σωκράτης συμβαίνειν· οὐ γὰρ τῆς κυρίως ἐπιστήμης εἶναι δοκούσης παρούσης γίνεται τὸ πάθος, οὐδ' αὕτη περιέλκεται διὰ τὸ πάθος, ἀλλὰ τῆς αἰσθητικῆς. περὶ μὲν οὖν τοῦ εἰδότα καὶ μή, καὶ πῶς εἰδότα ἐνδέχεται ἀκρατεύεσθαι, τοσαῦτα εἰρήσθω. But the ultimate proposition is a judgment according to sensible knowledge, and is directive of our actions; and the man who is under the influence of passion does not have this judgment at all, or has it in such a way that he cannot know actually, but speaks in these matters the way a drunken man repeats the words of Empedocles. Since the ultimate term is neither a universal nor—what amounts to the same thing—an object of scientific knowledge in the manner of a universal (in the practical order), what Socrates was looking for seems to follow. Indeed passion is not present with knowledge taken in the proper sense; and it is not this knowledge but that of the sensible which is dragged along by passion. We have discussed whether a person when he acts incontinently has knowledge or not, and how it is possible for him to have knowledge.
Primum quidem igitur intendendum et cetera. Postquam philosophus positis quibusdam probabilibus circa continentiam et incontinentiam movit contra singula dubitationes, hic accedit ad solvendum. Considerandum autem est quod non eodem ordine solutiones inducit neque quo probabilia praesupposuit neque quo dubitationes induxit, sed secundum quod exigit ratio doctrinae; prout scilicet unius dubitationis solutio ex altera dependet. Primo igitur dicit de quo est intentio. Secundo exequitur propositum, ibi, est autem principium et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod ad solvendum praedictas dubitationes, primo est considerandum utrum aliqui cum hoc, quod sunt scientes, possunt esse incontinentes vel non, et si sic, per quem modum sciant. Et haec dubitatio primo solvitur, quia eius solutio pertinet ad considerandum an sit incontinentia vel non. Dictum est enim supra, quod contentio Socratis ad hoc erat quasi incontinentia non esset. Prius autem de unoquoque oportet considerare an est. 1328. After the Philosopher has stated certain probable propositions and raised doubts about each, he now comes to the solutions. We should note he does not present the solutions in the same order in which he previously either stated the propositions or introduced the doubts, but according as the plan of the discussion requires, i.e., as the solution of one doubt depends on another. First [I] he states his intention; and then [II], at “In the beginning etc.,” he carries out his intention. He says first that, in order to solve these doubts, we must consider at the outset whether or not some people can be incontinent knowingly; and if so, in what way they know. This doubt is solved first because its solution belongs to the question whether or not there is incontinence. We stated previously (1315) that Socrates’ contention seemed to be that there was no incontinence. But first we must consider whether each (continence and incontinence) exists.
Deinde secundo oportet considerare circa qualia debeamus ponere aliquem dici continentem vel incontinentem, utrum scilicet circa omnem delectationem et tristitiam, vel circa quasdam determinatas; et haec dubitatio secundo solvitur, licet fuerit sexto loco proposita, quia principium inquirendi quis sit aliquis habitus est considerare materiam ipsius, sicut patet ex modo procedendi Aristotelis in praecedentibus. Et quia continens et perseverativus secundum materiam differunt, simul cum hoc considerandum est utrum sint idem vel differant. Et similiter considerandum est de omnibus aliis, quaecumque habent coniunctionem et convenientiam cum hac consideratione. 1329. Then we must consider in what kinds of matter we ought, to say a man is continent or incontinent; whether in every form of pleasure and pain or only in some specific forms. This doubt is solved in the second place, although it was proposed in the sixth place (1325), because the beginning of an investigation of the nature of any habit is the consideration of its matter, as is obvious in the manner of procedure followed by Aristotle in the preceding discussions. Since the continent man and the persevering man differ materially, we must ask at the same time whether they differ conceptually. Likewise, we must give our attention to all other matters having a connection and agreement with this consideration.
Deinde cum dicit: est autem principium etc., incipit solvere dubitationes supra motas. Et primo determinat an sit continentia et incontinentia, determinando primam dubitationem, quae movebatur contra tertium probabile; secundo determinat materiam continentiae et incontinentiae, solvendo sextam dubitationem, quae movebatur contra sextum probabile; et quia temperantia et continentia conveniunt in materia, simul in hac parte ostendit differentiam temperantiae et continentiae, solvendo tertiam dubitationem, quae movebatur contra quartum probabile. Ostendit etiam quis sit peior, utrum intemperatus vel incontinens, solvendo quintam dubitationem, quae movebatur contra primum probabile; et haec secunda pars incipit ibi: utrum autem est aliquis incontinens et cetera. 1330. Next [II], at “In the beginning,” he begins to solve the doubts previously raised. First [II, A] he settles the question on the existence of continence and incontinence by solving the first doubt that was raised about the third probable statement. Second [Lect. 4, I], he determines the matter of continence and incontinence by solving the sixth doubt that was raised about the sixth probable statement. Then, because temperance and continence agree in matter, at the same time he here explains the difference between temperance and continence in solving the third doubt that was raised about the fourth probable statement. Likewise he shows whether the intemperate or the incontinent man is worse, in solving the fifth doubt that was raised about the first probable statement. This second part begins at “Now, we must consider etc.” (B. 1147 b 20).
Tertio ostendit quid sit continentia et incontinentia solvendo quartam dubitationem, quae movebatur contra secundum probabile, et cum hoc solvit secundam quaestionem, quae movebatur contra quintum probabile, ostendendo, quod prudens non potest esse incontinens. Et haec tertia pars incipit, ibi, utrum igitur continens est et cetera. Circa primum tria facit. Primo praemittit quaedam, quae sunt necessaria ad solvendum. Secundo excludit falsam solutionem, ibi, de eo quidem igitur et cetera. Tertio ponit veram, ibi, sed quia dupliciter et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo dicit de quo est intentio. Secundo exequitur, ibi, neque enim et cetera. 1331. Third [Lect. 9: I] he explains the nature of continence and incontinence in solving the fourth doubt that was raised against the second probable statement. Likewise, with this he answers the second question that was asked about the fifth probable statement, showing that a prudent man cannot be incontinent. This third part begins at “Can a man be called etc.” (B 1151 a 29). On the first point [II, A] he does three things. First [A, 1] he presents in advance certain notions which are necessary for a solution. Then [A, 2], at “It makes no difference etc.,” he rejects a false solution. Third [A, 3], at “Since we say etc.,” he gives the true solution, In regard to the initial point he does two things. First [1, a] he states his intention, and then [1, b ] at “Neither is a man etc.,” he carries it out.
Dicit ergo primo, quod ad determinandum praedicta, oportet primo intendere, ut sciamus haec duo. Quorum primum est utrum continens et incontinens habeant differentiam, scilicet specificam, per quam ab omnibus aliis differant, in circa quae, id est ex hoc quod habeant materiam determinatam circa quam sint, sicut differentia mansuetudinis est ex hoc quod est circa iras, vel in qualiter, idest in modo se habendi circa quamcumque materiam, sicut prudentia est circa omnem materiam moralem, non tamen eodem modo sicut virtutes morales. 1332. He says first [1, a, i] that to determine these questions our primary effort must be directed towards the knowledge of two points. The first point is whether the continent and the incontinent differ specifically in their subject, i.e., in having limited matter with which they are concerned, as mildness differs specifically from the fact that it has to do with anger; or also in the manner, i.e., in the way of dealing with any matter, as prudence deals with all moral matter but not in the same way as (other) moral virtues.
Et ad exponendum quod dixerat, subdit quod considerandum est, utrum aliquis dicatur incontinens solum ex hoc quod est circa aliquam materiam, vel solum in ut, idest solum ex hoc, quod aliquo modo se habeat indifferenter circa omnem materiam. Vel non solum per hoc vel per illud dicatur aliquis continens vel incontinens, sed in ex ambobus, idest et ex determinato modo et ex determinata materia. 1333. In explanation of his inquiry, he adds that we must consider whether a man may be called incontinent only because he is concerned with a particular matter, or even only because he is concerned about the whole of some matter without distinction; or whether a man may be called continent or incontinent not only from the one or the other but also from both, i.e., from a limited manner and a limited matter.
Secundum quod oportet praeconsiderare est, si continentia et incontinentia sint circa omnia vel non, sed circa determinatam materiam. 1334. Another thing that we ought to consider beforehand is whether or not continence and incontinence deal with all kinds of matter or with a limited matter.
Deinde cum dicit neque enim etc., determinat quod dixerat. Et primo secundum: dicens, quod continens et incontinens non dicitur aliquis simpliciter circa omnia, sed circa illam determinatam materiam, circa quam dicitur aliquis temperatus vel intemperatus; scilicet circa concupiscentias et delectationes tactus. 1335. Then [1, a, ii], at “Incontinence in the unqualified sense,” he determines his statements: first [ii, x] the second statement, saying that continent and incontinent in the unqualified sense are not applied to anyone in all matters but in that limited matter in which he is temperate or intemperate, viz., in concupiscence and pleasures of touch.
Secundo ibi: neque in ad haec etc., determinat primum: et dicit quod non dicitur aliquis continens et incontinens solum in ad haec, id est respectu alicuius determinatae materiae (sic enim idem esset et intemperatus, cum sint circa eamdem materiam): sed dicitur aliquis incontinens in sic habere, idest ex hoc quod aliqualiter se habet circa determinatam materiam. Quia hic, scilicet intemperatus, ex electione ducitur ad peccandum, quasi existimans quod semper aliquis debeat persequi, id est accipere, delectabile sibi praesentialiter oblatum. Sed incontinens non hoc existimat, sed tamen persequitur delectabile, quando est sibi praesens. 1336. Second [ii, y (and “b”)], at “Neither is a man,” he determines the first statement, saying that someone is said to be continent or incontinent not alone in this, i.e., in respect of some limited matter (for thus he would be identified with the temperate or intemperate man since they deal with the same matter), but a person is said to be incontinent in conducting himself in such a manner, i.e., from the fact that he is concerned with limited matter in a certain way. The reason is that this man, viz., the intemperate, is led to commit sin by choice, in a manner judging that a pleasurable object presented to him always is to be pursued or accepted. But the incontinent man does not engage in this reasoning process; nevertheless, he pursues the pleasurable object when it is present to him.
Deinde cum dicit: de eo quidem igitur etc., excludit falsam solutionem, quam etiam supra tetigit. Et dicit quod nihil differt ad praesentem rationem si dicatur, quod illa cognitio praeter quam aliqui incontinenter agunt sit vera opinio, sed non sit scientia. Ex facti enim evidentia constat, quod quidam incontinenter operantium non habent debilem inhaesionem quasi dubitantes, sed aestimant se per certitudinem scire illud, contra quod agunt. Si ergo aliquis dicere velit, quod propter hoc magis opinantes praeter opinionem agunt quam scientes, quia quiete, idest debiliter inhaerent opinatis, considerandum est, quod in hoc nihil differt scientia ab opinione. Quidam enim non minus inhaerent opinionibus etiam falsis quam alii verae scientiae: et hoc potest videri per Heraclitum, qui adeo firmiter tenebat omnia semper moveri, et non esse veritatem aliquam diu permanendi in rebus, quod in fine vitae suae nolebat loqui, ne veritas interim transmutaretur, sed solum movebat digitum ad aliquid enunciandum, ut dicitur in quarto metaphysicae. 1337. Next [A, 2], at “It makes no difference,” he rejects a false solution that he has already treated (1316). He states that it does not make any difference in the present argument to say that the cognition, contrary to which some act incontinently, is real opinion but not knowledge. The fact is clear that some who act incontinently do not have a weak conviction, like people hesitating, but judge themselves to know certainly that against which they act. If then someone means that they are men with opinion rather than knowledge acting contrary to their convictions because their adherence to their judgments is ineffectual and feeble, our observation is that in the present instance knowledge does not differ from opinion. Some people are not less tenacious of even false opinions than others are of true knowledge. This can be seen in Heraclitus, who was so firmly convinced that everything is in perpetual motion and that no truth remains long in things, that at the end of his life, he was unwilling to talk lest truth should be changed in the meantime, but only wagged his finger to indicate something, as is related in the fourth book of the Metaphysics (Ch. 5, 1010 a 12-13; St. Th. Lect. 12, 683-684).
Deinde cum dicit sed quia dupliciter etc., ponit veram solutionem. Et primo solvit dubitationem per quasdam distinctiones. Secundo per naturam ipsius operativae scientiae, ibi: adhuc autem, et si naturaliter et cetera. Circa primum ponit tres distinctiones. Quarum prima est, quod dupliciter dicimus aliquem scire: uno quidem enim modo dicitur scire ille qui habet habitum, sed non utitur eo, puta geometra cum non considerat geometricalia; alio modo dicitur scire ille qui utitur sua scientia, scilicet considerando ea quae sunt illius scientiae; multum autem differt utrum aliquis agat ea quae non oportet habens habitum scientiae sed non utens, vel quod aliquis habeat habitum et utatur speculando. Hoc enim videtur esse durum, scilicet quod aliquis agat contra id quod actu speculatur. Non autem videtur esse durum si aliquis agat contra id quod habitualiter scit sed non considerat. 1338. At “Since we say” [A, 3] he gives the true solution. First [3, a] he solves the doubt by some distinctions, then [3, b], at “Furthermore etc,” by the nature of practical science. In regard to the first point he makes two distinctions. The first [3, a, i] is that we say a man knows in two ways: (1) by having a habit he does not use, e.g., the geometrician not studying questions of geometry; (2) by using his knowledge in actually considering its truths. It makes a big difference whether someone doing what he ought not has the habit but does not use it, or has the habit and does use it in thinking. It certainly seems hard for a man to act contrary to what he is actually considering. But it doesn’t seem hard for someone to act contrary to what he knows in an habitual way but is not actually considering.
Secundam distinctionem ponit ibi: adhuc quia duo modi et cetera. Et dicit quod duo sunt modi propositionum quibus utitur ratio practica, scilicet universalis propositio et singularis: nihil autem prohibere videtur, quod aliquis operetur praeter scientiam, qui habitu quidem cognoscit utramque propositionem, sed in actu considerat tantum universalem, non autem particularem; et hoc ideo, quia operationes sunt circa singularia. Unde si aliquis non considerat singulare, non est mirum si aliter agat. 1339. Next [3, a, ii], at “Yet, since,” he makes his second distinction. He says, since practical reason uses two modes of propositions, viz., the universal and the particular, there is no apparent obstacle in a man knowing both propositions in an habitual way but actually considering only the universal and not the particular, and operating contrary to the knowledge. This is so because operations are concerned with particulars. Hence, if a man does not consider the particular it is not astonishing that he acts contrary to it.
Sciendum tamen quod dupliciter potest accipi universale. Uno quidem modo prout est in seipso: puta si dicamus quod omni homini conferunt sicca. Alio modo secundum quod est in re singulari, puta si dicamus quod iste est homo vel talis cibus est siccus; potest ergo contingere quod aliquis sciat et in habitu et in actu universale secundum se consideratum; sed universale consideratum in hoc singulari vel non habet, idest in habitu non cognoscit, vel non operatur, id est non cognoscit in actu. 1340. We should note, however, that the universal can be taken in two ways. In one way as it is in itself, as in the example “Dry things are good for every man”; in another way as it is in a particular object, for instance, “This is a man,” or “That food is dry.” Therefore it is possible that a man knows, both habitually and actually, the universal considered in itself but either he does not grasp the universal considered in this particular object, i.e., the universal is not known in an habitual way, or he does not bestir himself, i.e., the universal is not actually known.
Secundum igitur hos modos sciendi differentes intantum differt impossibile quod Socrati videbatur, ut nullum inconveniens videatur eum qui incontinenter agit uno modo, scire scilicet in universali tantum vel etiam in singulari, in habitu sed non in actu. Si autem alio modo sciret ille qui incontinenter agit, videretur esse inconveniens, scilicet si sciret singulare in actu. 1341. Therefore what appeared impossible to Socrates according to these various modes of knowing differs so much that it does not seem unreasonable for a man, who acts incontinently, to have one kind of knowledge, viz., universal alone or even particular-if it is habitual but not actual. But it would seem unreasonable for the man who acts incontinently to have another kind of knowledge, i.e., actual, concerned with the particular.
Tertiam distinctionem ponit ibi: adhuc habere et cetera. Et primo ponit distinctionem. Secundo excludit obiectionem, ibi, dicere autem sermones et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod praeter dictos modos adhuc invenitur in hominibus alius modus sciendi. Quod enim aliquis sciat habitu et non actu, differentiam quamdam videtur habere. Aliquando enim est habitus solutus, ut statim possit exire in actum cum homo voluerit. Aliquando autem est habitus ligatus ita quod non possit exire in actum. Unde quodammodo videtur habere habitum et quodammodo non habere, sicut patet in dormiente vel maniaco aut etiam ebrioso. Et hoc modo sunt dispositi homines dum sunt in passionibus. Videmus enim quod irae et concupiscentiae venereorum et quaedam huiusmodi passiones manifeste transmutent et corpus exterius et non solum animales motus, puta cum ex his incalescit corpus; et quandoque tantum increscunt huiusmodi passiones quod quosdam in insanias deducunt. Et sic manifestum est quod incontinentes similiter disponuntur dormientibus, aut maniacis aut ebriosis, quod scilicet habent habitum scientiae practicae in singularibus ligatum. 1342. Then [3, a, iii], at “In addition,” he makes a third distinction. First [iii, x] he sets forth a difference. Next [iii, y], at “The use of learned terms etc.,” he refutes an objection. First he speaks of another mode of knowing in man, over and above the modes discussed. That someone should know by way of habit and not by way of act seems to be understood differently. Sometimes a habit is so responsive that it can go into act immediately when a man wishes. But other times the habit is so bound that it cannot go into act. Hence in one sense a man seems to have a habit and in another sense not to have it, as is evident in one sleeping, a maniac, or a drunkard. Men are disposed in this way when under the influence of the passions. We see anger, sexual desires, and certain passions of this kind obviously change the body externally, for example, in causing body heat. Sometimes such passions generate so much heat that they lead people to insanity. So, obviously, the incontinent are disposed somewhat like those asleep, maniacs, and drunkards, who have the habit of practical science impeded in regard to particulars.
Deinde cum dicit: dicere autem sermones etc., excludit obiectionem. Posset enim aliquis obiicere contra praedicta, quod incontinentes quandoque dicunt verba scientialia etiam in singulari et ita videtur quod non habeant habitum ligatum. Sed ipse hoc removet, dicens quod hoc quod dicunt sermones scientiae non est signum quod habeant habitum solutum. Et hoc probat per duo exempla. 1343. At “The use of learned terms” [iii, y] he refutes an objection. Someone could object against the statement made that the incontinent sometimes use terms dealing with knowledge and with the particular. So it seems they do not have a habit that is held in check. But Aristotle refutes this objection, saying that their use of scientific terminology is not a sign that they have an active habit; and he illustrates this by two examples.
Quorum primum est quod etiam illi qui sunt in passionibus praedictis, puta ebrii et maniaci, proferunt voce demonstrationes, puta geometricas, et dicunt verba Empedoclis, quae erant difficilia ad intelligendum, quia metrice philosophiam scripsit. Secundum exemplum est de pueris quando primo addiscunt, qui coniungunt sermones quos ore proferunt sed nondum eos sciunt, ita scilicet quod mente intelligant. Ad hoc enim requiritur quod illa quae homo audit fiant ei quasi connaturalia, propter perfectam impressionem ipsorum intellectui, ad quod homo indiget tempore in quo intellectus per multiplices meditationes firmetur in eo quod accepit. Et ita est etiam de incontinente. Etsi enim dicat, non est mihi bonum nunc persequi tale delectabile tamen non ita sentit in corde. Unde sic existimandum est, quod incontinentes dicant huiusmodi verba quasi simulantes, quia scilicet aliud sentiunt corde et aliud proferunt ore. 1344. The first is that even men who are under the influence of the passions just mentioned, e.g., inebriated and demented, mouth demonstrations in geometry, for instance, and declaim Empedocles’ sayings, which are difficult to understand because he wrote his philosophy in meter. The second example is of children who, when they begin to learn, put together words that they utter without any real understanding of what they say. To understand, it is necessary that those things that a man hears become, as it were, connatural to him in order that they may be impressed perfectly on his mind. For this a man needs time in which his intellect may be confirmed in what it has received, by much meditation. This is true also of the incontinent man, for even if he says: it is not good for me now to pursue such a pleasure, nevertheless, in his heart he does not think this way. So then we must judge the incontinent in saying these words are pretending, as it were, because they think one thing in their hearts and reveal another by their words.
Deinde cum dicit: adhuc autem, et si naturaliter etc., solvit propositam dubitationem secundum naturalem processum practicae scientiae, applicando praedictas distinctiones ad propositum. Et primo determinat veritatem quaestionis. Secundo respondet obiectioni Socratis. Circa primum duo facit. Primo proponit naturalem processum scientiae practicae in agendis; secundo ostendit impedimentum quod accidit in incontinente, ibi, quando quidem igitur et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod si aliquis velit considerare causam, quare incontinentes praeter scientiam agant secundum naturalem processum practicae scientiae, oportet scire quod in eius processu est duplex opinio. Una quidem universalis, puta omne inhonestum est fugiendum. Alia autem est singularis circa ea quae proprie per sensum cognoscuntur, puta: hic actus est inhonestus. Cum autem ex his duabus opinionibus fiat una ratio, necesse est quod sequatur conclusio. 1345. Next [3, b], at “Furthermore,” he solves the proposed doubt by the natural process of practical science in applying the preceding distinctions to what he proposed. First [3, b, i] he determines the true sense of the question. Second [3, b, ii], at “But the ultimate,” he answers Socrates’ objection. Regarding the initial point he does two things. First [b, i, x] he sets forth the natural process of practical science in action. Second [b, i, y], at “Now one universal,” he shows the obstacle which faces the incontinent man. He says first that if we wish to consider why the incontinent man can act contrary to his knowledge by the natural process of practical science, we must take into consideration the two judgments in this process. One is universal, for example, “Every dishonorable act must be avoided”; the other, singular, is concerned with objects which properly are known by sense, for instance, “This act is dishonorable.” But, since there is one formality underlying these judgments, a conclusion necessarily follows.
Sed in speculativis anima solum dicit conclusionem. In factivis autem statim eam operatur. Ut, si opinio universalis sit quod omne dulce oportet gustare, opinio autem particularis sit quod hoc, demonstrato aliquo particulari, sit dulce, necesse est quod ille qui potest gustare statim gustet, nisi sit aliquid prohibens. Et hoc quidem fit in syllogismo temperati, qui non habet concupiscentiam repugnantem rationi proponenti quod omne inhonestum est vitandum. Et similiter in syllogismo intemperati, cuius ratio concupiscentiae non repugnat quae inclinat ad hoc quod omne delectabile sit sumendum. 1346. However, in speculative matters the mind merely draws the conclusion, while in practical matters it goes into operation immediately. Thus, if the universal judgment is that we must taste every sweet thing but the particular judgment that this (some particular object presented) is sweet, the man able to taste immediately tastes if nothing prevents. So runs the syllogism of the temperate man who does not permit concupiscence to have mastery over reason pointing out every dishonorable act must be avoided. The same goes for the syllogism of the intemperate man. His reason does not resist the proposal of concupiscence which inclines to this: that every pleasure is to be seized.
Deinde cum dicit: quando quidem igitur etc., ostendit qualiter accidat defectus in incontinente. Et primo ostendit aliquid in eo esse prohibens; secundo ostendit causam prohibitionis, ibi: non contrarie autem etc.; tertio ostendit qualiter ista prohibitio cesset, ibi: qualiter autem et cetera. Circa primum considerandum est, quod in incontinente ratio non totaliter obruitur a concupiscentia quin in universali habeat veram sententiam; sit ergo ita quod ex parte rationis proponatur una universalis prohibens gustare dulce inordinate, puta si dicatur, nullum dulce oportet gustare extra horam, sed ex parte concupiscentiae proponitur quod omne dulce est delectabile, quod est per se quaesitum a concupiscentia. Et quia in particulari concupiscentia ligat rationem, non assumitur sub universali rationis, ut dicatur hoc esse praeter horam; sed assumitur sub universali concupiscentiae, ut dicatur hoc esse dulce. Et ita sequitur conclusio operis; et sunt in hoc syllogismo incontinentis quatuor propositiones, sicut iam dictum est. 1347. Then [b, i, y], at “Now one universal,” he explains how fault occurs in the incontinent man. First [y, aa] he shows that there is a restraining factor in this man. Next [y, bb], at “But this contrariety,” he explains the reason. Last [y, cc], at “How this ignorance etc.,” he explains how this restraint ceases. On the first point the proper consideration is this-reason in the incontinent man is not so completely overcome that he is without genuine knowledge of the universal. Put it this way. The reason proposes a universal judgment forbidding an inordinate tasting of something sweet, e.g., it says that nothing sweet should be tasted outside a certain time. But the appetite proposes that every sweet thing is pleasant, something in itself desired by concupiscence. And, since in a particular case concupiscence may bind reason, the proposal is not accepted under universal reason so as to say also that this is outside the time; but it is taken under the universal aspect of concupiscence so as to say this is sweet. So the conclusion of the operation follows. In this syllogism of the incontinent man there are four propositions, as already indicated (1346).
Et quod hoc modo se habeat quandoque processus rationis practicae, patet per hoc quod forte insurgente concupiscentia ratio dicit hoc concupiscibile esse fugiendum secundum universalem sententiam, ut dictum est: concupiscentia autem ducit ad hoc libere proponendo et assumendo absque prohibitione rationis, quae est ligata, quia concupiscentia quando est vehemens potest movere quamlibet particulam animae, etiam rationem, si non sit sollicita ad resistendum. Et sic accidit conclusio operis, ut scilicet aliquis agat incontinenter contra rationem et opinionem universalem. 1348. That the process of practical reason sometimes occurs in this way is evident from the fact that when concupiscence waxes strong, reason declares by a universal judgment that a particular desirable thing is to be avoided, as we just mentioned (1347)But concupiscence inclines to the appetible object by freely proposing and accepting it without the prohibition of reason, now rendered impotent. Concupiscence can be so vehement it can sway any part of the soul, even reason itself if reason does not make a strong effort to resist. Thus the term of the operation takes place, viz., a man may act incontinently contrary to reason and universal judgment.
Deinde cum dicit: non contrarie autem etc., ostendit causam praedictae repugnantiae. Et dicit, quod non est ibi contrarietas ex parte rationis per se, sicut accidit in dubitantibus, sed solum per accidens, inquantum scilicet concupiscentia contrariatur universali rationi rectae. Non autem aliqua opinio per se contrariatur rectae rationi, sicut quidam dicebant. 1349. At “But this contrariety” [y, bb] he explains the reason for this opposition. He states that the present contrariety does not happen from reason itself, as in uncertain people, but only incidentally so far as concupiscence is opposed to correct universal reason. In fact there is no judgment in itself opposed to right reason, as some philosophers have maintained.
Et ex hoc infert quoddam correlarium, quod scilicet bestiae non dicuntur continentes aut incontinentes, quia non habent universalem opinionem moventem cui contrariatur concupiscentia, sed moventur solum ex fantasia et memoria singularium. 1350. From this he infers a corollary, that dumb animals are not called continent or incontinent, for they do not make a universal judgment which is the foundation of rational action, to which concupiscence is opposed; for brutes are moved only by imagination and memory of particulars.
Deinde cum dicit: qualiter autem solvitur etc., ostendit qualiter cessat talis repugnantia. Et dicit quod qualiter solvatur ignorantia quam incontinens habet circa particulare et rursus redit ad rectam scientiam, eadem ratio est quod de vinolento et dormiente, quae quidem passiones solvuntur facta aliqua transmutatione circa corpus, et similiter quia per passiones animae, puta per concupiscentiam vel iram transmutatur corpus, oportet cessare hanc transmutationem corporalem ad hoc quod homo redeat ad sanam mentem. Et ideo haec ratio non est propria huius considerationis, sed magis oportet eam audire a physiologis, idest naturalibus. 1351. Next [y, cc], at “How this ignorance,” he explains how this opposition ceases. He says that the problem of dissipating an incontinent man’s ignorance about the particular and of his recovery of correct knowledge is the same as in the case of one inebriated or asleep. Their passions are dispelled when some bodily change occurs. Likewise, since the body is changed by the soul’s passions, like concupiscence and anger, this physical change must cease for a man to return to a sound mind. Hence this problem is not proper to our investigation but rather we ought to hear it discussed by physiologists, i.e., physicians (naturalibus).
Deinde cum dicit: quia autem ultima etc., secundum praemissa solvit hanc rationem Socratis. Et dicit, quod propositio et opinio ultima, scilicet singularis, accipitur per sensum et principatur in actionibus quae sunt circa singularia. Huiusmodi autem propositionem aut opinionem ille qui est in passione vel omnino non habet in habitu vel habet habitum ligatum ut non possit in actu scire, sed hoc modo loquitur de his, sicut ebrius dicit verba Empedoclis. Quia ergo ista sunt vera, et quia universale quod per scientiam comprehenditur non est extremus terminus operabilium, videtur sequi illud quod Socrates quaerebat. Patet enim ex praedictis quod passio non fit in praesentia principalis scientiae quae est circa universale, quum passio sit solum in particulari. Neque universalis scientia trahitur a passione, sed solum aestimatio sensibilis, quae non est tantae dignitatis. 1352. Then [3, b, ii], at “But the ultimate,” in accord with the premises he refutes the argument of Socrates, saying that the proposition and the ultimate, i.e., the particular, judgment is made according to sensible knowledge and is directive of actions concerned with particulars. But a man under the influence of passion either does not have this judgment or premise at all as a habit, or has a restrained habit so that he cannot know actually but speaks in these matters in the way that an inebriate repeats the verses of Empedocles. Since, then, these things are true, and since the universal, which is known by science, is not the ultimate term of practical operations, what Socrates held seems to follow. It is evident from previous statements that passion is not present with the principal knowledge that deals with the universal, since it is found only in the particular. it is not the knowledge of the universal but only the evaluation of the sensible, which is not so excellent, that is dragged along by passion.
Ultimo autem epilogat, tanta dicta esse de hoc quod sciens incontinenter agat, vel ille qui non est sciens, et quomodo incontinens sit sciens. 1353. Finally, he summarizes the questions discussed: whether a person when he acts incontinently has knowledge or not, and how it is possible for him to have knowledge.

The Generic Matter of Continence and Incontinence
Chapter 4
πότερον δ' ἐστί τις ἁπλῶς ἀκρατὴς ἢ πάντες κατὰ μέρος, καὶ εἰ ἔστι, περὶ ποῖά ἐστι, λεκτέον ἐφεξῆς. Now we must consider further whether anyone is totally incontinent, or whether everyone is said to be incontinent in a particular way. If totally so, then in what kind of matter is a man thus incontinent.
      A.  He, presents the general matter. — 1355
ὅτι μὲν οὖν περὶ ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας εἰσὶν οἵ τ' ἐγκρατεῖς καὶ καρτερικοὶ καὶ οἱ ἀκρατεῖς καὶ μαλακοί, φανερόν. It is obvious that the continent and the persevering, the incontinent and the effeminate are concerned with pleasure and pain.
      B.  He investigates the specific matter of these states.
                   a.   He shows (this)... according to the difference in human pleasures among themselves.
                         i.    He explains his proposition.
                               x.   HE DISTINGUISHES HUMAN PLEASURES. — 1356-1357
ἐπεὶ δ' ἐστὶ τὰ μὲν ἀναγκαῖα τῶν ποιούντων ἡδονήν, τὰ δ' αἱρετὰ μὲν καθ' αὑτὰ ἔχοντα δ' ὑπερβολήν, ἀναγκαῖα μὲν τὰ σωματικά λέγω δὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα, τά τε περὶ τὴν τροφὴν καὶ τὴν τῶν ἀφροδισίων χρείαν, καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα τῶν σωματικῶν περὶ ἃ τὴν ἀκολασίαν ἔθεμεν καὶ τὴν σωφροσύνην, τὰ δ' ἀναγκαῖα μὲν οὐχί, αἱρετὰ δὲ καθ' αὑτά λέγω δ' οἷον νίκην τιμὴν πλοῦτον καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα τῶν ἀγαθῶν καὶ ἡδέων· But of the objects that give men pleasure some are necessary; others are desirable in themselves, although capable of excess. I call necessary certain material things concerned with food, sex, and other physical goods that we previously established as the matter of temperance and intemperance. I mention as unnecessary, but desirable in themselves, things like victory, honor, riches, and other pleasurable goods of this kind.
                               y.   HE SHOWS HOW IN THESE PLEASURES A MAN IS CALLED CONTINENT...
                                     aa.  Concerning the unnecessary. — 1358-1359
τοὺς μὲν οὖν πρὸς ταῦτα παρὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον ὑπερβάλλοντας τὸν ἐν αὑτοῖς ἁπλῶς μὲν οὐ λέγομεν ἀκρατεῖς, προστιθέντες δὲ τὸ χρημάτων ἀκρατεῖς καὶ κέρδους καὶ τιμῆς καὶ θυμοῦ, ἁπλῶς δ' οὔ, ὡς ἑτέρους καὶ καθ' ὁμοιότητα λεγομένους, ὥσπερ ἄνθρωπος ὁ τὰ Ὀλύμπια νικῶν· ἐκείνῳ γὰρ ὁ κοινὸς λόγος τοῦ ἰδίου μικρὸν διέφερεν, ἀλλ' ὅμως ἕτερος ἦν. Therefore, people who go to excess in these things contrary to right reason in them, are not called incontinent simply but with the added note that they are incontinent in matters of money, gain, honor, or anger; as if there were others absolutely incontinent and the former are called incontinent by way of resemblance. Thus when we speak of “man” who was the B.1148 victor in the Olympics, the common notion of man differed little from the notion of this individual man but it was different.’ In confirmation of our contention, incontinence is censured not merely as a sin but as a kind of vice either in the full sense or the partial sense. But none of those previously discussed are viciously incontinent.
                                     bb. Concerning the necessary. — 1360
τῶν δὲ περὶ τὰς σωματικὰς ἀπολαύσεις, περὶ ἃς λέγομεν τὸν σώφρονα καὶ ἀκόλαστον, ὁ μὴ τῷ προαιρεῖσθαι τῶν ἡδέων διώκων τὰς ὑπερβολάσκαὶ τῶν λυπηρῶν φεύγων, πείνης καὶ δίψης καὶ ἀλέας καὶ ψύχους καὶ πάντων τῶν περὶ ἁφὴν καὶ γεῦσινἀλλὰ παρὰ τὴν προαίρεσιν καὶ τὴν διάνοιαν, ἀκρατὴς λέγεται, οὐ κατὰ πρόσθεσιν, ὅτι περὶ τάδε, καθάπερ ὀργῆς, ἀλλ' ἁπλῶς μόνον. σημεῖον δέ· καὶ γὰρ μαλακοὶ λέγονται περὶ ταύτας, περὶ ἐκείνων δ' οὐδεμίαν. But men who behave badly in physical pleasures, with which the temperate and the intemperate are concerned, and freely pursue excessive pleasures while avoiding discomforts, like hunger and thirst, heat and cold, and so forth pertaining to touch and taste, but contrary to right choice and right reason, are called incontinent not in any limited way, as the incontinent in the matter of anger, but absolutely speaking. Confirmation of this is found in the fact that people are called effeminate in reference to these discomforts but not in reference to others.
                               z.   HE INFERS CERTAIN COROLLARIES FROM THE PREMISES.
                                     aa.  The first. — 1361
καὶ διὰ τοῦτ' εἰς ταὐτὸ τὸν ἀκρατῆ καὶ τὸν ἀκόλαστον τίθεμεν καὶ ἐγκρατῆ καὶ σώφρονα, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐκείνων οὐδένα, διὰ τὸ περὶ τὰς αὐτάς πως ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας εἶναι· οἳ δ' εἰσὶ μὲν περὶ ταὐτά, ἀλλ' οὐχ ὡσαύτως εἰσίν, ἀλλ' οἳ μὲν προαιροῦνται οἳ δ' οὐ προαιροῦνται. For this reason we place the incontinent and intemperate, the continent and temperate in the same classification; not that one is the other but because they are concerned with pleasures and pain in some measure, yet not in the same way. Some act from deliberate choice, others without it.
                                     bb. The second. — 1362
διὸ μᾶλλον ἀκόλαστον ἂν εἴποιμεν ὅστις μὴ ἐπιθυμῶν ἢ ἠρέμα διώκει τὰς ὑπερβολὰς καὶ φεύγει μετρίας λύπας, ἢ τοῦτον ὅστις διὰ τὸ ἐπιθυμεῖν σφόδρα· τί γὰρ ἂν ἐκεῖνος ποιήσειεν, εἰ προσγένοιτο ἐπιθυμία νεανικὴ καὶ περὶ τὰς τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἐνδείας λύπη ἰσχυρά; Consequently, we say the intemperate person is more blamable than another who sins from violent passion, because the intemperate man pursues excesses and avoids discomforts without passion, or at least only with mild passion. What would such a person do were he to experience youthful lust and the serious discomforts from lack of necessities?
                         ii.   He clarifies some statements he had made.
                               x.   HE SHOWS WHY (THERE IS NOT INCONTINENCE IN... UNNECESSARY THINGS).
                                     aa.  He points out... kinds of unnecessary pleasures. — 1363-1364
ἐπεὶ δὲ τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν καὶ τῶν ἡδονῶν αἳ μέν εἰσι τῶν τῷ γένει καλῶν καὶ σπουδαίων τῶν γὰρ ἡδέων ἔνια φύσει αἱρετά, τὰ δ' ἐναντία τούτων, τὰ δὲ μεταξύ, καθάπερ διείλομεν πρότερον, οἷον χρήματα καὶ κέρδος καὶ νίκη καὶ τιμή· πρὸς ἅπαντα δὲ καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα καὶ τὰ μεταξὺ οὐ τῷ πάσχειν καὶ ἐπιθυμεῖν καὶ φιλεῖν ψέγονται, ἀλλὰ τῷ πῶς καὶ ὑπερβάλλειν. Some kinds of desires and pleasures are in the category of the noble and good. (Some pleasures are by nature desirable; others, just the reverse; and still others are in between, according to the previous division, as in the case of money, profit, victory, and honor.) But in all the intermediate kinds, people are not blamed because they are affected by a desire and love for these things but rather because their desire is excessive in some way.
                                     bb. He infers what kind of desire is aroused for these pleasures. — 1365
διὸ ὅσοι μὲν παρὰ τὸν λόγον ἢ κρατοῦνται ἢ διώκουσι τῶν φύσει τι καλῶν καὶ ἀγαθῶν, οἷον οἱ περὶ τιμὴν μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ σπουδάζοντες ἢ περὶ τέκνα καὶ γονεῖς· καὶ γὰρ ταῦτα τῶν ἀγαθῶν, καὶ ἐπαινοῦνται οἱ περὶ ταῦτα σπουδάζοντες· ἀλλ' ὅμως ἔστι τις ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἐν τούτοις, εἴ τις ὥσπερ ἡ Νιόβη μάχοιτο καὶ πρὸς τοὺς θεούς, ἢ ὥσπερ Σάτυρος ὁ φιλοπάτωρ ἐπικαλούμενος περὶ τὸν πατέρα· λίαν γὰρ ἐδόκει μωραίνειν· Hence, those who in an unreasonable manner possess or pursue any of the things that are noble and good by nature, for example, people having more zeal than they should about the acquisition of honor, or the care of their children or parents (are not blamed as evil). Certainly these operations are good, and people solicitous about them are praised. However, a kind of vicious excess can exist in these matters, for example, if someone should rebel against the gods as Niobe did, or should act towards his parents as did Satyrus called “father-lover,” who seemed to have behaved rather foolishly in this matter.
                                     cc.  He... infers... there is neither vice nor total incontinence... — 1366
μοχθηρία μὲν οὖν οὐδεμία περὶ ταῦτ' ἐστὶ διὰ τὸ εἰρημένον, ὅτι φύσει τῶν αἱρετῶν ἕκαστόν ἐστι δι' αὑτό, φαῦλαι δὲ καὶ φευκταὶ αὐτῶν εἰσὶν αἱ ὑπερβολαί. ὁμοίως δ' οὐδ' ἀκρασία· ἡ γὰρ ἀκρασία οὐ μόνον φευκτὸν ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν ψεκτῶν ἐστίν· So then there is no vice in these pleasures because, as was said, each of them is naturally desirable in itself; only their excesses are evil and to be avoided. Likewise there is no incontinence in them, for incontinence not only is a thing to be avoided but is something censurable.
                               y.   HE SHOWS WHY ONLY LIMITED INCONTINENCE IS PREDICATED. — 1367
δι' ὁμοιότητα δὲ τοῦ πάθους προσεπιτιθέντες τὴν ἀκρασίαν περὶ ἕκαστον λέγουσιν, οἷον κακὸν ἰατρὸν καὶ κακὸν ὑποκριτήν, ὃν ἁπλῶς οὐκ ἂν εἴποιεν κακόν. ὥσπερ οὖν οὐδ' ἐνταῦθα, διὰ τὸ μὴ κακίαν εἶναι ἑκάστην αὐτῶν ἀλλὰ τῷ ἀνάλογον ὁμοίαν, οὕτω δῆλον ὅτι κἀκεῖ ὑποληπτέον μόνην ἀκρασίαν καὶ ἐγκράτειαν εἶναι ἥτις ἐστὶ περὶ ταὐτὰ τῇ σωφροσύνῃ καὶ ἀκολασίᾳ, περὶ δὲ θυμοῦ καθ' ὁμοιότητα λέγομεν· διὸ καὶ προστιθέντες ἀκρατῆ θυμοῦ ὥσπερ τιμῆς καὶ κέρδους φαμέν. But people speak according as there is a resemblance to passion, putting limits on incontinence about each thing, for example, a bad doctor or a poor actor whom they would (not) term a bad person without qualification. The same goes for the things called bad in this way, because badness is predicated of any of them only in an analogous sense. So in regard to continence we must judge that only to be incontinence and continence (unqualifiedly) which concerns the same matters as temperance and intemperance. But we predicate incontinence of anger because of a resemblance, and for this reason we qualify, adding that a man is incontinent in anger as we say he is incontinent in honor and gain.
Utrum autem est aliquis incontinens et cetera. Postquam philosophus ostendit quod praeter scientiam potest aliquis prava operari, per quod sciri potest an continentia et incontinentia sit, hic determinat de materia continentiae et incontinentiae. Et primo ostendit quae sit materia utriusque. Secundo comparat ea aliis habitibus qui sunt circa eamdem materiam, ibi, circa eas autem quae per tactum et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo dicit de quo est intentio. Secundo manifestat propositum, ibi: quoniam quidem igitur et cetera. Est autem considerandum quod supra, sextam dubitationem proponens, dixit quod si continentia et incontinentia essent circa omnia, nullus esset simpliciter incontinens. Et ideo hanc dubitationem solvere intendens, duo proponit tractanda. Quorum primum est, utrum aliquis sit simpliciter incontinens vel omnes dicantur incontinentes particulariter. Secundum est, si aliquis est simpliciter incontinens, circa qualem materiam est. 1354. After the Philosopher has shown that a man can perform evil actions contrary to the knowledge he possesses (by this we can know whether continence and incontinence exist), he here determines the matter of continence and incontinence. First he shows the matter of each; then [Lect. 7, I], at “Continence and incontinence etc.” (B. 1150 a 9), he compares them with other habits dealing with the same matter. To clarify the first point he employs a twofold procedure. First [I] he declares his proposition. Second [II], at “It is obvious etc.,” he carries out his proposition. The reasoning employed is this: in proposing the sixth doubt, it was already stated that if continence and incontinence were concerned with all matters, no one would be incontinent in an unqualified sense. So, in an effort to solve this doubt, he presents two questions for consideration. The first is: can anyone be incontinent without qualification or is everyone said to be incontinent in a particular way? The second question is, if a man is totally incontinent, in what kind of matter is he so incontinent?
Deinde cum dicit: quoniam quidem igitur etc., exequitur propositum. Et primo proponit materiam generalem ut manifestam. Et dicit manifestum esse quod continentes et incontinentes, perseverantes et molles dicuntur circa delectationes et tristitias. 1355. Then [II], at “It is obvious,” he carries out his proposition. First [II, A] he presents the general matter, saying it is evident that the continent and the incontinent and the persevering and the effeminate are said to be concerned with pleasure and pain.
Secundo ibi: quia autem sunt haec etc., inquirit specialem materiam praedictorum. Et primo ostendit, quomodo diversimode dicatur continentia et incontinentia circa diversas delectationes; secundo comparat incontinentias diversarum delectationum adinvicem, ibi, quoniam autem est minus turpis et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo ostendit, quomodo dicatur aliquis diversimode continens vel incontinens secundum differentiam humanarum delectationum adinvicem. Secundo secundum differentiam humanarum delectationum ad bestiales, ibi: quia autem sunt quaedam et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo ostendit propositum. Secundo manifestat quaedam quae dixerat, ibi, quia autem concupiscentiarum et cetera. Circa primum tria facit. Primo distinguit delectationes humanas. Secundo ostendit quomodo circa eas diversimode dicitur aliquis continens vel incontinens, ibi, eos quidem igitur etc.; tertio infert quaedam correlaria ex dictis, ibi: et propter hoc in idem et cetera. 1356. Next [II, B], at “But of the objects,” he investigates the specific matter of these states. First [B, 1] he shows how continence may he used in different ways about different pleasures. Second [Lect. VI; B, 2], at “Now we will consider,” he compares the kinds of incontinence in different pleasures with one another (B. 1149 a 24). On the initial point he does two things. First [1, a] he shows how a man may be called continent or incontinent in different ways according to the difference in human pleasures among themselves; then according to the difference of human pleasures with regard to what is bestial [Lect. 5; 1, b] at “Of natural pleasures etc.” (B. 1148 b 15). In support of the first statement he uses a double process. First [a, i] he explains his proposition. Second [a, ii], at “Some kinds etc.,” he clarifies some statements he had made. The first point demands three clarifications. First [i, x] he distinguishes human pleasures. Next [i, y], at “Therefore, people etc.,” he shows how in these pleasures a man is called continent or incontinent in different ways. Last [i, z], at “For this reason,” he infers certain corollaries from the premises.
Dicit ergo primo, quod eorum quae faciunt delectationem homini quaedam sunt necessaria ad vitam humanam, quaedam autem non sunt necessaria, sed secundum se considerata sunt eligibilia homini, quamvis possit in eis esse superabundantia et defectus: quod apponit ad differentiam virtutum, in quibus non potest esse superabundantia et defectus. Et dicit necessaria esse corporalia quaedam, puta quae pertinent ad cibum et venerea, et alia huiusmodi corporalia, circa quae supra posuimus temperantiam et intemperantiam. Sed eligibilia secundum seipsa, non autem necessaria dicit esse, sicut victoriam, honorem, divitias et alia huiusmodi bona et delectabilia. 1357. He says first of all that, of those objects giving us pleasure, some are necessary for human life; others are unnecessary but, considered in themselves, desirable for men, however much they are capable of excess and defect. He designates as necessary certain bodily requirements such as those pertaining to food, drink, sex, and material things of this kind, which we previously established as the matter of temperance and intemperance (267, 595, 599, 603). But things desirable in themselves, which he mentions as unnecessary, are victory, honor, riches, and other goods and pleasures of the same kind.
Deinde cum dicit: eos quidem igitur etc., ostendit quomodo circa praedicta dicatur aliquis continens vel incontinens. Et primo quomodo circa non necessaria. Secundo quomodo circa necessaria, ibi, eorum autem qui circa corporales et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod illi qui circa praedicta bona non necessaria superexcellenter student praeter rectam rationem quae in ipsis est non dicuntur simpliciter incontinentes, sed cum aliqua additione; puta incontinentes pecuniarum vel lucri, vel honoris aut irae, quasi alteri sint simpliciter incontinentes et illi qui secundum similitudinem incontinentes dicuntur: quod signat appositio. Sicut cum dicitur homo qui Olimpia vicit, circa hunc quidem communis ratio hominis parum differt a propria quam appositio designat. Sed tamen aliquo modo est alia. 1358. At “Therefore, people” [i, y], he shows in what way a man may be called continent or incontinent in regard to these things: first [i, y, aa] concerning the unnecessary, and second [i, y, bb], at “But men who etc.,” concerning the necessary. His first remark is that people who go to excess in their pursuit of those unnecessary things in them that are contrary to right reason are not called simply incontinent but with a limitation, for example, incontinent in the matter of money, gain, honor, or anger, as if there were others absolutely incontinent. The former are called incontinent by way of likeness that the addition indicates; thus, when we say “man” the victor in the Olympics, the common notion of man differs little from the proper notion which this addition signifies, although it is different in some way.
Et inducit signum ad hoc quod circa praedicta non dicatur aliquis simpliciter incontinens, quia incontinentia vituperatur non solum ut peccatum quoddam quod potest contingere etiam cum aliquis persequitur aliquod bonum, sed inordinate. Vituperatur autem incontinentia, sicut malitia quaedam per quam scilicet tenditur in aliquod malum. Quae quidem vel est malitia simpliciter, puta cum ratio et appetitus tendunt in malum, et haec est vera malitia quae opponitur virtuti; vel est secundum quamdam partem, quia scilicet appetitus tendit in malum, non autem ratio, sicut contingit circa incontinentiam; sed nullus praedictorum incontinentium vituperatur ut malus, sed solum ut peccans; quia in bonum tendit, sed ultra quam oportet: unde nullus eorum est incontinens simpliciter. 1359. As an indication that a man may not be called incontinent without qualification in these matters, he remarks that incontinence is censured not only as a sin that someone can commit even in pursuing what is good though in an inordinate manner; but incontinence is censured as a kind of vice by which we tend to some evil. There is vice either in the complete sense, e.g., when the reason and the appetitive faculty aim at evil (this is the real vice that is contrary to virtue) or in an incomplete sense, e.g., when the appetitive faculty, but not the reason, tends to evil ‘ which occurs in incontinence (proper). But none of the incontinent previously mentioned are censured as wicked but only as sinners because they strive for good, but beyond what is proper. Hence none of them is incontinent without qualification.
Deinde cum dicit: eorum autem qui circa corporales etc., ostendit qualiter dicatur aliquis incontinens circa necessaria. Et dicit quod illi qui male se habent circa corporales voluptates circa quas est temperantia et intemperantia, non ita quod ex electione persequantur superabundantias delectationum et fugiant tristitias, puta famem et sitim et alia huiusmodi, quae pertinent ad gustum et tactum, sed praeter rectam electionem quam habent et praeter intellectum rectum qui in eis est persequuntur et fugiunt praedicta; tales inquam dicuntur incontinentes non quidem cum aliqua additione, sicut dicebatur incontinens irae, sed simpliciter. Et ad hoc inducit signum. Quia molles qui sunt propinqui incontinentibus dicuntur aliqui circa huiusmodi tristitias: puta quia non possunt pati famem aut sitim, aut aliquid huiusmodi, non autem dicuntur circa aliquid aliorum; puta quia non possunt sustinere paupertatem, aut aliquid huiusmodi. 1360. Then [y, bb], at “But men who,” he shows how someone is called incontinent in regard to necessary things. He observes that men who behave badly in the matter of physical pleasures, with which temperance and intemperance deal, not in such a way that by deliberate choice they pursue excessive pleasures and avoid discomforts, e.g., hunger and thirst and suchlike pertaining to taste and touch—but so that they pursue these things contrary to the right reason in themselves; men of this ‘kind, I say, are called incontinent not with some limitation like the incontinent in regard to anger but without qualification. He also offers confirmation of this by the fact that people are called effeminate-closely related to the incontinent-in reference to such discomforts, for instance, because they cannot undergo hunger or thirst or anything of this type, but not in reference to other things, for example, because they cannot bear poverty and suchlike.
Deinde cum dicit: et propter hoc in idem etc., infert quaedam corollaria ex dictis. Quorum primum est, quod in idem ponuntur incontinens et intemperatus, et continens et temperatus. Non ita quod unum eorum sit alterum; sed quia sunt aliqualiter circa eadem, scilicet corporales voluptates et tristitias, sed non eodem modo. Sed temperatus et intemperatus cum electione, continens autem et incontinens sine electione. 1361. Next [i, z], at “For this reason,” he infers certain corollaries from the premises. The first [z, aa] is that incontinent and intemperate, continent and temperate are placed in the same classification, not in the sense that one of them is the other, but because in some measure they deal with the same things, viz., bodily pleasures and pains, yet not in the same way, for the temperate and intemperate act with deliberate choice while the continent and incontinent act without it.
Secundum quod ex hoc sequitur ponit ibi: propter quod magis et cetera. Et dicit, quod ex praedictis patet quod magis peccat et vituperatur intemperatus eo quod peccat persequendo superfluas delectationes et fugiendo moderatas tristitias, non quia patiatur concupiscentiam, vel patitur quiete, idest remisse. Et ideo est peior quam homo qui peccat in praedictis propter vehementem concupiscentiam, qualis est incontinens. Qui enim absque concupiscentia peccat, quid faceret, si adesset ei fortis concupiscentia qualis est iuvenum, et fortis tristitia circa indigentiam venereorum? 1362. The second [z, bb], which follows from the first, he sets forth at “Consequently.” He says that, from the discussions, obviously the intemperate man is the greater sinner and to be censured because he sins more in pursuing superfluous pleasures and avoiding slight discomforts when he does not feel passion at all or feels it only gently, i.e., mildly. For this reason he is worse than a man like the incontinent fellow, who sins in these matters from violent passion. What would a man do who sins without passion, if he were to experience the vehement desires of youth and the serious discomforts arising from the lack of necessities?
Deinde cum dicit: quia autem concupiscentiarum etc., manifestat quae dixerat, assignans causam quare circa non necessaria non sit simpliciter incontinentia. Et primo ostendit quare circa ea non sit simpliciter incontinentia. Secundo, quare circa ea dicatur incontinentia cum additione, ibi, propter similitudinem autem et cetera. Circa primum tria facit. Primo proponit quales sint huiusmodi delectationes non necessariae; secundo concludit quale sit studium circa ea; tertio concludit ulterius quod circa ea non est malitia neque incontinentia simpliciter, ibi, malitia quidem igitur et cetera. Dicit ergo primo quod quaedam concupiscentiae et delectationes sunt eorum, quae secundum genus suum sunt bona et laudabilia. 1363. At “Some kinds” [a, ii] he clarifies what he had said, assigning reasons why there is no incontinence without qualification in the case of unnecessary things. First [ii, x] he shows why such must be the case. Then [ii, y], at “But people speak etc.,” he shows why only limited incontinence is predicated of such people. On the initial point he makes three observations. First [ii, x, aa] he points out what kinds of unnecessary pleasures there are. Next [ii, x, bb], at “Hence, those who etc.,” he infers what kind of desire is aroused for these pleasures. Third [ii, x, cc], at “So then there is etc.,” he further infers that there is neither vice nor total incontinence in regard to them. He shows first that some species of desires and pleasures concern things that are good and praiseworthy in themselves.
Sunt enim tria genera delectabilium. Quaedam sunt secundum naturam eligibilia, ad quae scilicet natura inclinat; quaedam autem sunt contraria his, sicut ea quae sunt contra inclinationem naturae; quaedam vero sunt media inter ista, sicut patet de pecunia et lucro et victoria et honore. Unde circa omnia huiusmodi intermedia non vituperantur aliqui ex hoc solum quod patiuntur eorum concupiscentiam et amorem, sed ex modo concupiscendi qui est superabundans. 1364. There are three kinds of pleasures. Some, to which nature inclines, are desirable by nature. Others are just the reverse, for example, those contrary to the natural inclination. Still others are midway between, witness the case of money and gain, victory and honor. Hence, in those of the middle kind, people are not blamed because they are affected by a desire and love for these things but because they desire them in an excessive manner.
Deinde cum dicit propter quod quanti etc., concludit ex praemissis quale sit studium hominum circa praedicta. Et dicit, quod illi qui praeter rationem vel habent vel persequuntur aliquid eorum quae sunt naturaliter pulchra et bona, non vituperantur quasi mali: puta illi qui student circa honorem adipiscendum, vel circa curam filiorum vel parentum magis quam oportet. Haec enim sunt bona, et laudantur illi qui circa haec student sicut oportet. Sed tamen in talibus potest esse quaedam superabundantia vitiosa. Sicut si aliqua mulier propter amorem filiorum superfluum contra Deum rebellet, puta propter filiorum mortem, sicut legitur de quadam muliere quae vocatur Niobes; vel si quis propter nimium amorem parentum aliquid insipienter agat, sicut quidam nomine Sathirus, qui cognominatus est Philopator, id est amator patris, valde videbatur desipere propter amorem quem circa patrem habebat. 1365. Next [ii, x, bb], at “Hence, those who,” he infers from the premises what kind of desire people have for these last types of pleasures. He remarks that those who, contrary to reason, possess or pursue any of the things that are noble and good by nature are not blamed as evil, for instance, people who are more zealous than they should be about honor or about the care of their children or parents. Certainly these operations are good, and men who are properly diligent about them are praised; nevertheless a kind of vicious excess can exist in such matters. Thus if a woman should rebel against God because of excessive love of her children, for example, in the event of their death, as we read of a woman named Niobe; or if a man should do something foolish out of immoderate love of a parent, as a certain Satyrus called philopater or “father-lover” seemed to act very foolishly because of the love he had for his father.’
Deinde cum dicit: malitia quidem igitur etc., concludit, quod circa praedicta non est malitia; propter hoc scilicet quod unumquodque eorum in se consideratum, est naturaliter eligibile, sed solae superabundantiae eorum sunt pravae et fugiendae. Et similiter nec incontinentia est simpliciter circa praedicta: quia incontinentia non solum est aliquid fugiendum sicut peccatum, sed etiam est vituperabile sicut turpe. Et ideo circa delectationes corporales, quae sunt turpes et serviles, ut in tertio dictum est, proprie est incontinentia. Nec sunt huiusmodi delectationes appetendae homini, nisi propter necessitatem. 1366. Then [ii, x, cc], at “So then there is,” he infers that there is no vice in these pleasures because each of them considered in itself is naturally desirable while only excesses in them are evil and to, be avoided. Likewise there is no complete incontinence in these pleasures, because incontinence not only is a thing to be avoided as a sin but is something censurable as being disgraceful. Therefore it is with bodily pleasures, which are disgraceful and servile as was said in book the third (612), that continence is properly concerned. Nor are pleasures of this kind to be desired by men except on account of necessity.
Deinde cum dicit: propter similitudinem autem etc., ostendit quare dicatur circa non necessaria incontinentia cum additione. Et dicit, quod hoc accidit propter similitudinem passionis: quia scilicet sicut aliquis immoderate concupiscit voluptates corporales, ita pecuniam et alia praedicta. Et est simile, sicut cum dicimus aliquem hominem esse malum medicum vel malum ypocritam, id est repraesentatorem, qui tamen non dicitur simpliciter malus. Sic igitur in his quae sic dicuntur mala, non dicimus malitiam simpliciter circa unumquodque eorum, sed secundum quandam proportionalem similitudinem, quia scilicet ita se habet malus medicus ad ea quae sunt medici, sicut malus homo ad ea quae sunt hominis; ita etiam et in genere continentiae solam illam dicimus simpliciter continentiam et incontinentiam, quae est circa eadem temperantiae et intemperantiae. Sed circa iram dicimus incontinentiam secundum similitudinem: et ideo addimus incontinentem irae, sicut incontinentem honoris et lucri. 1367. At “But people speak” [ii, y] he shows why partial incontinence should be predicated of unnecessary pleasures. He say this happens because of some likeness in passion: as someone has an immoderate passion for bodily pleasures, so too for money and other objects previously mentioned. There is a parallel case when we say a man is a bad doctor or a poor mimic, i.e., actor, who nevertheless is not called simply bad. So then in the things that are called bad in this way, we do not predicate badness of any of them in an unqualified sense but according to a proportionate likeness, because as a bad doctor is compared to what a doctor ought to be so a bad man is compared to what a man ought to be. Likewise in the genus of continence we call that continence and incontinence without qualification which is concerned with the same matters as temperance and intemperance. But with respect to anger we predicate incontinence by similitude, and hence say a man is incontinent in the matter of anger, as we say he is incontinent in the matter of honor or gain.

Kinds of Pleasure
Chapter 5
b.   He explains that a man is said to be continent or incontinent... according as his passions and pleasures are human or brutish.
      i.    which (kinds) are human and which, brutish.
            x.   HE DISTINGUISHES PLEASURES. — 1368-1371
ἐπεὶ δ' ἐστὶν ἔνια μὲν ἡδέα φύσει, καὶ τούτων τὰ μὲν ἁπλῶς τὰ δὲ κατὰ γένη καὶ ζώων καὶ ἀνθρώπων, τὰ δ' οὐκ ἔστιν, ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν διὰ πηρώσεις τὰ δὲ δι' ἔθη γίνεται, τὰ δὲ διὰ μοχθηρὰς φύσεις, ἔστι καὶ περὶ τούτων ἕκαστα παραπλησίας ἰδεῖν ἕξεις· Of natural pleasures, some are delightful to every taste, others to different classes of men and animals. But of the pleasures that are not natural, some become delightful because of sickness or privations, others because of customs or vicious natures. And to each of these pleasures there will be a corresponding habit.
                   aa. First. — 1372
λέγω δὲ τὰς θηριώδεις, οἷον τὴν ἄνθρωπον ἣν λέγουσι τὰς κυούσας ἀνασχίζουσαν τὰ παιδία κατεσθίειν, ἢ οἵοις χαίρειν φασὶν ἐνίους τῶν ἀπηγριωμένων περὶ τὸν Πόντον, τοὺς μὲν ὠμοῖς τοὺς δὲ ἀνθρώπων κρέασιν, τοὺς δὲ τὰ παιδία δανείζειν ἀλλήλοις εἰς εὐωχίαν, ἢ τὸ περὶ Φάλαριν λεγόμενον. αὗται μὲν θηριώδεις, I call bestial the pleasure of the man who is said to have slit pregnant women so he could devour the fetuses; of anyone who delights in the brutish practices ascribed to certain savages near the Black Sea: some of whom eat raw meat, others human flesh, and still others, one another’s children at their feasts; or Phalaris, according to what is related of him. Men delighting in such pleasures are like beasts.
                   bb.      Second. — 1373
αἳ δὲ διὰ νόσους γίνονται καὶ διὰ μανίαν ἐνίοις, ὥσπερ ὁ τὴν μητέρα καθιερεύσας καὶ φαγών, καὶ ὁ τοῦ συνδούλου τὸ ἧπαρ. αἳ δὲ νοσηματώδεις, But some people become bestial because of particular ailments, for example, insanity. Laboring under this affliction one man sacrificed his mother and ate her, another murdered his fellow slave and ate his liver. These persons are pathological.
                   cc. Last. — 1374
ἢ ἐξ ἔθους, οἷον τριχῶν τίλσεις καὶ ὀνύχων τρώξεις, ἔτι δ' ἀνθράκων καὶ γῆς, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ἡ τῶν ἀφροδισίων τοῖς ἄρρεσιν· τοῖς μὲν γὰρ φύσει τοῖς δ' ἐξ ἔθους συμβαίνουσιν, οἷον τοῖς ὑβριζομένοις ἐκ παίδων. Others become bestial because of habit, for instance, certain men who take pleasure in plucking out their hair, biting their nails, eating coal and earth, and having sexual intercourse with males. People act in these ways from the condition of their bodily temperament, or from usage to which they have become accustomed since childhood.
      ii. continence and incontinence are attributed in a different sense.
ὅσοις μὲν οὖν φύσις αἰτία, τούτους μὲν οὐδεὶς ἂν εἴπειεν ἀκρατεῖς, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ τὰς γυναῖκας, ὅτι οὐκ ὀπύουσιν ἀλλ' ὀπύονται· ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ὅσοι νοσηματώδως ἔχουσι δι' ἔθος. No one would accuse of (unqualified) incontinence those in whom nature is the cause of these pleasures, as is the case with women who do not govern their emotions but are governed by them. The same, too, may be said of people who are morbid because of bad habits.
                   aa. He states his proposition.
                         a’  He proposes two things. (First). — 1377
τὸ μὲν οὖν ἔχειν ἕκαστα τούτων ἔξω τῶν ὅρων ἐστὶ τῆς κακίας, καθάπερ καὶ ἡ θηριότης· To experience desires for these pleasures exceeds the limits of human vice, as brutishness was said to do.
                         b’  The second. — 1378
τὸν δ' ἔχοντα κρατεῖν ἢ κρατεῖσθαι οὐχ ἡ ἁπλῆ ἀκρασία ἀλλ' ἡ καθ' ὁμοιότητα, καθάπερ καὶ τὸν περὶ τοὺς θυμοὺς ἔχοντα τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον τοῦ πάθους, ἀκρατῆ δ' οὐ λεκτέον. If anyone has the desires and overcomes them or is overcome by them, he is not called continent or incontinent simply but in virtue of a resemblance. It was in this way that we spoke about one having the passion of anger, viz., that he must be called incontinent in part.
                   bb.      He explains it.
                         a’  In regard to vice.
                               a.   (CONCERNED WITH) VICES OPPOSED TO ALL VIRTUES. — 1379
πᾶσα γὰρ ὑπερβάλλουσα καὶ ἀφροσύνη καὶ δειλία καὶ ἀκολασία καὶ χαλεπότης αἳ μὲν θηριώδεις αἳ δὲ νοσηματώδεις εἰσίν· Every excess of vice, for example, folly, timidity, intemperance, and harshness is either brutish or caused by sickness.
                               b.   HE... EXEMPLIFIES TIMIDITY. — 1380
ὁ μὲν γὰρ φύσει τοιοῦτος οἷος δεδιέναι πάντα, κἂν ψοφήσῃ μῦς, θηριώδη δειλίαν δειλός, ὃ δὲ τὴν γαλῆν ἐδεδίει διὰ νόσον· Someone who is so inclined by nature that he fears everything, even the squeak of a mouse, has the timidity of a dumb beast; and the individual who was afraid of a ferret had a pathological condition.
                               c.   EXAMPLES OF FOLLY. — 1381
καὶ τῶν ἀφρόνων οἱ μὲν ἐκ φύσεως ἀλόγιστοι καὶ μόνον τῇ αἰσθήσει ζῶντες θηριώδεις, ὥσπερ ἔνια γένη τῶν πόρρω βαρβάρων, οἱ δὲ διὰ νόσους, οἷον τὰς ἐπιληπτικάς, ἢ μανίας νοσηματώδεις. Certain silly people are irrational by nature and, living according to the senses, become brutish like the barbarous tribes of distant regions. Others are irrational because of sickness like epilepsy or insanity, and are silly by reason of disease.
                         b’  In regard to... incontinence.
                               a.   IN WHAT WAY. — 1382
τούτων δ' ἔστι μὲν ἔχειν τινὰ ἐνίοτε μὲν μόνον, μὴ κρατεῖσθαι δέ, λέγω δὲ οἷον εἰ Φάλαρις κατεῖχεν ἐπιθυμῶν παιδίου φαγεῖν ἢ πρὸς ἀφροδισίων ἄτοπον ἡδονήν· ἔστι δὲ καὶ κρατεῖσθαι, μὴ μόνον ἔχειν· Sometimes a man may experience these passions but not be overcome, for instance, if Phalaris had kept a boy, desiring to use him for food or unseemly sexual pleasure. At other times a man may not only experience the passions but be overcome by them.
                               b.   NO COMPLETE... INCONTINENCE. — 1383-1384
ὥσπερ οὖν καὶ μοχθηρίας ἡ μὲν κατ' ἄνθρωπον ἁπλῶς λέγεται μοχθηρία, ἣ δὲ κατὰ πρόσθεσιν, ὅτι θηριώδης ἢ νοσηματώδης, ἁπλῶς δ' οὔ, τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον δῆλον ὅτι καὶ ἀκρασία ἐστὶν ἣ μὲν θηριώδης ἣ δὲ νοσηματώδης, ἁπλῶς δὲ ἡ κατὰ τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην ἀκολασίαν μόνη. As vice which is according to the human mode is called vice without qualification but that which is described as brutish or pathological is termed vice only in the qualified sense, so in the same way we may speak of incontinence, either brutish or pathological, in the limited sense or incontinence according to the human mode only in the unqualified sense.
ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἀκρασία καὶ ἐγκράτειά ἐστι μόνον περὶ ἅπερ ἀκολασία καὶ σωφροσύνη, καὶ ὅτι περὶ τὰ ἄλλα ἐστὶν ἄλλο εἶδος ἀκρασίας, λεγόμενον κατὰ μεταφορὰν καὶ οὐχ ἁπλῶς, δῆλον. It is obvious then that only (complete) continence and incontinence treat the matters dealt with by temperance and intemperance, and that a different kind of incontinence in a transferred and not the absolute sense is concerned with other matters.
Quia autem sunt quaedam et cetera. Postquam philosophus ostendit quod diversimode dicitur aliquis continens et incontinens secundum diversas concupiscentias et delectationes humanas, hic ostendit, quod diversimode dicitur aliquis continens et incontinens circa concupiscentias et delectationes humanas et bestiales. Et circa hoc duo facit. Primo ostendit, diversitatem concupiscentiarum et delectationum humanarum et bestialium. Secundo ostendit, quomodo diversimode circa eas dicatur continentia et incontinentia, ibi: quantis quidem igitur natura causa et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo proponit differentiam delectationum. Secundo manifestat quod dixerat, per exempla, ibi, dico autem bestiales et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod delectabilium, quaedam sunt delectabilia secundum naturam, quaedam autem non secundum naturam. Et utrumque horum subdividitur: 1368. After the Philosopher has explained that a man is called continent and incontinent in different ways according to the different human passions and pleasures, he here [1, b] explains that a man is said to be continent or incontinent in different senses according as his passions and pleasures are human or brutish. On this point he does two things. First [b, i] he shows among the different kinds of passion and pleasure which are human and which, brutish. Next [b, ii], at “No one would etc.,” he shows how continence and incontinence are attributed in a different sense to these (passions and pleasures). The initial point he develops in two stages. First [i, x] he distinguishes pleasures. Then [i, y], at “I call bestial etc.,” he clarifies his statement by examples. He says first that some pleasures are according to nature, others are not according to nature; and each group is subdivided.
Eorum enim, quae sunt delectabilia secundum naturam, quaedam sunt delectabilia omni habenti sensum, puta dulce est naturaliter delectabile omni habenti gustum. Quaedam vero sunt naturaliter delectabilia quibusdam differentiis et animalium et hominum. Alii enim cibi sunt naturaliter delectabiles animalibus comedentibus carnes, et animalibus comedentibus fructus. Similiter etiam inter homines, cholericis delectabilia sunt naturaliter frigida quae temperant eorum complexionem, phlegmaticis vero calida. 1369. Of the pleasures that are natural, some are delightful to every creature with senses, for example, sweet is naturally pleasing to all who have the sense of taste. Others are naturally delightful to certain classes of animals and men. Some foods are by their nature pleasant to carnivorous animals, others to herbivorous animals. Likewise, among men, cold foods that moderate the temperament are delightful to the choleric, but warm foods are agreeable to the phlegmatic.
Eorum vero quae sunt delectabilia non naturaliter, quaedam fiunt propter orbitates, idest propter aliquas supervenientes aegritudines corporales, aut etiam tristitias animales, ex quibus transmutatur natura ad aliam dispositionem. Quaedam vero fiunt delectabilia propter malam consuetudinem, quae fit quasi quaedam natura. Quaedam vero fiunt delectabilia propter perniciosas naturas, puta cum aliqui homines habent corruptas et perversas complexiones corporis et secundum hoc sequitur quod in his sint perversissimae tam apprehensiones imaginationis quam etiam affectiones sensibilis appetitus, quas quidem vires, cum sint organorum corporalium actus, necesse est, quod sint corporali complexioni proportionatae. 1370. Of the unnatural pleasures, some become delightful because of privation, i.e., on account of some supervenient sickness of the body or sadness of soul by which the nature is changed into a different condition. Others become delightful because of evil habit which brings about a quasi-nature. Still others become delightful because of vicious natures, as happens when people have corrupt and perverse bodily temperaments; and, accordingly both the perceptions of their imagination and the affections of their sensitive appetite are most perverse. Likewise, since these powers are acts of bodily organs, they are necessarily proportionate to the temperament of the body.
Et quia secundum diversitatem obiectorum diversificantur habitus, necesse est, quod singulis praedictorum delectabilium respondeant similes habitus. Puta, quod sint quidam habitus naturales et quidam non naturales. 1371. Because habits are diversified by a complete distinction of objects, corresponding habits will answer to these individual pleasures under discussion; thus some habits will be natural and others unnatural.
Deinde cum dicit: dico autem bestiales etc., manifestat per exempla singulas differentias innaturalium delectabilium. Et primo de his quae fiunt delectabilia propter perniciosam naturam hominum qui sunt quasi bestiales, quia propter corruptelam complexionis assimilantur bestiis; sicut de quodam homine dicebatur, quod scindebat ventres praegnantium mulierum, ut pueros in utero conceptos devoraret. Et simile est, si quis delectetur in talibus qualibus dicunt delectari quosdam silvestres homines in silvis, scilicet scitas commorantes circa mare Ponticum. Quorum quidam comedunt carnes crudas, quidam vero carnes humanas, quidam vero sibiinvicem ad celebranda convivia suos filios accommodant; et similia sunt ea quae dicuntur circa Phalarim quemdam, scilicet crudelissimum tyrannum, qui in ipsis cruciatibus hominum delectabatur. Hi igitur qui in talibus delectantur, sunt quasi similes bestiis. 1372. Next [i, y], at “I call bestial the pleasure etc.,” he exemplifies individually the different kinds of unnatural pleasures; and first [i, y, aa] those which are delightful because of the malignant nature of men who are, so to speak, bestial since they are like beasts by reason of a corrupt temperament. There is a story about one man who slit the wombs of pregnant women so he could devour the fetuses. Equally horrible are those who delight in practices of the kind reported of certain savages living in the forest near the Black Sea. Some eat raw meat, others human flesh; still others offer one another their children to be food for their feasts. Similar things are narrated about one Phalaris, a most cruel tyrant, who took pleasure in torturing men. Therefore, people who delight in deeds of this kind are, as it were, like beasts.
Secundo ibi: hi autem propter aegritudines etc., exemplificat de his quae fiunt innaturaliter delectabilia propter orbitates. Et dicit quod quibusdam fiunt delectabilia ea quae sunt contra naturam propter aliquas aegritudines, puta propter maniam vel furiam, aut aliquid huiusmodi: sicut de quodam legitur, quod factus maniacus sacrificavit matrem et comedit et etiam occidit conservum suum et comedit epar eius. 1373. Second [i, y, bb], at “But some people,” he exemplifies things that become delightful and are contrary to nature because of particular ailments, for example, insanity or madness or something of this sort. There is a story about one man who on becoming insane sacrificed his mother and ate her; still another who murdered his fellow slave and ate his liver.
Tertio ibi: hi autem aegritudinales etc., exemplificat de his quae fiunt contra naturam delectabilia ex consuetudine. Et dicit, quod quibusdam accidunt innaturales delectationes propter interiorem aegritudinem vel corruptionem provenientem ex consuetudine. Sicut quidam propter consuetudinem delectantur evellere sibi pilos, et corrodere ungues, et comedere carbones et terram, nec non et uti coitu masculorum. Omnia autem praedicta, quae sunt contra naturam delectabilia, possunt reduci ad duo: quibusdam enim accidunt ex natura corporalis complexionis, quam acceperunt a principio. Quibusdam vero accidunt ex consuetudine, puta quia assuefiunt ad huiusmodi a pueritia. Et simile est de his qui in hoc incidunt ex aegritudine corporali. Nam prava consuetudo est quasi quaedam aegritudo animalis. 1374. Last [i, y, cc], at “Others become,” he offers examples of things contrary to nature that become delightful by reason of habit. Some enjoy unnatural pleasures because of mental unbalance or habitual perversion. For example, certain men out of habit take pleasure in pulling out their hair, biting their nails, eating coal and earth, and having sexual intercourse with males. All the preceding can be reduced to two classes. Some people do them because of the tendency of bodily temperament that they had from the beginning; others because of habit, becoming accustomed to things of this kind from childhood. Such people are like individuals who fall into this condition by reason of physical sickness, for evil habit is a kind of psychological sickness.
Deinde cum dicit: quantis quidem igitur etc., ostendit quod circa praedicta delectabilia innaturalia non est incontinentia simpliciter, sed secundum quid. Et hoc dupliciter. Primo quidem ratione accepta ex conditione eorum qui delectantur. Secundo ratione accepta ex conditione delectabilium, ibi, habere quidem igitur et cetera. Dicit ergo primo quod nullus potest rationabiliter dicere hos esse simpliciter incontinentes in quibus natura bestialis est causa talium delectationum. Dictum est enim supra, quod bestias non dicimus continentes vel incontinentes, quia non habent universalem opinionem, sed singularium phantasiam et memoriam. Huiusmodi autem homines, qui propter perniciosam naturam sunt bestiis similes, habent quidem aliquid universalis apprehensionis sed valde modicum, propter hoc quod ratio in eis est oppressa ex malitia complexionis, sicut manifeste opprimitur in infirmis propter indispositionem corporalem; illud autem quod est modicum quasi nihil esse videtur. Nec contingit de facili quod modica vis rationis concupiscentias fortes repellat. Et ideo tales non dicuntur neque continentes simpliciter neque incontinentes, sed solum secundum quid, inquantum remanet in eis aliquid de iudicio rationis. 1375. Then [b, ii], at “No one would,” he shows that these unnatural pleasures do not dispose to incontinence simply but only in a qualified sense. He does this in two ways; first [ii, x] by a reason taken from the disposition of those who enjoy the pleasures; second [ii, y] by a reason taken from the nature of the pleasures, at “To experience etc.” He says first that no one will accuse of unqualified incontinence men whose bestial nature is the reason for such pleasures. We have already said (1350) that dumb animals are not referred to as continent or incontinent since they exercise no universal judgment but only imagination and memory of particulars. But these men who, by reason of a malignant nature, are like wild beasts indeed do have some, although very little, universal perception, reason in them being weighed down by bad temperament, as is obviously the case with those physically sick. But what is very little seems to be as nothing. Nor is it likely that the force of a weak argument should repel strong desires. Consequently, these individuals are not called incontinent or continent simply but only in a restricted sense, insofar as some judgment of reason remains with them.
Et ponit exemplum de mulieribus in quibus, ut in pluribus, modicum viget ratio propter imperfectionem corporalis naturae. Et ideo, ut in pluribus, non ducunt affectus suos secundum rationem, sed magis ab affectibus suis ducuntur. Propter quod raro inveniuntur mulieres sapientes et fortes. Et ideo non simpliciter possunt dici continentes vel incontinentes. Et eadem ratio videtur esse de his qui aegrotative se habent, idest qui habent corruptam dispositionem propter malam consuetudinem, quae etiam opprimit iudicium rationis ad modum perversae naturae. 1376. He offers the example of women in whom, for the most part, reason flourishes very little because of the imperfect nature of their body. Because of this they do not govern their emotions in the majority of cases by reason but rather are governed by their emotions. Hence wise and brave women are rarely found, and so women cannot be called continent and incontinent without qualification. The same argument seems valid for those who are ill, i.e., have a diseased temperament because of bad habits, which oppresses the judgment of reason after the manner of a perverse nature.
Deinde cum dicit: habere quidem igitur etc., ostendit, quod circa innaturalia delectabilia non est simpliciter incontinentia, sed secundum quid, ex conditione ipsorum delectabilium. Et primo proponit quod intendit. Secundo manifestat propositum, ibi: omnis enim superabundans et cetera. Primo autem duo proponit. Quorum primum est quod habere singula horum, idest pati concupiscentias praedictorum delectabilium excedit terminos malitiae humanae, sicut et de bestialitate dictum est supra. 1377. Next [ii, y], at “To experience,” he shows from the very nature of unnatural pleasures that there is no incontinence in the unqualified sense but only in a limited sense. He states his proposition [ii, y, aa], then [ii, y, bb], at “Every excess of vice etc.,” he explains it. First [aa, a’] he proposes two things. The first is that to experience desires for these pleasures exceeds the limits of human vice, as was previously said also about brutishness (1296, 1299).
Secundum ponit ibi: habentem autem et cetera. Et dicit quod si aliquis habeat concupiscentias et superet eas, non dicetur continens simpliciter, sed secundum similitudinem: vel si superetur ab eis, non dicetur incontinens simpliciter, sed secundum similitudinem: sicut et supra de incontinentia irae dictum est. 1378. The second [aa, b’] he proposes at “If anyone.” saying that if anyone should have these desires and overcome them, he will be called continent not simply but by reason of some resemblance to virtuous restraint. Or if he should be overcome by them, he will be called incontinent not simply but by way of a resemblance to complete incontinence. In this fashion we spoke before on incontinence in regard to anger (1367).
Deinde cum dicit: omnis enim superabundans etc., manifestat quod dixerat. Et primo quantum ad malitiam. Secundo quantum ad continentiam et incontinentiam, ibi, horum autem et cetera. Circa primum considerandum est quod huiusmodi superexcessus malitiae potest esse circa vitia omnibus virtutibus opposita, sicut circa insipientiam quae opponitur prudentiae, circa timiditatem quae opponitur fortitudini, circa intemperantiam quae opponitur temperantiae, et circa crudelitatem quae opponitur mansuetudini et circa singula eorum quaedam sunt dispositiones bestiales propter perniciosam naturam, quaedam vero aegritudinales quae sunt propter aegritudinem corporalem vel animalem quae est ex mala consuetudine. Et quia supra exempla posuit circa intemperantiam et crudelitatem, hic exemplificat, primo quidem de timiditate. 1379. At “Every excess of vice” [ii, y, bb] he explains his statement. First [bb, a’] he does so in regard to vice; then [bb, b’], at “Sometimes a man etc.,” in regard to continence and incontinence. On the first point we must consider [a’ a] that such an excess of vice can concern vices opposed to all virtues, for example, folly opposed to prudence, timidity opposed to fortitude, intemperance opposed to temperance, and harshness opposed to gentleness; and it can concern each one of the vices, for some of them are brutish habits arising from a malignant nature, others are diseased habits arising from physical or psychological sickness, i.e., a bad habit. Since he has already given examples of intemperance and harshness, he now first exemplifies timidity.
Ibi: hic quidem enim et cetera. Et dicit quod aliquis est naturaliter sic dispositus, ut omnia timeat, etiam sonitum muris, et talis est timidus bestialiter. Quidam vero propter aegritudinem incidit in talem timiditatem quod timebat mustelam. 1380. He does this at “Someone” [a’, b], saying that temperament may be so timid as to make some afraid of anything, even the squeak of a mouse. This is the timidity of a dumb animal. One man became so fearful from a pathological condition that he was afraid of a ferret.
Secundo ibi: et insipientium etc., exemplificat circa insipientiam; et dicit quod quidam naturaliter sunt irrationales, non quia nihil habeant rationis, sed valde modicum et circa singularia quae sensu apprehendunt, ita quod vivunt solum secundum sensum. Et tales sunt quasi secundum naturam bestiales. Quod praecipue accidit circa quosdam barbaros in finibus mundi habitantes. Ubi propter intemperiem aeris etiam corpora sunt malae dispositionis, ex qua impeditur rationis usus in eis; quidam vero efficiuntur irrationabiles propter aliquas aegritudines, puta epilentiam vel maniam. Et hi sunt aegritudinaliter insipientes. 1381. Then [a’, c], at “Certain silly people,” he gives examples of folly of some individuals irrational by nature, not because they have no reason but in fact very little, and this much concerned with particulars perceived by sense, so they live only according to the senses. Such individuals are—so to speak—brutish by nature. This happens especially to barbarians living at the ends of the earth, where from unhealthiness of the climate the bodies of the natives are likewise unhealthy, impeding the use of reason. Other people become irrational because of some sickness like epilepsy or insanity; and these are stupid because of disease.
Deinde cum dicit: horum autem etc., manifestat quod dixerat quantum ad incontinentiam. Et primo quomodo circa praedicta est quaedam similitudo continentiae et incontinentiae. Et dicit, quod contingit quandoque quod aliquis homo habeat quasdam praedictarum passionum innaturalium et non superetur ab eis, quod est simile continentiae; puta si Phalaris tyrannus teneat puerum et concupiscat eum vel ad usum comestionis vel ad incongruam delectationem veneream, ad neutrum tamen eo utatur. Quandoque autem contingit quod homo non solum habeat huiusmodi concupiscentias, sed etiam ab eis superetur; et hoc est simile incontinentiae. 1382. Next [bb, b’], at “Sometimes a man,” he explains his statement in regard to incontinence. First [b’, a] in what way continence and incontinence resemble the preceding vices. He remarks that a man may at times experience something of these unnatural passions and not be overcome by them, and this looks like continence. This would be the case if the tyrant Phalaris should keep a boy, wanting to use him either for food or unnatural pleasure, but nevertheless actually would not use him. At other times a man may not only experience desires of this kind but also be overcome by them; and this resembles incontinence.
Secundo ibi, quemadmodum autem etc., ostendit quod in talibus non est simpliciter continentia vel incontinentia. Et dicit quod sicut malitia quae est secundum humanum modum simpliciter dicitur malitia, quae autem est innaturalis homini dicitur cum additione malitia bestialis vel aegritudinalis et non malitia simpliciter; eodem modo et incontinentia innaturalis dicitur cum additione, puta bestialis vel aegritudinalis, sed simpliciter incontinentia dicitur sola illa quae est secundum temperantiam humanam. 1383. Then [b’, b], at “As vice” he shows that in matters of this sort there is no complete continence or incontinence. He says that as vice according to the human mode is called unqualified vice but that which is humanly unnatural is called brutish or pathological vice, and not in the unqualified sense; so in the same*way incontinence that is unnatural is predicated with some limitation, like bestial or pathological, but only incontinence according to human mode is called unqualified incontinence.
Ultimo autem epilogando concludit manifestum esse ex praedictis, quod continentia et incontinentia simpliciter solum est circa illa, circa quae est temperantia et intemperantia. Circa alia vero est quaedam species incontinentiae quae dicitur secundum metaphoram et non simpliciter. 1384. Finally, in summary, he concludes it is evident from our discussion that only unqualified continence and incontinence treat those matters dealt with by temperance and intemperance, while some kind of incontinence predicated in a transferred rather than in the absolute way is concerned with other matters.

Comparison of Different Kinds of Incontinence
Chapter 6
      a.   He compares incontinence in the pleasure of touch... with incontinence in the matter of anger.
            i.    He states his proposition. — 1385
ὅτι δὲ καὶ ἧττον αἰσχρὰ ἀκρασία ἡ τοῦ θυμοῦ ἢ ἡ τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν, θεωρήσωμεν. Now we will consider that incontinence in the matter of anger is less disgraceful than incontinence in pleasure.
            ii.   He proves his proposition by four arguments.
                   w.  FIRST. — 1386-1389
ἔοικε γὰρ ὁ θυμὸς ἀκούειν μέν τι τοῦ λόγου, παρακούειν δέ, καθάπερ οἱ ταχεῖς τῶν διακόνων, οἳ πρὶν ἀκοῦσαι πᾶν τὸ λεγόμενον ἐκθέουσιν, εἶτα ἁμαρτάνουσι τῆς προστάξεως, καὶ οἱ κύνες, πρὶν σκέψασθαι εἰ φίλος, ἂν μόνον ψοφήσῃ, ὑλακτοῦσιν· οὕτως ὁ θυμὸς διὰ θερμότητα καὶ ταχυτῆτα τῆς φύσεως ἀκούσας μέν, οὐκ ἐπίταγμα δ' ἀκούσας, ὁρμᾷ πρὸς τὴν τιμωρίαν. ὁ μὲν γὰρ λόγος ἢ ἡ φαντασία ὅτι ὕβρις ἢ ὀλιγωρία ἐδήλωσεν, ὃ δ' ὥσπερ συλλογισάμενος ὅτι δεῖ τῷ τοιούτῳ πολεμεῖν χαλεπαίνει δὴ εὐθύς· ἡ δ' ἐπιθυμία, ἐὰν μόνον εἴπῃ ὅτι ἡδὺ ὁ λόγος ἢ ἡ αἴσθησις, ὁρμᾷ πρὸς τὴν ἀπόλαυσιν. ὥσθ' ὁ μὲν θυμὸς ἀκολουθεῖ τῷ λόγῳ πως, ἡ δ' ἐπιθυμία οὔ. Anger seems to listen to reason to some extent but to hear badly, like hasty servants who hurry off before understanding instructions and then make mistakes in performing them,, and again like dogs barking at the first knock before knowing if a friend is coming. Anger listens in this way but, because of the heat and impulsiveness of its nature, moves to inflict punishment without heeding the injunction of reason. When reason or imagination shows a man that he has suffered injury or contempt, he concludes he ought to attack the one who injured him, and immediately becomes angry. But desire, as soon as reason or sense declares a thing delightful, proceeds to enjoy the pleasure. In this respect anger follows reason in b some measure, but not so desire, which is thus more disgraceful. Indeed the man incontinent in anger is prevailed upon to a degree by reason but this is not so of one incontinent in sensual desire.
                   x.   SECOND. — 1390-1392
αἰσχίων οὖν· ὁ μὲν γὰρ τοῦ θυμοῦ ἀκρατὴς τοῦ λόγου πως ἡττᾶται, ὃ δὲ τῆς ἐπιθυμίας καὶ οὐ τοῦ λόγου. ἔτι ταῖς φυσικαῖς μᾶλλον συγγνώμη ἀκολουθεῖν ὀρέξεσιν, ἐπεὶ καὶ ἐπιθυμίαις ταῖς τοιαύταις μᾶλλον ὅσαι κοιναὶ πᾶσι, καὶ ἐφ' ὅσον κοιναί· ὁ δὲ θυμὸς φυσικώτερον καὶ ἡ χαλεπότης τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν τῶν τῆς ὑπερβολῆς καὶ τῶν μὴ ἀναγκαίων, ὥσπερ ὁ ἀπολογούμενος ὅτι τὸν πατέρα τύπτοι καὶ γὰρ οὗτος ἔφη τὸν ἑαυτοῦ κἀκεῖνος τὸν ἄνωθεν, καὶ τὸ παιδίον δείξας καὶ οὗτος ἐμέ ἔφη, ὅταν ἀνὴρ γένηται· συγγενὲς γὰρ ἡμῖν· καὶ ὁ ἑλκόμενος ὑπὸ τοῦ υἱοῦ παύεσθαι ἐκέλευε πρὸς ταῖς θύραις· καὶ γὰρ αὐτὸς ἑλκύσαι τὸν πατέρα μέχρις ἐνταῦθα. Moreover, a man apparently deserves more pardon for sins about naturally desirable things, because tolerance is more readily extended towards such desires common to all, precisely because they are common. But anger is more natural and more difficult to resist than the desires for excessive and unnecessary pleasures, as is evident in the following examples. A certain man reprimanded for striking his father answered that the father had struck his own father who in turn had struck his father; then pointing to his son he said: “This boy will strike me when he becomes a man, for it is a family trait.” Another man, when dragged along by his son, bade the son stop at the doorway, as he himself had dragged his own father only that far.
                   y.   THIRD. — 1393-1395
ἔτι ἀδικώτεροι οἱ ἐπιβουλότεροι. ὁ μὲν οὖν θυμώδης οὐκ ἐπίβουλος, οὐδ' ὁ θυμός, ἀλλὰ φανερός· ἡ δ' ἐπιθυμία, καθάπερ τὴν Ἀφροδίτην φασίν·
δολοπλόκου γὰρ κυπρογενοῦς·
καὶ τὸν κεστὸν ἱμάντα Ὅμηρος·
πάρφασις, ἥ τ' ἔκλεψε νόον πύκα περ φρονέοντος.
ὥστ' εἴπερ ἀδικωτέρα καὶ αἰσχίων ἡ ἀκρασία αὕτη τῆς περὶ τὸν θυμόν ἐστι, καὶ ἁπλῶς ἀκρασία καὶ κακία πως.
Again, double dealing sinners are more unjust. Now the angry man does not act deceitfully but openly, nor does anger flare up secretly. On the other hand desire acts like Venus who is called the deceitful daughter of Cyprus and is said to wear a multicolored girdle; of her Homer relates [Iliad, xiv. 214, 217] that she craftily steals the wits of the wisest man. Therefore, incontinence of this kind is more unjust and disgraceful than incontinence of anger; it is incontinence in the unqualified sense and is to some extent a vice.
                   z.   FOURTH. — 1396-1397
ἔτι οὐδεὶς ὑβρίζει λυπούμενος, ὁ δ' ὀργῇ ποιῶν πᾶς ποιεῖ λυπούμενος, ὁ δ' ὑβρίζων μεθ' ἡδονῆς. εἰ οὖν οἷς ὀργίζεσθαι μάλιστα δίκαιον, ταῦτα ἀδικώτερα, καὶ ἡ ἀκρασία ἡ δι' ἐπιθυμίαν· οὐ γάρ ἐστιν ἐν θυμῷ ὕβρις. ὡς μὲν τοίνυν αἰσχίων ἡ περὶ ἐπιθυμίας ἀκρασία τῆς περὶ τὸν θυμόν, καὶ ὅτι ἔστιν ἐγκράτεια καὶ ἡ ἀκρασία περὶ ἐπιθυμίας καὶ ἡδονὰς σωματικάς, δῆλον· In addition, no one feels sad doing an injury. But what anyone does in anger he does with a feeling of sadness, while the one doing injury acts with pleasure. If then the more unjust things are those against which we are justly very angry, it follows that incontinence arising from sensual desire is more unjust, because no injury is involved in the anger. Therefore it is evident that incontinence concerning sensual desires is more disgraceful than that which concerns anger, and that continence and incontinence in the unqualified sense deal with sensual desires and bodily pleasures.
      b.   He compares human incontinence with brutish or pathological incontinence.
            i.    He takes up... kinds of sensual desires and pleasures. — 1398
αὐτῶν δὲ τούτων τὰς διαφορὰς ληπτέον. ὥσπερ γὰρ εἴρηται κατ' ἀρχάς, αἳ μὲν ἀνθρώπιναί εἰσι καὶ φυσικαὶ καὶ τῷ γένει καὶ τῷ μεγέθει, αἳ δὲ θηριώδεις, αἳ δὲ διὰ πηρώσεις καὶ νοσήματα. But we must take up again their differences. As we said in the beginning,” some are human and natural both in kind and amount, and others are brutish either as a result of inordinate passion or a pathological condition.
            ii.   He shows with which of these temperance... (is) concerned. — 1399-1400
τούτων δὲ περὶ τὰς πρώτας σωφροσύνη καὶ ἀκολασία μόνον ἐστίν· διὸ καὶ τὰ θηρία οὔτε σώφρονα οὔτ' ἀκόλαστα λέγομεν ἀλλ' ἢ κατὰ μεταφορὰν καὶ εἴ τινι ὅλως ἄλλο πρὸς ἄλλο διαφέρει γένος τῶν ζώων ὕβρει καὶ σιναμωρίᾳ καὶ τῷ παμφάγον εἶναι· οὐ γὰρ ἔχει προαίρεσιν οὐδὲ λογισμόν, ἀλλ' ἐξέστηκε τῆς φύσεως, ὥσπερ οἱ μαινόμενοι τῶν ἀνθρώπων. Yet with only the first of these do temperance and intemperance deal. For this reason we do not call dumb animals temperate or intemperate in the proper sense; we do say, in comparing one animal with another, that one species differs from another in uncleanness, in stupidity, or in voraciousness, but this is a figurative way of speaking, for none of them have choice or reason; they are creatures separated from reason as insane men are.
            iii. He compares human with brutish vice or incontinence. — 1401-1403
ἔλαττον δὲ θηριότης κακίας, φοβερώτερον δέ· οὐ γὰρ διέφθαρται τὸ βέλτιον, ὥσπερ ἐν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἔχει. ὅμοιον οὖν ὥσπερ ἄψυχον συμβάλλειν πρὸς ἔμψυχον, πότερον κάκιον· ἀσινεστέρα γὰρ ἡ φαυλότης ἀεὶ ἡ τοῦ μὴ ἔχοντος ἀρχήν, ὁ δὲ νοῦς ἀρχή. παραπλήσιον οὖν τὸ συμβάλλειν ἀδικίαν πρὸς ἄνθρωπον ἄδικον. ἔστι γὰρ ὡς ἑκάτερον κάκιον· μυριοπλάσια γὰρ ἂν κακὰ ποιήσειεν ἄνθρωπος κακὸς θηρίου. However, brutishness has less the nature of vice (but is more frightful) for what is best has not been corrupted as in an evil man-it is not present to be corrupt. Therefore, making a comparison to find out which is worse is like comparing an inanimate thing with a living one. The viciousness of that which does not have an intrinsic principle of action is always less blamable, while the intellect is such a principle. So then it is like the comparison between injustice as such and the unjust man. The fact is that each is worse in some sense; certainly the evil man can do ten thousand times more evil than a dumb animal.
Quoniam autem est minus turpis et cetera. Postquam philosophus ostendit quomodo est diversimode incontinentia circa diversa, hic comparat diversas incontinentias adinvicem. Et primo incontinentiam concupiscentiarum tactus, quae est incontinentia simpliciter, ad incontinentiam irae, quae est incontinentia secundum quid. Secundo comparat incontinentiam humanam ad incontinentiam bestialem vel aegritudinalem, ibi, ipsarum autem harum et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo proponit quod intendit. Et dicit considerandum esse quod incontinentia irae est minus turpis quam incontinentia concupiscentiarum tactus, circa quas est temperantia et intemperantia. 1385. After the Philosopher has shown how incontinence has to do with different pleasures in different ways, he now compares different kinds of incontinence with each other. First [2, a] he compares incontinence in the pleasures of touch, which is complete incontinence, with incontinence in the matter of anger, which is incontinence only partially. Then [2, b], at “But we must take up etc.,” he compares human incontinence with brutish or pathological incontinence. He treats the first point in a twofold manner. First [a, i] he states his proposition, that we must consider that incontinence in the matter of anger is less disgraceful than incontinence in pleasures of touch, with which both temperance and intemperance deal.
Secundo ibi: videtur enim etc., probat propositum quatuor rationibus. Circa quarum primam dicit, quod ira videtur aliqualiter audire rationem, inquantum scilicet iratus quodammodo ratiocinatur quod propter iniuriam sibi factam debeat inferre vindictam, sed obaudit, idest imperfecte audit rationem, quia non curat attendere iudicium rationis circa quantitatem et modum vindictae. In animalibus autem carentibus ratione invenitur quidem ira, sicut et alia opera rationi similia, ex naturali instinctu. 1386. Next [a, ii], at “Anger seems,” he proves his proposition by four arguments. In the first [ii, w] he says that anger listens somewhat to reason, inasmuch as the angry man reasons in some measure that he ought to inflict punishment for injury done to him. But he hears poorly, i.e., he listens imperfectly to reason because he is not careful to heed the judgment of reason about the amount and the mode of punishment. Among animals, who lack reason, we find anger—as also other activities similar to reason—according to natural instinct.
Inducit autem ad manifestationem propositi duo exempla. Quorum primum est de ministris qui sunt valde veloces, qui ante quam audiant totum quod eis dicitur currunt ad exequendum, et sic sequitur quod peccent in executione mandati quod non perfecte audierunt. Aliud exemplum est de canibus qui ad primum sonitum pulsantis ad ostium latrant antequam attendant si ille qui pulsat ad ostium sit aliquis de familiaribus vel amicis. Et ita est de ira: quod audit quidem in aliquo rationem; sed propter naturalem caliditatem et velocitatem cholerae commoventis ad iram, antequam audiat totum praeceptum rationis, movet ad puniendum. 1387. In clarification of his proposition he introduces two examples. The first is of servants who, because they are very precipitate, hasten to act before they hear all their instructions, and consequently make mistakes in executing the command which they did not fully understand. The other example is of dogs barking at the first sound of someone knocking at the door before they are aware whether the one knocking is family or friend. So in anger a man listens somewhat to reason but, because of the natural heat and swiftness of the bile inducing to anger, he proceeds to administer punishment before he hears the entire injunction of reason.
Quomodo autem hoc fiat, ostendit subdens: (ratio quidem enim etc.) Manifestatur enim homini quod sit sibi facta iniuria vel contemptus: quandoque quidem per rationem, sicut quando hoc verum est; quandoque autem per phantasiam, puta cum homini ita videtur licet non sit, homo autem iratus quasi syllogizat quod iniuriantem oportet impugnare, et determinat modum indebitum et sic statim irascitur movens ad vindictam antequam determinetur ei a ratione modus vindictae. Sed concupiscentia, statim quod denunciatur sibi delectabile per rationem vel per sensum, movet ad fruendum illud delectabile absque aliquo syllogismo rationis. 1388. Aristotle then, in addition, explains how this may happen. That a man has suffered injury or contempt is made known to him sometimes as a result of reason, as when this actually occurred, and other times as a result of imagination, as when the matter seems so to him, although it is not true. Then the man in anger apparently concludes he ought to attack the one who injured him and, taking an improper mode of vengeance, immediately bestirs himself in anger to inflict punishment before reason decides for him the mode of punishment. On the other hand sensual desire, as soon as something is declared delightful to it by reason or sense, moves to enjoy that pleasure without any reasoning.
Et huius differentiae ratio est, quia delectabile habet rationem finis per se appetibilis, qui est sicut principium insyllogizatum: nocumentum autem alteri inferendum non est per se appetibile ut finis qui habet rationem principii, sed sicut utile ad finem quod habet rationem conclusionis in agibilibus. Et ideo concupiscentia non movet syllogizans, sed ira movet syllogizans. Sed inde est quod ira aliqualiter consequitur rationem, non autem concupiscentia quae sequitur solum impetum proprium. Per hoc autem est aliquid turpe in rebus humanis quod est praeter rationem. Sic igitur patet quod incontinens concupiscentiae est turpior quam incontinens irae; quia incontinens irae aliqualiter vincitur a ratione, non autem incontinens concupiscentiae. 1389. The reason for this difference is that the pleasing object has the nature of an end desirable in itself and is like a principle in reference to the conclusion. But damage to be inflicted on another is not desirable in itself as an end having the nature of a principle but as something useful to the end, and has the nature of a conclusion in things to be done. For this reason sensual desire does not move by reasoning but anger does. Consequently, anger follows reason in some measure but not sensual desire, which follows its own impetuosity. In this way something shameful, which is contrary to reason, results in human affairs. So then, obviously, the man incontinent in sensual desire is more disgraceful than the man incontinent in anger. The reason is that the man incontinent in anger is prevailed upon by reason to a degree, but not the sensually incontinent man.
Secundam rationem ponit ibi: adhuc naturalibus et cetera. Et dicit quod si aliquis peccat circa ea quae naturaliter appetit, magis meretur veniam. Et huius signum est, quia concupiscentiis communibus, puta cibi et potus, magis datur venia, quia sunt naturales, tamen si accipiantur inquantum sunt communes. Nam concupiscentia cibi est communis et naturalis, non autem concupiscentia cibi sic praeparati. Ira autem naturalior est et difficilius ei resistitur quam concupiscentiis, non quidem communibus, quae sunt necessariae et naturales circa quas non multum peccatur, sed illis concupiscentiis quibus quaedam superflua concupiscuntur, quae non sunt necessariae, circa quas supra in tertio dixit esse temperantiam et intemperantiam. 1390. At “Moreover, a man” [ii, x] he gives the second argument, saying that if a man sins in things which he naturally desires he is rather deserving of pardon. An indication of this is that tolerance is more readily extended toward the common appetites, for example, of food and drink—since they are natural—if they are taken precisely as common. The desire for food but not for delicate food is natural and common. But anger is more natural and mote difficult to resist than desires (not the common ones which are necessary and natural, and less frequently the matter of sin) but those desires that seek superfluous and unnecessary things-those which temperance and intemperance treat, as he has said in the third book (619-624).
Est quidem enim naturale homini ut sit animal mansuetum, secundum communem naturam speciei, inquantum est animal sociale: (omne enim animal gregale est naturaliter tale); sed secundum naturam alicuius individui, quod in corporis complexione consistit, quandoque consequitur magna pronitas ad iram propter caliditatem et subtilitatem humorum facile inflammabilium. Concupiscentia autem superfluorum, puta cibi delicate praeparati, magis consequitur imaginationem et est passio animalis magis quam naturalem complexionem sequens. 1391. To be a peaceful animal is natural to man from the common nature of the species inasmuch as he is a social animal (for every gregarious animal is naturally of this kind); but sometimes a strong tendency to anger results from an individual’s nature, which consists in the composition of the body, because of the heat and dryness of easily enkindled humors. The desire for superfluous objects, for example, dainty food, follows rather the imagination and is a conscious passion of the soul rather than a natural temperament.
Unde pronitas ad iram de facili propagatur a patre in filium, quasi consequens naturalem complexionem, ut patet in exemplo quod subdit. Quidam enim patrem percutiens reprehensus respondit quod iste, idest pater suus percusserat etiam patrem suum, et ille etiam percusserat superiorem patrem, et ostenso filio suo dixit, et iste etiam quando veniet ad virilem aetatem me percutiet. Hoc est enim connaturale generi nostro. Ponit etiam aliud exemplum de eo qui, cum traheretur a filio suo, iussit quod quiesceret quando pervenerit ad ostium, quia ipse usque ad illum locum traxerat patrem suum. Sic ergo quia ira naturalior est, minus est turpis incontinens irae. 1392. Hence the tendency to anger is easily propagated from father to son, following as a result of the natural temperament, as is evident in the examples he adds. A certain man reprimanded for striking his father answered that he himself had also struck his own father who had in turn struck his father. Then the man pointing to his son said, “This boy will strike me when he becomes a man; it is a family trait.” He gives another example of a man who, when he was dragged out of his home by his son, asked the son to stop when they got to the doorway because he himself had dragged his own father only that far. So then a person incontinent of anger is less disgraceful because anger is more natural.
Tertiam rationem ponit ibi, adhuc iniustiores et cetera. Et dicit quod illi qui magis ex insidiis peccant sunt iniustiores, quia cum hoc quod laedunt etiam decipiunt. Iracundus autem non agit tamquam insidiator, sed manifeste vult inferre vindictam: non enim esset contentus, nisi ille qui ab eo laeditur sciret se propterea esse laesum, quia eum offenderat), neque etiam ira insurgit latenter et insidiose, sed cum quodam impetu. Sed concupiscentia delectabilium insurgit latenter et quasi insidiose. Quia enim delectabile per se natum est movere appetitum, statim cum apprehensum fuerit trahit ad se appetitum nisi ratio fuerit diligens ad prohibendum. 1393. At “Again, double dealing” [ii, y] he gives the third argument, saying that those who sin deceitfully are more unjust because, together with the fact that they cause injury, they also deceive. However, the angry man does not act deceitfully but obviously wants to take vengeance, for he would not be satisfied unless the one punished should know besides that he is being punished because he had given offense to the avenger. Nor does anger flare up secretly or cunningly but impulsively. But the desire for pleasures arises in secret and insidiously, so to speak. Since the pleasurable object is designed by nature to move the appetite immediately on perception, it draws the appetite to itself unless reason takes pains to hinder this.
Unde quidam dicunt, de Venere loquentes: dolosae Ciprigenae; Venus enim fuit regina Cypri, unde dicitur Cyprigena quasi in Cypro genita. Et attribuunt ei aliquid quasi dolosae. Et eius corrigiam dicunt esse variam, per quam intelligitur concupiscentia quae mentes ligat. Et dicitur esse varia, quia tendit in aliquid quod apparet bonum, inquantum est delectabile, et tamen est simpliciter malum. Et Homerus dicit quod deceptio Veneris est furata intellectum spisse, idest multum sapientis, quia etiam interdum latenter subintrat concupiscentia corda eorum qui sunt multum sapientes et ligat iudicium rationis in eis in singulari. 1394. Hence people speak of the deceitful Cyprian maid, meaning Venus, for she was queen of Cyprus, and so was called a Cyprian as if born in Cyprus. They attribute to her something of the artful woman, saying her girdle is multicolored, by which we understand sensual desire binding reason; varicolored because it directs one’s course to something apparently good inasmuch as it is pleasurable but really evil. Likewise, Homer writes “ that the cunning, Venus craftily steals the wits of the very wise man, because she binds the judgment of the reason in particular practical matters.
Unde haec incontinentia quae est circa concupiscentias est iniustior et turpior illa quae est circa iram et, si hoc est verum, sequitur quod sit simpliciter (incontinentia) incontinentia quae est circa concupiscentias, ut supra dictum est; et quod sit aliqualiter malitia, inquantum est insidiosa; non quia ex ratione agat, sed quia latenter subintrat. 1395, Therefore, this incontinence concerning sensual desires is more unjust and disgraceful than incontinence concerning anger. If this is true, the incontinence dealing with sensual desires is incontinence in the unqualified sense, as was pointed out previously (1384); and it is a vice in some measure inasmuch as it is deceitful, not that it acts by calculation but that it enters by stealth.
Quartam rationem ponit ibi, adhuc nullus et cetera. Et dicit quod nullus cum tristitia agens iniuriatur. Ostensum est enim supra in quinto, quod ille qui involuntarie aliquid facit, per se loquendo non facit iniustum nisi per accidens, inquantum accidit id quod agit esse iniustum. Quod autem cum tristitia facimus, involuntarie facere videmur; omnis autem qui facit aliquid per iram, facit hoc contristatus non quia tristetur de vindicta quam infert, sed magis de ea gaudet; tristatur autem de iniuria sibi illata et ex hoc movetur ad iram: et sic non est simpliciter involuntarius, quia nullo modo sibi imputaretur quod facit, sed habet voluntarium mixtum cum involuntario, unde minus sibi imputatur quod facit, inquantum provocatus facit. Ille autem qui iniuriatur quasi per se iniustum faciens, operatur voluntarius et cum delectatione. Si ergo illa videntur esse iniustiora contra quae maxime iuste irascimur, sequitur quod incontinentia quae est propter concupiscentiam sit iniustior, quia contra eam iustius irascimur, utpote contra male agentem totaliter voluntarie et cum delectatione. In ira autem non est primo iniuria, sed magis in eo qui ad iram provocavit. Unde minus iuste irascimur contra iratum qui provocatus cum tristitia peccat et sic est minus iniustus. 1396. At “In addition, no one” [ii, z] he gives his fourth argument: no one inflicting an injury acts with sadness. It has been explained previously in the fifth book (1035-1036) that a man who acts involuntarily does not do something unjust absolutely speaking, but only incidentally, inasmuch as what he does happens to be unjust. But what we do with sadness we seem to do involuntarily. Now anyone who acts immediately from anger is sad, not that he grieves about the punishment he inflicted—he is rather glad about this—but he is sad and moved to anger by the injury he has received. So his act is not simply involuntary because (if it were) what he does would not be imputed to him in any way; but it has a mixture of the voluntary and the involuntary. Therefore, what he does is less imputed to him inasmuch as he acts under provocation. But the man who does something apparently unjust in itself, when inflicting an injury, operates voluntarily and with pleasure. If then those things seem to be more unjust against which we are justly very angry, it follows that incontinence arising from sensual desire is more unjust because we are more justly aroused against it, as against an evil agent acting with complete voluntariness and with pleasure. But injury is not primarily in the anger but rather in him who has given provocation for the anger. Therefore, we are less justly angry against the angry person who under provocation sins with sadness, and for this reason is less unjust.
Sic ergo epilogando concludit, manifestum esse quod incontinentia quae est circa concupiscentias est turpior ea quae est circa iram, et quod incontinentia et continentia simpliciter est circa concupiscentias et delectationes corporales 1397. Hence he summarizes in conclusion that, obviously, incontinence which concerns sensual desires is more disgraceful than that which concerns anger; that incontinence and continence in the unqualified sense deal with sensual desires and pleasures.
Deinde cum dicit: ipsarum autem harum etc., comparat incontinentiam humanam incontinentiae bestiali. Et circa hoc tria facit. Primo resumit differentiam concupiscentiarum et delectationum. Secundo ostendit circa quas harum sit temperantia et intemperantia, et per consequens continentia et incontinentia, ibi, harum autem circa primas etc.; tertio comparat humanam malitiam vel incontinentiam bestiali, ibi, minus autem bestialitas et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod quia continentia et incontinentia sunt circa delectationes corporales, oportet assumere earum differentias. Sunt enim quaedam earum, ut prius dictum est, humanae et naturales, id est consonae naturae humanae, et quantum ad genus, quod consideratur secundum ea quae appetuntur, et quantum ad magnitudinem quae attenditur secundum modum appetendi, vel intensum vel remissum. Aliae vero non sunt naturales, sed bestiales propter perniciosam naturam; vel adveniunt propter orbitates et aegritudines, inter quas computantur etiam pravae consuetudines. 1398. Then [2, b], at “But we must take up,” he compares human incontinence with brutish incontinence. He treats this point in a threefold manner. First [b, i] he takes up again different kinds of sensual desires and pleasures. Next [b, ii], at “Yet with only etc.,” he shows with which of these temperance and intemperance, and consequently continence and incontinence, are concerned. Last [b, iii], at “However, brutishness etc.,” he compares human with brutish vice or incontinence. He says first that, since continence and incontinence have to do with bodily pleasures we must take up their differences. Some of them, as we indicated previously (1368-1371), are human and natural, i.e., in keeping with human nature both in regard to the genus which is considered according to the things sought, and in regard to the amount which is considered according to the mode, intense or feeble, of seeking. Others are not natural but brutish because of a vicious nature, or they come about by reason of privations and sickness—among these are evil habits.
Deinde cum dicit: harum autem etc., ostendit circa quas harum concupiscentiarum sit temperantia. Et dicit quod temperantia et intemperantia est solum circa primas concupiscentias, scilicet humanas et naturales. Et inde est quod bestias non dicimus, proprie loquendo, neque temperatas, neque intemperatas, sed forte metaphorice loquendo de uno animali per comparationem ad aliud, prout scilicet unum genus animalium differt ab alio in contumelia, id est in hoc quod unum est magis contumeliosum, id est turpe et immundam habens vitam, quam aliud, sicut porcus quam ovis. Et sinamoria, idest omnimoda stultitia, in hoc scilicet quod unum est stultius alio, sicut asinus equo, et in hoc quod unum est vorax in omnibus, sicut lupus; 1399. Next [b, ii], at “Yet only with the first,” he shows with which of these temperance is concerned. He states temperance and intemperance have to do only with sensual desires which are human and natural. Hence, properly speaking, we do not call dumb animals either temperate or intemperate. But, figuratively speaking of one animal compared to another, we do say that one kind of animal differs from another (i) in defilement—one is more filthy in living a more vile and unclean life, for example, the pig than the sheep; (2) in sinamoria i.e., stupidity in general—one is more stupid than another, for instance, the ass than the horse; (3) in voraciousness—the wolf is most rapacious.
Unde per comparationem horum animalium quae superfluunt in talibus, alia genera animalium dicuntur secundum similitudinem temperata vel prudentia, non autem proprie, quia nullum eorum habet electionem neque potest ratiocinari, sed est separatum a natura rationali, sicut etiam homines insani (qui) amiserunt usum rationis. Dictum est autem supra, quod temperatus et intemperatus agit cum electione; et ideo temperantia et intemperantia non est in bestiis neque in bestialibus hominibus, neque etiam circa bestiales concupiscentias. 1400. Hence, by a comparison with these animals which are excessive in this way, other kinds of animals are called temperate or prudent by a kind of similitude but not in the proper sense because none of them has deliberate choice or can reason but is separated from rational nature. All insane persons who have lost the use of reason are like this. But we have said before (1361) that a temperate and an intemperate man act with deliberate choice; and so temperance and intemperance are not found in dumb animals nor in brutish men, nor are they concerned with brutish desires.
Deinde cum dicit: minus autem bestialitas etc., comparat bestialem malitiam vel incontinentiam humanae. Et dicit quod bestialitas minus habet de ratione malitiae si consideretur conditio bestiae vel hominis bestialis. Sed bestialitas est terribilior, quia facit maiora mala. Et quod minus habeat de malitia bestialitas, probat per hoc quod in bestia id quod est optimum, scilicet intellectus, non remanet, sicut corruptum et depravatum, prout remanet in homine malo; sed totaliter ita corruptum est quod nihil habet de illo. 1401. At “However, brutishness” [b, iii] he compares brutish with human vice or incontinence, saying that brutishness has less of evil in it considering the condition of a beast (or of a bestial person). But brutishness is more frightening because it does worse things. He proves that brutishness is less evil by the fact that the highest part, i.e., the intellect, is not corrupt and depraved in-the animal, as in an evil man, but entirely lacking.
Unde simile est comparare bestiam homini malo utrum sit peius sicut comparare inanimatum animato. Inanimata quidem possunt plus laedere, sicut cum ignis urit, aut lapis conterit, sed plus recedit a ratione culpae. Semper enim pravitas eius qui non habet principium actionum est innocentior, quia minus potest ei imputari aliquid ad culpam, quae propter hoc homini imputatur, quia habet principium per quod est dominus suorum actuum: quod quidem principium est intellectus qui in bestiis non est. Sicut ergo comparatur bestia ad hominem, ita comparatur iniustitia ad hominem iniustum. 1402. Therefore, to compare a beast with a bad man to discover which is worse, is like comparing a non-living creature with a living one. Non-living creatures, like fire that burns or rock that crushes, do more damage but are farther from the notion of fault. Badness in a thing without an inner principle of its actions is always less blamable since less fault can be attributed to it—badness in man is imputable because he has a principle making him master of his own actions. This principle is the intellect that the brutes lack. Therefore a beast is compared to a man as injustice to an unjust man.
Nam habitus iniustitiae secundum propriam naturam habet inclinationem ad malum; sed homo iniustus habet in sua potestate in bonum vel malum inclinari. Est enim quodammodo utrumque peius, scilicet et iniustus quam iniustitia et homo malus quam bestia, quia unus homo malus decies millies potest plura mala facere quam bestia, propter rationem quam habet ad excogitandum diversa mala. Sic ergo sicut bestia minus habet de culpa quam homo malus sed est terribilior, ita etiam bestialis malitia seu incontinentia terribilior quidem est, sed minoris culpae et innocentior quam incontinentia seu malitia humana. Unde si aliqui amentes vel naturaliter bestiales peccent, minus puniuntur. 1403. For the habit of injustice by its very nature has an inclination to evil, but the unjust man retains the power to be good or bad. Each is worse in a measure, i.e., the unjust man is worse than injustice and the evil man worse than a brute because an evil man can do ten thousand times more harm than a beast by his reason which he can use to devise very diverse evils. Therefore, as a dumb animal is less guilty than an evil man but is more to be dreaded, so also brutish vice or even incontinence is more to be dreaded but is less culpable and more blameless than human incontinence or vice. Consequently people who are insane or naturally bestial are less severely punished.

Continence and Perseverance
Chapter 7
      A.  How incontinence differs from other habits.
                   a.   He distinguishes continence... from perseverance.
                         i.    He shows the agreement. — 1404-1405
περὶ δὲ τὰς δι' ἁφῆς καὶ γεύσεως ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας καὶ ἐπιθυμίας καὶ φυγάς, περὶ ἃς ἥ τε ἀκολασία καὶ ἡ σωφροσύνη διωρίσθη πρότερον, ἔστι μὲν οὕτως ἔχειν ὥστε ἡττᾶσθαι καὶ ὧν οἱ πολλοὶ κρείττους, ἔστι δὲ κρατεῖν καὶ ὧν οἱ πολλοὶ ἥττους· Continence and incontinence deal with pleasures and pains, with desires and aversions—things pertaining to touch and taste about which temperance and intemperance are concerned, as determined previously. In regard to these passions some people act in such a way that they are overcome by the passions that most men master; others overcome the passions against which most men are rather weak.
                         ii.   He shows the difference. — 1406-1407
τούτων δ' ὁ μὲν περὶ ἡδονὰς ἀκρατὴς ὃ δ' ἐγκρατής, ὁ δὲ περὶ λύπας μαλακὸς ὃ δὲ καρτερικός. μεταξὺ δ' ἡ τῶν πλείστων ἕξις, κἂν εἰ ῥέπουσι μᾶλλον πρὸς τὰς χείρους. Of those who contend with pleasures one is incontinent, and another is continent; of those who contend with sorrows one is called effeminate and another persevering. In between are the habits of most men who, however, are more inclined to the worse habits.
                   b.   He distinguishes... (continence and incontinence) from temperance and intemperance. — 1408-1411
[Some of the following in Greek original is in different order.]
παντὶ δ' ἂν δόξειε χείρων εἶναι, εἴ τις μὴ ἐπιθυμῶν ἢ ἠρέμα πράττοι τι αἰσχρόν, ἢ εἰ σφόδρα ἐπιθυμῶν, καὶ εἰ μὴ ὀργιζόμενος τύπτοι ἢ εἰ ὀργιζόμενος· τί γὰρ ἂν ἐποίει ἐν πάθει ὤν; διὸ ὁ ἀκόλαστος χείρων τοῦ ἀκρατοῦς. τῶν δὴ λεχθέντων τὸ μὲν μαλακίας εἶδος μᾶλλον, ὃ δ' ἀκόλαστος. Generally speaking, someone doing a shameful act without any passion at all, or with only mild passion, is worse than another who sins with violent passion. Likewise he who strikes another in cold blood is worse than one acting in anger. What would a man who sins without passion do under the influence of passion? For this reason the intemperate is worse than the incontinent person. In the latter there is rather a kind of effeminacy, while the intemperate man is opposed to the temperate.
                   b.   He compares the incontinent man with the effeminate (and the persevering with the continent).
                         i.    He shows which is better. — 1413
ἐπεὶ δ' ἔνιαι τῶν ἡδονῶν ἀναγκαῖαί εἰσιν αἳ δ' οὔ, καὶ μέχρι τινός, αἱ δ' ὑπερβολαὶ οὔ, οὐδ' αἱ ἐλλείψεις, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ ἐπιθυμίας ἔχει καὶ λύπας, ὁ μὲν τὰς ὑπερβολὰς διώκων τῶν ἡδέων ἢ καθ' ὑπερβολὰς ἢ διὰ προαίρεσιν, δι' αὐτὰς καὶ μηδὲν δι' ἕτερον ἀποβαῖνον, ἀκόλαστος· ἀνάγκη γὰρ τοῦτον μὴ εἶναι μεταμελητικόν, ὥστ' ἀνίατος· ὁ γὰρ ἀμεταμέλητος ἀνίατος. ὁ δ' ἐλλείπων ὁ ἀντικείμενος, ὁ δὲ μέσος σώφρων. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ὁ φεύγων τὰς σωματικὰς λύπας μὴ δι' ἧτταν ἀλλὰ διὰ προαίρεσιν. τῶν δὲ μὴ προαιρουμένων ὃ μὲν ἄγεται διὰ τὴν ἡδονήν, ὃ δὲ διὰ τὸ φεύγειν τὴν λύπην τὴν ἀπὸ τῆς ἐπιθυμίας, ὥστε διαφέρουσιν ἀλλήλων. But some pleasures are necessary, others not necessary; some are necessary up to a point, while excesses and defects are not at all necessary. So it is in the matter of desires and pains. Hence a man is called intemperate who pursues excesses in pleasures by desiring them beyond measure or by deliberately choosing them for their own sake and not for the sake of something else. Since such a one is not sorry for his actions he cannot be cured. But the man who is deficient in things of this nature is the very opposite (i.e., insensible). And he who follows a middle course is temperate. Similarly, someone may shun bodily pains not because he is overcome but because he deliberately chooses. Of those who yield but not from deliberate choice, one is drawn by the force of pleasure and another by aversion from the pain of unsatisfied desire. Therefore these persons differ one from the other.
                   a.   He compares the incontinent and effeminate man with the intemperate. — 1412
ἀντίκειται δὲ τῷ μὲν ἀκρατεῖ ὁ ἐγκρατής, τῷ δὲ μαλακῷ ὁ καρτερικός· τὸ μὲν γὰρ καρτερεῖν ἐστὶν ἐν τῷ ἀντέχειν, ἡ δ' ἐγκράτεια ἐν τῷ κρατεῖν, ἕτερον δὲ τὸ ἀντέχειν καὶ κρατεῖν, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ μὴ ἡττᾶσθαι τοῦ νικᾶν· διὸ καὶ αἱρετώτερον ἐγκράτεια καρτερίας ἐστίν. The continent man is set opposite the incontinent, and the persevering man is opposite the effeminate. In fact, one is said to be persevering in this that he holds fast, while continence consists in conquering. But holding fast differs from conquering, as not being conquered differs from conquering. For this reason continence is more desirable than perseverance.
                         ii.   He explains a likeness previously mentioned. — 1414-1416
ὁ δ' ἐλλείπων πρὸς ἃ οἱ πολλοὶ καὶ ἀντιτείνουσι καὶ δύνανται, οὗτος μαλακὸς καὶ τρυφῶν· καὶ γὰρ ἡ τρυφὴ μαλακία τίς ἐστιν· ὃς ἕλκει τὸ ἱμάτιον, ἵνα μὴ πονήσῃ τὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ αἴρειν λύπην, καὶ μιμούμενος τὸν κάμνοντα οὐκ οἴεται ἄθλιος εἶναι, ἀθλίῳ ὅμοιος ὤν. ὁμοίως δ' ἔχει καὶ περὶ ἐγκράτειαν καὶ ἀκρασίαν. οὐ γὰρ εἴ τις ἰσχυρῶν καὶ ὑπερβαλλουσῶν ἡδονῶν ἡττᾶται ἢ λυπῶν, θαυμαστόν, ἀλλὰ συγγνωμονικὸν εἰ ἀντιτείνων, ὥσπερ ὁ Θεοδέκτου Φιλοκτήτης ὑπὸ τοῦ ἔχεως πεπληγμένος ἢ ὁ Καρκίνου ἐν τῇ Ἀλόπῃ Κερκύων, καὶ ὥσπερ οἱ κατέχειν πειρώμενοι τὸν γέλωτα ἀθρόον ἐκκαγχάζουσιν, οἷον συνέπεσε Ξενοφάντῳ· ἀλλ' εἴ τις πρὸς ἃς οἱ πολλοὶ δύνανται ἀντέχειν, τούτων ἡττᾶται καὶ μὴ δύναται ἀντιτείνειν, μὴ διὰ φύσιν τοῦ γένους ἢ διὰ νόσον, οἷον ἐν τοῖς Σκυθῶν βασιλεῦσιν ἡ μαλακία διὰ τὸ γένος, καὶ ὡς τὸ θῆλυ πρὸς τὸ ἄρρεν διέστηκεν. The man, however, who fails in resisting those pleasures which most people successfully resist is called effeminate and delicate. Indeed delicacy is a kind of effeminacy. Such is the man who trails his clothing to avoid the wearisome trouble of lifting it and imitates an invalid, not considering himself wretched in resembling a person who is. Likewise this applies to continence and incontinence, for it is not surprising for somebody to be overcome by the more intense and more extreme pleasures or pains; rather his action is excusable if he resists as Philoctetes did, in the play of Theodectus, when bitten by a snake, and Carcinus Cercyon in the Alope. The same can be said of those who try to keep from laughing but suddenly burst out like Xenophantus did. But a person is called incontinent and effeminate if he succumbs to those pleasures and pains which most people overcome, being unable to resist not because of a disposition of his nature (but because of a sickness of soul) as for instance, effeminacy among the Scythian kings. The same goes for women who in this differ from the masculine sex.
                         iii. He refutes an error. — 1417
δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ ὁ παιδιώδης ἀκόλαστος εἶναι, ἔστι δὲ μαλακός. ἡ γὰρ παιδιὰ ἄνεσίς ἐστιν, εἴπερ ἀνάπαυσις· τῶν δὲ πρὸς ταύτην ὑπερβαλλόντων ὁ παιδιώδης ἐστίν. Although it might seem that one fond of amusement is intemperate, he is really effeminate because play is relaxation and rest, which the lover of amusement seeks excessively.
      B.  He distinguishes the different species of incontinence.
            1.   HE GIVES THE DIVISION. — 1418
ἀκρασίας δὲ τὸ μὲν προπέτεια τὸ δ' ἀσθένεια. One kind of incontinence is impetuosity and the other, weakness.
            2. HE EXPLAINS THE MEMBERS OF THE DIVISION. — 1419-1420
οἳ μὲν γὰρ βουλευσάμενοι οὐκ ἐμμένουσιν οἷς ἐβουλεύσαντο διὰ τὸ πάθος, οἳ δὲ διὰ τὸ μὴ βουλεύσασθαι ἄγονται ὑπὸ τοῦ πάθους· ἔνιοι γάρ, ὥσπερ προγαργαλίσαντες οὐ γαργαλίζονται, οὕτω καὶ προαισθόμενοι καὶ προϊδόντες καὶ προεγείραντες ἑαυτοὺς καὶ τὸν λογισμὸν οὐχ ἡττῶνται ὑπὸ τοῦ πάθους, οὔτ' ἂν ἡδὺ ᾖ οὔτ' ἂν λυπηρόν. Some incontinent persons after taking counsel do not abide by the advice they received, because of passion. Others do not take counsel and as a result succumb to passion. Still others are like people who excite themselves but are not stirred up by others. This is the way with those who, experiencing the movement of passion beforehand and arousing themselves and their reasoning powers in advance, are not overwhelmed either by the passion of pleasure or of pain.
μάλιστα δ' οἱ ὀξεῖς καὶ μελαγχολικοὶ τὴν προπετῆ ἀκρασίαν εἰσὶν ἀκρατεῖς· οἳ μὲν γὰρ διὰ τὴν ταχυτῆτα οἳ δὲ διὰ τὴν σφοδρότητα οὐκ ἀναμένουσι τὸν λόγον, διὰ τὸ ἀκολουθητικοὶ εἶναι τῇ φαντασίᾳ. It is especially the choleric and the depressed who are victims of unbridled incontinence. Neither of these awaits reason’s decision but follows the imagination, the former by the quickness of their reaction and the latter by the vehemence of their passions.
Circa eas autem quae per tactum et cetera. Postquam philosophus ostendit quae sit materia circa quam est continentia et incontinentia simpliciter dicta; hic comparat ea ad alia quae communicant eis in materia. Et circa hoc duo facit. Primo ostendit differentiam continentis et incontinentis ad perseverativum et mollem et temperatum et intemperatum: in quo solvitur tertia dubitatio quae proponebatur contra quartum probabile. Secundo ostendit quis sit peior, utrum incontinens vel intemperatus: per quod solvitur quinta dubitatio quae proponebatur contra primum probabile, et hoc, ibi, est autem intemperatus et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo ostendit differentiam incontinentiae ad alia. Secundo distinguit diversas incontinentiae species, ibi, incontinentiae autem et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo distinguit continentiam et incontinentiam a temperantia et intemperantia, a perseverantia et mollitie. Secundo comparat ea secundum bonitatem et malitiam, ibi: omni autem utique videbitur et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo distinguit continentiam et incontinentiam a perseverantia et mollitie. Secundo distinguit utramque a temperantia et intemperantia, ibi, quia autem quaedam et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo ponit convenientiam. Secundo differentiam, ibi, horum autem hic quidem et cetera. Circa primum designat duas convenientias. 1404. After the Philosopher has shown the nature of the matter about which continence and incontinence in the unqualified sense are concerned, he now compares them to other habits that share the same matter. He discusses this point in a twofold manner. First [I] he shows how the continent and incontinent man differ from the persevering and the effeminate man, from and the temperate and the intemperate man. Here he solves the third difficulty that was raised against the fourth probable statement (1321-1324). Next [Lect. 8; II], at “But the intemperate man etc.” (B. 1150 b 29), he shows who is worse, the incontinent or the intemperate man, and by this he solves the fifth difficulty which was raised against the first probable statement. He treats the initial point under two aspects. First [I, A] he shows how incontinence differs from other habits. Then [I, B], at “One kind of incontinence etc.,” he distinguishes the different species of incontinence. He considers the first point in two ways. First [A, 1] he distinguishes continence and incontinence from temperance and intemperance, from perseverance and effeminacy. Next [A, 2], it “Generally speaking,” he compares these according to goodness and badness. He handles the first point in a twofold fashion. First [1, a] he distinguishes continence and incontinence from perseverance and effeminacy. Second [1, b], at “But some pleasures,” he distinguishes both (incontinence and continence) from temperance and intemperance. He discusses the first point from a double aspect. First [a, i] he shows the agreement; and then, at “Of these who etc.” [a, ii] he shows the difference. On the first he notes two points of agreement.
Quarum prima est secundum materiam, in qua etiam cum temperantia communicant. Sunt enim circa delectationes et tristitias, et concupiscentias et fugas quae pertinent ad actum et gustum, circa quas etiam est temperantia et intemperantia, ut supra determinatum est in tertio. Secunda convenientia est quantum ad modum se habendi circa passiones. Contingit enim quosdam sic se habere circa praedictas passiones ut vincantur a talibus passionibus quibus multi sunt meliores, idest fortiores; quasi dicat, quas multi vincunt. Contingit etiam quod aliqui superent tales passiones quibus multi sunt minores, idest debiliores; quasi dicat, a quibus multi superantur. 1405. The first is according to the matter which continence and incontinence share with temperance. They deal with pleasures and pains, with desires and aversions—things pertaining to touch and taste about which temperance and intemperance are also concerned, as determined previously in the third book (339, 342, 616, 618, 651). The second point of agreement touches the manner of conducting oneself in regard to the passions. Some people act in such a way that they are overcome by passions in which most men are better disciplined or strong, that is to say, which they overcome; still others conquer those passions in which most men are less disciplined or weaker, that is to say, by which the majority are conquered.
Deinde cum dicit horum autem etc., ponit differentiam. Et dicit quod horum qui superant et superantur circa delectationes et tristitias praedictas, circa delectationes (hic) quidem, scilicet superatus a delectationibus tactus quas multi superant, est incontinens, hic autem, scilicet superans delectationes tactus a quibus multi superantur, est continens. Sed circa tristitias contrarias, hic scilicet superatus ab his quas multi superant, dicitur mollis. Hic autem scilicet superans eas, a quibus multi superantur, dicitur perseverans. 1406. Next [a, ii], at “Of those who,” he explains the difference. Men win and lose, he says, in contending with these pleasures and pains; and he who is overcome by those pleasures of touch where most people are victorious is called incontinent, but he who overcomes the pleasures of touch in which most people are overcome is called continent. In connection with the opposite pains, one overwhelmed by those which the majority endure is called effeminate, while another who triumphs over those to which many men succumb is called persevering.
Et quia diversi sunt gradus delectationum et tristitiarum et hominum qui eas superant et ab eis superantur, manifestum est quod praedicti habitus possunt esse inter plura medii. Sed tamen illi qui sonant in malum magis declinant ad deteriores. Magis enim dicuntur incontinentes vel molles qui a minoribus delectationibus et tristitiis vincuntur; sicut et boni habitus magis declinant ad meliores. Magis enim dicuntur continentes et perseverantes qui maiores delectationes et tristitias superant. Potest etiam intelligi quod homines magis inclinentur ad deteriores habitus, scilicet ad incontinentiam et mollitiem. 1407. Because there are different degrees of pleasures and pains, and so of men who control and are controlled by them, it is evident that these habits can be for the most part “in-between.” However, those habits signifying evil incline more easily to the lower pleasures, for people are said to be more incontinent and effeminate who are overcome by minor pleasures or pains; just as good habits incline more to the higher pleasures, for they are called more continent and persevering who master the greater pleasures and pains. Likewise it can be understood that men may be inclined toward the worse habits, viz., incontinence and effeminacy.
Deinde cum dicit: quia autem quaedam etc., ostendit differentiam praedictorum ad temperantiam et intemperantiam. Et dicit quod delectationum gustus et tactus quaedam sunt necessariae, sicut cibi et potus. Quaedam non necessariae, sicut diversorum condimentorum, et illae quae sunt necessariae, sunt usque ad aliquem terminum necessariae (est enim aliqua mensura cibi et potus homini necessarii), sed neque superabundantiae sunt necessariae neque etiam defectus; et similiter se habet circa concupiscentias et tristitias. 1408. Then [1, b], at “But some” he shows how these habits differ from temperance. He says some pleasures of taste and touch, for example, of food and drink, are necessary; other pleasures like different seasonings are unnecessary. Those necessary are so up to a certain point, for there is a quantity of food and drink necessary for man. But excesses (of pleasures) are unnecessary and so are deficiencies. The same is true for desires and pains.
Ille ergo intemperatus dicitur qui persequitur ex proposito superabundantias delectationum praedictorum; vel, etiam si non quaerat superabundantes delectationes, quaerit tamen eas secundum superabundantias, id est superabundanter concupiscendo eas; vel etiam quaerit eas ex electione propter ipsas et non propter aliquid aliud; habet enim eas quasi finem. Et quia ei immobiliter homo inhaeret, quod propter se ex proposito quaerit, necesse est quod intemperatus non poeniteat de delectationibus quas quaesivit: et ideo non potest sanari a suo vitio, a quo nullus sanatur nisi per displicentiam, quia virtus et vitium in voluntate est. Et sicut intemperatus superabundat in quaerendo delectationes, ita insensibilis qui ei est oppositus, deficit in huiusmodi, ut in tertio dictum est. Ille autem qui medio modo se habet circa huiusmodi, est temperatus. Et sicut intemperatus quaerit ex electione corporales delectationes, ita fugit corporales tristitias; non propter hoc quod vincatur ab eis, sed propter electionem. 1409. Therefore, someone who intentionally pursues excesses immoderately, i.e., in desiring them above measure, or even seeks them by deliberate choice for their own sake and not for the sake of something else, considering them as an end, is called intemperate. Because a man cleaves immovably to that which he intentionally seeks for itself, the intemperate man is necessarily not sorry about pleasures he has sought. Consequently his vice is incurable, for no one is cured except by being displeased since virtue and vice are in the will. As the intemperate man abounds in his quest for pleasures, so the insensible man—his counterpart—is deficient in the same affairs, as noted in the third book (630-631). But one following a middle course in these matters is temperate. And as the intemperate person seeks bodily pleasures by deliberate choice, so he shuns bodily pain, not by being overcome by them but out of deliberate choice.
Sed eorum qui non ex electione peccant, hic quidem, scilicet incontinens, ducitur ex vi delectationis: hic autem, scilicet mollis, ducitur ex horrore tristitiae quae sequitur a concupiscentia, inquantum scilicet privatur quis re concupita; unde patet quod differunt abinvicem incontinens et mollis et intemperatus. 1410. Still, of those who do not sin from deliberate choice, one, viz., the incontinent is drawn by the pleasure’s power, another—the “soft”—is conquered by dread of pain following the desire, i.e., the deprivation of the thing desired. Hence it is clear that the incontinent, the effeminate, and the intemperate man are each different.
Est autem hic advertendum quod supra, philosophus determinans materiam continentiae et incontinentiae, ne error subreperet, ex incidenti tetigit differentiam intemperati et incontinentis quam hic ex principali intentione prosequitur. 1411. We should note here that previously (1361-1362), in determining the matter of continence and incontinence—lest error creep in—the Philosopher incidentally touched on the difference between the intemperate and the incontinent man-a matter he now makes his prime concern.
Deinde cum dicit: omni autem etc., comparat praedicta secundum bonitatem et malitiam. Et primo comparat incontinentem et mollem intemperato. Secundo incontinentem molli, ibi, opponitur autem et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod omnino videtur esse deterior si quis operatur aliquid turpe omnino non concupiscens, vel quiete, idest remisse concupiscens, quam si vehementer concupiscens turpe operetur: sicut etiam deterior est, si quis non iratus percutit, quam si iratus percutiat. Quid enim faceret passione superveniente qui absque passione peccat? Et inde est quod intemperatus qui non vincitur passione sed ex electione peccat, est deterior incontinente qui concupiscentia vincitur. Et similiter horum duorum unum magis pertinet ad speciem mollitiei, scilicet vinci passione, scilicet fuga tristitiae; aliud autem pertinet ad intemperatum, scilicet ex electione peccare. Unde etiam deterior est intemperatus quam mollis. 1412. At “Generally speaking” [A, 2] he compares these habits according to goodness and evil. First [2, a] he compares the incontinent and the effeminate man with the intemperate. Next [2, b], at “The continent man etc.,” he compares the incontinent man with the effeminate. He says first that, generally speaking, one who does something shameful without any passion at all, or under the influence of what is only ineffectual or mild passion, is worse than one doing something shameful with violent passion. Likewise striking another in cold blood is worse than striking in anger. What might a man sinning without passion do if he was passionate? Consequently the intemperate man, not overcome by passion but sinning by deliberate choice, is worse than the incontinent man who is mastered by passion. Likewise one of these two conditions, being mastered by passion in running away from pain belongs rather to a kind of effeminacy, while the other, sinning by deliberate choice belongs to intemperance. Hence the intemperate person is worse than the “softy.”
Deinde cum dicit opponitur autem etc., comparat mollem incontinenti et perseverantem continenti. Et circa hoc tria facit: primo ostendit quis eorum sit melior. Secundo manifestat quamdam convenientiam supra positam, ibi, deficiens autem et cetera. Tertio excludit quemdam errorem, ibi: videtur autem et lusivus et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod incontinenti opponitur continens, et molli opponitur perseverativus. Perseverare autem dicitur aliquis ex eo quod tenet se contra aliquid impellens, sed continentia dicitur ex eo quod est superare. Illud enim quod continemus, in nostra potestate habemus. Et hoc necessarium est: quia delectationes sunt refrenandae vel cohibendae, contra tristitias autem est standum: unde perseverans ad continentem comparatur, sicut non vinci ad id quod est vincere: quod est manifeste melius. Unde melior est continentia quam perseverantia. Mollities autem videtur peior quam incontinentia; quia utraque consistit in hoc quod est vinci; sed incontinens vincitur a fortiori passione. 1413. Next [2, b], at “The continent man,” he compares the “soft” man to the incontinent, and the persevering man to the continent. He considers these points in three ways. First [b, i] he shows which is better. Then [b, ii], at “The man, however, etc.,” he explains a likeness previously mentioned. Last [b, iii], at “Although it might seem etc.,” he refutes an error. He says first that the continent man is contrasted with the incontinent, and the persevering man is contrasted with the effeminate. One is called persevering in this that he maintains his ground when another urges him to the contrary. But continence is designated from this that it conquers, for what we contain (continemus) we have in our power. It is necessary that we should stand firm against pain because pleasure must be bridled or kept in check. Hence the persevering man is compared to the continent man as the unconquered is compared to the conqueror who is obviously more perfect. Consequently continence is more perfect than perseverance. Effeminacy, however, seems worse than incontinence: each consists in defeat but the incontinent person is beaten by a stronger passion.
Deinde cum dicit: deficiens autem etc., manifestat convenientiam quamdam quam supra tetigit inter mollem et incontinentem; quod scilicet vincuntur a passionibus quas multi superant. Et dicit, quod ille dicitur mollis et delicatus qui deficit in his contra quae multi et contratendunt, resistendo, et possunt, vincendo. Ideo autem mollis et delicatus in idem ponuntur. Delitia enim est quaedam species mollitiei. Mollities enim refugit inordinate omnem tristitiam, sed delitia proprie refugit tristitiam laboris. Ille enim qui trahit vestimentum suum per lutum, ut non laboret se subcingendo, quod pertinet ad delicatum, vincitur secundum illam tristitiam quam reputat sibi imminere si levaret vestimenta. Et licet imitetur laborantem in hoc quod vestimenta trahit, et per hoc videtur non esse miser, tamen habet similitudinem cum misero inquantum fugiens laborem sustinet laborem. 1414. Then [b, ii], at “The man, however,” he makes clear a likeness mentioned previously (1413), between the effeminate and the incontinent person, both are beaten by passions that many other people master. He says that the man failing in these pleasures against which even the majority fight to resist and can overcome is called effeminate and delicate. The effeminate and the delicate belong in the same class, for delicacy is a kind of effeminacy. Effeminacy inordinately shuns all weariness but delicacy in the strict sense shuns the weariness of toil. An individual, who trails his clothing after him on the ground to avoid the labor of carrying it—which pertains to delicacy, is overcome by that weariness which he thinks is at hand from tucking up his clothes. Although he acts like an invalid in dragging his clothes, and in this he seems not to be wretched; nevertheless he resembles a wretched person inasmuch as he shuns fatigue only to meet it.
Et sicut dictum est de mollitie, ita etiam se habet circa continentiam et incontinentiam. Non enim est admirabile, si quis vincitur a fortibus et superexcellentibus delectationibus et tristitiis, ut propter hoc debeat dici incontinens vel mollis, sed magis ei condonatur, si tamen nitatur resistere et non statim cedat. Et ponit exemplum de Philotethe: de quo Theodoctus poeta narrat quod percussus a vipera gravem dolorem passus nitebatur continere planctum, sed non potuit. Et simile est de quadam muliere, quae vocabatur Malopes, percussa a quodam nomine Carcino; et sicut etiam accidit illis qui tentant se continere a risu, et tamen supervincuntur ut repente effuse rideant, sicut accidit Senophanto. 1415. What was said about effeminacy holds true for continence and incontinence. It is not surprising if a person is overcome by the more intense and more extreme pleasures and pains, so that he ought (not) to be called incontinent or effeminate for this reason. Rather he should be pardoned if he attempts to resist and does not yield at once. Aristotle gives the example of Philoctetes who, Theodectus the poet narrates, when bitten by a snake and suffering great pain tried to contain his anguish but could not. Something like this is told about a woman named Melopes who was struck by a man called Carcinus. So also it happens to those who try to keep from laughing, yet are not successful and suddenly burst out, as did Xenophantus.
Sed tunc dicitur aliquis incontinens et mollis si quis vincitur a talibus tristitiis et delectationibus contra quas multi possunt, si tamen hoc quod non potest resistere huiusmodi passionibus non sit propter naturam generis ex qua posset ei esse grave quod aliis esset leve, sed propter aegritudinem, scilicet animi, quae provenit ex mala consuetudine; sicut mollities propter naturam generis invenitur in regibus Scytharum qui delicate nutriti non possunt labores et tristitias ferre, et sicut etiam est de feminis per comparationem ad masculos propter infirmitatem naturae. 1416. But a man is then called incontinent and effeminate when he succumbs to such pains and pleasures as most people can overcome. Yet his inability to resist passions of this sort does not arise from his type of nature-by reason of which a thing serious for him would be slight for others-but from a debility of mind caused by evil habit. Thus effeminacy from an innate tendency is found in the kings of Scythia who cannot bear labors and pains because of their delicate rearing. The same thing is true of women in comparison with men by the weakness of their nature.
Deinde cum dicit: videtur autem et lusivus etc., excludit quemdam errorem. Posset enim alicui videri quod lusivus, idest qui nimis amat ludere, sit intemperatus, quia in ludo est quaedam delectatio. Sed ipse dicit quod magis est mollis. Ludus enim est quaedam quies et remissio animi quam superabundanter quaerit lusivus. Unde continetur sub molli, cuius est fugere difficultates et labores. 1417. At “Although it might seem” [b, iii] he refutes an error. It seems possible that the playful type, i.e., one too much in love with amusement is intemperate because there is a kind of pleasure in amusement, but the Philosopher says that such a person more properly is effeminate. Amusement is a quieting and relaxation of the mind, which the lover of amusement seeks to an excessive degree. Hence he comes in the classification of effeminate, whose characteristic is to shun difficulties and labors.
Deinde cum dicit incontinentiae autem etc., distinguit species incontinentiae. Et circa hoc tria facit. Primo ponit divisionem. Et dicit quod incontinentia dividitur in duo, quorum unum est praevolatio et aliud est debilitas. 1418. Next [I, B], at “One kind of incontinence,” he distinguishes the species of incontinence. He treats this point under three headings. First [B, 1] he gives the division, saying that incontinence has a twofold division: impetuosity and weakness.
Secundo ibi: hi quidem enim etc., exponit membra divisionis. Et dicit quod quidam incontinentes sunt qui superveniente concupiscentia consiliantur quidem, sed non permanent in his quae consiliati sunt, propter passionem a qua vincuntur. Et talis incontinentia dicitur debilitas. Quidam vero ducuntur a passione propter hoc quod non consiliantur, sed statim concupiscentia superveniente eam sequuntur. Et haec incontinentia dicitur praevolatio, propter sui velocitatem qua anticipat consilium. Si autem consiliarentur, non ducerentur a passione. 1419. Then [B, 2], at “Some incontinent,” he explains the members of the division. He says that some incontinent people do deliberate when passion arises, but they do not abide by the results of deliberation because of the passion which overcomes them. Incontinence of this kind is called weakness. Other incontinent persons are led by passion because they do not deliberate but when passion arises they follow it immediately. This incontinence is called impetuosity because of its quickness which forestalls deliberation. However, if they had deliberated they would not have been led astray by passion.
Sicut enim quidam qui prius titillant seipsos, postea non moventur cum ab aliis titillantur. Sic et illi qui praesentiunt motum concupiscentiae et praesciunt quid est illud in quo concupiscentia inclinat et praesuscitantes, idest provocantes seipsos et ratiocinationem suam ad resistendum concupiscentiae, ex hoc consequuntur quod non vincantur a passione; neque delectationis a qua vincitur incontinens, neque tristitiae a qua vincitur mollis. 1420. Still others excite themselves in advance and afterwards are not moved when excited by others. This is the way also with those who, feeling the movement of passion beforehand and having previous knowledge of that to which passion inclines, arouse themselves in advance, i.e., provoke themselves and their powers of deduction to resist sensual desire, and consequently they are not changed either by the passion of pleasure that overwhelms the incontinent man, or by the pain that overwhelms the effeminate man.
Tertio ibi: maxime autem et acuti etc., ostendit quibus competat haec secunda species incontinentiae quae dicitur praevolatio. Et dicit quod maxime sunt incontinentes secundum incontinentiam quae non refrenatur consilio, quae dicta est praevolatio acuti, idest cholerici et melancholici. Neutri enim expectant rationem consiliantem, sed sequuntur primam phantasiam concupiscibilis. Cholerici quidem propter velocitatem motus colerae, melancolici autem propter vehementiam motus melancholiae accensae, cuius impetum non de facili potest homo ferre. Nam et terra accensa vehementius ardet. E contrario autem est intelligendum, quod sanguinei et phlegmatici habent incontinentiam debilitatis propter humiditatem complexionis, quae non est fortis ad resistendum impressioni. 1421. Last [B, 3], at “It is especially,” he shows to whom the second kind of incontinence called impetuosity is attributable. He says that the highly sensitive or the choleric and the depressed are especially incontinent according to the incontinence which is not restrained by counsel, and which is called impetuosity. Neither of these awaits the advice of reason but they follow the first sensual image: the choleric on account of the quickness of their wrath but the depressed on account of the vehemence of their intensified melancholy whose impulse no man can easily endure, for a dry object when kindled bums furiously. On the contrary we are to understand that men with sanguine and phlegmatic temperaments experience the incontinence of weakness on account of the humidity of their temperament which is not strong enough to resist an impression.

The Intemperate Are Worse than the Incontinent
Chapter 8
      A.  He explains his intention.
            1.   THE INTEMPERATE (MAN) IS WORSE.
                   a.   He compares the incontinent with the intemperate man ... three arguments ... that the intemperate (man) is worse.
                         i.    First reason. — 1422-1423
ἔστι δ' ὁ μὲν ἀκόλαστος, ὥσπερ ἐλέχθη, οὐ μεταμελητικός· ἐμμένει γὰρ τῇ προαιρέσει· ὁ δ' ἀκρατὴς μεταμελητικὸς πᾶς. διὸ οὐχ ὥσπερ ἠπορήσαμεν, οὕτω καὶ ἔχει, ἀλλ' ὃ μὲν ἀνίατος ὃ δ' ἰατός· But the intemperate man, as was pointed out before,’ is not inclined to be penitent, for he is tenacious of his choice. On the other hand, every incontinent man is given to repentance. For this reason, we are not here dealing with our original problem. Consequently, one (the intemperate) is incurable and the other (the incontinent) is curable.
                         ii.   Second reason. — 1424
ἔοικε γὰρ ἡ μὲν μοχθηρία τῶν νοσημάτων οἷον ὑδέρῳ καὶ φθίσει, ἡ δ' ἀκρασία τοῖς ἐπιληπτικοῖς· ἣ μὲν γὰρ συνεχὴς ἣ δ' οὐ συνεχὴς πονηρία. Now vice resembles diseases like dropsy and tuberculosis, while incontinence is like epilepsy. Vice is chronic while incontinence is a kind of intermittent badness.
                         iii. Third reason. — 1425
καὶ ὅλως δ' ἕτερον τὸ γένος ἀκρασίας καὶ κακίας· ἡ μὲν γὰρ κακία λανθάνει, ἡ δ' ἀκρασία οὐ λανθάνει. Generally speaking, incontinence and vice are different in kind, for vice is unconscious of itself but incontinence is not.
                   b.   He compares the two kinds of incontinence. — 1426-1427
αὐτῶν δὲ τούτων βελτίους οἱ ἐκστατικοὶ ἢ οἱ τὸν λόγον ἔχοντες μέν, μὴ ἐμμένοντες δέ· ὑπ' ἐλάττονος γὰρ πάθους ἡττῶνται, καὶ οὐκ ἀπροβούλευτοι ὥσπερ ἅτεροι· ὅμοιος γὰρ ὁ ἀκρατής ἐστι τοῖς ταχὺ μεθυσκομένοις καὶ ὑπ' ὀλίγου οἴνου καὶ ἐλάττονος ἢ ὡς οἱ πολλοί. Among the incontinent the impulsive sort are not as bad as those who, having the advice of reason, do not abide by it. These people give in to a milder passion and do not, like the impulsive, lack deliberation. In fact, incontinent people (i.e., the weak) are like those who become quickly intoxicated by a little wine or by less than most men.
                   a.   First. — 1428
ὅτι μὲν οὖν κακία ἡ ἀκρασία οὐκ ἔστι, φανερόν ἀλλὰ πῇ ἴσως· τὸ μὲν γὰρ παρὰ προαίρεσιν τὸ δὲ κατὰ τὴν προαίρεσίν ἐστιν· Although incontinence is not vice in the strict sense it is obviously so in a qualified way, for incontinence sins without deliberate choice but vice with deliberate choice.
                   b.   The second point of agreement. — 1429
οὐ μὴν ἀλλ' ὅμοιόν γε κατὰ τὰς πράξεις, ὥσπερ τὸ Δημοδόκου εἰς Μιλησίους Μιλήσιοι ἀξύνετοι μὲν οὐκ εἰσίν, δρῶσιν δ' οἷάπερ ἀξύνετοι, καὶ οἱ ἀκρατεῖς ἄδικοι μὲν οὐκ εἰσίν, ἀδικήσουσι δέ. Besides, there is a similarity in action, as illustrated by what Demodochus said to the Milesians: “You are not foolish but you do the things foolish men do.” So too the incontinent are really not unjust but they do unjust deeds.
      B.  He clarifies a matter formerly assumed.
ἐπεὶ δ' ὃ μὲν τοιοῦτος οἷος μὴ διὰ τὸ πεπεῖσθαι διώκειν τὰς καθ' ὑπερβολὴν καὶ παρὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον σωματικὰς ἡδονάς, ὃ δὲ πέπεισται διὰ τὸ τοιοῦτος εἶναι οἷος διώκειν αὐτάς, ἐκεῖνος μὲν οὖν εὐμετάπειστος, οὗτος δὲ οὔ· ἡ γὰρ ἀρετὴ καὶ μοχθηρία τὴν ἀρχὴν ἣ μὲν φθείρει ἣ δὲ σώζει, ἐν δὲ ταῖς πράξεσι τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα ἀρχή, ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς μαθηματικοῖς αἱ ὑποθέσεις· οὔτε δὴ ἐκεῖ ὁ λόγος διδασκαλικὸς τῶν ἀρχῶν οὔτε ἐνταῦθα, ἀλλ' ἀρετὴ ἢ φυσικὴ ἢ ἐθιστὴ τοῦ ὀρθοδοξεῖν περὶ τὴν ἀρχήν. σώφρων μὲν οὖν ὁ τοιοῦτος, ἀκόλαστος δ' ὁ ἐναντίος. One man (the incontinent) pursues bodily pleasures excessively and contrary to right reason, and not because he is convinced that they are to be followed. But another (the intemperate) is convinced, because of his inclination, that these pleasures are to be followed. Hence the first is easily persuaded to change but not the second. The reason is that virtue and vice look to a principle that is destroyed by vice and preserved by virtue. Now the principle in actions is the end on account of which we operate, like axioms in mathematics; and just as reasoning does not teach principles in mathematics, so neither does reasoning teach the end in the sphere of action. But the right evaluation regarding the principle of things to be done is derived from a habit of virtue either natural or acquired. Therefore, the man who makes this evaluation is temperate, but he who makes the opposite evaluation is intemperate.
            2.   (HE) TELLS US WHY THE INCONTINENT MAN REPENTS. — 1433-1434
ἔστι δέ τις διὰ πάθος ἐκστατικὸς παρὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον, ὃν ὥστε μὲν μὴ πράττειν κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον κρατεῖ τὸ πάθος, ὥστε δ' εἶναι τοιοῦτον οἷον πεπεῖσθαι διώκειν ἀνέδην δεῖν τὰς τοιαύτας ἡδονὰς οὐ κρατεῖ· οὗτός ἐστιν ὁ ἀκρατής, βελτίων ὢν τοῦ ἀκολάστου, οὐδὲ φαῦλος ἁπλῶς· σώζεται γὰρ τὸ βέλτιστον, ἡ ἀρχή. ἄλλος δ' ἐναντίος, ὁ ἐμμενετικὸς καὶ οὐκ ἐκστατικὸς διά γε τὸ πάθος. φανερὸν δὴ ἐκ τούτων ὅτι ἣ μὲν σπουδαία ἕξις, ἣ δὲ φαύλη. Take the incontinent person exceeding the limits of right reason because of passion that so overcomes him that he does not act according to right reason; still he is not convinced that he should abandon himself to such pleasures without restriction. In this he is better than the libertine, and not absolutely bad, for he retains the highest principle. Nevertheless there is still another person, the very opposite, who keeps to right reason and does not go to excess in passion. From this, it is clear that continence is a good habit but incontinence an evil habit.
Est autem intemperatus quidem et cetera. Postquam philosophus ostendit differentiam incontinentis ad intemperatum, hic ostendit quis eorum sit peior: per quod solvitur dubitatio supra quinto loco proposita contra primum probabile; dixit autem hoc supra Aristoteles, sed breviter ex incidenti tangendo, hic autem perfectius hoc determinat ex principali intentione. Et circa hoc duo facit. Primo ostendit propositum. Secundo manifestat quiddam quod proposuerat, ibi: quia autem hic quidem talis et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo ostendit, intemperatum esse peiorem incontinente. Secundo ostendit similitudinem inter eos, ibi, quoniam quidem igitur et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo comparat incontinentem intemperato. Secundo comparat duas species incontinentiae adinvicem, ibi, ipsorum autem et cetera. Circa primum ponit tres rationes, per quas ostenditur intemperatus peior incontinente. 1422. After the Philosopher has shown the difference between the incontinent and the intemperate man, he now shows which is worse [II]. Thus he solves the difficulty raised in the fifth place (1325) about the first probable statement. Aristotle had considered this matter before but rather briefly and only incidentally. Now he gives it formal consideration by two operations. First [II, A] he explains his intention. Then [II, B], at “One man etc.,” he clarifies a matter formerly assumed. In the first part of the discussion he makes two points. First [A, 1 ] he shows that the intemperate is worse than the incontinent man. Then [A, 2], at “Although incontinence etc.,” he shows what is common to them. On the initial point, first [1, a] he compares the incontinent with the intemperate man. Then [1, b], at “Among the incontinent etc.,” he compares the two kinds of incontinence. First of all there are three arguments to show that the intemperate is worse than the incontinent man.
Circa quarum primam dicit, quod sicut supra dictum est, intemperatus non est poenitivus, quia peccat ex electione in qua permanet eo quod eligit delectationes corporales tamquam finem. Omnis autem incontinens de facili poenitet, cessante passione a qua vincebatur. Unde patet quod sicut supra dictum est, intemperatus est insanabilis, hic autem, scilicet incontinens, est sanabilis. Et sic per interemptionem solvitur dubitatio supra posita, quae procedebat ex hoc quod incontinens sit insanabilior intemperato. Quia vero intemperatus est insanabilior, potest concludi quod sit peior, sicut et morbus corporalis qui est incurabilis deterior est. 1423. In the first reason he says, as was pointed out before (1409), that the intemperate man is not inclined to be penitent since he sins by a deliberate choice in which he persists, having chosen bodily pleasures as an end. But an incontinent man readily repents when the passion to which he gave in passes away. Therefore, it is evident, as previously indicated (1409), that the intemperate man is as incurable as the incontinent is curable. So from the quality of excess Aristotle solves the difficulty mentioned before (1409), which proceeds from this, that incontinence is more incurable than intemperance. Since the intemperate man is indeed more incurable, it is possible to conclude he is worse, just as an incurable disease is worse.
Secundam rationem ponit ibi, assimulatur autem et cetera. Et dicit quod malitia, scilicet intemperantia, assimilatur illis aegritudinibus quae continue insunt homini, sicut hydropisis et phtysis. Sed incontinentia assimilatur aegritudinibus quae non continue hominem invadunt sicut epilentiae; et hoc ideo, quia intemperantia et quaelibet malitia est continua. Habet enim habitum permanentem per quem eligit mala. Sed incontinentia non est continua, quia movetur ad peccandum incontinens solum propter passionem quae cito transit. Et sic incontinentia est quasi quaedam malitia non continua. Continuum autem malum est peius non continuo. Ergo intemperantia est peior quam incontinentia. 1424. He states his second reason [a, ii] at “Now vice resembles,” saying that vice (intemperance) can be compared to long sicknesses such as dropsy and tuberculosis. But incontinence resembles those sicknesses like epilepsy which occur at intervals. This is so because intemperance-and every real vice-is without interruption, being a lasting habit which chooses evils. But incontinent is not continual because the incontinent man is moved to sin only by reason of passion which quickly passes. Thus incontinence is—so to speak—a kind of transitory vice. But a continuing evil is worse than a passing one. Therefore intemperance is worse than incontinence.
Tertiam rationem ponit ibi, et omnino autem et cetera. Et dicit quod alterum genus est incontinentiae et malitiae, sub qua intemperantia continetur. Malitia enim latet, eum scilicet cui inest qui est deceptus, ut aestimet bonum illud quod facit. Sed incontinentia non latet eum cui inest; scit enim per rationem malum esse id in quod a passione ducitur. Malum autem latens est periculosius et insanabilius. Ergo intemperantia est peior quam incontinentia. 1425. At “Generally speaking” [a, iii] he gives his third reason: the genus of incontinence is different from that of vice under which intemperance is contained. Real vice is hidden from the one having it and his deception consists in thinking that what he does is good. But incontinence is not concealed, for such a person in his right mind knows that the object to which he is drawn by passion is evil. But hidden evil is more dangerous than overt evil. Therefore intemperance is worse than incontinence.
Deinde cum dicit: ipsorum autem etc., comparat species incontinentiae adinvicem. Et dicit quod inter incontinentes, meliores, idest minus mali, sunt excessivi, idest praevolantes, quam debiles qui habent quidem rationem consiliantem sed non permanent in ea. Duplici autem ratione sunt peiores debiles. Primo quidem, quia vincuntur a minori passione. Nam praevolantes vincuntur a passione excedente, vel secundum velocitatem vel secundum vehementiam. Et secundum hanc rationem supra probavit quod intemperatus est peior incontinente. Quae potest esse quarta ratio adiuncta tribus praedictis. Secunda ratio est, quia debiles non sunt impraeconsiliati, sicut alii, idest praevolantes. Et haec ratio supra inducebatur de incontinente et intemperato, quasi incontinens esset praeconsiliatus, non autem intemperatus. Et hoc est falsum, quia etiam intemperatus praeconsiliatus est, peccat enim ex electione, et ideo videtur hic hoc inducere ad ostendendum quod ibi locum non habet. 1426. Then [1, b], at “Among the incontinent,” he compares the kinds of incontinence. He says that among the incontinent, impulsive or impetuous people are better or at least not as bad as the weak who still have reason’s counsel, although they do not follow it. The weak are worse in two ways. First they are conquered by a milder passion, while the impulsive are overcome by an excessive passion either by surprise or vehemence. He has just proved (1423) by this argument that the intemperate man is worse than the incontinent. This can be considered a fourth argument connected with the preceding three. The second reason is that the weak are not without counsel like the impetuous. The same argument was used before (1419-1420) in the case of the incontinent and the intemperate man, as if the incontinent man deliberated beforehand but not the intemperate. This is not true, for the intemperate man has reflected in advance, sinning by deliberate choice. Therefore, he apparently introduces this point to show that it is really out of place there.
Ponit autem quoddam exemplum dicens, quod incontinens debilis est similis illis qui velociter, idest de facili, inebriantur et a pauco vino et minori quam multi. Et sicut isti peius sunt dispositi secundum corpus, ita et debiles, quia minori passione vincuntur, sunt peiores secundum animam. 1427. He gives an example, comparing the incontinent person in his weakness with people who quickly or easily become intoxicated by a little wine or by less than most men. Such persons have a poor constitution; in the same way weak people giving in to a milder passion have a poor soul.
Deinde cum dicit: quoniam quidem igitur etc., ostendit convenientiam incontinentis ad intemperatum quantum ad duo. Primum quidem quantum ad hoc quod incontinentia, etsi non sit malitia simpliciter, est tamen malitia secundum quid, sicut supra dictum est, quod est quasi malitia non continua. Et quod non sit malitia simpliciter, patet; quia incontinentia peccat praeter electionem, malitia autem cum electione. 1428. Next [A, 2], at “Although incontinence,” he shows an agreement between the incontinent and the intemperate man in two matters. First [2, a] in regard to the fact that, although incontinence is not unqualified badness it is still vice in some sense, as previously stated (1379); it is then a quasi-vice, being but transitory. It is obviously not unqualified vice because incontinence sins without deliberate choice but real vice with deliberate choice.
Secundam convenientiam ponit ibi: insuper et cetera. Et dicit quod incontinentia et malitia habent similitudinem in actione, sicut quidam Dymodokes, id est censor populi, dixit ad Milesios reprehendens eos: Milesii non sunt stulti, sed operantur similia opera operibus stultorum. Similiter, etiam incontinentes non sunt mali vel iniusti vel intemperati, sed faciunt opera iniusta et mala. 1429. The second point of agreement is given at “Besides, there is” [2, b]. He says incontinence and vice have a similar action, illustrated by one Demodochus, an ancient of the people, who chided the Milesians thus: “Milesians, you are not foolish but you do things like the works of foolish people.” So the incontinent are not really bad (i.e., unjust or intemperate) but they do unjust and evil things.
Deinde cum dicit: quia autem hic quidem etc., assignat rationem eius quod supra dixerat, scilicet quare intemperatus non paeniteat sicut incontinens. Et primo assignat huius rationem quare intemperatus non paenitet; secundo quare incontinens paenitet, ibi: est autem aliquis et cetera. Dicit ergo primo quod aliquis est qui persequitur superabundanter et praeter ordinem rectae rationis corporales delectationes, non quia sic est dispositus, ut sit ei persuasum quod tales delectationes sint sequendae sicut bonae. Et iste est incontinens. Alius autem est, scilicet intemperatus, cui persuasum est, quod tales delectationes sint eligendae, quasi per se bonae; et hoc propter dispositionem quam habet ex habitu. Unde ille cui non est persuasum delectationes esse per se bonas ex habituali dispositione sed solum ex passione, scilicet incontinens, sed habet falsam aestimationem de eis in particulari, facile recedit a sua credulitate passione cessante. Ille autem qui ex habituali dispositione aestimat delectationes corporales per se esse eligendas, scilicet intemperatus, non de facili recedit a sua credulitate. 1430. Then [II, B], at “One man,” he gives his reason [B, 1] for his previous statement, that the intemperate person is, in contrast to the incontinent, unrepentant. Next [B, 2], at “Take the incontinent person,” Aristotle tells us why the incontinent man repents, saying in the first place that one man pursues bodily pleasures excessively and against the order of right reason not because he is convinced these pleasures are good. Such a one is incontinent. Another, i.e., intemperate man on the contrary is convinced that these pleasures are to be chosen as good in themselves, because of an inclination he has by habit. Thus the incontinent person who is habitually unconvinced of the goodness of evil pleasures, though actually and in passion so convinced from his false evaluation on the spot, quickly changes when passion fades. In contrast the intemperate person judging physical pleasures are to be chosen in every instance does not depart from his judgment so easily.
Et huius rationem (assignat) consequenter assignat, dicens quod virtus et malitia respiciunt principium operabilium quod malitia corrumpit, virtus autem salvat: principium autem in actionibus est finis, cuius gratia aliquid agitur: quod ita se habet in agibilibus, sicut suppositiones, idest prima principia in demonstrationibus mathematicis. Sicut enim in mathematicis principia non docentur per rationem, sed statim intellecta creduntur, ita etiam in agibilibus fines non docentur per rationem, sed per habitum virtutis, sive naturalis sive per assuetudinem acquisitae, consequitur rectam aestimationem circa principium agibilium quod est finis. 1431. After this he gives his argument: virtue and vice concern in the sphere of action a principle that vice destroys and virtue preserves. Now this principle of action is the end for the sake of which we act; in things to be done it takes the place that axioms or first principles have in mathematical demonstrations. just as principles in mathematics are not taught by reasoning, so neither is the end in the sphere of action taught by reasoning. But man acquires right evaluation regarding the principle of things to be done, i.e., the end, by the habit of virtue either natural or learned by custom.
Ille igitur qui habet rectam aestimationem de fine circa delectationes corporales, ut scilicet aestimet medium in eis bonum et finem, superabundantias autem malum, est temperatus. Ille autem qui habet contrariam aestimationem propter habitum malitiae, est intemperatus. Manifestum est autem quod ille qui errat circa principia non potest de facili revocari ab errore, quia non invenitur ratio doctiva principii; unde intemperatus, qui errat circa principium in agibilibus, non potest revocari aliqua persuasione a suo errore et ideo non est transcredibilis vel paenitivus, nisi forte secundum quod per longam consuetudinem contrariam tollitur habitus causativus erroris. 1432. Then the one making a right evaluation on the objective of physical pleasures, appraising the mean to be a good and an end in these matters, and excesses, an evil, is temperate. In contrast the one making the opposite evaluation from a habit of vice is intemperate. It is clear that anyone making a mistake in principles cannot be easily recalled from error because reasoning does not teach the principles. From this point of view he is not amenable or penitent until the habit causing the error is destroyed by a contrary practice of long standing.
Deinde cum dicit: est autem aliquis etc., ostendit qualiter incontinens sit transcredibilis et poenitivus. Et dicit quod aliquis homo est qui propter passionem excedit quidem a ratione recta quantum ad hoc quod passio eum superat, ut non agat secundum rationem rectam. Non autem superat eum quantum ad hoc ut sit ei persuasum quod oporteat persequi delectationes corporales quasi per se bonas absque omni prohibitione. Et ideo talis, cessante passione quae cito transit, remanet in recta aestimatione finis. Et iste est incontinens; qui propter hoc est melior intemperato, et non est pravus simpliciter, quia salvatur in eo optimum principium, scilicet recta aestimatio finis. Est autem pravus secundum quid, inquantum scilicet in aliquo particulari aestimat operandum praeter rationem rectam. Alius autem, scilicet continens, est contrarius incontinenti, qui permanet in ratione recta, et nullo modo excedit eam propter passionem etiam quantum ad agere. 1433. At “Take the incontinent person” [b, 2] he shows that the incontinent are amenable and inclined to be penitent. He says that these people exceed the limits of right reason because of passion overcoming them to this extent that they do not act according to right reason, but still not to the extent of convincing them that they should pursue bodily pleasures as good in themselves without restriction. For this reason such people continue in a right evaluation of the end after the cessation of passion which passes quickly. Such is the incontinent person who in this respect is better than the intemperate person and not absolutely evil because he does preserve the highest principle, which is the correct evaluation of the end. But in a sense this man is evil in considering that something contrary to reason is to be done in a particular case. Another person, viz., the continent, the direct opposite of the incontinent person, stays by right reason and in no way departs from it because of passion even in his actions.
Ex quo manifestum est quod continentia est bonus habitus quia permanet in ratione. Incontinentia autem pravus, quia recedit a ratione recta in agendo. Et hoc erat primum probabile quod nunc concludit, soluta quinta dubitatione quae contra hoc proponebatur. 1434. From this it is clear that continence is a good habit because it abides by reason. But incontinence is an evil habit because it recedes from right reason in its operation. This was the first probable statement, which he now concludes after the solution of the fifth difficulty raised concerning it.

The Continent and the Obstinate Man
Chapter 9
      A.  He shows how continence is related to the right principle.
                   a.   Whether a man, who abides by any principle... may be called continent... — 1435-1436
πότερον οὖν ἐγκρατής ἐστιν ὁ ὁποιῳοῦν λόγῳ καὶ ὁποιᾳοῦν προαιρέσει ἐμμένων ἢ ὁ τῇ ὀρθῇ, καὶ ἀκρατὴς δὲ ὁ ὁποιᾳοῦν μὴ ἐμμένων προαιρέσει καὶ ὁποιῳοῦν λόγῳ ἢ ὁ τῷ μὴ ψευδεῖ λόγῳ καὶ τῇ προαιρέσει τῇ ὀρθῇ, ὥσπερ ἠπορήθη πρότερον; Can a man be called continent who abides by any principle whatsoever and by any choice whatsoever? Or can he only be called continent who abides by right principle and choice? Can a man be called incontinent who does not abide by any principle or choice whatsoever? Can he be called incontinent who does not abide by a principle that is false and by a choice that is wrong—a point that was previously discussed?
                   b.   He solves the question raised. — 1437-1439
ἢ κατὰ μὲν συμβεβηκὸς ὁποιᾳοῦν, καθ' αὑτὸ δὲ τῷ ἀληθεῖ λόγῳ καὶ τῇ ὀρθῇ προαιρέσει ὃ μὲν ἐμμένει ὃ δ' οὐκ ἐμμένει; εἰ γάρ τις τοδὶ διὰ τοδὶ αἱρεῖται ἢ διώκει, καθ' αὑτὸ μὲν τοῦτο διώκει καὶ αἱρεῖται, κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς δὲ τὸ πρότερον. ἁπλῶς δὲ λέγομεν τὸ καθ' αὑτό. ὥστε ἔστι μὲν ὡς ὁποιᾳοῦν δόξῃ ὃ μὲν ἐμμένει ὃ δ' ἐξίσταται, ἁπλῶς δὲ [ὁ] τῇ ἀληθεῖ. A man who abides or does not abide by any principle at all is called continent or incontinent only incidentally; but a man who abides or does not abide by a true principle and a correct choice is said to be absolutely continent or incontinent. Certainly if someone chooses and pursues this for the sake of that, he essentially chooses and pursues the latter but incidentally the former. But what is essential we predicate in an absolute sense. Therefore, he who adheres to any opinion whatsoever is continent or incontinent in some way; but he who adheres or does not adhere to a true opinion is called continent or incontinent in the complete sense.
                   a.   He identifies (these men). — 1440
εἰσὶ δέ τινες οἳ ἐμμενετικοὶ τῇ δόξῃ εἰσίν, οὓς καλοῦσιν ἰσχυρογνώμονας, οἱ δύσπειστοι καὶ οὐκ εὐμετάπειστοι· Some people, however, are tenacious in their opinions; they are called obstinate because they are difficult to convince, and, once convinced, do not easily change.
                   b.   He shows how such people compare with the continent man. — 1441
οἳ ὅμοιον μέν τι ἔχουσι τῷ ἐγκρατεῖ, ὥσπερ ὁ ἄσωτος τῷ ἐλευθερίῳ καὶ ὁ θρασὺς τῷ θαρραλέῳ, They resemble the continent as the spendthrift resembles the generous man, and the rash the courageous man.
                   c.   He shows the difference. — 1442-1443
εἰσὶ δ' ἕτεροι κατὰ πολλά. ὃ μὲν γὰρ διὰ πάθος καὶ ἐπιθυμίαν οὐ μεταβάλλει [ὁ ἐγκρατής], ἐπεὶ εὔπειστος, ὅταν τύχῃ, ἔσται ὁ ἐγκρατής· οἳ δὲ οὐχ ὑπὸ λόγου, ἐπεὶ ἐπιθυμίας γε λαμβάνουσι, καὶ ἄγονται πολλοὶ ὑπὸ τῶν ἡδονῶν. But they differ in many respects, for the continent man is not changed by the passion of sensual desire, because he is easily convinced by a reason offered and remains continent. On the contrary, the obstinate man is not changed by reason, because such people follow passion and are often led from reason by pleasures.
                   d.   He shows how (the obstinate) compare with the incontinent man. — 1444
εἰσὶ δὲ ἰσχυρογνώμονες οἱ ἰδιογνώμονες καὶ οἱ ἀμαθεῖς καὶ οἱ ἄγροικοι, οἱ μὲν ἰδιογνώμονες δι' ἡδονὴν καὶ λύπην· χαίρουσι γὰρ νικῶντες ἐὰν μὴ μεταπείθωνται, καὶ λυποῦνται ἐὰν ἄκυρα τὰ αὐτῶν ᾖ ὥσπερ ψηφίσματα· ὥστε μᾶλλον τῷ ἀκρατεῖ ἐοίκασιν ἢ τῷ ἐγκρατεῖ. The word obstinacy refers to the headstrong, since these people are both undisciplined and rude. Opinionated by pleasure and pain, they are glad to win an argument and to remain convinced in their opinion. But they grieve if their judgments seem weak and only opinions. Therefore they bear more resemblance to the incontinent than the continent man.
εἰσὶ δέ τινες οἳ τοῖς δόξασιν οὐκ ἐμμένουσιν οὐ δι' ἀκρασίαν, οἷον ἐν τῷ Φιλοκτήτῃ τῷ Σοφοκλέους ὁ Νεοπτόλεμος· καίτοι δι' ἡδονὴν οὐκ ἐνέμεινεν, ἀλλὰ καλήν· τὸ γὰρ ἀληθεύειν αὐτῷ καλὸν ἦν, ἐπείσθη δ' ὑπὸ τοῦ Ὀδυσσέως ψεύδεσθαι. οὐ γὰρ πᾶς ὁ δι' ἡδονήν τι πράττων οὔτ' ἀκόλαστος οὔτε φαῦλος οὔτ' ἀκρατής, ἀλλ' ὁ δι' αἰσχράν. There are others who do not stand by the things that seem good but not because of incontinence. Thus in Sophocles’ Philoctetes, Neoptolemus did not abide by what seemed good although he did this by reason of a pleasure that was good, for telling the truth was pleasing to him. He had been persuaded by Odysseus to lie. Surely not everyone who does something for pleasure is intemperate or evil or incontinent but only he who acts for shameful pleasure.
      B.  He shows how continence is related to the general nature of virtue.
                   a.   He shows in what things continence is a mean. — 1446-1447
ἐπεὶ δ' ἔστι τις καὶ τοιοῦτος οἷος ἧττον ἢ δεῖ τοῖς σωματικοῖς χαίρειν, καὶ οὐκ ἐμμένων τῷ λόγῳ, ὁ [τοιοῦτος] τούτου καὶ τοῦ ἀκρατοῦς μέσος ὁ ἐγκρατής· ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἀκρατὴς οὐκ ἐμμένει τῷ λόγῳ διὰ τὸ μᾶλλόν τι, οὗτος δὲ διὰ τὸ ἧττόν τι· ὁ δ' ἐγκρατὴς ἐμμένει καὶ οὐδὲ δι' ἕτερον μεταβάλλει. Sometimes a man is disposed to enjoy bodily pleasures less than he ought, not abiding by the judgment of reason. Hence, between such a person and the incontinent man there is a mean, viz., the continent man. The idea here is that the incontinent man forsakes reason by enjoying physical pleasures too much but the other by enjoying them too little. But the continent man adheres to reason and is not diverted by either extreme.
                   b.   He shows how (excess and defect of continence) are related to good and evil. — 1448
δεῖ δέ, εἴπερ ἡ ἐγκράτεια σπουδαῖον, ἀμφοτέρας τὰς ἐναντίας ἕξεις φαύλας εἶναι, ὥσπερ καὶ φαίνονται· Since, indeed, continence is something good, the two contrary habits are evil, as is obvious.
                   c.   He responds to a foreseen question. — 1449-1450
ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ τὴν ἑτέραν ἐν ὀλίγοις καὶ ὀλιγάκις εἶναι φανεράν, ὥσπερ ἡ σωφροσύνη τῇ ἀκολασίᾳ δοκεῖ ἐναντίον εἶναι μόνον, οὕτω καὶ ἡ ἐγκράτεια τῇ ἀκρασίᾳ. Because one extreme rarely happens and is not so evident, it seems that just as temperance is opposed only to intemperance, so in the same way continence is opposed to incontinence.
                   a.   He compares continence with temperance.
                         i.    He states his intention. — 1451
ἐπεὶ δὲ καθ' ὁμοιότητα πολλὰ λέγεται, καὶ ἡ ἐγκράτεια ἡ τοῦ σώφρονος καθ' ὁμοιότητα ἠκολούθηκεν· Since language is often used in a metaphorical sense, we have come to speak metaphorically of the continence of the temperate man.
                         ii.   He points up the resemblance. — 1452
ὅ τε γὰρ ἐγκρατὴς οἷος μηδὲν παρὰ τὸν λόγον διὰ τὰς σωματικὰς ἡδονὰς ποιεῖν καὶ ὁ σώφρων, Indeed the continent man has the ability to do nothing against principle for the sake of carnal pleasures. And the temperate man has the same ability.
                         iii. He shows several divergences. — 1453
ἀλλ' ὃ μὲν ἔχων ὃ δ' οὐκ ἔχων φαύλας ἐπιθυμίας, καὶ ὃ μὲν τοιοῦτος οἷος μὴ ἥδεσθαι παρὰ τὸν λόγον, ὃ δ' οἷος ἥδεσθαι ἀλλὰ μὴ ἄγεσθαι. But the first has evil desires while the other, the temperate man, does not; and the second is so disposed that he does not take pleasure contrary to reason. But the continent man is disposed to take pleasure but is not seduced by passion.
                   b.   He compares incontinence with intemperance. — 1454
ὅμοιοι δὲ καὶ ὁ ἀκρατὴς καὶ ἀκόλαστος, ἕτεροι μὲν ὄντες, ἀμφότεροι δὲ τὰ σωματικὰ ἡδέα διώκουσιν, ἀλλ' ὃ μὲν καὶ οἰόμενος δεῖν, ὃ δ' οὐκ οἰόμενος. Although the incontinent and the intemperate man do resemble one another, they nevertheless are different. Both seek bodily pleasures; but the intemperate man thinks he should pursue them, while the incontinent man does not.
Utrum igitur continens est et cetera. Postquam philosophus determinavit dubitationem per quam scitur an continentia et incontinentia sint, ostendit etiam materiam circa quam sint, hic determinat dubitationem per quam scitur quid continentia est. Et circa hoc duo facit. Primo enim ostendit, utrum continens sit immansivus cuilibet rationi et incontinens a qualibet egressivus: per quod solvitur quarta dubitatio proposita contra secundum probabile. Secundo ostendit, utrum prudens possit esse incontinens: per quod solvitur secunda dubitatio mota contra quintum probabile, ibi, neque simul prudentem et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo ostendit, quomodo continentia se habeat ad propriam rationem quae accipitur secundum hoc quod est immanere rationi. Secundo ostendit, quomodo se habeat ad communem rationem virtutis quae consistit in hoc quod est in medio esse, ibi, quia autem est aliquis et cetera. Circa primum tria facit. Primo ostendit, cui rationi continens laudabiliter immanet, et a qua incontinens vituperabiliter egreditur. Secundo ostendit, quomodo aliqui rationi vituperabiliter immanent, ibi, sunt autem quidam immansivi etc.; tertio quomodo aliqui laudabiliter a ratione egrediuntur ibi, sunt autem quidam et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. 1435. After the Philosopher has settled the question of the existence of continence and incontinence, and has explained their objects, he now settles the question of the precise species of continence. Here are his two operations: first [I] he discusses in what sense the continent man abides by every principle and the incontinent man forsakes every principle. Thus the fourth difficulty (1321) against his second probable argument is solved. Next [Lect. 10, II], at “Nor can the same man etc.” (B. 1152 a 7), he raises the question of a prudent person being incontinent. By this he solves the second difficulty raised against the fifth probable statement. On the first point he does two things. First [I, A] he shows how continence is related to the right principle which is understood as abiding by reason. Then [I, B], at “Sometimes a man etc.,” he shows how continence is related to the general nature of virtue which consists in following a middle course. He develops the first point in a threefold manner. First [A, 1] he shows to what principle the continent man laudably adheres and from what principle the incontinent man blamably departs. Next [A, 2], at “Some people, however etc.,” he shows how some men wrongly hold to a principle. Third [A, 3], at “There are others etc.,” he shows how others commendably forsake a principle. There are two considerations of the first point.
Primo movet quaestionem: quae quidem est, utrum continens dicatur qui immanet qualicumque rationi, idest sive rectae sive falsae, et qualicumque electioni, id est sive rectae sive falsae: vel solum ille dicitur continens qui immanet rationi rectae et electioni. Et similis dubitatio est, utrum incontinens dicatur qui non immanet qualicumque rationi et electioni, vel solum qui rectae non immanet. Vel etiam potest sic moveri quaestio: an possit dici incontinens qui non immanet falsae rationi et electioni, sicut supra in dubitationibus propositum est? 1436. First [A, 1, a] he raises the question whether a man, who abides by any principle whatsoever, either true or false, or by any choice whatsoever, either good or bad, may be called continent. Or whether only he who abides by the right principle and choice is called continent. There is a similar question: whether a man who does not abide by any principle or choice at all, or who only does not abide by a right principle or choice may be called incontinent. Or the question can be framed in this way: can a man who does not abide by a wrong principle or choice be called incontinent, as was stated in the preceding difficulties?
Secundo ibi: vel secundum accidens etc., solvit propositam quaestionem: et dicit quod dicitur continens et incontinens qui immanet vel non immanet qualicumque rationi, secundum accidens; sed per se loquendo qui immanet vel non immanet verae rationi et rectae electioni. Et hoc quidem sic exponit. Si enim aliquis eligit vel persequitur, id est quaerit hoc propter hoc, idest hoc loco huius, puta si eligit fel loco mellis, quia scilicet propter similitudinem coloris aestimat illud esse mel, manifestum est quod per se loquendo eligit et quaerit hoc propter quod alterum eligit et quaerit, puta mel; sed per accidens eligit et quaerit id quod prius est, id est illud quod eligit loco alterius, puta fel. 1437. Next [A, 1, b], at “A man who abides,” he solves the question raised, saying that a man who abides or does not abide by any principle at all is said to be continent or incontinent incidentally (secundum accidens), but a man who does or does not abide by a true principle and a correct choice essentially (per se) speaking is said to be continent or incontinent. He explains it in this way. If someone chooses or pursues, i.e., acquires this for the sake of or instead of that, for example, if he chooses gall in place of honey because he thinks it is honey from the resemblance in color, it is obvious that speaking formally he really chooses and seeks a different thing, namely, honey. But incidentally he chooses what is harmful, that which he chooses instead, viz., gall.
Et ratio huius est, quia in appetibilibus illud est per se ad quod refertur intentio appetentis. Bonum enim, inquantum est apprehensum, est proprium obiectum appetitus. Illud autem quod est praeter intentionem, est per accidens. Unde ille qui intendit eligere mel et eligit fel praeter intentionem, per se quidem eligit mel, sed per accidens fel. Sit ergo aliquis qui falsam rationem aestimet veram: puta si quis aestimet hoc esse verum quod bonum est fornicari. Si ergo immaneat huic rationi falsae putans eam esse veram, per se quidem immanet verae rationi, per accidens autem falsae. Intendit enim verae immanere. Et eadem ratio est de incontinente qui egreditur a ratione falsa, quam putat esse veram. 1438. The supporting argument runs this way: in desirable things, that to which the intention of the agent is referred is essentially desired. Good, insofar as it is known, is the proper object of the appetitive faculty. But that which is beside the intention is only incidentally desired. Hence the man who means to choose honey and chooses gall instead, essentially (per se) is choosing honey but only incidentally gall. Therefore, there may be people considering a false argument as true, e.g., someone believing as true this statement: “It is good to commit fornication.” If then he sticks by this false conclusion, really believing it to be true, he is essentially standing by a true reason but incidentally by a false reason. He intended to abide by a true reason. This same argument holds for the continent man who departs from a false reason which he considers to be true.
Sic ergo patet quod continens vel incontinens per se immanet vel non immanet rationi verae, per accidens autem falsae. Simpliciter autem dicimus id quod est per se. Quod autem est per accidens dicitur secundum quid. Et ideo contingit quidem secundum aliquem modum quod continens vel incontinens immanet qualicumque opinioni etiam falsae; sed simpliciter continens vel incontinens dicitur qui immanet vel non immanet rationi seu opinioni verae. 1439. So it is evident that a man is essentially continent (or incontinent) who adheres (or does not adhere) to a true reason but incidentally to a false reason. Now what is essential is predicated absolutely but what is incidental we predicate in a limited way. Consequently he, who adheres to any opinion whatsoever, even a false one, is called continent or incontinent in some measure; but he who adheres or does not adhere to a true reason or opinion is called continent or incontinent in the absolute sense.
Deinde cum dicit: sunt autem quidam immansivi etc., ostendit, quomodo aliqui vituperabiliter immanent rationi. Et primo ostendit qui sint; secundo quomodo se habeant ad continentem, ibi, qui simile quidem etc.; tertio quomodo se habeant ad incontinentem, ibi: sunt autem ischirognomones et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod sunt quidam nimis immanentes propriae opinioni. Et hi sunt illi quos homines vocant ischyrognomones, idest fortis sententiae sive pertinaces, quia scilicet difficile persuadetur eis aliquid et, si fuerit eis aliquid persuasum, non de facili transmutantur ab illa suasione. Quod maxime videtur accidere melancholicis, qui difficile recipiunt, sed recepta fortiter tenent ad modum terrae. 1440. Then [A, 2], at “Some people, however,” he shows how some men wrongly hold to a principle. First [A, 2, a] he identifies them. Next [A, 2, b], at “They resemble etc.,” he shows how such people compare with the continent man. Third [A, 2, c], at “But they differ etc.,” he shows the difference. Finally [A, 2, d], at “The word obstinacy etc.,” he shows how they compare with the incontinent man. He says first that there are some who unreasonably stand by their own opinion. These are the people called ischyrognomones, i.e., opinionated or obstinate, because it is hard to persuade them of anything. And if they have been convinced of something they are not easily changed from that opinion. This seems to happen especially to the melancholic who admit a thing reluctantly but hold to what they do accept, with great firmness.
Deinde cum dicit: qui simile quidem etc., comparat tales continenti. Et dicit quod tales videntur aliquid simile habere continenti, quia per excessum habent id quod est continentis, sicut prodigus habet aliquid simile liberali, et audax confidenti, idest forti. Tales enim immanent rationi plusquam debent, continens autem secundum quod debet. 140. At “They resemble” [A, 2, b] he compares these obstinate persons to the continent man. He says that they apparently have some likeness to the continent because they have in excess what the continent have, just as the spendthrift resembles a generous soul, and the rash are like the self-reliant or brave. Such people maintain their opinion more than they should, but the continent man as he should.
Secundo ibi: sunt autem alteri etc., ostendit differentiam; et dicit quod praedicti secundum multa differunt a continente. Ad cuius evidentiam considerandum est quod dupliciter potest aliquis removeri a sua opinione: uno modo ex parte ipsius rationis; puta si superveniat aliqua ratio fortior. Alio modo ex parte passionis quae pervertit iudicium rationis in particulari operabili. 1442. Then [A, 2, c], at “But they differ,” he points out the many differences of the obstinate from the continent. For evidence of this we must consider that a person’s opinion can be changed in two ways. In one way on the part of reason itself, for example, if a better reason follows. In the other way, on the part of passion perverting the judgment of the reason, particularly in an individual practical case.
Praecipue igitur secundum hoc est differentia, quia hic quidem, scilicet continens, non transmutatur a ratione propter concupiscentiae passionem; sed tamen quando oportet bene persuasibilis erit ab alia ratione meliori inducta. Unde laudabilis est, quia non vincitur concupiscentia, sed ratione. Hic autem, scilicet pertinax, non mutatur a sua opinione propter aliquam rationem inductam, sed recipiunt concupiscentias. Et multi eorum ducuntur a delectationibus extra rationem. Sic ergo vituperabiles sunt, quia cum non permittant se vinci a ratione, vincuntur tamen a passione. 1443. This then is the difference, that the continent man is not changed from his principle by the passion of sensual desire, but nevertheless, when it is expedient, he will be rightly convinced when presented with another and better reason. Consequently, he is to be praised because he is not overcome by sensual desire but by reason. But the other, the obstinate, is not changed from opinion by a new reason but rather follows passion. And many obstinate persons are seduced by pleasures outside reason. They then are censurable in this way because they are overcome by passion rather than prevailed upon by reason.
Deinde cum dicit: sunt autem ischirognomones etc., ostendit, quomodo se habeant tales ad incontinentem. Et dicit quod isti quos dicimus ischyrognomones, dicuntur et idiognomones, idest propriae sententiae, sive proprii sensus homines; et sunt indisciplinati, quia nolunt ab alio instrui, et sunt etiam agrestes, quia dum semper volunt sequi proprium sensum, non de facili possunt cum aliis commorari. Sunt autem idiognomones, idest proprii sensus, propter hoc quod aliquam delectationem nimis quaerunt, et aliquam tristitiam nimis fugiunt. Gaudent enim quando conferendo cum aliis vincunt, si scilicet non transmutentur per aliquam suasionem a sua opinione. Tristantur autem si ea quae sunt ipsorum, scilicet sententiae, appareant infirmae, ita quod oporteat eas deserere. Hoc autem est proprium incontinentis et mollis, superabundanter appetere delectationes et fugere tristitias. Unde patet quod pertinaces magis assimilantur incontinenti quam continenti. 1444. Next [A, 2, d], at “The word,” he shows what relation the obstinate have to the incontinent man. Those called obstinate, he says, are also known as idiognomones, i.e., self-opinionated, headstrong men. They are undisciplined because unwilling to be taught by anyone, they are rude in this way—always wanting to follow their own view, they cannot adjust to others. So they are opinionated in their excessive quest of pleasure and avoidance of pain. They are glad, when they triumph in conversation with others, i.e., if they are not changed from their opinion by some argument. They are grieved if their judgments or opinions seem so weak that it is necessary to abandon them. Now it is proper to the incontinent and effeminate man to desire pleasures and to avoid pains excessively. Obviously then the obstinate are more like the incontinent than the continent man.
Deinde cum dicit: sunt autem quidam qui his etc., ostendit, quomodo aliqui discedunt laudabiliter a ratione. Et dicit quod quidam sunt qui non immanent his quae eis videntur, non propter incontinentiam, sed propter amorem virtutis. Sicut narratur in libro quem de Philoctete Sophocles scripsit, quod Neoptolemus non permansit in his quae ei videbantur, non tamen propter incontinentiam, quamvis hoc fecerit propter aliquam delectationem non malam, sed bonam. Appetebat enim quasi quoddam bonum dicere verum et hoc erat ei delectabile. Sed persuasum fuerat ei ab Ulysse quod diceret falsum in utilitatem patriae, cui quidem persuasioni ipse non immansit propter delectationem veritatis. Nec tamen propter hoc fuit incontinens. Non enim omnis qui propter delectationem aliquid operatur est intemperatus, sive pravus sive incontinens, sed solum ille qui propter turpem delectationem aliquid operatur. 1445. At “There are others” [A, 3] he shows in what way some commendably forsake a principle. He says that there are still others who, do not abide by the things that seem good to them, not from incontinence but from a love of virtue. Thus, in Sophocles’ drama on Philoctetes, Neoptolemus did not adhere to the things seeming good to him, not from incontinence because he had done what he did for pleasure that was not really bad but rather good. He was seeking a good in a sense, in speaking the truth and this was pleasing to him. But he had been persuaded by Ulysses to tell a lie for the good of his country; he did not keep his resolution out of love for the truth. This did not make him guilty of incontinence. For not everyone who acts for pleasure is intemperate and evil or incontinent, but only those who yield to shameful pleasure.
Deinde cum dicit: quia autem est aliquis etc., ostendit, quomodo continentia se habeat ad rationem virtutis, ad quam pertinet in medio esse. Et circa hoc duo facit. Primo manifestat continentiam in medio esse, sicut et temperantiam. Secundo, ostendit quod quandoque continentia propter similitudinem temperantia nominatur, ibi, quia autem secundum similitudinem et cetera. Circa primum tria facit. Primo ostendit quorum continentia sit medium. Et dicit quod aliquis homo invenitur sic dispositus qui minus gaudet corporalibus delectationibus quam oporteat. Et hoc est non propter finem boni, sed propter fastidium. Propter quod non permanet in ratione iudicante, quod oportet, secundum quod necesse est talibus delectationibus uti. De incontinente autem iam dictum est quod non immanet rationi propter hoc quod gaudet talibus delectationibus plusquam oportet. 1146. Then [I, B], at "Sometimes a man," he shows how continence is related to the notion of virtue, to which it pertains to follow the mean. On this point he does two things. First [ B, 1], he shows that continence like temperance consists in a mean. Next [B, 2], at “Since language is etc.,” he shows that continence, because of its similarity, is sometimes called temperance. He discusses this initial point under three aspects. First [B, 1, a] he shows in what things continence is a mean, saying that occasionally someone enjoys physical pleasures less than he should. not for a virtuous purpose but out of disgust. This state is not in accord with a correct and reasonable judgment which indicates some necessity for these pleasures. The incontinent man quite otherwise, we know (1444), is not reasonable in enjoying such pleasures more than he should.
Unde horum duorum medius est continens. Nam incontinens non immanet rationi propter aliquid maius. Ille autem alius propter aliquid minus. Quia scilicet ille vult plus uti delectationibus quam oportet, et iste minus. Sed continens immanet rationi et non transmutatur ab ea, nec propter alterum praedictorum, idest neque propter maius, neque propter minus. 1447. So the mean between these two extremes is represented by the continent man. For the incontinent man forsakes reason because of excess and the insensible man because of deficiency. The reason is that the first wants to enjoy pleasures more than he ought and the other less than he ought. But the continent man perseveres in reason and is not diverted from it by either extreme, i.e., too much or too little.
Secundo ibi: oportet autem, si quidem etc., ostendit, qualiter se habeant ad bonitatem et malitiam. Manifestum est autem ex praedictis quod continentia est aliquid bonum. Unde oportet quod utrique habitus qui ei contrariantur, scilicet et secundum plus et secundum minus, sint mali, sicut et apparet ex hoc ipso quod non immanent rationi, sed accipiunt, aut plus aut minus. 1448. Next [B, 1, b], at "Since indeed," he shows how (excess and defect of continence) are related to good and evil. It is evident from our discussions (1433-1434) that continence is something good. So it necessarily follows that the two habits opposed to it (by excess and defect) are bad, as is obvious from the very fact that they do not adhere to reason but take either too much or too little.
Tertio ibi: sed propter alterum etc., respondet tacitae quaestioni: quare scilicet sola incontinentia videatur esse contraria continentiae, cum habeat duos habitus contrarios. Et dicit quod hoc contingit propter hoc quod alterum in paucis accidit, quod scilicet aliquis egrediatur a ratione in minus. Et ideo non est adeo manifestum sicut alterum extremum. Nam in pluribus accidit quod circa delectationes corporales fiat egressus a recta ratione in plus. Et propter eamdem rationem temperantia videtur esse contraria soli intemperantiae, quia insensibilitas non est manifesta propter hoc quod in paucioribus accidit. 1449. At “But because” [B, 1, c] he responds to a foreseen question: why is incontinence alone apparently opposed to continence, which should have two contrary habits? This happens because one extreme—departure from reason by defect—is rare, and consequently not so evident as the opposite extreme. Indeed the departure from right reason by excess is quite frequent in bodily pleasure. By the same reason temperance seems to be opposed only to intemperance, since insensibility is not conspicuous because it happens in few cases.
Est autem hic considerandum, quod continentiae assignantur dupliciter extrema. Uno modo ex parte rationis cui inhaeret: et secundum hoc supra dixit quod pertinax se habet ad continentem, sicut prodigus ad liberalem. Alterum autem extremum est ad minus vitium instabilitatis. Alio modo assignantur ei extrema ex parte concupiscentiae quam vincit. Et sic continentia est medium inter extrema nunc posita. 1450. Here we should consider that extremes are opposed to continence in two different respects. First from the point of view of reason to which continence adheres, and under this aspect the analogy has already been presented (1441-1443): what prodigality is to generosity, obstinacy is to continence. The opposite extreme relating to the defect is the vice of instability. Second from the point of view of restraining desire there are extremes. And under this aspect continence is a medium between these extremes—our present problem.
Deinde cum dicit: quia autem secundum similitudinem etc., ostendit, quod continentia propter similitudinem quandoque dicitur temperantia. Et primo comparat secundum hoc continentiam temperantiae. Secundo incontinentiam intemperantiae, ibi: similes autem et cetera. Circa primum tria facit. Primo proponit quod intendit. Et dicit quod quia multa nominantur metaphorice sive secundum similitudinem, inde est quod etiam continentia consequitur quandoque nomen temperantiae similitudinarie. 145 1. Next [ B, 2 1, at “Since language is,” he shows that continence is at times called temperance for its similarity. First [B, 2, a] in this similarity he compares continence with temperance. Next [B, 2, b], at "Although the incontinent etc.," he compares incontinence with intemperance. He discusses the first point under three subheadings. First [a, i] he states his intention: continence is sometimes called temperance metaphorically, since similar things permit metaphor.
Secundo ibi: et enim continens etc., ostendit in quo sit similitudo. Continens enim habet facultatem, ut nihil praeter rationem operetur propter delectationes corporales. Et hoc idem potest facere temperatus. 1452. Then [a, ii], at "Indeed the continent," he points up the resemblance. The continent person has the ability to do nothing against principle for the sake of carnal pleasures, and the temperate person has the same ability.
Tertio ibi: sed hic quidem etc., ponit duas differentias. Quarum prima est, quod continens habet pravas concupiscentias, sed temperatus non habet eas, quia eius concupiscibilis est per habitum temperantiae ordinata. Secunda differentia est quam ponit ibi, et hic quidem et cetera. Quod scilicet temperatus est sic dispositus per habitum temperantiae quod non delectatur praeter rationem, continens autem est sic dispositus, ut delectetur quidem praeter rationem, sed non ducatur a passione. 1453. Finally [a, iii], at “But the first,” he shows several differences. The temperate man does not have the evil desires of the continent because his sensual desire is well ordered by his habit of temperance. The second difference, stated at “and the second etc.,” [a, iii], is that the temperate man by his habit of temperance is not delighted contrary to reason, while the continent man is disposed to take unreasonable pleasure though he is not seduced by his passion.
Deinde cum dicit: similes autem etc., comparat incontinentiam intemperantiae. Et dicit quod etiam incontinens et intemperatus sunt similes, cum tamen differant. Unde eodem modo incontinens dicitur intemperatus per similitudinem. Sunt enim similes in hoc quod utrique persequuntur, idest quaerunt delectabilia corporalia. Differunt autem in hoc: quod intemperatus existimat oportere huiusmodi delectabilia sequi propter habitum pervertentem iudicium de fine. Incontinens autem non hoc existimat, quia salvatur in eo principium, ut supra dictum est. 1454. Then [B, 2, b], at “Although the incontinent,” he compares incontinence with intemperance: though the incontinent and the intemperate man seem alike, they do differ. Hence—by resemblance—incontinence is called intemperance. The resemblance is that both pursue carnal delights, but they differ because the intemperate man thinks he should follow such pleasures by perverse judgment on his goal. Quite otherwise the incontinent man has no such idea because his judgment remains unimpaired, as stated previously (1312, 1426, 1428-1430).

The Prudent and the Incontinent Man
Chapter 10
      A.  Prudence and incontinence are incompatible.
            1.   HE PLOTS HIS COURSE. — 1455
οὐδ' ἅμα φρόνιμον καὶ ἀκρατῆ ἐνδέχεται εἶναι τὸν αὐτόν· Nor can the same man be at once prudent and incontinent,
                   a.   The first. — 1456
ἅμα γὰρ φρόνιμος καὶ σπουδαῖος τὸ ἦθος δέδεικται ὤν. for we have shown that a man is simultaneously prudent and virtuous in action.
                   b.   The second. — 1457
ἔτι οὐ τῷ εἰδέναι μόνον φρόνιμος ἀλλὰ καὶ τῷ πρακτικός· ὁ δ' ἀκρατὴς οὐ πρακτικός. Again, one is prudent not simply by knowing what is right but especially by doing it; and the incontinent man does not do the right.
                   c.   He offers a reason for the phenomenon of prudent people being incontinent. — 1458
τὸν δὲ δεινὸν οὐδὲν κωλύει ἀκρατῆ εἶναι· διὸ καὶ δοκοῦσιν ἐνίοτε φρόνιμοι μὲν εἶναί τινες ἀκρατεῖς δέ, διὰ τὸ τὴν δεινότητα διαφέρειν τῆς φρονήσεως τὸν εἰρημένον τρόπον ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις λόγοις, However, nothing hinders a shrewd person from being incontinent. This is why people sometimes seem to be prudent and still incontinent because shrewdness differs from prudence in the way indicated in our previous discussion.
      B.  The relationship of the incontinent to prudence.
                   a.   He makes the comparison.
                         i.    his comparison.
                               x.   HE SAYS WHAT HE IS GOING TO DO. — 1459
καὶ κατὰ μὲν τὸν λόγον ἐγγὺς εἶναι, διαφέρειν δὲ κατὰ τὴν προαίρεσιν, They are similar because both reason correctly; they differ because the prudent man follows deliberate choice but the incontinent man does not.
οὐδὲ δὴ ὡς ὁ εἰδὼς καὶ θεωρῶν, ἀλλ' ὡς ὁ καθεύδων ἢ οἰνωμένος. This is not to say that the incontinent man resembles one knowing and actually considering; rather he is like a person asleep or drunk.
                               z.   HE CLARIFIES HIS STATEMENT ABOUT THE DIFFERENCE. — 1461
καὶ ἑκὼν μέν τρόπον γάρ τινα εἰδὼς καὶ ὃ ποιεῖ καὶ οὗ ἕνεκα, πονηρὸς δ' οὔ· ἡ γὰρ προαίρεσις ἐπιεικής· So he acts voluntarily, knowing in some way both what he does and why. But he is not evil for his choice is in a way good.
                         ii.   He infers a corollary. — 1462-1463
ὥσθ' ἡμιπόνηρος. καὶ οὐκ ἄδικος· οὐ γὰρ ἐπίβουλος· ὃ μὲν γὰρ αὐτῶν οὐκ ἐμμενετικὸς οἷς ἂν βουλεύσηται, ὃ δὲ μελαγχολικὸς οὐδὲ βουλευτικὸς ὅλως. Therefore, the incontinent man is partly evil and not absolutely unjust, for he is not a deliberate schemer. However, some incontinent people do deliberate but do not abide by the deliberation; while the impetuous do not deliberate at all.
                   b.   He uses a comparison.
                         i.    He presents his comparison. — 1464
καὶ ἔοικε δὴ ὁ ἀκρατὴς πόλει ἣ ψηφίζεται μὲν ἅπαντα τὰ δέοντα καὶ νόμους ἔχει σπουδαίους, χρῆται δὲ οὐδέν, ὥσπερ Ἀναξανδρίδης ἔσκωψεν
ἡ πόλις ἐβούλεθ', ᾗ νόμων οὐδὲν μέλει·
ὁ δὲ πονηρὸς χρωμένῃ μὲν τοῖς νόμοις, πονηροῖς δὲ χρωμένῃ.
The incontinent man is like a city that reckons everything that is logically necessary and has good laws but keeps none of them; as Anaxandrides sarcastically remarked, a certain city wanted laws but cared nothing about observing them. The evil man, however, is like a city that observes its laws but has only bad ones.
                         ii.   He explains the last statement. — 1465
Continence and incontinence are concerned with matter that goes beyond the habit of the majority, for the continent abide by reason more and the incontinent less than most men can.
                   a.   First. — 1466
ἔστι δ' ἀκρασία καὶ ἐγκράτεια περὶ τὸ ὑπερβάλλον τῆς τῶν πολλῶν ἕξεως· ὃ μὲν γὰρ ἐμμένει μᾶλλον ὃ δ' ἧττον τῆς τῶν πλείστων δυνάμεως. Among the kinds of incontinence, that by which the melancholic incontinently operate is more easily cured than the incontinence of those who take counsel but do not abide by it.
                   b.   Another difference. — 1467-1468
εὐιατοτέρα δὲ τῶν ἀκρασιῶν, ἣν οἱ μελαγχολικοὶ ἀκρατεύονται, τῶν βουλευομένων μὲν μὴ ἐμμενόντων δέ, καὶ οἱ δι' ἐθισμοῦ ἀκρατεῖς τῶν φυσικῶν· ῥᾷον γὰρ ἔθος μετακινῆσαι φύσεως· διὰ γὰρ τοῦτο καὶ τὸ ἔθος χαλεπόν, ὅτι τῇ φύσει ἔοικεν, ὥσπερ καὶ Εὔηνος λέγει
φημὶ πολυχρόνιον μελέτην ἔμεναι, φίλε, καὶ δή
ταύτην ἀνθρώποισι τελευτῶσαν φύσιν εἶναι. τί μὲν οὖν ἐστὶν ἐγκράτεια καὶ τί ἀκρασία καὶ τί καρτερία καὶ τί μαλακία, καὶ πῶς ἔχουσιν αἱ ἕξεις αὗται πρὸς ἀλλήλας, εἴρηται.
Then, too, the habitually incontinent are more easily cured than the naturally incontinent, for it is easier to change a habit than a nature. A habit is difficult to change for the very reason that it is similar to nature; as Evenus would have it: “I say that constant application evolves harmoniously, and it must become men’s nature in the end.” We have now discussed the notion of continence and incontinence, of perseverance and effeminacy; and we have shown in what way these habits are related to one another.
Neque simul prudentem et cetera. Postquam philosophus ostendit quomodo continens et incontinens immaneat vel non immaneat rationi, hic ostendit utrum contingat quod prudentia quae est recta ratio agibilium, sit simul cum incontinentia. Et per hoc solvitur secunda dubitatio quae movebatur contra quintum probabile. Et circa hoc duo facit. Primo ostendit quod prudentem non contingit esse incontinentem secundo ostendit quomodo se habeat incontinens ad prudentiam, ibi, et secundum quidem rationem et cetera. Circa primum tria facit. Primo proponit quod intendit: et dicit quod non contingit, quod idem homo sit simul prudens et incontinens. 1455. Now that the Philosopher has shown how the continent stand by—and the incontinent depart from—reason, he goes on to raise the question [II]: ‘Can prudence (the right reason of things to be done) co-exist with incontinence?” And his answer resolves his second hesitation which he, was advancing on the fifth probability (1317-1319). In this business there are two steps. First [II, A] this conclusion that prudence and incontinence are incompatible; second [II, B], at “They are similar etc.,” the relationship of the incontinent to prudence. He discusses the initial step in a threefold manner. First [A, 1] he plots his course, saying that it is impossible for the same man to be prudent and incontinent at the same time.
Secundo ibi, simul enim etc., probat propositum duabus rationibus. Quarum prima est, quod sicut supra in sexto ostensum est, prudentia simul est cum virtute morali. Et sic simul est aliquis prudens et studiosus secundum virtutem moralem. Sed incontinens non est studiosus secundum virtutem moralem, quia non deduceretur a passionibus. Ergo non potest esse quod aliquis sit simul prudens et incontinens. 1456. Then [A, 2], at “for we have,” he proves this statement with two arguments. The first [A, 2, a], already explained in the sixth book (1172, 1273, 1275, 1285, 1287), is this: prudence accompanies moral virtue, so that a prudent person is likewise morally good But in the present problem of the incontinent there is no moral virtue insofar as the passions are seductive. There fore it is impossible to be prudent and still incontinent.
Secundam rationem ponit ibi: adhuc non in scire et cetera. Non enim dicitur aliquis prudens ex hoc solum quod est sciens; sed ex hoc etiam quod est practicus, idest operativus. Dictum est enim supra in sexto, quod prudentia est praeceptiva opera et non solum consiliativa et iudicativa. Sed incontinens deficit ab eo quod sit practicus. Non enim operatur secundum rationem rectam. Prudens ergo non potest esse incontinens. 1457. At “Again, one” he gives his second argument [A, 2, b]. Prudence involves not just knowledge but practice. According to previous discussions in the sixth book (1216, 1239, 1240, 1269, 1289) prudence not merely counsels and judges what is to be done; it commands. The incontinent man fails in practice, i.e., he does not operate according to right reason. Therefore the prudent man cannot be incontinent.
Tertio ibi: dynum autem etc., assignat rationem, quare quandoque videantur prudentes esse incontinentes. Et dicit quod nihil prohibet dinum, idest ingeniosum seu industrium, esse incontinentem. Et ex hoc contingit quod quandoque videtur, quod quidam prudentes sint incontinentes, quia scilicet dini reputantur prudentes propter hoc quod dinotica differt a prudentia secundum modum praedictum in VI, quia scilicet prudentia se habet ex additione ad dynoticam. 1458. Third [A, 2, c], at “However nothing,” he offers a reason for the phenomenon of prudent people being incontinent. There is no reason why a shrewd character, ingenious and skillful, cannot be incontinent. So, it seems at times that prudent people are incontinent precisely because the shrewd have a reputation for prudence. Now the reason (for the mistaken idea) is the difference between prudence and shrewdness, which is (in the way already described in the sixth book—1275, 1279, 1280) that prudence as it were adds a further connotation to shrewdness.
Deinde cum dicit: et secundum quidem rationem etc., comparat incontinentem prudenti. Et circa hoc duo facit. Primo comparat incontinentem prudenti. Secundo comparat incontinentes adinvicem, ibi, sanabilior autem et cetera. Circa primum duo facit: primo ponit comparationem; secundo adhibet similitudinem, ibi: et assimulatur utique et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo ponit comparationem. Secundo infert corollarium ex dictis, ibi, quare semimalus et cetera. Circa primum tria facit. Primo proponit quod intendit. Et dicit quod incontinens secundum aliquid propinquus est prudenti, scilicet secundum rationem, quia uterque habet rationem rectam. Sed differunt secundum electionem, quam prudens sequitur, incontinens non sequitur. 1459. Then [II, B], at “They are similar,” he compares the incontinent to the prudent man. He treats this point in a twofold manner. First [B, 1] he compares the incontinent to the prudent man. Next [B, 2], at “Among the kinds etc.,” he compares the species of incontinence. He develops the first point in two ways. First [1, a] he makes the comparison. Then [1, b], at “The incontinent man etc.,” he uses a comparison. He handles the initial point in a twofold fashion. First [a, i] he makes his comparison. Then [a, ii], at “Therefore etc.,” he infers a corollary from that. There are three considerations on the first point. First [i, x] he says what he is going to do. He states that the incontinent is like the prudent man in a limited way—according to reason—for both reason correctly. But they differ according to deliberate choice, the prudent man following it and the incontinent man not.
Secundo ibi: neque utique etc., manifestat qualiter sint propinqui secundum rationem. Et dicit quod hoc non est ita quod incontinens sit sicut sciens in habitu et speculans, idest considerans in actu particularia eligibilia. Sed se habet sicut dormiens et vinolentus, in quibus est habitus rationis ligatus, sicut supra expositum est. 1460. Here, in the second place [i, y], at “This is not,” he shows in what sense prudence and incontinence approach reason, by denying that the incontinent person—as it were—habitually knows and actually speculates (i.e., considers) particular things to be chosen. Rather he acts like a dreamer or a drunkard and in whom the habit of reason is suspended (cf. previous explanation 1351-1352).
Tertio ibi: et volens quidem etc., manifestat quod dixerat de differentia secundum electionem. Et dicit, quod incontinens peccat quidem volens. Scit enim quodammodo, scilicet in universali, et illud quod facit, et cuius gratia facit, et alias circumstantias. Unde voluntarie agit. Non tamen est malus, quia non agit ex electione, sed electio eius est epiikes, idest bona, quando est extra passionem. Sed quando supervenit passio, corrumpitur eius electio, et vult malum. Et ideo secundum electionem incontinens differt a prudenti, quia prudentis electio non corrumpitur, incontinentis autem corrumpitur. 1461. Third [i, z], at “So he acts,” he clarifies his statement about the difference in deliberate choice. The incontinent person sins willingly enough, for he knows in a way (i.e., in general) what he does and why and the other circumstances. Therefore his act is voluntary. Still he is not bad because he does not act by choice; when he is not in the throes of passion, his choice is the good or equitable. But when passion sweeps over him, his choice crumbles and he wills evil. So the incontinent man differs from the prudent man according to deliberate choice because the choice of the prudent man is not corrupted but that of the incontinent man is.
Deinde cum dicit: quare semimalus etc., infert correlarium ex dictis. Quia enim ante passionem habet bonam electionem, sed per passionem vult malum, sequitur quod sit ex media parte malus, in quantum scilicet vult malum, et non sit iniustus vel malus simpliciter, quia non est insidiator, quasi ex consilio et electione agens malum. Incontinentium enim quidam, scilicet debiles, consiliantur quidem, sed non immanent consiliatis: melancholici autem et acuti, quos supra dixit praevolantes, totaliter non consiliantur. Unde patet, quod neutri ex consilio et electione agunt malum. 1462. Next [a, ii], at “Therefore,” he draws a corollary. Since the incontinent man did make a good choice before passion but wills evil through passion, he is consequently partly bad (he wills evil) but not absolutely unjust or evil (not a schemer doing evil-as it were-deliberately and by choice). However, one class of the incontinent, the weak, deliberate but do not stand by their resolution; another class, the melancholic and the highly sensitive—previously called impetuous (1421)—do not deliberate at all. So it is clear that neither do evil deliberately and by choice.
Ex his autem, quae dicta sunt, accipere possumus quid sit subiectum continentiae et incontinentiae. Non enim potest dici, quod utriusque subiectum sit concupiscibilis: quia non differunt secundum concupiscentias, quas uterque, scilicet continens et incontinens, habet pravas: neque etiam subiectum utriusque est ratio, quia uterque habet rationem rectam. Relinquitur ergo, quod subiectum utriusque sit voluntas, quia incontinens volens peccat, ut dictum est, continens autem volens immanet rationi. 1463. From these discussions (1455-1462) we can gather what the subject of continence and incontinence is. We cannot say that the subject of each is sensual desire since the continent and incontinent are alike, both having evil desires; nor is the subject of each the reason since both have right reason. It remains then that the subject of each is the will because the incontinent man voluntarily sins, as was just pointed out (1461); the continent man voluntarily keeps to reason.
Deinde cum dicit: et assimulatur utique etc., adhibet similitudinem ad praedicta. Et circa hoc duo facit. Primo proponit similitudinem. Et dicit, quod incontinens assimilatur civitati, cui omnia necessaria calculantur, idest dispensantur, et quae habet bonas leges, sed nulla earum utitur. Sicut Anaxandrides convitiando dixit, quod civitas quaedam volebat leges, cui nihil erat curae de observantia legum. Et similiter incontinens non utitur recta ratione quam habet. Malus autem, puta intemperatus, assimilatur civitati utenti legibus, sed malis. Utitur enim malus perversa ratione. 1464. Then [i, b], at “The incontinent man,” he uses a comparison with which he does two things. First [b, i] he presents his comparison: the incontinent man resembles a city that plans intelligently, arranges everything logically necessary, has good laws, but keeps none of them. Thus Anaxandrides sarcastically said that a certain city wanted laws but cared nothing about observing them. Likewise, the incontinent man does not use the right reason he has. But the bad or the intemperate man in using perverse reason is like a city observing bad laws.
Secundo ibi: est autem incontinentia etc., manifestat quod dixerat: qualiter scilicet incontinens sit similis civitati non utenti rectis legibus. Non enim quilibet excessus rationis rectae facit incontinentem; sed continentia et incontinentia dicuntur secundum id quod excellit habitum, idest facultatem multorum. Continens enim immanet rationi rectae magis quam multi possint, quia vincit concupiscentias, a quibus multi superantur. Incontinens autem minus immanet quam multi possint; quia vincitur a concupiscentiis, quas multi vincunt, ut supra dictum est. 1465. Next [b, ii], at “Continence and incontinence’ “ he explains the last statement (how the incontinent man is like a city that does not observe good laws). In fact, not every excess of right reason makes a man incontinent, but continence and incontinence are so named as being beyond the inclination or habit of the majority. The continent man adheres to right reason more than most people can, for he is the master of sensual desires which are the master of most people. But the incontinent man abides by reason less than most men, because he is overcome by sensual desires which most men overcome, as indicated before (237, 439, 1406, 1410).
Deinde cum dicit: sanabilior autem etc., comparat incontinentes adinvicem secundum duplicem differentiam. Primo enim dicit, quod inter incontinentias illa est sanabilior quam melancolici incontinenter agunt, scilicet non praeconsiliantes, incontinentia eorum qui consiliantur, sed non immanent; quia illi adhibito consilio videntur posse sanari, non autem isti, ut supra dictum est. 1466. At “Among the kinds” [B, 2] he compares the species of the incontinent according to two differences. First [B, 2, a] he says that among the kinds of incontinence, that by which the melancholic—who do not deliberate—incontinently operate is more easily cured than the incontinence of those who deliberate but do not abide by the deliberation. The reason is that the melancholic, it seems, can be cured when counsel has been taken, but not the others (1442-1443).
Secundo ibi: et per consuetudinem etc., comparat incontinentes secundum aliam differentiam. Et dicit, quod illi qui sunt incontinentes per consuetudinem sunt sanabiliores illis qui sunt incontinentes per naturam, scilicet corporalis complexionis ad hoc inclinantis. Quia facilius potest transmutari consuetudo, quam natura. Quia propter quod unumquodque, illud magis. Consuetudo autem propter hoc est difficilis ad immutandum, quia assimilatur naturae, sicut Evenus poeta dicit: aio, idest dico, diuturnam meditationem, idest consuetum studium immanere amice, idest amicabiliter, seu conformiter: et dico hanc finientem, idest quando perficitur, omnibus esse naturam. 1467. Then [B, 2, b], at “Then too,” he compares the incontinent according to another difference. He says that those who are incontinent by habit are more easily cured than the incontinent by nature, i.e., bodily temperament inclining to it, because a habit can be changed more easily than a nature. That, for the sake of which a thing exists, is itself greater. But a habit is difficult to change because of this, that it is like nature. Evenus the poet expresses it this way: “I declare that daily meditation (constant application) develops agreeably, smoothly and harmoniously. This, I say, in the end (when perfected) is nature for all.”
Ultimo autem epilogando concludit, dictum esse quid sit continentia et incontinentia, et perseverantia et mollities, et qualiter hi habitus se habeant adinvicem. 1468. Finally he ends with an epilogue that we have discussed the notion of continence and incontinence, of perseverance and effeminacy; and we have shown in what way these habits are related to one another.

Pleasure and Pain
Chapter 11
      A.  He states his objective. — 1469
περὶ δὲ ἡδονῆς καὶ λύπης θεωρῆσαι τοῦ τὴν πολιτικὴν φιλοσοφοῦντος· The investigation of pleasure and pain pertains to the philosopher of political science;
      B.  He demonstrates his proposition by three arguments.
            1.   THE FIRST (ARGUMENT). — 1470
οὗτος γὰρ τοῦ τέλους ἀρχιτέκτων, πρὸς ὃ βλέποντες ἕκαστον τὸ μὲν κακὸν τὸ δ' ἀγαθὸν ἁπλῶς λέγομεν. for it is to pleasure and pain as an architectonic end that we refer everything in calling this good and that bad in the absolute sense.
            2.   HIS SECOND ARGUMENT. — 1471
ἔτι δὲ καὶ τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἐπισκέψασθαι περὶ αὐτῶν· τήν τε γὰρ ἀρετὴν καὶ τὴν κακίαν τὴν ἠθικὴν περὶ λύπας καὶ ἡδονὰς ἔθεμεν, Besides, it is necessary for the moralist to study these passions, since we have already shown that virtue and vice are concerned with pains and pleasures.
            3.   THE THIRD ARGUMENT. — 1472
καὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν οἱ πλεῖστοι μεθ' ἡδονῆς εἶναί φασιν· διὸ καὶ τὸν μακάριον ὠνομάκασιν ἀπὸ τοῦ χαίρειν. Moreover, many people maintain that happiness is connected with pleasure. For this reason they call the happy man by a name derived from a verb meaning “to enjoy.”
      A.  (He investigates pleasure and pain) in general.
                   a.   He gives (the) opinions. — 1473
τοῖς μὲν οὖν δοκεῖ οὐδεμία ἡδονὴ εἶναι ἀγαθόν, οὔτε καθ' αὑτὸ οὔτε κατὰ συμβεβηκός· οὐ γὰρ εἶναι ταὐτὸ τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἡδονήν· τοῖς δ' ἔνιαι μὲν εἶναι, αἱ δὲ πολλαὶ φαῦλαι. ἔτι δὲ τούτων τρίτον, εἰ καὶ πᾶσαι ἀγαθόν, ὅμως μὴ ἐνδέχεσθαι εἶναι τὸ ἄριστον ἡδονήν. Some philosophers held that pleasure could be called good neither intrinsically nor incidentally, for goodness and pleasure are not identical. Others were of the opinion that some pleasures are good, but most are evil. Still others maintain that even if all pleasures are good, nevertheless no pleasure can be the highest good.
                   b.   He presents supporting arguments.
                         i.    for the first opinion.
                               u.   FIRST. — 1474
ὅλως μὲν οὖν οὐκ ἀγαθόν, ὅτι πᾶσα ἡδονὴ γένεσίς ἐστιν εἰς φύσιν αἰσθητή, οὐδεμία δὲ γένεσις συγγενὴς τοῖς τέλεσιν, οἷον οὐδεμία οἰκοδόμησις οἰκίᾳ. According to them, then, pleasure is not a good at all, because it is a sensate process to a natural term; and no process belongs to the classification of ends, for example, the act of building is never a house.
                               v.   SECOND. — 1475
ἔτι ὁ σώφρων φεύγει τὰς ἡδονάς. Moreover, the temperate man shuns pleasure.
                               w.  THIRD. — 1476
ἔτι ὁ φρόνιμος τὸ ἄλυπον διώκει, οὐ τὸ ἡδύ. Again, the prudent man seeks not pleasure but freedom from pain.
                               x.   FOURTH. — 1477
ἔτι ἐμπόδιον τῷ φρονεῖν αἱ ἡδοναί, καὶ ὅσῳ μᾶλλον χαίρει, μᾶλλον, οἷον τῇ τῶν ἀφροδισίων· οὐδένα γὰρ ἂν δύνασθαι νοῆσαί τι ἐν αὐτῇ. Besides, pleasure hinders a man from being prudent; and the more so as it is more delectable, for example, sexual pleasure. In fact while it is, being experienced no one is capable of turning his mind to anything.
                               y.   FIFTH. — 1478
ἔτι τέχνη οὐδεμία ἡδονῆς· καίτοι πᾶν ἀγαθὸν τέχνης ἔργον. Then too, there is no art of pleasure, although every good is the product of some art.
                               z.   SIXTH. — 1479
ἔτι παιδία καὶ θηρία διώκει τὰς ἡδονάς. Finally, children and dumb animals seek pleasure.
                         ii.   He gives the argument for the second opinion. — 1480
τοῦ δὲ μὴ πάσας σπουδαίας, ὅτι εἰσὶ καὶ αἰσχραὶ καὶ ὀνειδιζόμεναι, καὶ ὅτι βλαβεραί· νοσώδη γὰρ ἔνια τῶν ἡδέων. But not all pleasures of this kind are good, because some are shameful and dishonorable; while others are harmful, causing sickness.
                         iii. He argues for the third opinion. — 1481-1482
ὅτι δ' οὐ τἄριστον ἡδονή, ὅτι οὐ τέλος ἀλλὰ γένεσις. τὰ μὲν οὖν λεγόμενα σχεδὸν ταῦτ' ἐστίν. Furthermore, no pleasure can be the highest good because pleasure is not an end but a kind of generative process. These then are the things usually discussed about pleasure.
De delectatione autem et tristitia et cetera. Postquam philosophus determinavit de continentia et incontinentia, ostendens quod sunt circa delectationes et tristitias, hic intendit determinare de delectationibus et tristitiis. Et primo ostendit quod haec consideratio pertinet ad praesentem intentionem. Secundo, exequitur propositum, ibi, his quidem igitur et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo proponit quod intendit: et dicit quod considerare de delectatione et tristitia pertinet ad eum, qui circa scientiam politicam philosophatur, ad quam tota moralis doctrina reducitur sicut ad principalem, ut in principio habitum est. 1469. After the Philosopher has finished his investigation of continence and incontinence, showing that they are concerned with pleasures and pains, now he intends to investigate pleasures and pains themselves. First [I] he states that this consideration fits in with his present intention. Then [II], at “Some philosophers etc.,” he proceeds with his intention. He discusses the first point from three aspects. First [I, A] he states his objective, saying that a consideration of pleasure and pain pertains to the philosopher who applies himself to political science to which the whole of moral doctrine is reducible as to a principal science, as was pointed out in the beginning (2630).
Secundo ibi: iste enim finis etc., probat propositum tribus rationibus. Quarum prima est quod sicut finis architectonicae artis est ille ad quem respiciunt, sicut ad quamdam mensuram, omnia quae sub illa arte continentur, ita se habet delectatio in his quae pertinent ad moralem doctrinam. Respiciendo enim ad delectationem, dicimus aliquid esse malum et aliquid simpliciter bonum. Illum enim dicimus esse bonum, qui in bonis delectatur; malum autem eum, qui in malis. Et in his etiam quae fiunt, idem iudicium observatur. Iudicamus enim esse malum id quod ex mala delectatione procedit, bonum autem quod ex bona. In qualibet autem scientia maxime considerandum est id quod habetur pro regula. Unde ad philosophum moralem maxime pertinet considerare de delectatione. 1470. Second [I, B], at “for it is etc.,” he demonstrates his proposition by three arguments: first [B, 1], as the end of a master art is the measure to which all affairs of the art are referred, so is pleasure in the matter of moral study. Relevant to pleasure, one thing is called bad, and another, in like fashion, good. A good man is said to be one who is pleased by good things. A bad man, one delighted by evil things. The same judgment is passed on-actions inasmuch as something proceeding from wicked pleasure is judged wicked; on the other hand, good, as proceeding from good pleasure. In any science the principal consideration is that which is taken as a rule. Therefore the moral philosopher in a very special way concerns himself with pleasure.
Secundam rationem ponit ibi: adhuc autem et cetera. Et dicit quod non solum conveniens est morali considerare de delectatione; sed etiam est ei necessarium, quia ad ipsum pertinet considerare virtutes et malitias. Ostensum est autem supra in secundo, quod virtus et malitia moralis sunt circa delectationes et tristitias. Ergo necessarium est morali considerare de delectatione et tristitia. 1471. At “Besides, it is etc.” [B, 2] his second argument proceeds: it is not only proper but necessary for the moral philosopher to investigate pleasure because his duty is to study virtues and vices. As explained in the second book (266-267, 268, 269-272), moral virtue and vice are concerned with pleasures and pains. Therefore, it is necessary for the moralist to consider pleasure and pain.
Tertiam rationem ponit ibi, et felicitatem et cetera. Ad philosophum enim moralem pertinet considerare felicitatem, sicut ultimum finem. Sed plures ponunt esse felicitatem cum delectatione, inter quos etiam et ipse, unde et apud Graecos beatus nominatur a gaudendo; ergo ad moralem philosophum pertinet determinare de delectatione. 1472. Then the third argument [B, 3], at “Moreover, many people etc.”: the moral philosopher must consider happiness as the ultimate end. But the majority, including Aristotle himself, maintain that happiness is connected with pleasure. Hence, among the Greeks the term “happy” is derived from the verb “to rejoice exceedingly.” Therefore, it is the business of the moral philosopher to investigate pleasure.
Deinde cum dicit: his quidem igitur etc., determinat de delectatione et tristitia. Et primo determinat de eis in communi. Secundo specialiter determinat de corporalibus delectationibus, circa quas posuit esse continentiam et incontinentiam, ibi, de corporalibus autem utique et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo prosequitur opiniones impugnantium delectationem. Secundo determinat contrariam veritatem, ibi, sed tamen quoniam et tristitia malum et cetera. Circa primum tria facit. Primo proponit opiniones impugnantium delectationes. Secundo inducit rationes eorum, ibi, totaliter quidem igitur et cetera. Tertio solvit, ibi, quoniam autem non accidit et cetera. Circa primum ponit tres opiniones. Quibusdam enim videbatur, quod nulla delectatio esset bona, neque per se neque per accidens. Et si contingat quod aliquod delectabile sit bonum, non tamen idem est in eo id quod est bonum et delectatio. Alii autem dixerunt, quod delectationes quaedam sunt bonae, sed multae sunt pravae. Et ita non omnis delectatio est bonum. Tertii autem dixerunt, quod etiam si omnes delectationes essent bonae, non tamen continget aliquam delectationem esse optimum. 1473. Then [II], at “Some philosophers,” he investigates pleasure and pain themselves: first [II, A] in general; then [Lect. 14] at “In the matter of etc.” (B. 1154 a 8), in particular he treats physical pleasures with which, as he has already said, continence and incontinence are concerned. He discusses his first point from a double point of view. First [A, 1] he takes up the opinions of philosophers opposing pleasure. Then [Lect. 13], at “But it is obvious etc.” (B. 1153 b), he determines that the truth is the opposite. On this first point he has three operations: first [1, a] he gives opinions opposed to pleasure; second [1, b], at “According to them etc.,” he presents supporting arguments; finally [1, c; Lect. 12], at “From what follows etc.,” he refutes them. First then, three opinions. Some philosophers held that no pleasure could be good either intrinsically or incidentally; and that if a pleasurable thing is good, pleasure and good will not be identical. Others were of the opinion that some pleasures are good but most are evil. Still others maintained that even if all pleasures are good, nevertheless no pleasure can be the highest good.
Deinde cum dicit: totaliter quidem igitur etc., inducit rationes ad praedictas opiniones. Et primo ad primam; secundo ad secundam, ibi: huius autem etc.; tertio ad tertiam, ibi: quod autem non optimum et cetera. Circa primum ponit sex rationes. Quarum prima, sumitur ex definitione delectationis quam ponebant, dicentes quod delectatio est quaedam sensibilis generatio in naturam. Dum enim aliquid sensibiliter aggeneratur naturae nostrae, quasi nobis connaturale, ex hoc delectamur, sicut patet in sumptione cibi et potus. Nulla autem generatio est de genere finium, sed potius generatio est via in finem, sicut aedificatio non est domus. Sed bonum habet rationem finis. Ergo nulla generatio, et per consequens nulla delectatio, est bonum. 1474. At “According to them” [1, b] he presents the arguments in favor of these opinions. At the outset he gives the arguments [b, i] for the first opinion. Then [b, ii], at “But not all etc.,” he gives the argument for the second opinion. Last [b, iii], at “Furthermore, no pleasure etc.,” he argues for the third opinion. Relative to the first point he offers six reasons. The first [i, u] is taken from the definition of pleasure given by those who say that pleasure is a kind of process of the senses to a natural term. When something, as it were connatural to us, is consciously produced in our nature, we delight in it, e.g., eating and drinking. Now no such process belongs to the class of ends (building something is not the thing built) but is rather a means to the end. But good has the nature (ratio) of end. Therefore no process, and consequently no pleasure, is good.
Secundam rationem ponit ibi adhuc temperatus et cetera. Quae talis est. Nullus virtuosus laudatur ex hoc, quod fugit quod bonum est. Temperatus autem laudatur ex hoc quod fugit delectationes. Ergo delectatio non est aliquid bonum. 1475. The second reason [i, v], at “Moreover, the temperate,” is this. No one is praised as virtuous for avoiding good; yet a temperate man is praised for avoiding pleasures. Therefore, pleasure is not something good.
Tertiam rationem ponit ibi, adhuc prudens et cetera. Quae talis est. Sicut prudens persequitur, idest quaerit non tristari, ita etiam quaerit non delectari. Sed tristitia non est bonum. Ergo neque delectatio. 1476. He gives the third reason at “Again, the prudent” [i, w]. It is this: as the prudent man seeks freedom from pain so he seeks freedom from pleasure. But pain is not good and by the same token neither is pleasure.
Quartam rationem ponit ibi, adhuc impedimentum et cetera. Quae talis est. Nullo bono impeditur prudentia. Impeditur autem per delectationes; et tanto magis, quanto sunt maiores; ex quo videtur quod per se et non per accidens impediant: sicut patet quod delectatio venereorum, quae est maxima, intantum impedit rationem quod nullus in ipsa delectatione actuali potest aliquid actu intelligere; sed tota intentio animae trahitur ad delectationem. Ergo delectatio non est aliquid bonum. 1477. The fourth reason [i, x], at “Besides, pleasure,” follows. Prudence is not impeded by any good. But prudence is impeded by pleasure, and all the more as the pleasures are greater. From this it seems that of themselves and not merely incidentally they are obstacles. Thus, sexual pleasure obviously very intense impedes the mind to such an extent that no one is capable of exercising the act of understanding at the time of the act of pleasure, for the whole attention of the mind is drawn to it. Consequently, pleasure is not something good.
Quintam rationem ponit ibi, adhuc ars et cetera. Quae talis est. Omne bonum humanum videtur esse opus alicuius artis, quia bonum hominis ex ratione est. Sed delectatio non est opus alicuius artis, quia nulla ars est ad delectandum. Ergo delectatio non est aliquid bonum. 1478. The fifth reason [i, y], at “Then too,” is the following. Every human good seems to be the work of some art, because man’s good comes from reason. But pleasure is not the product of any art, since no art is merely for pleasure. Therefore, pleasure is not something good.
Sextam rationem ponit ibi, adhuc pueri et cetera. Quae talis est. Illud quod est in homine puerile et bestiale vituperatur. Sed pueri et bestiae persequuntur, id est quaerunt, delectationes. Ergo delectatio non est aliquid bonum. 1479. He gives the sixth reason at “Finally, children” [i, z], and it is this. What is childish and animal in man is blamable. But children and dumb animals pursue pleasures. Therefore, pleasure is not something good.
Deinde cum dicit: huius autem etc., ostendit quod non omnes delectationes sint ostendit quod non omnes delectationes sunt bonae. Et dicit quod huius quod est non omnes delectationes esse bonas, ostensivum est quod sunt quaedam delectationes turpes, idest inhonestae, et probrosae, id est infames, et cum hoc etiam quaedam delectationes sunt nocivae. Quod patet ex hoc quod quaedam delectabilia inducunt homini aegritudinem. Et sic patet quod non omnes delectationes sunt bonae. 1480. Next [b, ii], at “But not all,” he shows that not all pleasures are good. He says that this is proved by the fact that some pleasures are shameful, i.e., dishonorable, opprobrious, notoriously evil, etc.; and over and above this, other pleasures are evidently harmful because some cause sickness. So it is clear that not all pleasures are good.
Deinde cum dicit: quod autem non optimum etc., probat quod nulla delectatio sit optimum, etiam si omnes essent bonae. Finis enim est id quod est optimum. Delectatio autem non est finis, sed magis generatio quaedam. Ergo delectatio non est optimum. 1481. Then [b, iii], at “Furthermore,” he proves that no pleasure is the highest good, even if all pleasures are good, for the end is what is best. But pleasure is not an end but rather a kind of process. Consequently, pleasure is not the highest good.
Ultimo autem epilogando concludit, quod ea quae dicuntur de delectatione fere haec sunt. 1482. He concludes by way of summary: for all practical purposes, these approximate the points raised against pleasure.

Refutation of Previous Arguments
Chapter 12
c.    (Aristotle’s) refutation.
      i.    (Outline of) his discussion. — 1483
From what follows it will be clear that these previous arguments do not prove that pleasure is not a good nor that it is not the highest good.
      ii.   Actual rebuttal.
            x.   DISTINCTIONS TO BE MADE.
                   aa. First. — 1484-1485
ὅτι δ' οὐ συμβαίνει διὰ ταῦτα μὴ εἶναι ἀγαθὸν μηδὲ τὸ ἄριστον, ἐκ τῶνδε δῆλον. πρῶτον μέν, ἐπεὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν διχῶς τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἁπλῶς τὸ δὲ τινί, καὶ αἱ φύσεις καὶ αἱ ἕξεις ἀκολουθήσουσιν, ὥστε καὶ αἱ κινήσεις καὶ αἱ γενέσεις, καὶ αἱ φαῦλαι δοκοῦσαι εἶναι αἳ μὲν ἁπλῶς φαῦλαι τινὶ δ' οὒ ἀλλ' αἱρεταὶ τῷδε, ἔνιαι δ' οὐδὲ τῷδε ἀλλὰ ποτὲ καὶ ὀλίγον χρόνον αἱρεταί, ἁπλῶς δ' οὔ· αἳ δ' οὐδ' ἡδοναί, ἀλλὰ φαίνονται, ὅσαι μετὰ λύπης καὶ ἰατρείας ἕνεκεν, οἷον αἱ τῶν καμνόντων. First of all, good can be distinguished into the absolute and relative good. This distinction is verified of nature and habits, and consequently of movements and processes. Some of these (processes) seem depraved, indeed some are absolutely wicked. However to a particular person they may not seem so, but instead desirable. And again some such processes, ordinarily undesirable, at times—even though the times be few—appear desirable. Some of these are not pleasures at all, but merely appear to be; those for instance that are painful yet taken by the sick as medicine.
                   bb.      Good is twofold. — 1486-1489
ἔτι ἐπεὶ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ τὸ μὲν ἐνέργεια τὸ δ' ἕξις, κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς αἱ καθιστᾶσαι εἰς τὴν φυσικὴν ἕξιν ἡδεῖαί εἰσιν· ἔστι δ' ἡ ἐνέργεια ἐν ταῖς ἐπιθυμίαις τῆς ὑπολοίπου ἕξεως καὶ φύσεως, ἐπεὶ καὶ ἄνευ λύπης καὶ ἐπιθυμίας εἰσὶν ἡδοναί, οἷον αἱ τοῦ θεωρεῖν [ἐνέργειαι], τῆς φύσεως οὐκ ἐνδεοῦς οὔσης. σημεῖον δ' ὅτι οὐ τῷ αὐτῷ ἡδεῖ χαίρουσιν ἀναπληρουμένης τε τῆς φύσεως καὶ καθεστηκυίας, ἀλλὰ καθεστηκυίας μὲν τοῖς ἁπλῶς ἡδέσιν, ἀναπληρουμένης δὲ καὶ τοῖς ἐναντίοις· καὶ γὰρ ὀξέσι καὶ πικροῖς χαίρουσιν, ὧν οὐδὲν οὔτε φύσει ἡδὺ οὔθ' ἁπλῶς ἡδύ. ὥστ' οὐδ' ἡδοναί· ὡς γὰρ τὰ ἡδέα πρὸς ἄλληλα διέστηκεν, οὕτω καὶ αἱ ἡδοναὶ αἱ ἀπὸ τούτων. Besides, one good is an activity and another is a habit. Now those actions producing a natural habit are pleasurable only incidentally. But a pleasurable activity in the appetites indicates an undeveloped and imperfect state, and proceeds from some dispositional or natural principle. For there are pleasures without pain and desire, e.g., that which has to do with contemplative activity, and in these nature is not deficient. An indication of this is that delight is not taken in the same pleasurable objects when nature is normal and when it is surfeited. But a normal nature finds pleasure in things essentially enjoyable while a surfeited nature enjoys pleasures opposed to those which are naturally enjoyable, for example, pungent and bitter foods, none of which are pleasant either by nature or without some qualification. Therefore the pleasures they produce are not—simply speaking—pleasant; for, as pleasant things are compared, so the pleasures they cause.
                   aa. The refutation of the, argument for opinion number three. — 1490-1493
ἔτι οὐκ ἀνάγκη ἕτερόν τι εἶναι βέλτιον τῆς ἡδονῆς, ὥσπερ τινές φασι τὸ τέλος τῆς γενέσεως· οὐ γὰρ γενέσεις εἰσὶν οὐδὲ μετὰ γενέσεως πᾶσαι, ἀλλ' ἐνέργειαι καὶ τέλος· οὐδὲ γινομένων συμβαίνουσιν ἀλλὰ χρωμένων· καὶ τέλος οὐ πασῶν ἕτερόν τι, ἀλλὰ τῶν εἰς τὴν τελέωσιν ἀγομένων τῆς φύσεως. διὸ καὶ οὐ καλῶς ἔχει τὸ αἰσθητὴν γένεσιν φάναι εἶναι τὴν ἡδονήν, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον λεκτέον ἐνέργειαν τῆς κατὰ φύσιν ἕξεως, ἀντὶ δὲ τοῦ αἰσθητὴν ἀνεμπόδιστον. δοκεῖ δὲ γένεσίς τισιν εἶναι, ὅτι κυρίως ἀγαθόν· τὴν γὰρ ἐνέργειαν γένεσιν οἴονται εἶναι, ἔστι δ' ἕτερον. There is no need for some other thing to be better than pleasure because of the opinion of some that the result is better than the process. Indeed, not all pleasures are processes nor even involve them; in fact some are activities, and consequently, ends. Neither do such pleasures come from something achieved but from use. Not all pleasures have an end extrinsic to themselves but only pleasures connected with things leading to the perfection of our nature. Likewise, for this reason it is not correct to define pleasure as an experienced process; rather it should be called an activity of a natural habit. In place of “experienced” we should put “unimpeded.” But pleasure seemed to some a process because concerned with what is principally good (an activity), that they consider a process, although it is really something consequent to it.
                   bb.      The dismissal of the argument for opinion number two. — 1494
τὸ δ' εἶναι φαύλας ὅτι νοσώδη ἔνια ἡδέα, τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ ὅτι ὑγιεινὰ ἔνια φαῦλα πρὸς χρηματισμόν. ταύτῃ οὖν φαῦλα ἄμφω, ἀλλ' οὐ φαῦλα κατά γε τοῦτο, ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸ θεωρεῖν ποτὲ βλάπτει πρὸς ὑγίειαν. But to prove that pleasures are evil because some pleasurable things cause sickness is about the same as to argue that remedies are bad because expensive. Such pleasure and sickness are of course bad, but not for this reason, since even contemplation may occasionally injure health.
                   cc. The refutation of the argument behind the first opinion.
                         a’  (Answer to) the fourth argument. — 1495
ἐμποδίζει δὲ οὔτε φρονήσει οὔθ' ἕξει οὐδεμιᾷ ἡ ἀφ' ἑκάστης ἡδονή, ἀλλ' αἱ ἀλλότριαι, ἐπεὶ αἱ ἀπὸ τοῦ θεωρεῖν καὶ μανθάνειν μᾶλλον ποιήσουσι θεωρεῖν καὶ μανθάνειν. However, neither prudence nor any other habit is hindered by its own pleasure, although every habit is impeded by alien pleasures. On the other hand, the pleasures connected with investigation and learning make a man investigate and learn more.
                         b’  (A reply) to the fifth argument. — 1496
τὸ δὲ τέχνης μὴ εἶναι ἔργον ἡδονὴν μηδεμίαν εὐλόγως συμβέβηκεν· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἄλλης ἐνεργείας οὐδεμιᾶς τέχνη ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ τῆς δυνάμεως· καίτοι καὶ ἡ μυρεψικὴ τέχνη καὶ ἡ ὀψοποιητικὴ δοκεῖ ἡδονῆς εἶναι. No pleasure—it seems reasonable to say—is the product of art because art does not have the power to bring about any activity but only capacity to act. However, the arts of perfumery and of cookery do seem ordered to pleasure.
                         c’  (A refutation of) the second, third, and sixth arguments. — 1497
τὸ δὲ τὸν σώφρονα φεύγειν καὶ τὸν φρόνιμον διώκειν τὸν ἄλυπον βίον, καὶ τὸ τὰ παιδία καὶ τὰ θηρία διώκειν, τῷ αὐτῷ λύεται πάντα. ἐπεὶ γὰρ εἴρηται πῶς ἀγαθαὶ ἁπλῶς καὶ πῶς οὐκ ἀγαθαὶ πᾶσαι αἱ ἡδοναί, τὰς τοιαύτας καὶ τὰ θηρία καὶ τὰ παιδία διώκει, καὶ τὴν τούτων ἀλυπίαν ὁ φρόνιμος, τὰς μετ' ἐπιθυμίας καὶ λύπης, καὶ τὰς σωματικάς τοιαῦται γὰρ αὗται καὶ τὰς τούτων ὑπερβολάς, καθ' ἃς ὁ ἀκόλαστος ἀκόλαστος. διὸ ὁ σώφρων φεύγει ταύτας, ἐπεὶ εἰσὶν ἡδοναὶ καὶ σώφρονος. The arguments that the temperate man avoids pleasures, that the prudent man seeks a life free from pain and that children and brutes seek pleasures—all have the same solution; for we have shown how some pleasures are good in the absolute sense and how not all pleasures are of this nature. These non-absolute pleasures are pursued by children and animals and cause the grief that the prudent man avoids. The reference is to physical pleasures accompanied by both desire and pain. These are the kind just mentioned (non-absolute goods); and excesses in them make a man intemperate. The temperate man avoids these pleasures, for he has other pleasures distinctively his own.
Quoniam autem non accidit et cetera. Postquam philosophus posuit rationes ad opiniones praemissas, hic intendit eas solvere. Et primo proponit quod intendit, dicens quod ex sequentibus erit manifestum, quod propter praedictas rationes non sequitur neque quod delectatio non sit bona, neque quod non sit optima. Praetermittit autem mediam opinionem quae ponebat: non omnes delectationes esse bonas quia est aliqualiter vera; has autem duas simul commemorat quia ex similibus rationibus procedunt, unde et simul solvuntur. 1483. Now that Aristotle has stated the arguments for these previous opinions, he begins their refutation [i, c]. First of all [c, i] he outlines his discussion which will show that the arguments advanced do not really prove that pleasure is not good, nor that it is not the very best thing. He begins with the second opinion, “Not all pleasures are good,” because in a way this is true. The other two (i.e., the first and the third) he deals with together, because their arguments are so much alike that they can be answered simultaneously.
Secundo ibi, primum quidem etc., solvit praedictas rationes. Et primo praemittit quasdam distinctiones per quas potest sciri qualiter delectatio sit bona vel non bona. Secundo solvit rationes inductas, ibi: adhuc non necessarium et cetera. Circa primum ponit duas distinctiones. Quarum utraque sumitur secundum distinctionem boni, quod est delectationis obiectum. Dicit ergo primo, quod bonum dupliciter dicitur. Uno modo id quod est bonum simpliciter. Alio modo id quod est bonum alicui. Et quia omnia in bonum tendunt, consequenter ad hoc se habent et naturae et habitus, qui scilicet ordinantur vel ad bonum simpliciter vel ad id quod est alicui bonum. Et quia motiones et generationes ex quibusdam naturis et habitibus procedunt, oportet quod etiam consequenter eodem modo se habeat circa eas, ut scilicet quaedam earum sint bonae simpliciter et quaedam sint bonae alicui. Sic igitur, supposito quod delectationes sint motiones et generationes, ut adversarius dicit, distinguenda sunt quatuor genera delectationum. 1484. Then [c, ii], at “First of all,” he makes the actual rebuttal. First [ii, x] he introduces distinctions to be made, by which we can know how pleasure is good or bad. Next [ii, y], at “There is no need,” he refutes arguments already presented. On the first point he makes two distinctions, both taken according to the distinct good which is the object of pleasure. First [x, aa], something is good in two ways: first, absolutely; then, relative to some individual. Because all things tend to good, so do both natures and habits that are ordered either to good absolutely or to the good of an individual. And because movements and generations proceed from particular natures and habits, they too must be consequently related to these things in the same way: some are good absolutely and others for a particular individual. Hence on the supposition that pleasures are movements and processes, as our opponent contends, four kinds of pleasure must be distinguished.
Quarum quaedam sunt bonae simpliciter, sicut delectationes in operibus virtutum. Quaedam autem delectationes simpliciter quidem videntur pravae, sed quantum ad aliquem unum non sunt pravae, sed eligibiles ei propter aliquam necessitatem, sicut infirmanti sumere medicinalia. Tertio autem gradu quaedam neque huic sunt simpliciter eligibiles et bonae, sed aliquando et per paucum tempus, non tamen sunt ei eligibiles simpliciter, sicut furari cibum in articulo extremae necessitatis. Quarto autem gradu sunt quaedam delectationes, quae etiam non sunt vere delectationes, sed apparent propter corruptam dispositionem eius qui in talibus delectatur, sicut quaecumque delectationes sunt cum tristitia vel dolore, assumuntur ut medicinae illius doloris. Sicut patet de his in quibus delectantur laborantes, idest infirmantes. Delectabile enim videtur quandoque infirmo vertere se per lectum et sumere aliqua acerba vel aliquid simile. 1485, Some of these are good absolutely, as pleasures in virtuous works. On the contrary, others seem absolutely bad, although in a way desirable to a particular person by reason of some necessity, for example, medicine to a sick man. A third class are not consistently chosen by anyone but only at times and for a short period, e.g., the taking of food in the case of extreme necessity. A fourth class of pleasures comprise counterfeit pleasures because of the perverse disposition of the one who delights in them: such are pleasures accompanied by sadness or pain, and taken to relieve that pain. This is evident of diversions resorted to by the feverish or the weak, for sometimes it seems a relief to a sick man to twist and turn in bed and take bitter foods and so forth.
Secundam distinctionem ponit ibi: adhuc quia boni et cetera. Et dicit quod duplex est bonum: quoddam quidem se habet per modum operationis, sicut consideratio; quoddam autem per modum habitus, sicut scientia. Horum autem, operatio est sicut bonum perfectum, quia est perfectio secunda; habitus autem est sicut bonum imperfectum, quia est perfectio prima. Unde et delectatio vera et perfecta consistit in bono quod est operatio. Illae vero actiones vel motiones quae constituunt hominem in habitum naturalem, idest quae sunt naturalis habitus constitutivae, sunt quidem delectabiles, sed secundum accidens. Nondum enim habent rationem boni, quia praecedunt etiam ipsum habitum qui est perfectio prima. Sed secundum ordinem ad hoc bonum, habent rationem boni et delectabilis. 1486. At “Besides, one” [x, bb] he makes the other distinction, that good is twofold. One is an activity, for instance, contemplation; the other is a habit, for example, science. But of these, activity seems to be the perfect good because it is an additional perfection, while habit seems to be the imperfect good because it is an initial perfection. Consequently, genuine and perfect pleasure is found in the good that consists in an activity. Nevertheless those actions or movements that produce a natural habit in man, i.e., which are formative natural habits, are indeed pleasurable but only incidentally. They do not yet have the nature of good because they precede even the habit itself, which is the initial perfection. But by reason of a relation to this good they have the nature of goodness and pleasure.
Manifestum est autem, quod operatio delectabilis quae est in concupiscentia non est operatio habitus perfecti, quia perfecto habitu non remanet aliquid concupiscendum quod ad istum habitum pertineat. Unde oportet quod talis operatio procedat ex aliquo principio habituali seu naturali, quod est cum tristitia. Non enim est absque tristitia quod aliquis concupiscat perfectionem naturalem quam nondum habet. 1487. Obviously a pleasurable activity accompanied by desire is not the activity of a perfect habit, since there is nothing left to desire that belongs to the habit when it is perfect. Therefore an activity of this kind must proceed from some dispositional. or natural principle, which is accompanied by pain; it is not without pain that a man covets a natural perfection that he does not yet possess.
Quod autem non omnes operationes delectabiles sint tales, patet: quia inveniuntur quaedam delectationes quae sunt sine tristitia et concupiscentia, sicut patet de delectatione quae est circa operationes speculationis. Talis enim delectatio non est cum aliqua indigentia naturae, sed potius procedit ex naturae perfectione, puta ex ratione perfecta per habitum scientiae. Sic ergo vere et per se delectationes sunt illae quae sunt circa operationes procedentes ex habitibus, seu naturis et formis iam existentibus. Illae autem delectationes quae sunt circa operationes constitutivas habituum et naturarum non sunt vere et simpliciter delectationes, sed per accidens. 1488. However, it is evident that not all pleasurable activities are of this kind, because some pleasures are without pain and desire, as obviously is the pleasure that has to do with contemplative activity. Such pleasure is not associated with any need in nature but rather proceeds from its perfection, i.e., from reason perfected by the habit of science. So then the pleasures connected with activities proceeding from habits, i.e., natures and forms already existing, are pleasures in the true and perfect sense. But those producing habits and natures are not pleasures in the true and perfect sense but only in an imperfect manner.
Et huius signum est, quia si essent huiusmodi vere delectabilia, in omni statu delectabilia essent: quod patet esse falsum; quia non eodem delectabili gaudet natura superimpleta, puta cum homo nimis comedit, et natura constituta, idest bene disposita. Natura enim bene disposita gaudet his quae sunt simpliciter delectabilia, quae scilicet sunt convenientia naturae humanae. Sed natura superimpleta gaudet in quibusdam contrariis his quae sunt simpliciter delectabilia. Gaudent enim homines repleti quibusdam acutis et amaris eo quod faciunt digerere cibum, cum tamen nihil eorum sit naturaliter delectabile, quia non est simile naturae humanae, sed in excessu se habens. Ex quo sequitur quod neque etiam sint simpliciter delectationes quae ab eis causantur. Quia sicut se habent delectabilia adinvicem, ita etiam se habent et delectationes quae ab eis causantur. 1489. An indication of this is that if pleasures of this kind were really and completely enjoyable, they would be so under any condition. This is patently false because a gorged nature (present when a man has eaten too much) and a temperate or well regulated nature do not enjoy the same pleasure. Nature properly controlled finds delight in things essentially enjoyable and in keeping with human nature. But a gorged nature enjoys pleasures just the opposite of those that are unconditionally enjoyable. In fact well-fed people enjoy pungent and bitter foods as a help to digestion, although nothing naturally pleasant, not being akin to human nature, but excessive. From this it follows that the pleasures produced by them are not pleasures in the unqualified sense. The reason is that, as enjoyable things are compared, so are the pleasures they cause.
Deinde cum dicit adhuc non necessarium etc., solvit rationes supra inductas. Et primo solvit rationem inductam ad tertiam opinionem. Secundo rationem inductam ad secundam, ibi, esse autem pravas et cetera. Tertio rationes quae sunt inductae ad primam, ibi, impedit autem et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod non est necessarium quod delectatio non sit optimum, sed aliquid aliud sit melius delectatione. Quod quidam hac ratione dicunt, quia finis est melior generatione. Delectationem vero ponunt generationem. 1490. Next [ii, y], at “There is no need,” he refutes these arguments (1473-1481): first [y, aa] the refutation of the argument for opinion number three; then [y, bb], at “But to prove etc.,” the dismissal of the argument for opinion number two; finally [y, cc], at “However, neither etc.,” the refutation of the argument behind the first opinion. He says first there is no need to exclude pleasure entirely as the highest good so that something else must be better than pleasure. Some hold this for the reason that the result is more excellent than the process. But they consider pleasure a kind of process.
In quo quidem falsum supponunt: quia, ut ex praemissis patet, non omnes delectationes sunt generationes aut cum generatione. Tales enim sunt solae illae quae sunt cum tristitia et concupiscentia constitutivae habituum, sed quaedam sunt operationes. Et ex hoc habent rationem finis, quia operatio est perfectio secunda, ut dictum est. Et huiusmodi delectationes non accidunt factorum, idest his quae fiunt, sed utentium, idest utentibus, quasi dicat: non consistunt huiusmodi delectationes in ipso fieri habituum, sed in usu eorum iam existentium. Et secundum hoc patet, quod non oportet quod omnium delectationum alterum aliquid sit finis, sed solummodo illarum delectationum quae sequuntur operationes ducentes ad perfectionem naturae quae sunt cum concupiscentia. 1491. Certainly there is a false supposition here, because not all pleasures are kinds of process nor are they accompanied by some process, as is evident from the premises (1487-1489). Only those pleasures that create habits with pain and desire are so. But some pleasures are activities, and have the nature of end because an activity is the second perfection, as has been pointed out (1486). Such pleasures do not come from production, i.e., from things that are being formed but from use. What Aristotle means is: these pleasures do not consist in the formation of habits but in the exercise of already existing habits. Obviously then it is not necessary that the purpose of all pleasures be something other than the pleasures themselves; this is verified only in pleasures following operations that lead to the perfection of a nature and accompany desire.
Et ex hoc etiam tollitur definitio delectationis quae inducebatur in prima ratione primae opinionis. Non enim bene se habet dicere quod delectatio sit generatio sensibilis, quod convenit imperfectis delectationibus; sed magis dicendum est, secundum quod convenit perfectis delectationibus, quod delectatio sit operatio habitus connaturalis iam existentis. 1492. Likewise, by reason of this we must reject the definition of pleasure introduced with the first argument for to define pleasure as an experienced process—this is proper to imperfect pleasures—rather we must make the definition that harmonizes with perfect pleasures: pleasure is the connatural activity of a habit already existing.
Et loco eius quod posuerunt sensibilem, ponamus nos non impeditam, ut sit haec diffinitio delectationis: delectatio est operatio non impedita habitus qui est secundum naturam, idest qui naturae habentis congruit. Impedimentum autem operationis difficultatem causat in operando, quae delectationem excludit. Ideo autem quibusdam visum est quod delectatio esset generatio quaedam, quoniam delectatio est circa id quod est principaliter bonum, idest circa operationem quam existimant esse idem generationi, cum tamen non sit idem, sed aliquid posterius. Nam generatio est via in naturam, operatio autem est usus naturalis formae aut habitus. 1493. In place of the word “experienced” they used, let us substitute “unimpeded,” so that accordingly the definition of pleasure will be: an unimpeded activity of a habit that is natural, harmonizing with the nature of the one having it. Now the impediment to the operation causes difficulty in operating, and this prevents pleasure. For this reason it seemed to some that pleasure is a kind of process because pleasure is concerned with what is principally good, namely, an activity that they consider to be the same as generation, although it is not the same but something consequent to it. In fact generation is a process toward a nature, but activity is the use of a natural form or habit.
Deinde cum dicit: esse autem pravas etc., solvit rationem inductam pro secunda opinione. Et dicit quod hoc quod probabatur esse quasdam delectationes pravas, quia sunt quaedam delectabilia inducentia aegritudinem, idem est ac si concluderetur quod quaedam sanativa sunt prava quia nocent pecuniae, quae in ea expenditur. Dicendum est igitur quod ambo, scilicet delectabilia et sana, sunt prava ex una parte, scilicet inquantum nocent delectabilia quidem sanitati, sanativa vero pecuniae, sed non sunt prava secundum hoc, idest inquantum sunt sanativa vel delectabilia. Quia secundum eamdem rationem posset concludi quod speculatio veritatis esset prava, quia aliquando nocet sanitati. 1494. Then [y, bb], at “But to prove,” he disproves the reason for the second opinion. He says that to conclude that some pleasures are evil because some pleasurable objects lead to sickness is the same as to infer that some remedies are evil because they are expensive. We must say then that both, pleasurable and healthful things, are evil from one angle, inasmuch as pleasurable objects are injurious to health and remedies cost money but they are not evil in this, that they are curative or, delightful. Such logic leads to a conclusion that contemplation is bad because at times it injures health.
Deinde cum dicit: impedit autem etc., solvit rationes inductas pro prima opinione: quarum prima iam soluta est. Unde primo solvit quartam. Secundo quintam, ibi, artis autem non esse et cetera. Tertio simul secundam, tertiam et sextam, ibi, temperatum autem fugere et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod non praestat impedimentum neque prudentiae neque alicui alii habitui delectatio propria, quae scilicet est ab unoquoque, sed alienae delectationes unicuique impedimentum praestant, quin immo delectationes propriae coadiuvant ad unumquodque. Sicut delectatio qua quis delectatur in speculando et discendo facit hominem magis speculari et discere. Et sic non sequitur quod delectatio sit malum simpliciter, sed quod aliqua delectatio sit mala alicui. 1495. At “However, neither prudence [y, cc] he refutes the arguments supporting the first opinion-the first argument has already been resolved (1490-1494). Hence, first [cc, a’] he answers the fourth argument. Next [cc, b’], at “No pleasure etc.,” he replies to the fifth argument. Last [cc, c’], at “The arguments that etc.,” he disproves the second, third, and sixth arguments together. He says first that neither prudence nor any other habit is impeded by its own pleasure arising from the habit itself but by pleasure alien to it. Nay rather, proper pleasures are a help to every habit. Thus the pleasure which a man takes in investigating and learning causes him to investigate and learn more. So it does not follow that pleasure must be an evil to everyone.
Deinde cum dicit: artis autem non esse etc., solvit quintam rationem. Et dicit quod rationabiliter accidit quod nulla delectatio sit opus artis; ea enim quae est vere et proprie delectatio consequitur operationem, non autem generationem. Ars autem est factiva generationis, quia est recta ratio factibilium, ut in VI dictum est, non est autem ars factiva operationis, sed potentiae alicuius ex qua procedit operatio. Quamvis posset solvi per interemptionem; quia pigmentaria ars et pulmentaria videtur ordinari ad delectationem; tamen non sunt ipsius delectationis factivae sed delectabilium. 1496. Next [cc, b’], at “No pleasure,” he replies to the fifth argument, saying that it is reasonable to maintain that no pleasure is a product of art. The reason is that what is truly and properly pleasure follows activity and not process. But art has the power to bring about some process because it is the right plan of things to be made, as was explained in the sixth book (1153, 1160, 1166); however, it does not have the power to bring about activity but only the capacity from which activity springs. Still a rebuttal could be offered: the arts of perfumery and cookery seem ordered to pleasures. Just the same these arts cannot give pleasure; they more precisely manufacture things which may give pleasure.
Deinde cum dicit temperatum autem etc., solvit simul secundam, tertiam et sextam rationem. Et dicit quod hoc quod temperatus fugit delectationes (quod erat secunda ratio) et hoc quod prudens quaerit vitam sine tristitia (quod erat tertia ratio) et hoc quod pueri et bestiae quaerunt delectationes (quod erat sexta ratio), omnia habent eandem solutionem. Dictum est enim quod quaedam delectationes sunt bonae simpliciter, et quomodo non omnes sunt tales. Et huiusmodi delectationes, quae scilicet non sunt bonae simpliciter quaerunt pueri et bestiae, et harum tristitiam fugit prudens. Et loquimur de corporalibus delectationibus quae sunt cum concupiscentia et tristitia. Et tales sunt huiusmodi delectationes, scilicet non bonae simpliciter. Et secundum harum superabundantias dicitur aliquis intemperatus. Unde et hae sunt illae delectationes quas temperatus fugit. Sunt autem quaedam delectationes propriae temperati, prout scilicet in operatione propria delectatur; et has non fugit, sed quaerit. 1497. Then [cc, c’], at “The arguments that,” he disproves the second, third, and sixth arguments. He says that the fact that the temperate man avoids pleasures (the second reason), that the prudent man seeks a life free from pain (the third reason), and that children and dumb animals seek pleasures (the sixth reason).all have the same solution. We have shown (1485) how some pleasures are good in the absolute sense, and how not all pleasures are of this kind. Such pleasures (the non-absolute kind) children and brutes seek, and it is the pain in these that the prudent man avoids. The question here concerns physical pleasures accompanied by desire and pain. These pleasures are not good in an unqualified way. And from their excesses a man becomes intemperate. Consequently these same pleasures a temperate man avoids. But still others are characteristic of the temperate man precisely as he enjoys his own activity; and these he does not avoid but rather seeks.

One Pleasure Is the Highest Good
Chapter 13
      A.  Pleasure is a good.
            1.   HIS ARGUMENT. — 1498-1499
ἀλλὰ μὴν ὅτι καὶ ἡ λύπη κακόν, ὁμολογεῖται, καὶ φευκτόν· ἣ μὲν γὰρ ἁπλῶς κακόν, ἣ δὲ τῷ πῇ ἐμποδιστική. τῷ δὲ φευκτῷ τὸ ἐναντίον ᾗ φευκτόν τι καὶ κακόν, ἀγαθόν. ἀνάγκη οὖν τὴν ἡδονὴν ἀγαθόν τι εἶναι. But it is obvious that pain is evil and to be avoided. Now one kind is evil simply, and another in a limited sense, in that it hinders good. But the contrary of what is to be avoided—to the extent it is evil and to be avoided—is good. Therefore pleasure is necessarily a good.
            2.   HE RULES OUT ONE ANSWER. — 1500-1503
ὡς γὰρ Σπεύσιππος ἔλυεν, οὐ συμβαίνει ἡ λύσις, ὥσπερ τὸ μεῖζον τῷ ἐλάττονι καὶ τῷ ἴσῳ ἐναντίον· οὐ γὰρ ἂν φαίη ὅπερ κακόν τι εἶναι τὴν ἡδονήν. To answer with Speusippus (that pleasure is opposed to pain and to good) as the greater to the less and to the equal is not a valid solution, for he would not hold that pleasure is some thing really evil.
      B.  One pleasure is the highest good.
                   a.   By two arguments (the first).
                         i.    He gives his argument.
                               x.   HE REFUTES A CONTRARY ARGUMENT. — 1504
τἄριστόν τ' οὐδὲν κωλύει ἡδονήν τινα εἶναι, εἰ ἔνιαι φαῦλαι ἡδοναί, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπιστήμην τινὰ ἐνίων φαύλων οὐσῶν. However, there is nothing to prevent some pleasure from being the highest good, even if some pleasures are evil; just as a particular science is the highest even if some sciences are bad.
                               y.   THE ARGUMENT FOR HIS STATEMENT... BY DIRECT PROOFS. — 1505
ἴσως δὲ καὶ ἀναγκαῖον, εἴπερ ἑκάστης ἕξεώς εἰσιν ἐνέργειαι ἀνεμπόδιστοι, εἴθ' ἡ πασῶν ἐνέργειά ἐστιν εὐδαιμονία εἴτε ἡ τινὸς αὐτῶν, ἂν ᾖ ἀνεμπόδιστος, αἱρετωτάτην εἶναι· τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶν ἡδονή. ὥστε εἴη ἄν τις ἡδονὴ τὸ ἄριστον, τῶν πολλῶν ἡδονῶν φαύλων οὐσῶν, εἰ ἔτυχεν, ἁπλῶς. Perhaps it is even necessary that, inasmuch as there are unimpeded activities of every habit, and happiness arises from the unimpeded activity of all these habits or of one of them, that activity should be the object most worthy of our choice. And this activity is pleasure. Therefore some pleasure will be the highest good even though many pleasures are absolutely evil.
                         ii.   He clarifies his statement inferring some corollaries.
                               x.   FIRST. — 1506
καὶ διὰ τοῦτο πάντες τὸν εὐδαίμονα ἡδὺν οἴονται βίον εἶναι, καὶ ἐμπλέκουσι τὴν ἡδονὴν εἰς τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν, εὐλόγως· οὐδεμία γὰρ ἐνέργεια τέλειος ἐμποδιζομένη, ἡ δ' εὐδαιμονία τῶν τελείων· For this reason everyone thinks that a happy life is a pleasant one; and understandably they associate pleasure with happiness, for no perfect activity is impeded. But happiness is a perfect good.
                               y.   HE FURTHER CONCLUDES. — 1507
διὸ προσδεῖται ὁ εὐδαίμων τῶν ἐν σώματι ἀγαθῶν καὶ τῶν ἐκτὸς καὶ τῆς τύχης, ὅπως μὴ ἐμποδίζηται ταῦτα. οἱ δὲ τὸν τροχιζόμενον καὶ τὸν δυστυχίαις μεγάλαις περιπίπτοντα εὐδαίμονα φάσκοντες εἶναι, ἐὰν ᾖ ἀγαθός, ἢ ἑκόντες ἢ ἄκοντες οὐδὲν λέγουσιν. Therefore the happy man needs goods of the body and external goods of fortune so that he may not be impeded in his activity. People who say that a virtuous man is happy even when tossed about I and overcome by great misfortune talk nonsense either willingly or unwillingly.
                               z.   A THIRD COROLLARY. — 1508
διὰ δὲ τὸ προσδεῖσθαι τῆς τύχης δοκεῖ τισὶ ταὐτὸν εἶναι ἡ εὐτυχία τῇ εὐδαιμονίᾳ, οὐκ οὖσα, ἐπεὶ καὶ αὐτὴ ὑπερβάλλουσα ἐμπόδιός ἐστιν, καὶ ἴσως οὐκέτι εὐτυχίαν καλεῖν δίκαιον· πρὸς γὰρ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν ὁ ὅρος αὐτῆς. Because of this need it seemed to some philosophers that good fortune is identical with happiness. But this is not true, because too much good fortune is itself an obstacle. Moreover, it is perhaps not right to call superabundance good fortune, for its limit is fixed by reference to happiness.
                   b.   The second argument.
                         i.    He states (it). — 1509
καὶ τὸ διώκειν δ' ἅπαντα καὶ θηρία καὶ ἀνθρώπους τὴν ἡδονὴν σημεῖόν τι τοῦ εἶναί πως τὸ ἄριστον αὐτήν·
φήμη δ' οὔτις πάμπαν ἀπόλλυται, ἥν τινα λαοί
The fact that all things including brutes and men seek pleasure is some indication that it is the highest good; for a belief prevalent among most people never dies completely.
                         ii.   He excludes a possible objection (two reasons).
                               x.   FIRST. — 1510
ἀλλ' ἐπεὶ οὐχ ἡ αὐτὴ οὔτε φύσις οὔθ' ἕξις ἡ ἀρίστη οὔτ' ἔστιν οὔτε δοκεῖ, οὐδ' ἡδονὴν διώκουσι τὴν αὐτὴν πάντες, ἡδονὴν μέντοι πάντες. However, since neither the same nature nor the same habit is the best for all either really or apparently, all do not seek the same pleasure although they all do seek pleasure.
                               y.   SECOND. — 1511
ἴσως δὲ καὶ διώκουσιν οὐχ ἣν οἴονται οὐδ' ἣν ἂν φαῖεν, ἀλλὰ τὴν αὐτήν· πάντα γὰρ φύσει ἔχει τι θεῖον. Perhaps they do not think nor would they acknowledge that they pursue the same pleasure but in fact they do, for all things naturally have in themselves something divine.
            2.   HE ASSIGNS THE REASON FOR AN ERROR. — 1512
ἀλλ' εἰλήφασι τὴν τοῦ ὀνόματος κληρονομίαν αἱ σωματικαὶ ἡδοναὶ διὰ τὸ πλειστάκις τε παραβάλλειν εἰς αὐτὰς καὶ πάντας μετέχειν αὐτῶν· διὰ τὸ μόνας οὖν γνωρίμους εἶναι ταύτας μόνας οἴονται εἶναι. Bodily pleasures have usurped the right to the name because most people are inclined to them and all share them. Moreover, because these pleasures alone are familiar, they are thought to be the only pleasures.
      A.  The first (inconsistency). — 1513
φανερὸν δὲ καὶ ὅτι, εἰ μὴ ἡδονὴ ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἡ ἐνέργεια, οὐκ ἔσται ζῆν ἡδέως τὸν εὐδαίμονα· τίνος γὰρ ἕνεκα δέοι ἂν αὐτῆς, εἴπερ μὴ ἀγαθόν, ἀλλὰ καὶ λυπηρῶς ἐνδέχεται ζῆν; Obviously if pleasure and pleasurable activity are not something good, the happy man will not live a pleasant life. For what reason would a happy life need pleasure if it were not good?
      B.  (The) next (inconsistency). — 1514
οὔτε κακὸν γὰρ οὔτ' ἀγαθὸν ἡ λύπη, εἴπερ μηδ' ἡδονή· ὥστε διὰ τί ἂν φεύγοι; But it would be possible to live a happy life in pain, for if pleasure is neither good nor evil, the same would hold for pain. Why then avoid it?
      C.  The third inconsistency. — 1515
οὐδὲ δὴ ἡδίων ὁ βίος ὁ τοῦ σπουδαίου, εἰ μὴ καὶ αἱ ἐνέργειαι αὐτοῦ. Nor would the life of a virtuous man be pleasurable if his activities were not pleasurable.
Sed tamen quoniam et tristitia malum et cetera. Postquam philosophus prosecutus est opiniones impugnantium delectationem et solvit rationes eorum, hic ostendit contrariam veritatem. Et primo per rationes ostensivas. Secundo ducendo ad inconveniens, ibi, manifestum autem et quoniam et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo ostendit, quod delectatio sit bonum. Secundo, quod aliqua delectatio sit optimum, ibi: optimum autem nihil prohibet et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo ponit rationem. Secundo excludit quamdam responsionem, ibi, ut enim Speusippus et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod confessum est ab omnibus quod tristitia est simpliciter malum aliquid et fugiendum. Sed hoc dupliciter. Quaedam enim tristitia est simpliciter malum, sicut tristitia quae est de bono, quaedam autem est mala secundum quid, inquantum scilicet est impeditiva boni. Quia etiam tristitia quae est de malo impedit animum ne prompte et expedite operetur bonum. 1498. After the Philosopher has treated the opinions and answered the arguments of those attacking pleasure, he now shows the opposite truth. He supports his statement first [I] by direct proofs; then [II], at “Obviously if etc.,” by concluding to the inconsistent. On the first point he does two things. First [I, A] he shows that pleasure is a good; next [I, B], at “However, there is etc.,” that one pleasure is the highest good. He discuses the first point from two aspects. First [A, 1] he gives his argument. Then [A, 2], at “To answer etc.,” he rules out one answer. He remarks first that everyone admits that pain in itself is something bad and to be avoided; and this is twofold. For one kind of pain is evil simply, e.g., sadness about good; the other kind is evil in a limited way, as a hindrance to good, since even sadness about evil hinders the soul from doing the good readily and quickly.
Manifestum est autem quod ei quod est malum et fugiendum invenitur duplex contrarium. Unum quidem quod est fugiendum et malum. Aliud autem quod est bonum. Sicut timiditati quae est mala contrariatur fortitudo tamquam bonum et audacia tamquam malum. Tristitiae autem contrariatur delectatio. Unde concludit necesse esse quod delectatio sit quoddam bonum. 1499. Obviously there are two contraries of what is evil and inadmissible: one is evil and to be avoided, the other is good. Thus to cowardice, an evil, are opposed fortitude as a good and rashness as an evil. But to pain is opposed pleasure as a good; hence he concludes pleasure is necessarily a good.
Deinde cum dicit: ut enim Speusippus etc., excludit quamdam solutionem praedictae rationis. Videbatur enim praedicta ratio non valere: eo quod concludit a disiunctiva ad alteram eius partem: scilicet si fugibili contrariatur bonum vel fugibile, quod delectatio quae contrariatur tristitiae fugibili sit aliquid bonum. 1500. Then [A, 2], at “To answer” he excludes an answer to this argument. The reason offered doesn’t seem valid because it concludes from one disjunctive element to its other part: if some good, or a thing to be avoided, is contrary to what is to be avoided it seems that pleasure which is contrary to pain-something to be shunned-is a good.
Et ideo Speusippus, qui fuit nepos et successor Platonis in schola, solvebat dicens, quod sicut maius contrariatur minori et aequali, ita tristitia contrariatur delectationi non quidem tamquam aequali, sed sicut maius minori aut e converso, id est non sicut malum extremum bono medio, sed sicut unum malum extremum alteri, puta quod est in defectu ei quod est in excessu aut e converso. 1501. For this reason Speusippus, a nephew and successor of Plato in the Academy, answered that, as the greater is opposed to the less and the equal, so is pain opposed to pleasure, not as to an equal but as the greater to the less and conversely. Not as an extreme evil to a medium good but as one extreme evil to another, for example, what is deficient to what is excessive, or the reverse.
Sed Aristoteles dicit, hanc solutionem non esse convenientem: quia sequeretur quod delectatio esset vere malum, scilicet secundum suam propriam rationem, sicut superabundantia vel defectus. Sed hoc nullus dicit. 1502. But Aristotle says that this answer is not plausible because it would follow that pleasure is really evil according to its own nature, like excess and defect. But no o ne maintains this.
Platonici enim, quorum erat haec opinio quod delectatio non sit bonum, non ponebant quod delectatio sit malum simpliciter et secundum se, sed negabant eam esse bonum aliquid, in quantum est quiddam imperfectum vel impeditivum virtutis, sicut patet ex processu praemissarum rationum. 1503. The Platonists, who were of the opinion that pleasure is not a good, did not hold that pleasure is evil simply and in itself, but they denied that it is a good inasmuch as it is something imperfect or an obstacle to virtue, as is evident from the procedure of the previous argument.
Deinde cum dicit: optimum autem etc., ostendit quod aliqua delectatio sit optimum. Et primo ostendit propositum. Secundo assignat causam erroris, ibi: sed et assumpserunt et cetera. Primum ostendit duabus rationibus, quarum secunda incipit ibi: et persequi autem omnia et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo ponit rationem. Secundo manifestat quod dixerat per quaedam signa, inferendo quaedam corollaria ex dictis, ibi, et propter hoc omnes et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo excludit quandam rationem contrariam. Videntur enim quaedam delectationes esse pravae, ex quo posset aliquis aestimare quod delectatio non sit aliquid optimum. Sed ipse dicit quod hoc nihil prohibet quin delectatio sit optimum, sicut etiam videmus quod aliqua scientia est optima, scilicet sapientia, ut in sexto dictum est, et tamen quaedam scientiae sunt pravae, non quidem inquantum sunt scientiae, sed propter aliquem defectum quem habent vel ex defectu principiorum, quia scilicet procedunt ex falsis principiis, vel ex defectu materiae, sicut patet in scientiis operativis, quarum usus inducit ad malum. 1504. Next [I, B], at “However, there is,” he shows that one pleasure is the highest good. First [B, 1] he explains his proposition. Then [B, 2], at “Bodily pleasures,” he assigns the reason for an error. He shows the first point [i, a] by two arguments; the second argument [i, b] begins at “The fact that etc.” On the first point he does two things. First [a, i] he gives his argument (the first). Next [a, ii], at “For this reason etc.,” he clarifies his statement by some indications, inferring some corollaries from the discussions. He treats the first point in a twofold manner. First [i, x] he refutes a contrary argument. Some pleasures seem to be evil; from this a person can conclude that pleasure is not the best thing. But Aristotle says that this does not prevent pleasure from being the highest good. Likewise we see that a particular science is the highest, viz., wisdom, as was pointed out in the sixth book (1184); nevertheless some sciences are bad, not precisely as sciences, but on account of a defect they have either on the part of their principles—because they proceed from false principles—or on the part of the matter, as appears in the practical sciences whose use leads to evil.
Secundo ibi: forte autem necessarium etc., inducit rationem ad propositum. Et dicit quod uniuscuiusque habitus sunt operationes aliquae non impeditae. Felicitas autem est operatio non impedita, vel omnium bonorum habituum vel alicuius eorum, ut patet ex his quae in primo dicta sunt. Unde necessarium est, huiusmodi operationes non impeditas esse per se appetibiles. Operatio autem non impedita est delectatio, ut supra dictum est. Unde consequens est quod aliqua delectatio sit optimum, illa scilicet in qua consistit felicitas, licet multae delectationes sint pravae, etiam si contingat quod sint pravae simpliciter. 1505. Second [i, y], at “Perhaps it is,” he gives the argument for his statement. He says there are some unimpeded activities of every habit. But happiness is an unimpeded activity either of all good habits or of one of them, as is evident from the discussions in the first book (118, 130). Hence it is necessary that unimpeded activities of this kind are desirable in themselves. But pleasure is an unimpeded activity as we have just indicated (1492-1493)Consequently there is a highest pleasure, that in which happiness consists, although many pleasures are unqualifiedly evil.
Deinde cum dicit: et propter hoc omnes etc., manifestat quod dixerat per signa, inducendo tria corollaria. Quorum primum est, quod quia operatio non impedita est felicitas, et hoc etiam delectationem causat, inde est quod omnes aestimant vitam felicem esse delectabilem et rationabiliter adiungunt delectationem felicitati. Quia nulla operatio perfecta est impedita. Felicitas autem est perfectum bonum, ut in primo ostensum est. Unde est operatio non impedita, quod delectationem causat. 1506. At “For this reason” [a, ii] he clarifies his statement by indications, inferring some corollaries. The first [a, ii, x] is that because happiness is an unimpeded activity—and it also causes pleasure—everyone thinks that the happy life is pleasurable; and they understandably connect pleasure with happiness because no perfect activity is impeded. But happiness is a perfect good, as was explained in the first book (111, 112, 117, 118, 201, 122). Therefore it is an unimpeded activity inasmuch as it causes pleasure.
Ex hoc autem concludit ulterius ibi: propter quod indiget etc., quod quia felicitas est operatio non impedita, felix indiget bonis corporis, puta sanitate et incolumitate et bonis exterioribus, quae dicuntur bona fortunae, ut per horum defectum non impediatur felix in sua operatione. Illi autem qui dicunt, si homo est virtuosus est felix, etiam si circumferatur et subdatur magnis infortuniis, nihil rationabile dicunt, sive hoc dicant volentes, quasi interius huic dicto assentientes, sive hoc dicant nolentes, quasi per rationem coacti contra id quod eis videtur; et innuit Stoicos, quorum erat ista opinio. 1507. From this he further concludes, at “Therefore the happy” [a, ii, y], that because happiness is an unimpeded activity, the happy man needs the goods of the body, such as general health and an uninjured state, then external goods-called goods of fortune-so that he may not be impeded in his activity by a lack of them. People who say that a virtuous man is happy even when tossed about and overcome by great misfortune talk nonsense, whether they say this willingly (as it were assenting to the statement by intuition) or unwillingly (as it were forced by reason contrary to the available evidence). The reference of course is to the Stoic opinion.
Tertium corollarium infert ibi, propter indigere autem et cetera. Et dicit, quod quia felicitas indiget bona fortuna, quibusdam visum est quod idem sit felicitas et bona fortuna: quod tamen non est verum. Quia ipsa superexcellentia bonorum fortunae est impeditiva felicitatis, inquantum scilicet aliqui per hoc impediuntur ab operatione virtutis, in qua consistit felicitas, et tunc non est iustum quod talis superexcellentia vocetur bona fortuna; quia terminus, idest finis, vel ratio bonae fortunae est per comparationem ad felicitatem, ut scilicet in tantum dicatur bona in quantum iuvat ad felicitatem. 1508. He infers a third corollary at “Because of this need” [a, ii, z]: since happiness needs good fortune, it seemed to some philosophers that happiness and good fortune are identical. But this is not so, because too much of the good things is an obstacle to happiness since some people are hindered by wealth from the work of virtue in which happiness consists. Then it is not right that a superabundance of this kind should be called good fortune, since the limit, i.e., the end, or the norm of good fortune is established in comparison with happiness.
Deinde cum dicit: et persequi autem omnia etc., ponit secundam rationem, ad ostendendum quod felicitas sit aliquid optimum. Et sumitur per quoddam signum. Unde primo ponit ipsum. Et dicit quod hoc quod omnia persequuntur, idest quaerunt delectationem, est quoddam signum quod aliqualiter delectatio sit optimum. Illud enim in quod omnes vel plures consentiunt, non potest esse omnino falsum. Unde in proverbio dicitur, quod non perditur omnino fama, quae apud multos populos divulgatur. Et huius ratio est, quia natura non deficit, neque in omnibus neque in pluribus, sed solum in paucioribus. Unde id quod invenitur ut in omnibus aut in pluribus videtur esse ex inclinatione naturae, quae non inclinat neque ad malum neque ad falsum. Et sic videtur, quod delectatio, in quam concurrit omnium appetitus, sit aliquid optimum. 1509. Then [i, b], at “The fact that,” he gives his second argument (by inference) to prove that happiness is the highest good. Hence, he first states his argument [b, i]: the fact that everyone pursues pleasure is some indication that pleasure is the highest good; for a thing on which many, at least, agree cannot be entirely false. Thus, it is proverbial that a saying generally expressed among the people never dies completely. The reason is that nature does not fail in all or in most cases but only in a few. Therefore what is found among all or most men seems to arise from a disposition of nature which inclines neither to evil nor falsehood. So it seems that pleasure in which the desire of all men concur is the highest good.
Secundo ibi: sed quia non eadem etc., excludit quiddam quod possit reputari contrarium, scilicet quod non omnes appetunt contrarium, quod scilicet non omnes appetunt eamdem delectationem. Sed ipse ostendit, per hoc non impediri principale propositum, duplici ratione. Primo quidem, quia non est eadem natura et habitus optimus omnium neque secundum veritatem neque secundum apparentiam, alia est enim optima dispositio hominis, alia equi. Item alia iuvenis, alia senis. Et quia unicuique est delectabile id quod est sibi conveniens, inde est, quod non omnes appetunt eamdem delectationem, quamvis omnes appetant delectationem. Quia scilicet delectatio est optimum omnibus, sed non eadem; sicut nec eadem dispositio naturae est omnibus optima. 1510. Next [b, ii], at “However, since,” he excludes a possible objection, “Not all desire the same pleasure,” by returning that his main contention is not so damaged. This for two reasons: first [b, ii, x] because the same nature and the same habit are not best for everyone either really or apparently; for the best tendency in a man is one thing and in a horse another. Likewise the best tendency in a young man is different from that in an old man. And because what is agreeable to each one is delightful to him, it follows that not all desire the same pleasure although all do desire pleasure. This is the reason why pleasure, but not the same pleasure, is the highest good for all; just as the same tendency of nature is not the best for all.
Secundam rationem ponit ibi, forte autem et cetera. Et potest dici quod omnes homines appetunt eamdem delectationem secundum naturalem appetitum, non tamen secundum proprium iudicium; non enim omnes existimant corde, neque dicunt ore eamdem delectationem esse optimam, natura tamen omnes inclinat in eandem delectationem sicut in optimam, puta in contemplationem intelligibilis veritatis, secundum quod omnes homines natura scire desiderant. Et hoc contingit, quia omnia habent naturaliter in se ipsis quiddam divinum, scilicet inclinationem naturae, quae dependet ex principio primo; vel etiam ipsam formam, quae est huius inclinationis principium. 1511. He gives the second reason at “Perhaps they” [b, ii, y], stating that it can be said that all men seek the same pleasure according to natural desire but not according to their own judgment. Indeed not all think in their heart or say with their lips that the same pleasure is the best. Nevertheless everyone is inclined by nature to the same pleasure as the highest, namely, the contemplation of rational truth inasmuch as all men naturally desire to know. This happens because all things have in themselves something divine, i.e., an inclination of nature—which is derived from the first principle—or even their (substantial) form itself which is the basis of the inclination.
Deinde cum dicit: sed et assumpserunt etc., assignat rationem, quare aliqui opinati sunt delectationem non esse bonum aut optimum. Et dicit, quod ratio huius est, quia corporales delectationes assumpserunt sibi, quasi hereditarie nomen delectationis propter hoc, quod frequentius inclinamur in ipsas, utpote adiunctas necessariis vitae et quia omnes participant ipsas, utpote sensibiles et omnibus notas. Et quia ipsae solae sunt cognitae communiter ab omnibus, propter hoc existimant has solas esse delectationes. Et ideo, quia huiusmodi delectationes non sunt optimae, existimant quidam, quod delectatio non sit optimum. 1512. At “Bodily pleasures” [B, 2] he assigns the reason why some philosophers were of the opinion that pleasure is not a good or the highest good. He says the reason is that bodily pleasures have usurped the name pleasure for themselves as an inherited possession because we are more often inclined to them as being connected with the necessary things of life, and because everyone shares in them as being sensibly perceptible and known to all. Moreover, they alone are commonly acknowledged because people consider them the only pleasures. Since pleasures of this kind are not the highest, some think pleasure is not the highest good.
Deinde cum dicit manifestum autem et quoniam etc., ostendit propositum ducendo ad inconveniens. Ducit autem ad tria inconvenientia. Quorum primum est, quod si delectatio et operatio delectabilis non sit quoddam bonum, sequetur quod felix non vivat delectabiliter. Cum enim felicitas sit per se bona, non requireret delectationem vita felicis, si delectatio non esset quoddam bonum. 1513. Then [II], at “Obviously if,” he explains his proposition by concluding to three inconsistencies. The first [II, A] is that if pleasure and pleasurable activity are not something; good it follows that the happy man may not live a pleasant life; for happiness not being a good in itself, the life of a happy man should not require pleasure if pleasure were not something good.
Secundo ibi: sed et triste etc., et dicit, quod si delectatio non sit aliquod bonum, continget quod vivere in tristitia non sit aliquod malum. Si enim delectatio non sit neque bona neque mala, sequeretur idem de tristitia quae ei contrariatur. Et sic tristitia non esset fugienda. 1514. Next [II, B], at “But it would,” he says that if pleasure is not a good it is possible that living in pain is not an evil; for if pleasure is neither good nor evil the same would hold for pain which is the opposite. Thus pain would not be something to be avoided.
Tertio ibi: neque utique etc., ducit ad tertium inconveniens. Sequetur enim quod vita virtuosi non sit delectabilis, si operationes eius non sunt delectabiles; quod iam esset si delectatio non esset aliquid bonum. Manifestum est enim quod virtus est operativa boni. 1515. Last [If, C], at “Nor would,” he concludes to the third inconsistency. It follows that the life of the virtuous man is not pleasurable, if his activities are not pleasurable-which would be the case if pleasure were not a good. But it is obvious that virtue is productive of good.

Physical Pleasures
Chapter 14
περὶ δὲ δὴ τῶν σωματικῶν ἡδονῶν ἐπισκεπτέον τοῖς λέγουσιν ὅτι ἔνιαί γε ἡδοναὶ αἱρεταὶ σφόδρα, οἷον αἱ καλαί, ἀλλ' οὐχ αἱ σωματικαὶ καὶ περὶ ἃς ὁ ἀκόλαστος. In the matter of physical pleasures there are those who maintain that good ones are especially worthy of choice but the others, in which a man becomes intemperate, are not so.
      A.  The doubt. — 1517
διὰ τί οὖν αἱ ἐναντίαι λῦπαι μοχθηραί; κακῷ γὰρ ἀγαθὸν ἐναντίον. Why then are the opposite pains evil? For good is contrary to evil.
      B.  Resolving it.
            1.   FIRST. — 1518
ἢ οὕτως ἀγαθαὶ αἱ ἀναγκαῖαι, ὅτι καὶ τὸ μὴ κακὸν ἀγαθόν ἐστιν; ἢ μέχρι του ἀγαθαί; Either they are good inasmuch as they are necessary, because what is not evil is good;
            2.   THE SECOND SOLUTION. — 1519-1521
τῶν μὲν γὰρ ἕξεων καὶ κινήσεων ὅσων μὴ ἔστι τοῦ βελτίονος ὑπερβολή, οὐδὲ τῆς ἡδονῆς· ὅσων δ' ἔστι, καὶ τῆς ἡδονῆς. ἔστιν δὲ τῶν σωματικῶν ἀγαθῶν ὑπερβολή, καὶ ὁ φαῦλος τῷ διώκειν τὴν ὑπερβολήν ἐστιν, ἀλλ' οὐ τὰς ἀναγκαίας· πάντες γὰρ χαίρουσί πως καὶ ὄψοις καὶ οἴνοις καὶ ἀφροδισίοις, ἀλλ' οὐχ ὡς δεῖ. ἐναντίως δ' ἐπὶ τῆς λύπης· οὐ γὰρ τὴν ὑπερβολὴν φεύγει, ἀλλ' ὅλως· οὐ γάρ ἐστι τῇ ὑπερβολῇ λύπη ἐναντία ἀλλ' ἢ τῷ διώκοντι τὴν ὑπερβολήν. or they are good up to a certain point. The reason would seem to be that if in such habits and activities there is not an excess of what is good, neither is such pleasure excessive. But if this excess is present in the habits or activities it will also be present in the pleasure. Now a superabundance of what is good can exist in bodily goods. Moreover, a man is described as evil for pursuing not necessary goods but an excess of them. Indeed everybody enjoys food, wine, and sex, but not always as they should. However, it is the opposite in regard to pain, for everybody shuns not merely its excess but absolutely all of it. In fact pain is not opposed to the excess of physical pleasures, except to the man who pursues this excess.
      C.  The argument for his position.
            1.   HIS POSITION. — 1522
ἐπεὶ δ' οὐ μόνον δεῖ τἀληθὲς εἰπεῖν ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ αἴτιον τοῦ ψεύδους· τοῦτο γὰρ συμβάλλεται πρὸς τὴν πίστιν· ὅταν γὰρ εὔλογον φανῇ τὸ διὰ τί φαίνεται ἀληθὲς οὐκ ὂν ἀληθές, πιστεύειν ποιεῖ τῷ ἀληθεῖ μᾶλλον· ὥστε λεκτέον διὰ τί φαίνονται αἱ σωματικαὶ ἡδοναὶ αἱρετώτεραι. Not only must the truth be explained, but the cause of error must also be exposed. This strengthens conviction; for, when it is carefully shown why the untruth seems to be true, the truth becomes more acceptable. Therefore we must show why bodily pleasures seem more desirable.
            2.   THE ACTUAL ARGUMENT.
                   a.   Why bodily pleasures seem more desirable.
                         i.    First.
                               x.   THE REASON. — 1523-1524
πρῶτον μὲν οὖν δὴ ὅτι ἐκκρούει τὴν λύπην· καὶ διὰ τὰς ὑπερβολὰς τῆς λύπης, ὡς οὔσης ἰατρείας, τὴν ἡδονὴν διώκουσι τὴν ὑπερβάλλουσαν καὶ ὅλως τὴν σωματικήν. σφοδραὶ δὲ γίνονται αἱ ἰατρεῖαι, διὸ καὶ διώκονται, διὰ τὸ παρὰ τὸ ἐναντίον φαίνεσθαι. The first reason is: they drive away pain; and since pleasure is a remedy against the excesses of pain, men seek abundant pleasures and in general bodily pleasures. These seem vehement inasmuch as they are remedies and for this reason are avidly sought because they appear better when placed alongside their contrary.
                               y.   BODILY PLEASURES DO NOT SEEM UNIVERSALLY GOOD. — 1525-1527
καὶ οὐ σπουδαῖον δὴ δοκεῖ ἡ ἡδονὴ διὰ δύο ταῦτα, ὥσπερ εἴρηται, ὅτι αἳ μὲν φαύλης φύσεώς εἰσι πράξεις ἢ ἐκ γενετῆς, ὥσπερ θηρίου, ἢ δι' ἔθος, οἷον αἱ τῶν φαύλων ἀνθρώπων, αἳ δ' ἰατρεῖαι [ὅτι] ἐνδεοῦς, καὶ ἔχειν βέλτιον ἢ γίνεσθαι· αἳ δὲ συμβαίνουσι τελεουμένων· κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς οὖν σπουδαῖαι. Likewise it seems that pleasure is not something good for these two reasons, as has been said. First, some pleasures are naturally evil and follow from evil actions; these are desirable to certain beings either from birth—for example, dumb animals—or from habituation, like the pleasures of evil men. Second, other bodily pleasures are remedies for some defect. Now it is better to be perfect than in the process of becoming perfect. But pleasures of this kind are taken by those who are being perfected. Therefore they are good only incidentally.
                         ii.   The second (argument).
                               x.   HE PRESENTS THE REASON. — 1528
ἔτι διώκονται διὰ τὸ σφοδραὶ εἶναι ὑπὸ τῶν ἄλλαις μὴ δυναμένων χαίρειν· αὐτοὶ γοῦν αὑτοῖς δίψας τινὰς παρασκευάζουσιν. ὅταν μὲν οὖν ἀβλαβεῖς, ἀνεπιτίμητον, ὅταν δὲ βλαβεράς, φαῦλον. οὔτε γὰρ ἔχουσιν ἕτερα ἐφ' οἷς χαίρουσιν, τό τε μηδέτερον πολλοῖς λυπηρὸν διὰ τὴν φύσιν. Moreover, because bodily pleasures are vehement they are sought by those incapable of enjoying others. Consequently such men stimulate for themselves a thirst for these pleasures. Since people of this sort do not have other pleasures for recreation, it is not blameworthy for them to enjoy those that are not harmful; but it is wrong if the pleasures are harmful.
                               y.   SOMETHING... TAKEN FOR GRANTED.
                                     aa.  a reason that applies to all. — 1529-1530
ἀεὶ γὰρ πονεῖ τὸ ζῷον, ὥσπερ καὶ οἱ φυσιολόγοι μαρτυροῦσι, τὸ ὁρᾶν, τὸ ἀκούειν φάσκοντες εἶναι λυπηρόν· ἀλλ' ἤδη συνήθεις ἐσμέν, ὡς φασίν. Certainly men encounter pain in most matters on account of nature. In fact sensitive nature continually is afflicted, as statements of natural scientists indicate. Some even hold that hearing and seeing cause pain, and they further say we have gotten used to it.
                                     bb. a reason applicable to young men. — 1531
ὁμοίως δ' ἐν μὲν τῇ νεότητι διὰ τὴν αὔξησιν ὥσπερ οἱ οἰνωμένοι διάκεινται, καὶ ἡδὺ ἡ νεότης. In like manner, on account of their growth young men are in a state similar to that of intoxicated people, and youth is exhilarating.
                                     cc.  A reason applicable to the melancholic. — 1532
οἱ δὲ μελαγχολικοὶ τὴν φύσιν δέονται ἀεὶ ἰατρείας· καὶ γὰρ τὸ σῶμα δακνόμενον διατελεῖ διὰ τὴν κρᾶσιν, καὶ ἀεὶ ἐν ὀρέξει σφοδρᾷ εἰσίν· ἐξελαύνει δὲ ἡδονὴ λύπην ἥ τ' ἐναντία καὶ ἡ τυχοῦσα, ἐὰν ᾖ ἰσχυρά· καὶ διὰ ταῦτα ἀκόλαστοι καὶ φαῦλοι γίνονται. But the melancholic have a continual need of a restorative because of their nature, for their body incessantly undergoes a kind of corrosion due to their temperament. For this reason they are always urged by strong desire; for pleasure drives out both the opposite pain and any other when the pleasure is intense. As a result the melancholic frequently become intemperate and depraved.
                   b.   Other pleasures are in reality more desirable. — 1533
αἱ δ' ἄνευ λυπῶν οὐκ ἔχουσιν ὑπερβολήν· αὗται δὲ τῶν φύσει ἡδέων καὶ μὴ κατὰ συμβεβηκός. λέγω δὲ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ἡδέα τὰ ἰατρεύοντα· ὅτι γὰρ συμβαίνει ἰατρεύεσθαι τοῦ ὑπομένοντος ὑγιοῦς πράττοντός τι, διὰ τοῦτο ἡδὺ δοκεῖ εἶναι· φύσει δ' ἡδέα, ἃ ποιεῖ πρᾶξιν τῆς τοιᾶσδε φύσεως. On the other hand pleasures which are without an opposite pain do not have an excess, for they are concerned with things which are pleasurable naturally and not incidentally. And I call those things incidentally pleasurable that are curative. The reason is that when a cure is wrought by the action of the part that remains healthy, the activity then seems pleasurable. But those things naturally pleasurable produce an activity proper to this nature.
      A.  The first observation.
            1.   THE REASON. — 1534
οὐκ ἀεὶ δ' οὐθὲν ἡδὺ τὸ αὐτὸ διὰ τὸ μὴ ἁπλῆν ἡμῶν εἶναι τὴν φύσιν, ἀλλ' ἐνεῖναί τι καὶ ἕτερον, καθὸ φθαρτοί, ὥστε ἄν τι θάτερον πράττῃ, τοῦτο τῇ ἑτέρᾳ φύσει παρὰ φύσιν, ὅταν δ' ἰσάζῃ, οὔτε λυπηρὸν δοκεῖ οὔθ' ἡδὺ τὸ πραττόμενον· However, the same object is not always pleasurable to man because our nature is not simple but comprises more than one element with the result that we are perishable beings. Therefore if one element is active, this may be unnatural to the other. But when a balance is struck the activity seems neither distressing nor pleasurable.
            2.   HE CONCLUDES. — 1535
ἐπεὶ εἴ του ἡ φύσις ἁπλῆ εἴη, ἀεὶ ἡ αὐτὴ πρᾶξις ἡδίστη ἔσται. διὸ ὁ θεὸς ἀεὶ μίαν καὶ ἁπλῆν χαίρει ἡδονήν· οὐ γὰρ μόνον κινήσεώς ἐστιν ἐνέργεια ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀκινησίας, καὶ ἡδονὴ μᾶλλον ἐν ἠρεμίᾳ ἐστὶν ἢ ἐν κινήσει. Wherefore, if the nature of a pleasing thing is simple the action itself will always be most delightful. Hence God always rejoices in one simple pleasure; for activity exists not only in motion but also in immobility, and pleasure is found more in rest than in movement.
      B.  The second observation. — 1536-1537
μεταβολὴ δὲ πάντων γλυκύ, κατὰ τὸν ποιητήν, διὰ πονηρίαν τινά· ὥσπερ γὰρ ἄνθρωπος εὐμετάβολος ὁ πονηρός, καὶ ἡ φύσις ἡ δεομένη μεταβολῆς· οὐ γὰρ ἁπλῆ οὐδ' ἐπιεικής. περὶ μὲν οὖν ἐγκρατείας καὶ ἀκρασίας καὶ περὶ ἡδονῆς καὶ λύπης εἴρηται, καὶ τί ἕκαστον καὶ πῶς τὰ μὲν ἀγαθὰ αὐτῶν ἐστὶ τὰ δὲ κακά· λοιπὸν δὲ καὶ περὶ φιλίας ἐροῦμεν. But change is the most delightful of all things, as the poet says. (Yet this happens) because of some defect. just as a man readily changes because he is evil, so does nature for it is neither simple nor completely good. We have discussed continence and incontinence, pleasure and pain, the nature of each, and how some of these may be good and others bad. We must now go on to the discussion of friendship.
De corporalibus utique delectationibus et cetera. Postquam philosophus determinavit de delectatione et tristitia in generali, hic specialiter determinat de corporalibus delectationibus circa quas est continentia et incontinentia. Et circa hoc tria facit. Primo proponit intentum. Secundo movet dubitationem, ibi, propter quid igitur et cetera. Tertio assignat causam quorumdam, quae accidunt circa delectationes, ibi, non semper autem et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod post ea quae dicta sunt de delectatione in communi, intendendum est nobis de corporalibus delectationibus, ut dicamus, quod quaedam delectationes sunt valde eligibiles, scilicet illae quae sunt naturaliter bonae, corporales autem delectationes, circa quas aliquis fit intemperatus, non sunt tales. 1516. After this general consideration of pleasure and pain the Philosopher now treats in particular those pleasures with which continence and incontinence are concerned. He discusses this point in a threefold manner. First [I] he makes a statement of his intention. Next [II], at “Why then etc.,” he manifests some hesitancy. Last [III], at “However, the same etc.,” he gives his reason for some general observations on pleasures. He says first that, after our discussions on pleasure in general (1473-1515), we must turn our attention also to bodily pleasures to say that some pleasures are especially worthy of choice, those which are naturally good. But bodily pleasures, by reason of which a man becomes intemperate, are not of this kind.
Deinde cum dicit: propter quid igitur etc., movet dubitationem contra praedicta. Et primo proponit dubitationem; secundo solvit eam, ibi, vel sic bonae et cetera. Tertio assignat causam dictorum, ibi, quia autem non solum oportet et cetera. Est autem circa primum considerandum, quod philosophus supra, ad probandum delectationem esse bonum, sumpsit argumentum a malitia tristitiae et quia tunc dixerat corporales delectationes non esse bonas, resumit idem medium pro obiectione. Si enim malo contrariatur bonum, remanet dubitatio, ex quo delectationes corporales dicuntur esse non bonae, quare contrariae tristitiae sint malae. 1517. Then [II], at “Why then,” he raises a doubt about previous statements: first [II, A], stating the doubt; then [II, B], at “Either they are etc.,” resolving it. Finally [II, C], at “Not only etc.,” he gives the argument for his position. On the first point we should consider that, in order to prove that pleasure is a good the Philosopher previously (1498-1499) argued from the evil of pain. Now, because he has said that bodily pleasures are not good, he uses the same argument as an objection; for, if good is contrary to evil, a doubt remains-from the fact that bodily pleasures are said not to be good-why the opposite pains are evil.
Deinde cum dicit vel sic bonae etc., solvit obiectionem dupliciter. Primo enim dicit, quod delectationes corporales sunt aliqualiter bonae, inquantum scilicet sunt necessariae ad depellendas contrarias tristitias. Quia et per hunc modum omne illud quod non est malum in sua natura potest dici bonum. 1518. Next [II, B], at “Either they are,” he gives a twofold solution to the objection. First [B, 1 ] he says that bodily pleasures are good in some manner inasmuch as they are necessary to drive away the opposing pains. The reason is that at least in this way anything that is not evil by its nature can be called good.
Secundam solutionem ponit ibi, vel usque ad hoc et cetera. Et dicit, quod delectationes corporales sunt quidem bonae, non autem absolute sed usque ad hoc, id est usque ad certum terminum. Et huius rationem assignat. Cum enim omnis delectatio consequatur habitum aliquem et motum sive operationem, oportet quod si habituum et motuum sive operationum non potest esse superabundantia melioris, idest superexcessus a bono, quod neque delectationis consequentis posset esse superexcessus, sicut huius operationis quae est contemplatio veritatis, non potest esse superexcessus melioris, quia quanto plus aliquis veritatem contemplatur, tanto melius est; unde et delectatio consequens est bona absolute, et non solum usque ad aliquam mensuram. Si autem habituum et motuum sive operationum sit superexcessus melioris, ita etiam se habebit et circa delectationem consequentem. Manifestum est autem, quod circa corporalia bona potest esse superabundantia melioris. 1519. He gives the second solution at “or they are” [B, 2], saying that bodily pleasures certainly are good, not absolutely but up to a certain point. His reason for this is that every pleasure follows some habit and movement or activity. Hence it is necessary that if in the habits and movements or activities there cannot be a superabundance of the better, i.e., an excess above the good, neither can there be an excess in the pleasure that follows. Thus there cannot be an excess of the good in that activity, which is contemplation of the truth, because the more a man contemplates the truth the better he is. Therefore the pleasure that follows is good absolutely, and not only to a degree. But if there is an excess of what is good in the habits or activities, so too will there be in the pleasure that follows. Now it is evident that there can be too much of a good thing in the physical area.
Et huius signum est, quod ex hoc aliquis dicitur pravus quod horum bonorum superabundantiam quaerit, etiam si nulli alii noceat. Non tamen ex hoc ipso, quod quaerit corporalia bona et delectatur in eis est pravus, quia omnes homines aliqualiter gaudent pulmento et vino et venereis: sed ex hoc vituperantur aliqui, quod gaudent in eis, non secundum quod oportet. Ex quo patet, quod delectatio corporalis est bona usque ad aliquam mensuram, superabundantia autem ipsius est mala. 1520. Some indication of the fact is in this: a man is said to be bad because he wants these goods excessively though he may injure nobody. However, he is not evil by his desire and delight in bodily goods, for everyone enjoys food, wine, and sex to some degree; on the contrary, some people are blamed for not enjoying pleasures as they should. From this it is obvious that bodily pleasure is good up to a certain point, but its excess is bad.
E contrario autem se habet in tristitia; quia non solum eius superabundantiam fugit virtuosus, sed totaliter omnem tristitiam. Tristitia enim non est contraria superabundantiae delectationis corporalis, quia sic aliquis non tristaretur nisi de maximo recessu a superabundantia delectationum. Quae quidem tristitia non multum vituperabilis esset, sed aliqualiter toleranda. Sed magis tristitia inhaeret ei, qui persequitur superabundantiam delectationum. Ex hoc enim contingit, quod ex modico defectu delectabilium tristatur. Et inde est, quod sicut superabundantia delectationum corporalium est mala, ita et tristitia. 1521. Pain works out in the opposite way, for the man of virtue flees not just its excess, but absolutely all pain. Pain then is not the contrary to excessive physical pleasure; if it were, no one would be grieved except for the maximum departure from excessive pleasure. If this were the case, pain would not be so much something to be shunned as to be somewhat tolerated. But the real situation is this: pain is connected with those pursuing excessive pleasure. And this happens precisely because by the least lack of pleasures such people are grieved. So it is that, as excessive physical pleasures are bad, so also is pain.
Deinde cum dicit: quia autem etc., assignat rationem praedictorum. Et primo dicit de quo est intentio. Secundo exequitur propositum, ibi, primum quidem utique et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod non solum oportet dicere solutionem obiectionis, sed assignare causam falsitatis quae erat in obiectione. Hoc enim multum confert ad hoc quod fides adhibeatur veritati. Cum enim appareat ratio propter quam videtur esse verum illud quod non est verum, hoc facit magis credere veritati. Et ideo dicendum est, quare corporales delectationes videantur multis esse eligibiliores aliis delectationibus, cum tamen illae sint bonae absolute, corporales autem solum usque ad aliquam mensuram. 1522. At “Not only” [II, C] he presents his argument for the preceding statements. First [C, 1] he states his position. Then [C, 2], at “The first reason etc.,” he gives the actual argument. First he says that not only must the solution to the difficulty be given, but the reason for the error in the objection must be found. This is a great help in establishing the credibility of the truth; for, when the reason why the untruth seems to be true is exposed, the student more readily accepts the truth. This is the reason we must discuss why bodily pleasures seem to the majority more desirable than other pleasures, when nevertheless these other pleasures are absolutely good while bodily pleasures are so only to a certain degree.
Deinde cum dicit: primum quidem igitur etc., exequitur propositum. Et primo assignat rationem quare delectationes corporales videantur magis appetibiles. Secundo assignat rationem quare aliae sint magis appetibiles secundum rei veritatem, ibi: quae autem sine tristitia et cetera. Circa primum assignat duas rationes. Quarum secunda ponitur ibi: adhuc persecutae sunt et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo assignat rationem quare delectationes corporales videantur magis appetibiles. Secundo assignat rationem quare delectationes non videantur bonae universaliter, ibi, et non studiosum utique et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod prima ratio quare delectationes corporales videantur esse magis eligibiles est quia expellunt tristitiam; et quia delectatio corporalis propter sui superabundantiam est medicina contra tristitiam. Non enim quacumque delectatione tristitia tollitur, sed vehementi, inde est quod homines quaerunt delectationem superabundantem et corporalem, cui tristitia contrariatur. Delectationi autem intellectuali, puta quae est in considerando, non contrariatur aliqua tristitia; quia non est in fieri, sed in facto esse, ut supra dictum est. 1523. Then [C, 2], at “The first reason,” he gives the actual argument. First [2, a] he tells us just why bodily pleasures seem more desirable. Next [2, b), at “On the other hand,” he presents an argument to show that other pleasures are in reality more desirable. For the first point he offers two arguments: (the first at [a, i]) while the second [a, ii] is presented at “Moreover, because etc.” On the first argument he performs two operations. First [i, x] he gives the reason why bodily pleasures seem more desirable. Then [i, y], at “Likewise it seems etc.,” he assigns the reason why bodily pleasures do not seem universally good. He says at the outset that the first reason why physical pleasures seem to be more desirable is that they drive out pain; and by their very intensity are a remedy for pain. Indeed pain is not eliminated by every kind of pleasure but by vehement pleasure. For this reason men seek abundant bodily pleasure to which pain is opposed. But there is no pain opposed to intellectual pleasure—like that found in contemplation—because it is not in an imperfect but a perfect state.
Ex hoc autem ipso quod corporales delectationes sunt medicinae contra tristitias, videntur esse vehementes, quia mensurantur non solum ex sui natura, sed etiam ex contrario quod pellunt; et inde est quod valde quaeruntur, propter hoc quod magis apparent iuxta suum contrarium positae, sicut delectatio potus magis apparet si affuerit sitis. Et ideo illi qui quaerunt delectationem potus praeparant sibi sitim per comestionem salsorum, ut magis in potu delectentur. 1524. From the very fact that bodily pleasures are remedies for pain they seem to be vehement, measured as they are not only by their nature but even by the contrary which they banish. Consequently they are avidly sought because they look better when placed beside their contrary, for drinking seems much more important to the thirsty. This is why people who want the pleasure of drinking stimulate their thirst by eating salty foods, thus getting more pleasure in the drink.
Deinde cum dicit: et non studiosum utique etc., assignat rationem quare delectationes non videantur bonae universaliter. Et dicit quod propter delectationes corporales, sicut etiam supra dictum est, visum fuit quibusdam quod delectatio non esset aliquid bonum. In delectationibus enim corporalibus duo inveniuntur. Quaedam enim earum sunt pravae naturaliter, utpote consequentes pravas operationes, quae quidem sunt appetibiles quibusdam ab ipsa sua nativitate, sicut bestiis et bestialibus hominibus; quibusdam autem sunt appetibiles propter consuetudinem, sicut delectationes pravorum hominum. Quaedam vero delectationum corporalium sunt medicinae contra aliquem defectum. 1525. Next [i, y], at “Likewise it seems,” he points out why these pleasures may not seem universally good. He says that, on account of bodily pleasure—as was previously noted (1512)—it “seemed to some people” that pleasure was not a good. The explanation is that there are two kinds of bodily pleasures. Some are naturally evil, resulting from evil activities, and are desirable to certain beings as soon as they are born (for example, dumb animals and brutish men) but to others from habituation, like the pleasures of depraved men. Other bodily pleasures, however, are remedies for some defect.
Et huius signum est, quia non sunt nisi indigentis. Non enim aliquis delectatur in cibo quo non indiget et sic delectatio cibi est medicina contra tristitiam famis. Et manifestum est quod melius est esse aliquem iam perfectum quam fieri. Huiusmodi autem delectationes, quas dicimus esse medicinales, accidunt his qui perficiuntur, non autem his qui iam sunt perfecti. Causantur enim ex hoc quod per id quod sumitur tollitur naturae indigentia. Sic igitur patet quod non sunt bonae secundum se, sed per accidens, inquantum scilicet sunt ad aliquid necessariae. 1526. An indication of this is that they belong only to someone in need. A man does not enjoy food when he is not hungry. Clearly then the pleasure of food is a remedy for the distress of hunger. Obviously it is better for someone to be already perfect than to be in the process of becoming perfect. But pleasures of this kind, which we call medicinal, are taken by those who are being perfected but not by those who are already perfect. They are indulged in because a need of nature is satisfied through what is taken. So then it is clear that they are not good intrinsically but incidentally inasmuch as they are necessary for something.
Et has duas rationes supra tetigit in duabus solutionibus. Nam illae delectationes excedunt mensuram debitam quae consequuntur pravas operationes. Quia ergo corporales delectationes non sunt secundum se bonae, cum tamen videantur magis appetibiles, quidam aestimaverunt universaliter delectationes non esse bonas. 1527. He has already touched on these two arguments in two previous solutions (1510-1511). Surely those pleasures that are involved in evil actions exceed the proper measure. Since then physical pleasures are not in themselves good, however more desirable they seem, some thought pleasures are universally not good.
Deinde cum dicit: adhuc persecutae sunt etc., ponit secundam rationem. Et circa hoc duo facit. Primo ponit rationem. Secundo manifestat quiddam quod supposuerat, ibi, etenim multis et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod quia corporales delectationes sunt vehementes, quaeruntur ab his qui non possunt aliis delectationibus gaudere, scilicet ab hominibus qui solis sensibilibus inhaerent et delectationes intellectuales non percipiunt. Et inde est quod tales homines praeparant sibiipsis quamdam sitim talium delectationum, dum scilicet sponte seipsos incitant ad earum concupiscentiam, sicut dictum est de illis qui comedunt salsa, ut concupiscant potum. Et ideo, quia praedicti homines non habent alia delectabilia in quibus recreentur, non est increpabile si corporales delectationes accipiant, dum tamen tales delectationes non noceant, nec eis nec aliis: si autem sint nocivae, hoc est pravum et increpabile, sicut patet de delectatione adulterii vel cibi nocivi. 1528. At “Moreover, because” [a, ii] he gives the second reason. On this point he does two things. First [ii, x] he presents the reason. Then [ii, y], at “Certainly men etc.,” he explains something which he had taken for granted. He says first that, since bodily pleasures are vehement, they are sought by those who cannot enjoy other pleasures, i.e., by those who, since they know nothing of intellectual delights, incline only to physical pleasures. Consequently people artificially arouse in themselves a thirst for such pleasures, on their own volition stimulating themselves to their desires. Remember (1524) those who cat salty foods to induce thirst for drink. Therefore since such people do not have other pleasures for recreation, for them to enjoy such pleasures is not too bad, providing they do not hurt themselves or others. But if the pleasures are harmful they will be wrong and reprehensible; obviously so in adultery and poisonous food.
Deinde cum dicit: et enim multis etc., assignat rationem cuiusdam quod supposuerat, scilicet quod omnes homines indigeant aliqua delectatione recreari. Et primo assignat huiusmodi rationem communiter quantum ad omnes; secundo quantum ad iuvenes, ibi, similiter autem et cetera. Tertio quantum ad melancholicos, ibi, melancholici autem et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod ideo non est increpabile, quod aliqui utantur delectationibus corporalibus cum non habeant alias, quia indigent eis, sicut medicina contra tristitias. Quantum enim ad multa, tristitia advenit hominibus propter naturales motus et operationes. Semper enim animal vigilans est in labore. Labor autem est contristativus, sicut naturales sermones testantur. 1529. Next [ii, y], at “Certainly men,” he assigns the reason for something he had taken for granted, that all men need some pleasure for recreation. First [y, aa] he gives the kind of reason that applies to all in general; then [y, bb], at “In like manner etc.,” a reason applicable to young men; finally [y, cc], at “But the melancholic etc.,” a reason applicable to the melancholic. He says first that it is not to be considered a fault for some people to enjoy bodily pleasures, when they do not have others, because they need pleasures as a remedy for pain. Men encounter pain in many matters on account -of natural movements and activities. In fact sensitive nature is always under tension while at work, and work is wearisome as the statements of the natural scientists attest.
Qui dicunt quod videre et audire ingerit tristitiam in quantum est laboriosum: ratione cuius animal indiget quiete somni, ut dicitur in libro de somno et vigilia. Sed ideo non percipimus huiusmodi tristitiam, quia iam sumus consueti continue eam pati. Videre tamen et audire, etsi habeant laborem et tristitiam naturalem ex parte organorum corporalium, habent tamen delectationem animalem ratione cognitionis sensibilium. 1530. Some say that continual seeing and hearing cause pain inasmuch as they cause strain; because of this an animal needs the relaxation of sleep as is explained in De Somno et Vigilia (Ch. 1, 454 a 26-33; St. Th. Lect. 2). But we are unaware of this sort of hurt because we are accustomed to endure it continually. However, even though seeing and hearing naturally fatigue and strain the bodily organs, nevertheless they give physical pleasure by reason of sense knowledge.
Deinde cum dicit: similiter autem etc., assignat rationem quare iuvenes maxime indigent delectatione. Et dicit quod in iuvenibus propter augmentum sunt multae commotiones spirituum et humorum sicut etiam accidit vinolentis. Et ideo propter huiusmodi laborem, iuventus maxime quaerit delectationem. 1531. Then [y, bb], at “In like manner,” he tells why young men especially need pleasure: because of their growth young men have many disturbances of spirits and humors, such as occur in intoxicated persons. So, on account of activity of this sort young men especially seek pleasure.
Deinde cum dicit melancholici autem etc., assignat rationem ex parte melancholicorum. Et dicit, quod melancholici secundum naturalem dispositionem semper indigent medicina contra tristitias, quia corpus eorum patitur corrosionem quamdam propter siccitatem complexionis. Et ideo habent vehementem appetitum delectationis per quam huiusmodi tristitia repellatur. Delectatio enim expellit tristitiam, non solum contrariam, puta delectatio cibi tristitiam famis; sed si delectatio sit fortis expellit quamcumque aliam tristitiam, quia omnibus tristitiis contrariatur secundum genus, licet non secundum speciem. Et quia melancholici vehementer appetunt delectationes, inde est quod plerumque fiunt intemperati et pravi. 1532. At “But the melancholic” [y, cc] he assigns the reason on the part of the depressed. He says that the melancholic, by reason of their natural disposition, have a continual need of a remedy for pain because their body undergoes a kind of corrosion due to dryness of temperament. Hence they have a vehement desire for pleasure as a means of dispelling this pain, for pleasure drives out not only the opposite pain—the pleasure of food banishes the pain of hunger—but, if the pleasure is intense, it sometimes drives out other pain. The reason is that it is contrary to all pain according to genus but not according to species. And because the melancholic vehemently desire pleasures, as a result they frequently become intemperate and depraved.
Deinde cum dicit: quae autem sine tristitia etc., assignat rationem, quare delectationes intellectuales secundum rei veritatem sint meliores. Et dicit quod quia huiusmodi delectationes non habent contrariam tristitiam quam expellant, inde est quod non habent superabundantiam ex qua reddantur vitiosae. Huiusmodi enim delectationes sunt circa ea quae sunt delectabilia secundum sui naturam et non secundum accidens. Et haec duo exponit. Primo quidem, quid sit delectabile secundum accidens. Et dicit quod illa sunt delectabilia secundum accidens quae delectant in quantum sunt medicativa. Quia enim dum aliquis patitur sanationem, accidit quod sanum ibi aliquid operetur, propter hoc videtur operatio esse delectabilis. Et inde est quod quando quaeruntur huiusmodi delectabilia ultra necessitatem medicinae, sunt delectationes inordinatae. Consequenter autem exponit, quod delectabilia secundum naturam sunt illa quae faciunt operationem talis naturae. Unicuique enim naturae delectabilis est operatio propria, cum sit eius perfectio. Et ideo homini delectabilis est operatio rationis. 1533. Next [2, b], at “On the other hand,” he gives the reason why intellectual pleasures are really better, stating that such pleasures lack an opposite pain, which they drive out; they have consequently no excess to render them vicious. These pleasures deal with things which are pleasurable naturally and not incidentally. Here he explains two things: first, the nature of what is incidentally pleasurable. He asserts that those things are pleasurable incidentally that give pleasure inasmuch as they are curative. The reason is that when a man obtains a cure it happens that a healthy condition is brought about and the activity seems pleasurable. Hence when pleasures of this kind are sought outside the need for a remedy they are immoderate. Subsequently he explains that those things are naturally pleasurable that produce an activity of this nature; for the activity proper to a nature, since it is its perfection, is pleasurable to every nature. For this reason the activity of the intellect is pleasurable to man.
Deinde cum dicit: non semper autem etc., assignat rationem duorum quae accidunt circa delectationes humanas. Quorum unum est quod nihil idem est semper delectabile homini. Et huius rationem dicit esse, quia natura nostra non est simplex, sed est ex multis composita et ex uno in aliud transmutabilis, inquantum subiacet corruptioni. Et ideo, si homo secundum aliquam sui dispositionem agat aliquam actionem sibi delectabilem, haec delectatio est praeternaturalis homini secundum alteram eius dispositionem. Sicut contemplari est naturale homini ratione intellectus, sed est praeternaturale homini ratione organorum imaginationis, quae laborant in contemplando. Et ideo contemplatio non est semper homini delectabilis. Et est simile de sumptione cibi quae est naturalis corpori indigenti, praeter naturam autem corpori iam repleto. Cum autem homo appropinquet ad contrariam dispositionem, tunc id quod prius erat delectabile secundum praecedentem dispositionem, neque adhuc videtur triste, quia nondum contraria dispositio totaliter advenit, neque videtur delectabile, quia iam fere alia dispositio recessit. 1534. Then [III], at “However, the same” he assigns the reason for two observations on human pleasures. The first observation [III, A] is that the same object is not always pleasurable to man. He says that the reason [A, i] is that our nature is not simple but composite, and is changeable from one thing to another inasmuch as it is subject to deterioration. For this reason if man performs an action pleasurable to him according to one element, this pleasure is unnatural to him according to a different element. Thus contemplation is natural to man by reason of his intellect but beyond the natural scope of the powers of imagination which try to take an active part in the work of contemplation. Therefore contemplation is not ‘ always delightful to man. It is the same with the taking of food, which is natural to man who needs it but not natural to a body already surfeited. But when a man approaches the opposite condition, then what was pleasurable in his previous condition seems to be neither distressing, because the opposite condition has not yet been reached, nor still pleasurable because the other condition has now almost been passed.
Et ex hoc concludit quoddam corollarium, ibi: quare si huius et cetera. Et dicit, quod si natura alicuius rei delectantis esset simplex et immutabilis, semper eadem actio esset sibi delectabilissima. Puta si homo esset solum intellectus, semper in contemplando delectaretur. Et inde est quod, quia Deus est simplex et immutabilis, semper gaudet una et simplici delectatione, quam scilicet habet in contemplatione suiipsius. Non enim est operatio, quae delectationem causat, solum in motu consistens, sed etiam in immobilitate; sicut patet de operatione intellectus. Et illa delectatio quae est absque motu est maior quam illa quae est in motu: quia illa quae est in motu est in fieri, illa autem quae est in quiete est in esse perfecto, ut ex supra dictis patet. 1535. From this he concludes, at “Wherefore, if” [A, 2], that if the nature of any being that is capable of delight were simple and unchangeable the same action would be most delightful for it. Thus if man were only intellect, he would always take pleasure in contemplating. Hence, since God is simple and unchangeable he rejoices always in one simple pleasure that he takes in the contemplation of himself; for the activity that produces pleasure consists not in motion alone but even in immobility, as is evident in the activity of the intellect. That pleasure which is without motion is greater than pleasure with motion, because what is in motion is on the way to being but what is at rest has complete being, as is obvious from previous discussions (1523).
Deinde cum dicit transmutatio autem etc., assignat causam secundi accidentis circa delectationes, quod scilicet transmutatio, secundum dictum cuiusdam poetae, est maxime delectabilis hominibus. Et hoc dicit accidere propter quamdam malitiam, idest defectum naturae, quae non semper potest in eadem dispositione consistere. Sicut enim mali hominis est quod de facili transmutetur et non habeat mentem fixam in uno, ita est de natura quae indiget transmutatione, quia non est simplex neque perfecte bona. Est enim motus actus imperfecti, ut dicitur in tertio physicorum. 1536. At “But change” [III, B] he gives the reason for the second observation on pleasure, that change is most delightful to men according to the saying of a certain poet. Aristotle adds that this happens because of some evil, or defect of nature, which is not capable of remaining in the same condition. just as it is with an evil man who is easily changed and does not have his mind fixed on one thing, so-with nature that needs change because it is neither simple nor completely good; for motion is the act of what is imperfect, as is stated in the third book of the Physics (Ch. 2., 201 b 27-202 a 2; St. Th. Lect. 3, 296).
Ultimo autem epilogando concludit, dictum esse in hoc septimo libro de continentia et incontinentia, delectatione et tristitia, quid unumquodque eorum est, et qualiter sint bona vel mala. Unde iam dicendum est de amicitia. Et sic terminatur sententia septimi libri. 1537. He concludes in summary: in the seventh book he has discussed continence and incontinence, pleasure and pain, the nature of each of these subjects, and how they may be good or bad. Therefore he must now go on to a discussion of friendship. Thus he completes the teaching of the seventh book.