Chapter 1
      A.  He shows that liberality has to do with wealth.
            A’ He says what his intention is. Let us next discuss liberality, — 649-650
λέγωμεν δ' ἑξῆς περὶ ἐλευθεριότητος. Let us next discuss liberality.
            B’ He shows the matter of liberality.
δοκεῖ δὴ εἶναι ἡ περὶ χρήματα μεσότης· ἐπαινεῖται γὰρ ὁ ἐλευθέριος οὐκ ἐν τοῖς πολεμικοῖς, οὐδ' ἐν οἷς ὁ σώφρων, οὐδ' αὖ ἐν ταῖς κρίσεσιν, ἀλλὰ περὶ δόσιν χρημάτων καὶ λῆψιν, μᾶλλον δ' ἐν τῇ δόσει. which seems to be a mean in regard to wealth. No one is praised as liberal for exploits in war, or for conduct in matters with which the temperate man is concerned, or again for pronouncing judgments. But a man is praised as liberal for his giving and taking of wealth.
            C’ He explains what he had said. — 651-653
χρήματα δὲ λέγομεν πάντα ὅσων ἡ ἀξία νομίσματι μετρεῖται. (Wealth here means whatever can be evaluated in terms of money.)
      B.  He shows that there are opposite vices dealing with this matter.
            A’ He states his general intention. — 654
ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἡ ἀσωτία καὶ ἡ ἀνελευθερία περὶ χρήματα ὑπερβολαὶ καὶ ἐλλείψεις· Extravagance is the excess and miserliness, the defect in the use of wealth.
            B’ He mentions... we always... charge with miserliness people who are more diligent... about... wealth than they ought to be. — 655
καὶ τὴν μὲν ἀνελευθερίαν προσάπτομεν ἀεὶ τοῖς μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ περὶ χρήματα σπουδάζουσι, Miserliness is always attributed to people who are more careful about money than they should be.
            C’ He explains in what manner extravagance may be concerned with wealth. — 656-657
τὴν δ' ἀσωτίαν ἐπιφέρομεν ἐνίοτε συμπλέκοντες· τοὺς γὰρ ἀκρατεῖς καὶ εἰς ἀκολασίαν δαπανηροὺς ἀσώτους καλοῦμεν. διὸ καὶ φαυλότατοι δοκοῦσιν εἶναι· πολλὰς γὰρ ἅμα κακίας ἔχουσιν. οὐ δὴ οἰκείως προσαγορεύονται· βούλεται γὰρ ἄσωτος εἶναι ὁ ἓν κακὸν ἔχων, τὸ φθείρειν τὴν οὐσίαν· ἄσωτος γὰρ ὁ δι' αὑτὸν ἀπολλύμενος, δοκεῖ δ' ἀπώλειά τις αὑτοῦ εἶναι καὶ ἡ τῆς οὐσίας φθορά, ὡς τοῦ ζῆν διὰ τούτων ὄντος. οὕτω δὴ τὴν ἀσωτίαν ἐκδεχόμεθα. But the intemperate are sometimes accused of extravagance by inference, for the incontinent and the intemperate are notorious as extravagant wasters. For this reason, too, they seem to be very depraved; indeed they have many vices. However, they are not properly called prodigal, for a spendthrift is a man who has acquired one vice, that of wasting his substance (he is ruined by his own fault). The dissipation of one’s substance seems to be a kind of ruin of one’s being, since a man lives by means of riches. It is in this sense that extravagance is treated here.
      A.  ...considering first the liberal man.
            A’ He examines the act of liberality.
                         a.   He makes clear that the act of liberality is the proper use of wealth. — 658
ὧν δ' ἐστὶ χρεία, ἔστι τούτοις χρῆσθαι καὶ εὖ καὶ κακῶς· ὁ πλοῦτος δ' ἐστὶ τῶν χρησίμων· ἑκάστῳ δ' ἄριστα χρῆται ὁ ἔχων τὴν περὶ τοῦτο ἀρετήν· καὶ πλούτῳ δὴ χρήσεται ἄριστα ὁ ἔχων τὴν περὶ τὰ χρήματα ἀρετήν· οὗτος δ' ἐστὶν ὁ ἐλευθέριος. Things that have utility—among which are riches—can be used well or badly. And the man who possesses the virtue concerned with particular objects uses each one best. Therefore he who has the virtue dealing with wealth will use riches to the best advantage. This man is the liberal man.
                         b.  He explains what the use of wealth is. — 659
χρῆσις δ' εἶναι δοκεῖ χρημάτων δαπάνη καὶ δόσις· ἡ δὲ λῆψις καὶ ἡ φυλακὴ κτῆσις μᾶλλον. The spending and distribution of wealth seem to be the use of it; the acceptance and saving of wealth more properly are the possession.
                         c.   He draws a conclusion.
                               i.    He states it. — 660
διὸ μᾶλλόν ἐστι τοῦ ἐλευθερίου τὸ διδόναι οἷς δεῖ ἢ λαμβάνειν ὅθεν δεῖ καὶ μὴ λαμβάνειν ὅθεν οὐ δεῖ. For this reason liberality is rather the bestowal of wealth on the right persons than the acceptance of wealth from proper sources or the refusal from improper sources.
                               ii.   He substantiates the conclusion by five reasons.
                                     v.    FIRST. — 661
τῆς γὰρ ἀρετῆς μᾶλλον τὸ εὖ ποιεῖν ἢ τὸ εὖ πάσχειν, καὶ τὰ καλὰ πράττειν μᾶλλον ἢ τὰ αἰσχρὰ μὴ πράττειν· οὐκ ἄδηλον δ' ὅτι τῇ μὲν δόσει ἕπεται τὸ εὖ ποιεῖν καὶ τὸ καλὰ πράττειν, τῇ δὲ λήψει τὸ εὖ πάσχειν ἢ μὴ αἰσχροπραγεῖν. Virtue consists more in bestowing than in receiving benefits, more in performing good actions than in refraining from disgraceful ones. But it is obvious that the conferring of benefits and the performance of good deeds accompany disbursements.
                                     w.   SECOND. — 662
καὶ ἡ χάρις τῷ διδόντι, οὐ τῷ μὴ λαμβάνοντι, καὶ ὁ ἔπαινος δὲ μᾶλλον. Thanks and, in a special way, praise are due the giver and not the recipient.
                                     x.    THIRD. — 663
καὶ ῥᾷον δὲ τὸ μὴ λαβεῖν τοῦ δοῦναι· τὸ γὰρ οἰκεῖον ἧττον προΐενται μᾶλλον ἢ οὐ λαμβάνουσι τὸ ἀλλότριον. Likewise, it is easier not to take from another than to give, for people prefer not to accept what belongs to others rather than give what is theirs.
                                     y.    FOURTH. — 664
καὶ ἐλευθέριοι δὲ λέγονται οἱ διδόντες· οἱ δὲ μὴ λαμβάνοντες οὐκ εἰς ἐλευθεριότητα ἐπαινοῦνται, ἀλλ' οὐχ ἧττον εἰς δικαιοσύνην· οἱ δὲ λαμβάνοντες οὐδ' ἐπαινοῦνται πάνυ.φιλοῦνται δὲ σχ. People who give donations are called liberal, but not so those who receive gifts even honorably—such persons are praised for justice rather than liberality; those who simply accept gifts, however, are praised very little.
                                     z.    FIFTH. — 665
εδὸν μάλιστα οἱ ἐλευθέριοι τῶν ἀπ' ἀρετῆς· ὠφέλιμοι γὰρ, τοῦτο δ' ἐν τῇ δόσει. Of all virtuous men the liberal person is particularly loved, since he is useful because of his benefactions.

Dicamus autem deinceps de liberalitate et cetera. Postquam philosophus determinavit de fortitudine et temperantia, quae respiciunt ea quibus conservatur ipsa hominis vita, hic incipit agere de aliis medietatibus, quae respiciunt quaedam secundaria bona vel mala. Et primo determinat de medietatibus laudabilibus, quae sunt virtutes. Secundo de his quae non sunt virtutes, sed passiones, ibi: de verecundia autem et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo determinat de virtutibus respicientibus res exteriores. Secundo de virtutibus pertinentibus ad actus humanos, ibi, in colloquiis autem et convivere et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo determinat de virtutibus quae respiciunt exteriora bona. Secundo de virtute mansuetudinis, quae respicit exteriora mala, ibi, mansuetudo autem est quaedam medietas et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo determinat de virtutibus respicientibus divitias. Secundo de his quae respiciunt honores, ibi, magnanimitas autem et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo determinat de liberalitate. 649. Having completed the study of fortitude and temperance which deals with means preservative of human life itself, he now begins to examine other mediums which concern certain subsidiary goods and evils. First he defines the laudable mediums which are the virtues. Then [Lect. 17], at “Shame is not properly spoken of etc.” (B. 1128 b 10), he defines the mediums that are not virtues but passions. On the first point he does two things. Initially, he considers the virtues that regard external things. Next [Lect. 14], at “Some men seem to be etc.” (B. 1126 b 10), he considers the virtues pertaining to human actions. In regard to the first point he considers the virtues relating to riches. Second [Lect. 8], at “Judging by the name etc.” (B. 1123 a 33), he considers the virtues having to do with honors. He handles the initial point in two ways. First he considers liberality. Then [Lect. 7, at “it seems logical etc.” (B. 1122 a 18), he investigates magnificence.
Secundo de magnificentia, ibi: videbitur autem consequens esse et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo inquirit materiam liberalitatis et oppositorum vitiorum. Secundo determinat actus eorum circa propriam materiam, ibi, quorum autem est aliqua utilitas, et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo ostendit, quod liberalitas est circa pecunias. Secundo ostendit quod circa eandem materiam sunt opposita vitia, ibi: est autem et prodigalitas et cetera. Circa primum tria facit: primo dicit de quo est intentio. Secundo ostendit materiam liberalitatis, ibi: videtur enim esse et cetera. Tertio exponit quod dixerat, ibi, pecunias autem et cetera. The first point he subdivides in a twofold manner. Initially [I] he examines the matter of liberality and the opposite vices. Next [II], at “Things that have utility etc.,” he defines their acts concerned with the proper matter. He discusses the initial point from two aspects. First [I, A] he shows that liberality has to do with wealth. Then [I, B], at “Extravagance is the excess etc.,” he shows that there are opposite vices dealing with this matter. The first point is developed in three ways. Initially [I, A, A’] he says what his intention is. Next [A, B’], at “which seems to be a mean etc.,” he shows the matter of liberality. Last [A, C’], at “Wealth here etc.,” he explains what he had said.
Dicit ergo primo, quod post temperantiam dicendum est de liberalitate: et hoc propter convenientiam liberalitatis ad temperantiam. Sicut enim temperantia moderatur concupiscentias delectationum tactus, ita liberalitas moderatur cupiditatem acquirendi vel possidendi res exteriores. 650. After the treatise on temperance, he says first that we must take up the study of liberality because of the likeness between liberality and temperance. As temperance moderates the desires of tactile pleasures, so liberality moderates the desire of acquiring or possessing external goods.
Deinde cum dicit: videtur enim esse etc., ostendit quae sit materia liberalitatis; et dicit quod est medietas quaedam circa pecunias sicut manifeste apparet, ex hoc scilicet quod liberalis laudatur non in rebus bellicis, circa quas est fortitudo, neque in delectationibus tactus circa quas est temperantia, neque etiam in iudiciis circa quae est iustitia. Sed laudatur in datione et sumptione, id est acceptione pecuniarum; magis tamen in datione quam in acceptione, ut infra ostendetur. 651. At “which seems” [A, B’] he defines the matter of liberality, saying that it is a certain mean in regard to wealth. This is obvious from the fact that a man is praised as liberal not in military affairs (with which fortitude is concerned), nor in tactile pleasures (temperance has to do with these), nor in judgments (which are matters for justice). But he is praised for the giving and taking, i.e., the acceptance of wealth—more in giving than in taking, as will be shown afterwards (660, 661, 665, 666, 683).
Est tamen considerandum quod aliquid potest dici materia virtutis moralis dupliciter. Uno modo sicut materia propinqua. Et hoc modo passiones sunt materia plurimarum virtutum moralium. Alio modo sicut materia remota, et hoc modo obiecta passionum ponuntur materiae. Sicut fortitudinis materia proxima est timor et audacia, materia autem remota pericula mortis. Temperantiae autem materia proxima concupiscentiae et delectationes, materia autem remota cibi et actus venerei. Sic igitur et liberalitatis materia quidem propinqua est cupiditas vel amor pecuniarum, materia autem remota ipsa pecunia. 652. We must consider that something can be called the matter of moral virtue in two ways: in one way as the proximate matter (thus the passions are the matter of many moral virtues); in the other way, as the remote matter (thus the objects of the passions are called their matter). Accordingly the proximate matter of fortitude is fear and recklessness; the remote matter, the fear of death; the proximate matter of temperance is desires and pleasures but the remote matter is food, drink, and sexual acts. Hence we find that the proximate matter of liberality is desire or love of wealth, and the remote matter is wealth itself.
Deinde cum dicit: pecunias autem etc., exponit quid nomine pecuniae intelligatur. Et dicit quod nomine pecuniarum significantur omnia illa, quorum dignum pretium potest numismate mensurari; sicut equus, vestis, domus, et quaecumque denariis appretiari possunt; quia idem est dare vel accipere ista, et dare vel accipere pecunias. 653. Then [A, C’], at “Wealth here,” he explains what is understood by the name “wealth,” saying that the term signifies everything the value of which can be computed in dollars and cents, like a horse, a coat, a house, or whatever can be evaluated in cash. The reason is that to give or take these objects is the same as to give or take wealth.
Deinde cum dicit: est autem prodigalitas etc., ostendit quomodo circa praedictam materiam, sunt etiam vitia liberalitati opposita. Et circa hoc tria facit. Primo proponit in communi, quod intendit. Et dicit, quod etiam circa pecunias se habent secundum superabundantiam et defectum prodigalitas et illiberalitas. Medium enim et extrema circa idem sunt. Unde cum prodigalitas et illiberalitas sint extrema liberalitatis, consequens est quod etiam ipsa sint circa pecunias. 654. At “Extravagance is” [I, B] he shows in what manner there are vices contrary to liberality. Here he makes the following points. First [B, A’] he states his general intention, saying that extravagance and miserliness in the use of wealth are denominated such by excess and defect.
Secundo ibi: illiberalitatem quidem etc., ostendit specialiter de illiberalitate, quod semper copulamus eam, idest attribuimus illis qui student, id est sollicitantur, circa pecunias acquirendas vel conservandas magis quam oportet. 655. Next [B, B’], at “Miserliness is always,” he mentions particularly that we always connect or charge with miserliness people who are more diligent, i.e., solicitous, about making or keeping wealth than they ought to be.
Tertio ibi prodigalitatem autem etc., ostendit quomodo prodigalitas se habeat circa pecunias. Et dicit quod nomen prodigalitatis quandoque extendimus attribuentes ipsum intemperatis hominibus: vocamus enim quandoque prodigos illos qui incontinenter vivunt et consumunt divitias suas in intemperantiam sive ciborum sive venereorum. Unde et tales videntur esse pravissimi in hoc genere, quia simul habent multa vitia, id est intemperantiam et prodigalitatem. Et quamvis quandoque tales vocentur prodigi, nomen tamen intemperantiae proprie competit eis; quia nomen prodigi impositum est ad significandum unum vitium quod consistit in indebita corruptione vel consumptione substantiae, idest propriarum divitiarum. Et hoc probat ex ipso nomine prodigalitatis. Nam prodigus dicitur quasi perditus, inquantum scilicet homo corrumpendo proprias divitias per quas vivere debet, videtur suum esse destruere quod per divitias conservatur. 656. Finally [B, C’], at “But the intemperate” he explains in what manner extravagance may be concerned with wealth. By extension the term “extravagance” is applied occasionally to the intemperate, for men who live riotously and dissipate their riches by overindulgence in food and sex are sometimes called spendthrifts. Hence they seem very depraved in the sense that they also possess many vices, like intemperance and extravagance. Although such men at times may be called extravagant, nevertheless they do not strictly deserve the name that is used to signify a vice consisting in inordinate waste or consumption of one’s substance or riches. He proves the statement by the name “extravagance.” The extravagant person is spoken of as ruined inasmuch as dissipation of his own riches, by which he ought to live, seems to destroy his existence-a thing sustained by riches.
Sed oportet quod hoc conveniat ei propter seipsum; quia unumquodque habet speciem et denominationem ab eo quod convenit ei per se; ille ergo vere dicitur prodigus cui per se hoc convenit quod consumat suas divitias quasi non habens curam debitam de eis. Ille vero qui consumit suam substantiam propter aliquid aliud, puta propter intemperantiam, non per se est consumptor divitiarum, sed per se est intemperatus. Contingit enim quandoque quod etiam homines cupidi et tenaces propter vim concupiscentiae bona sua consumant. Sic ergo nunc de prodigalitate loquimur, prout scilicet aliqui consumunt proprias divitias secundum se et non propter aliud. 657. This name should be predicated of a man in relation to himself because each thing receives its species and name from what pertains to it essentially. Therefore a man is truly called extravagant who dissipates his riches precisely because he does not have proper care of them. On the other hand, he who wastes his substance for some other reason, for example, intemperance, is not essentially a spendthrift but an intemperate person. It happens now and then that even the covetous and grasping waste their goods because of the influence of concupiscence. For the present then we are treating extravagance according as some squander riches themselves and do not waste them in some other way.
Deinde cum dicit: quorum autem est aliqua utilitas etc., ostendit qualiter liberalitas et opposita vitia circa praedictam materiam, operantur. Et circa hoc tria facit: primo determinat de liberali. Secundo de prodigo, ibi, qui autem superabundat et cetera. Tertio de illiberali, ibi, illiberalitas autem et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo determinat de actu liberalitatis. Secundo ponit quasdam proprietates ipsius, ibi, liberalis autem est vehementer et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo ostendit quis sit praecipuus actus liberalitatis; secundo ostendit qualis esse debeat, ibi, quae autem secundum virtutem et cetera. Circa primum tria facit. Primo ostendit quod actus liberalitatis est bonus usus pecuniae, tali ratione. Quaecumque sunt ad aliquid utilia, contingit his uti bene vel male. Sed divitiae quaeruntur tamquam ad aliud utiles; ergo contingit eis uti bene vel male; sed si aliquibus rebus contingat bene uti, bonus usus illarum rerum pertinet ad virtutem quae est circa illas res. Ergo bene uti pecuniis pertinet ad liberalitatem quae est circa pecunias, ut supra ostensum est. 658. Then [II], at “Things that have,” he explains in what way liberality and the opposite vices function in this matter. Here he takes up two (three) points, considering first [II, A] the liberal man; next [Lect. 3; II, B] the spendthrift, at “But the spendthrift etc.” (B. 1120 b 25); and finally [Lect. 5; II, C], the miser, at “Illiberality etc.” (B. 1121 b 13). He treats the first point from two aspects. First [II, A, A’] he examines the act of liberality; then [Lect. 2; II, A, B’], he states certain characteristics of it at “The liberal person however” (B. 1120 b 5). He discusses the first point in a twofold manner. First [A’, 1] he shows what the principal act of liberality is; and next [Lect. 2; A’, 2], what qualities this act should have, at “Since virtuous actions” (B. 1120 a 23). He handles the initial point under two headings. First [i, a] he makes clear that the act of liberality is the proper use of wealth, by the following argument. Whatever has any utility can be used well or badly. But riches are sought because they have some utility. Therefore they can be used well or badly. Now the proper use of things pertains to that virtue which deals with those things. Consequently, the proper use of wealth belongs to liberality, which is concerned with wealth, as we proved before (651-653).
Secundo ibi: usus autem etc., ostendit quis sit usus pecuniae: et dicit quod usus pecuniae consistit in emissione eius, quae quidem fit per sumptus expensarum et per dationes, sed accipere vel custodire pecunias non est uti pecuniis, sed est possidere eas. Nam per acceptionem pecuniae acquiritur eius possessio; per custodiam autem conservatur: acceptio enim est sicut quaedam pecuniae generatio, custodia autem sicut quaedam habitualis retentio. Usus autem non nominat generationem vel habitum, sed actum. 659. Next [1, b ], at “The spending,” he explains what the use of wealth is, indicating that it consists in spending which takes place by disbursements and gifts. To accept or save wealth is not to use it, for acceptance brings about possession, and saving is the preservation of wealth; acceptance is a kind of production, and saving is an habitual retention. Use, however, does not signify production or habit but act.
Tertio ibi: propter quod etc., infert quamdam conclusionem ex dictis. Et primo ponit eam, concludens ex praemissis quod magis pertinet ad liberalem dare pecuniam quibus oportet, quod est bene uti eis, quam accipere unde oportet quod pertinet ad pecuniae generationem debitam, et non accipere unde non oportet quod pertinet ad remotionem contrarii. 660. Finally [1, c], at “For this reason,” he draws a conclusion from what has been said. First [c, i] he states it, inferring from the premises that it is more characteristic of a liberal man to distribute wealth to the right persons than to accept wealth from the proper sources (this pertains to a lawful increase of wealth), and to refuse wealth from improper sources (this pertains to removal of the contrary).
Secundo ibi: virtutis enim magis etc., confirmat inductam conclusionem quinque rationibus. Quarum prima talis est. Magis pertinet ad virtutem benefacere quam bene pati, quia benefacere est melius et difficilius. Similiter etiam magis pertinet ad virtutem bene operari quam abstinere a turpi operatione. Quia recessus a termino est principium motus, cui assimilatur vitatio turpis operationis. Sed operatio boni assimilatur perventioni ad terminum quae perficit motum. Manifestum est autem quoniam ex eo quod aliquis dat, benefacit et bene operatur; ad sumptionem autem, idest receptionem pertinet bene pati, inquantum scilicet aliquis recipit unde oportet, vel non turpe operari, inquantum scilicet non recipit unde non oportet. Ergo consequens est quod ad virtutem liberalitatis magis pertineat bene dare quam bene accipere vel abstinere a mala acceptione. 661. Then [c, ii], at “Virtue consists,” he substantiates the conclusion by five reasons. The first reason [ii, v] is that it is more characteristic of virtue to bestow than to receive benefits because the act of benefitting is better and more difficult. Likewise, it is more characteristic of virtue to perform a good action than to refrain from an evil one, because departure from a terminus is the principle of motion to which the avoidance of an evil action is likened. But the performance of a good action is likened to the arrival at the goal which perfects motion. It is obvious when someone gives gifts that he bestows a benefit and performs a good action. On the other hand, it pertains to taking or acceptance to receive benefits worthily (inasmuch as a man acquires them from proper sources), and not to act unworthily (inasmuch as a man refuses them from improper sources). Consequently, it belongs to the virtue of liberality to give well rather than to receive worthily or refrain from reprehensible acceptance of gifts.
Secundam rationem ponit ibi et gratia danti et cetera. Quae talis est. Operationi virtutis debetur laus et gratiarum actio. Sed utrumque horum magis debetur danti quam accipienti bene vel non male accipienti; ergo virtus liberalitatis magis consistit in dando quam in accipiendo. 662. The second reason [ii, w], at “Thanks and,” follows. Praise and thanks are due in return for a good act. But each one of these is ascribed with better reason to the giver than the receiver, worthy or unworthy. Therefore, the virtue of liberality consists rather in giving than receiving.
Tertiam rationem ponit ibi, et facilius autem et cetera. Quae talis est. Virtus est circa difficile. Sed facilius est quod aliquis non accipiat aliena, quam quod det proprium. Quia cum aliquis dat id quod est sibi proprium, quasi abscidit a se id quod est sibi incorporatum. Ergo virtus liberalitatis magis est circa dationem quam circa acceptionem. 663. The third reason is presented at “Likewise it is easier” [ii, x]. Virtue is concerned with the difficult. But it is easier not to receive what belongs to others than to give what is one’s own because a person giving what is his cuts himself away, so to speak, from what was a part of him. Therefore, the virtue of liberality more property has to do with giving than receiving.
Quartam rationem ponit ibi, sed et liberales dicuntur et cetera. Quae sumitur ex communi modo loquendi. Dicuntur enim maxime liberales illi qui dant. Illi vero qui non accipiunt inordinate non multum laudantur de liberalitate, sed magis de iustitia; illi vero qui accipiunt non multum laudantur. Ergo liberalitas maxime videtur esse circa dationes. 664. The fourth reason, beginning at “People who” [ii, y], is taken from common usage. Men who give gifts are said to be liberal in a marked degree; those who do not accept dishonest gifts are commended not so much for liberality as justice, and those who simply accept presents are praised very little. Therefore, the virtue of liberality seems to be concerned in a special way with giving gifts.
Quintam rationem ponit ibi, amantur autem maxime et cetera. Quae talis est. Inter omnes virtuosos maxime amantur liberales, non quidem amicitia honesti, quasi liberalitas sit maxima virtus, sed amicitia utilis, inquantum scilicet sunt aliis utiles. Sunt autem utiles per hoc quod dant. Ergo liberalitas maxime consistit circa dationes. 665. The fifth reason is given at “Of all virtuous men” [ii, z]. Among all virtuous men the liberal person is especially loved not by an honorable friendship—as if liberality was a most excellent virtue—but by a friendship of utility precisely as he is useful to others. The liberal are indeed useful in this that they make disbursements. Therefore, liberality deals especially with giving gifts.

The Act of Liberality
Chapter 1 (II, A, A’)

            a.   He explains the quality of the principal act.
                   i.    What should be the quality of giving...
αἱ δὲ κατ' ἀρετὴν πράξεις καλαὶ καὶ τοῦ καλοῦ ἕνεκα. καὶ ὁ ἐλευθέριος οὖν δώσει τοῦ καλοῦ ἕνεκα καὶ ὀρθῶς· οἷς γὰρ δεῖ καὶ ὅσα καὶ ὅτε, καὶ τἆλλα ὅσα ἕπεται τῇ ὀρθῇ δόσει· καὶ ταῦτα ἡδέως ἢ ἀλύπως· Since virtuous actions are good both in themselves and in their intent, the liberal man will give with a good intention and in the right circumstances. He will make gifts to the proper persons, at the opportune time, of whatever gifts are fitting and with all the requisites of reasonable giving.
                         y.   THE GIVING OF A LIBERAL PERSON SHOULD BE ENJOYABLE. — 667
τὸ γὰρ κατ' ἀρετὴν ἡδὺ ἢ ἄλυπον, ἥκιστα δὲ λυπηρόν. Besides, he will give with pleasure and without sadness, for a virtuous action is pleasurable and either not sad at all or in a very slight degree.
                   ii.   The other kinds of donations do not pertain to liberality.
                         x.   ONE WHO GIVES TO THE WRONG PERSONS... IS NOT CALLED LIBERAL. — 668
ὁ δὲ διδοὺς οἷς μὴ δεῖ, ἢ μὴ τοῦ καλοῦ ἕνεκα ἀλλὰ διά τιν' ἄλλην αἰτίαν, οὐκ ἐλευθέριος ἀλλ' ἄλλος τις ῥηθήσεται. The man, however, who gives to the wrong persons, or not with the right intention, but for some other cause will be called not liberal but by some other name.
                         y.   A MAN WHO GIVES WITH SADNESS IS NOT LIBERAL. — 669
οὐδ' ὁ λυπηρῶς· μᾶλλον γὰρ ἕλοιτ' ἂν τὰ χρήματα τῆς καλῆς πράξεως, τοῦτο δ' οὐκ ἐλευθερίου. Nor will anyone be called liberal who gives with sadness, for he would choose money rather than the generous deed. Such a one surely is not liberal.
            b.  (He explains) the qualities of the secondary acts.
                   i.    What the liberal person avoids in accepting. — 670
οὐδὲ λήψεται δὲ ὅθεν μὴ δεῖ· οὐ γάρ ἐστι τοῦ μὴ τιμῶντος τὰ χρήματα ἡ τοιαύτη λῆψις. οὐκ ἂν εἴη δὲ οὐδ' αἰτητικός· οὐ γάρ ἐστι τοῦ εὖ ποιοῦντος εὐχερῶς εὐεργετεῖσθαι. Nor will a liberal man accept a gift from an improper source, since an accepting of this sort is not characteristic of one who does not pay homage to wealth. And certainly he will not be inclined to seek favors, for it is not the usual thing that a man who bestows benefactions readily accepts them.
                   ii.   What (the liberal man) should observe. — 671
ὅθεν δὲ δεῖ, λήψεται, οἷον ἀπὸ τῶν ἰδίων κτημάτων, οὐχ ὡς καλὸν ἀλλ' ὡς ἀναγκαῖον, ὅπως ἔχῃ διδόναι. οὐδ' ἀμελήσει τῶν ἰδίων, βουλόμενός γε διὰ τούτων τισὶν ἐπαρκεῖν. οὐδὲ τοῖς τυχοῦσι δώσει, ἵνα ἔχῃ διδόναι οἷς δεῖ καὶ ὅτε καὶ οὗ καλόν. He will take from the proper sources, i.e., from his own possessions, for money is not good itself but necessary that he may have something to give. He will not give to everyone so that he can give to the right persons when and where it is fitting.
B’  He states four properties of liberality.
ἐλευθερίου δ' ἐστὶ σφόδρα καὶ τὸ ὑπερβάλλειν ἐν τῇ δόσει, ὥστε καταλείπειν ἑαυτῷ ἐλάττω· τὸ γὰρ μὴ βλέπειν ἐφ' ἑαυτὸν ἐλευθερίου. The liberal person, however, is characteristically eager to be generous, keeping things of lesser value for his own use, for he is not solicitous about himself.
κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν δ' ἡ ἐλευθεριότης λέγεται· οὐ γὰρ ἐν τῷ πλήθει τῶν διδομένων τὸ ἐλευθέριον, ἀλλ' ἐν τῇ τοῦ διδόντος ἕξει, αὕτη δὲ κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν δίδωσιν. οὐθὲν δὴ κωλύει ἐλευθεριώτερον εἶναι τὸν τὰ ἐλάττω διδόντα, ἐὰν ἀπ' ἐλαττόνων διδῷ. Liberality makes allowance for the amount of one’s wealth, since the liberal deed does not lie in the number of gifts but in the condition of the giver who gives according to his means. Nothing hinders the smaller donor from being more liberal, if he contributes from more limited resources.
ἐλευθεριώτεροι δὲ εἶναι δοκοῦσιν οἱ μὴ κτησάμενοι ἀλλὰ παραλαβόντες τὴν οὐσίαν· ἄπειροί τε γὰρ τῆς ἐνδείας, καὶ πάντες ἀγαπῶσι μᾶλλον τὰ αὑτῶν ἔργα, ὥσπερ οἱ γονεῖς καὶ οἱ ποιηταί. People who inherit wealth—not having any experience of need—are more liberal than those who earn their money. All men esteem more highly what they themselves have produced, like parents and poets.
            a.   He indicates the property. — 675
πλουτεῖν δ' οὐ ῥᾴδιον τὸν ἐλευθέριον, μήτε ληπτικὸν ὄντα μήτε φυλακτικόν, προετικὸν δὲ καὶ μὴ τιμῶντα δι' αὐτὰ τὰ χρήματα ἀλλ' ἕνεκα τῆς δόσεως. It is not easy to increase the wealth of the liberal man who is inclined neither to accept nor keep riches but rather to distribute them, placing value not on riches themselves but on the bestowal of them.
            b.  He makes clear... what he had said. — 676
διὸ καὶ ἐγκαλεῖται τῇ τύχῃ ὅτι οἱ μάλιστα ἄξιοι ὄντες ἥκιστα πλουτοῦσιν. συμβαίνει δ' οὐκ ἀλόγως τοῦτο· οὐ γὰρ οἷόν τε χρήματ' ἔχειν μὴ ἐπιμελόμενον ὅπως ἔχῃ, ὥσπερ οὐδ' ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων. Men bring the accusation against fortune that of those who deserve wealth most do not become rich—a fact that has a reasonable explanation. Here (and the same is true in other matters) it is not possible for a person to possess money who does not trouble himself about it.
            c.   He excludes a false opinion. — 677
οὐ μὴν δώσει γε οἷς οὐ δεῖ οὐδ' ὅτε μὴ δεῖ, οὐδ' ὅσα ἄλλα τοιαῦτα· οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἔτι πράττοι κατὰ τὴν ἐλευθεριότητα, καὶ εἰς ταῦτα ἀναλώσας οὐκ ἂν ἔχοι εἰς ἃ δεῖ ἀναλίσκειν. ὥσπερ γὰρ εἴρηται, ἐλευθέριός ἐστιν ὁ κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν δαπανῶν καὶ εἰς ἃ δεῖ· The liberal man, however, will not give to the wrong persons, nor at the wrong time, nor in any other wrong manner, for he would not be directed to these things according to liberality. Besides, by this squandering he would be without the resources on which to draw. As has been explained, the liberal man then spends according to his means and in the way he ought.
Quae autem secundum virtutem (et) operationes et cetera. Postquam philosophus ostendit quis sit praecipuus actus liberalitatis, hic ostendit qualis debeat esse. Et primo ostendit qualis sit praecipuus actus eius. Secundo quales sint actus eius secundarii, ibi: neque accipiet et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo ostendit qualis debeat esse liberalitatis datio quae est praecipuus actus eius. Secundo ostendit quod aliae dationes non pertinent ad liberalitatem, ibi: qui autem dat quibus non oportet et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo ostendit, quod datio liberalis debeat debitis circumstantiis esse vestita, quia scilicet omnes operationes quae sunt secundum virtutem debent esse bonae, id est rectificatae a ratione secundum debitas circumstantias, et ulterius ordinatae per intentionem ad bonum finem. Cum igitur datio sit praecipuus actus liberalitatis, consequens est quod liberalis det propter bonum finem, et quod recte, id est secundum regulam rationis; inquantum scilicet dat quibus oportet et quando oportet et quaecumque aliae debitae circumstantiae consequuntur ad rectam dationem. 666. After the Philosopher has made clear what the principal act of liberality is, he now [(II, A, A’)2] shows what its qualities should be. First [2, a] he explains the quality of the principal act; and next [2, b] the qualities of the secondary acts, at “Nor will a liberal man accept.” In regard to the initial point he does two things. First [a, i] he shows what should be the quality of giving which is the principal act of liberality. Then [a, ii] he shows that other kinds of donations do not pertain to liberality, at “The man, however, etc.” He treats the first point in a twofold manner. First [i, x] he explains that the giving of the liberal man should be endowed with circumstances because all virtuous operations ought to be good, directed by reason according to the required circumstances and ordered to a good end. Since, then, giving is the principal act of liberality, it follows that the liberal man should give with rectitude of intention and of deed, i.e., in conformity with the norm of reason. This means that he bestows on the proper person, in a fitting manner and according to all other requisite circumstances called for by right reason.
Secundo ibi: et haec delectabiliter etc., ostendit quod datio liberalis debet esse delectabilis. Et hoc est quod dicit quod liberalis dat delectabiliter, vel saltem sine tristitia. Ita enim est in omni virtute, ut ex supradictis patet, quod actus virtuosus, vel est delectabilis, vel saltem est sine tristitia; vel si oporteat aliquam tristitiam admisceri, minimum habebit per comparationem ad alios homines, sicut supra dictum est de forti quod, si non multum delectetur in suo actu, tamen non tristatur, vel saltem minus tristatur inter omnes qui huiusmodi pericula subeunt. 667. Next [i, y], at “Besides, he will give with pleasure,” he shows that the giving of a liberal person should be enjoyable. This is what he means saying that the liberal man gives cheerfully, or at least without sadness. It is true of any virtue, as evident in previous discussions (265-279, 371-378), that virtuous action is either pleasurable or at least without sadness. If the virtuous man has some sadness mingled with his activity, it will be very slight compared with what other men suffer. This was said before in regard to the brave man who, even if he does not take much pleasure in his operation, nevertheless is not made sad or at least has less sadness than anyone who undergoes trials of this kind in his activities.
Deinde cum dicit: qui autem dat quibus non oportet etc., ostendit quod aliae dationes non pertinent ad liberalem. Et primo de dationibus quibus desunt debitae circumstantiae. Et dicit quod ille qui dat quibus non oportet, vel non propter honestatem, sed propter aliquam aliam causam licitam vel illicitam, non dicitur liberalis. Sed alio nomine nominatur secundum differentiam finis propter quem dat, ex quo moralia speciem et nomen sortiuntur. 668. Then [a, ii], at “The Man, however,” he brings out that other donations do not pertain to the liberal man. First [ii, x] he says—speaking of disbursements that lack the proper circumstances—that one who gives to the wrong persons, or not for an honorable motive but for some other reason, good or bad, is not called liberal. But he is given a different name according to the difference of the end for which he gives, since moral matters take their species and name from the end.
Secundo ibi: neque qui triste etc., ostendit idem de dationibus quae sunt cum tristitia. Et dicit quod neque illi qui cum tristitia dant sunt liberales, quia ex hoc ipso quod tristantur in dando, videtur quod magis eligerent pecunias quam operationem virtuosam honestae dationis. Quod non pertinet ad liberalem. 669. Second [ii, y], at “Nor will anyone,” he affirms that a man who gives with sadness is not liberal. The reason is that the cheerless giver seems to prefer wealth to the virtuous action of honorable giving—which is not the case with a liberal person.
Deinde cum dicit: neque accipiet etc., ostendit quales sint operationes liberalitatis sicut acceptio et alia huiusmodi. Et circa hoc duo facit. Primo ostendit quid vitet liberalis in accipiendo. Secundo ostendit quid observet, ibi, unde autem oportet et cetera. Circa primum duo ponit. Quorum primum est, quod liberalis non accipit unde non oportet. Sic enim accipere non videtur competere homini, qui non appretiatur pecunias. Secundum est, quod liberalis non est promptus ad petendum. Sicut enim in naturalibus, quod est multum activum est parum passivum, ut ignis, ita etiam in moralibus liberalis, qui est promptus ad benefaciendum donando, non de facili vult beneficia ab alio recipere, quod est bene pati. 670. Next [2, b], at “Nor will a liberal man accept,” he explains the nature of the secondary acts of liberality like receiving and so on. Here he makes two points, showing first what the liberal person avoids in accepting; and then [b, ii] what he should observe, at “He will take etc.” On the first point he makes two comments. The first is that the liberal man does not take from improper sources, for to take in this way does not seem becoming to a man who does not highly prize wealth. The second is that the liberal man is not quick to make requests. As in the natural order, what is greatly active has little receptivity, for example, fire, so in the moral order the liberal person, who is prompt in making benefactions, is not eager to accept benefits from others, i.e., to be easily receptive.
Deinde cum dicit: unde autem oportet etc., ostendit quid observet liberalis in accipiendo vel retinendo; et ponit tria. Quorum primum est, quod liberalis accipit unde oportet, scilicet a propriis possessionibus vel ab aliis huiusmodi, non quia quaerit pecuniam quasi per se bonum, sed quasi necessarium ad dandum. Secundum est, quod liberalis non negligit procurationem bonorum propriorum, quia vult habere unde sufficiat ad dandum aliis. Tertium est, quod liberalis non dat quibuscumque, sed retinet ad hoc quod possit dare quibus oportet, et loco et tempore debito. 671. Then [b, ii] , at “He will take,” Aristotle shows what the liberal man should observe in taking and retaining. He makes three observations, of which the first is that the liberal man takes from the proper sources, i.e., from his own possessions and not from others, since he seeks wealth not as a good itself but as something necessary for making gifts. The second is that he does not neglect the care of his own goods because he wants to have enough to bestow on others. The third is that he does not give to everyone but holds back so he can give to the right persons at a fitting place and time.
Deinde cum dicit: liberalis autem etc., ponit quatuor proprietates liberalitatis. Quarum prima est, quod ad liberalem pertinet, ut vehementer superabundet in datione, non quidem sic quod superabundet a ratione recta, sed ita quod datio in ipso superabundet retentioni. Quia minus sibi relinquit, quam aliis det. Paucis enim in seipso contentus est; sed dum vult multis providere oportet, quod pluribus largiatur. Non enim pertinet ad liberalem quod sibi soli intendat. 672. Then [B’], at “The liberal person,” he states four properties of liberality. The first [B’, 1] is that it pertains to the liberal person to give eagerly and generously, not however without right reason but in such a way that what he gives is more than what he retains, because he keeps less for himself than he gives to others. He is indeed content with a few things for himself but if he wants to care for many people, he must distribute much more. It is not a mark of the generous man to have himself alone in mind.
Secundam proprietatem ponit ibi: secundum substantiam autem et cetera. Et dicit quod liberalitas commendatur secundum proportionem substantiae, idest divitiarum. Non enim datio iudicatur liberalis ex multitudine donorum sed ex habitu, idest ex facultate et voluntate dantis, qui scilicet dat secundum modum suarum divitiarum. Unde nihil prohibet, quod aliquis, qui minora dat, liberalior iudicetur, si a minoribus divitiis det. 673. At “Liberality makes allowance” he gives the second property [B’, 2], saying that liberality is attributed according to the relative quantity of a man’s substance or riches. Hence there is no reason why someone who bestows smaller gifts may not be judged more liberal, if he gives from more moderate means.
Tertiam proprietatem ponit ibi: liberaliores autem et cetera. Et dicit quod illi qui suscipiunt divitias a parentibus sunt magis liberales quam illi qui proprio labore eas acquirunt. Et huius assignat duas rationes. Quarum prima est, quod illi qui suscipiunt divitias a parentibus, nunquam fuerunt experti indigentiam; unde non timent eam et propter hoc non timent expendere, sicut illi qui aliquando experti sunt paupertatem. Secunda ratio est, quia naturale est quod omnes diligant sua opera, sicut parentes diligunt suos filios, et poetae sua poemata. Illi autem qui acquirunt proprio labore divitias, reputant eas quasi sua opera. Unde magis volunt eas conservare. 674. He presents the third property at “People who inherit” [B’, 3], affirming that persons who inherit riches from their parents are more liberal than those who acquire them by their own labor. He assigns two reasons for this. The first is that people who are given wealth by their parents have never felt the pinch of need. Consequently, they are not afraid to spend, as those are who have experienced poverty at one time. The second reason is that all men naturally love their own works; parents love their children, and poets, their poems. Likewise, those who acquire riches by their labor look upon them as their own works and rather desire to keep them.
Quartam proprietatem ponit ibi: ditari autem non facile et cetera. Et circa hoc tria facit. Primo ponit proprietatem. Et dicit quod non est facile quod ditetur homo liberalis, quum non de facili accipiat, neque multum custodiat divitias; sed magis a se emittit eas dando et expendendo et non appretiatur divitias propter ipsas, sed solum propter dationem. 675. He presents the fourth property at “It is not easy” [B’, 4]. He considers this point under three aspects. First [4, a] he indicates the property, saying that the liberal man is not easily made rich, since he is not disposed to accept or keep riches but rather to distribute them in gifts and disbursements. Nor does he value riches for themselves but for their distribution.
Secundo ibi: propter quod etc., manifestat quod dixerat per quoddam signum. Quia enim liberales non de facili sunt divites, homines vulgares accusant fortunam, cui attribuunt divitias, quod non sunt divites illi qui maxime essent digni, scilicet liberales, qui aliis largiuntur. Sed ipse dicit, quod hoc non irrationabiliter accidit: quia non est possibile, quod homo habeat pecunias, qui non multum curat habere; sicut etiam non est possibile, quod aliquid aliud habeatur, de quo homo non curat. 676. Next [4, b], at “Men bring the accusation,” he makes clear by a certain sign what he had said. Since the liberal do not readily become wealthy, the common people blame fortune—to which they attribute riches—because those who would be especially deserving (i.e., the liberal who give generously to others) are not rich. But Aristotle says that this is not an unreasonable occurrence, for it is not possible that a person should possess wealth who troubles himself very little about it, just as it is not possible that anything else which a man does not care for should be retained.
Tertio ibi: non tamen dabit etc., excludit falsam opinionem. Non enim propter hoc dictum est quod non curet divitias, quia det quibus non oportet, vel quando non oportet, vel indebite secundum quamcumque aliam circumstantiam. Tum quia talis operatio non esset liberalis: tum quia per hoc impediretur ab operatione liberali, dum inutiliter consumens non haberet quod oportune consumeret. Sicut enim dictum est, liberalis dicitur, qui expendit secundum proportionem propriae substantiae, et in ea quae oportet. 677. Finally [4, c] he excludes a false opinion at “The liberal man, however, will not.” It was not said that the liberal man does not care about riches because he gives to the wrong person, or at the wrong time, or in the wrong manner according to some other circumstance. The reason is both that such an operation would not be liberal and that the liberal person would be hindered in this way from truly generous action, for by reason of useless waste he would lack the means to make the most worthy disbursements. As has been explained (658-659), he is called liberal, then, who gives donations in the proper manner and according to the condition of his own resources.

Chapter 1 (II)

B.   He begins the consideration of the spendthrift.
      A’ He treats the person who is altogether extravagant.
                   a.   In what respect the spendthrift is excessive. — 678
ὁ δ' ὑπερβάλλων ἄσωτος. διὸ τοὺς τυράννους οὐ λέγομεν ἀσώτους· τὸ γὰρ πλῆθος τῆς κτήσεως οὐ δοκεῖ ῥᾴδιον εἶναι ταῖς δόσεσι καὶ ταῖς δαπάναις ὑπερβάλλειν. But the spendthrift is a man who squanders. Hence we do not call tyrants spendthrifts, for it is not easy to be excessive in gifts and expenditures with a vast sum of money in their possession.
                   b.   Of what nature (the spendthrift’s) act is.
                         i.    He ... resumes what was said about the act of the liberal man.
τῆς ἐλευθεριότητος δὴ μεσότητος οὔσης περὶ χρημάτων δόσιν καὶ λῆψιν, ὁ ἐλευθέριος καὶ δώσει καὶ δαπανήσει εἰς ἃ δεῖ καὶ ὅσα δεῖ, ὁμοίως ἐν μικροῖς καὶ μεγάλοις, καὶ ταῦτα ἡδέως· Since liberality is the mean concerned with the giving and taking of wealth, the liberal man will both give and expend whatever he ought and in the way he ought, whether the sum be large or small. He will also do this gladly.
                               y.   IN MATTERS SECONDARILY PERTAINING TO HIM.
                                     aa.  The liberal man’s reaction to taking. — 680
καὶ λήψεται δ' ὅθεν δεῖ καὶ ὅσα δεῖ. τῆς ἀρετῆς γὰρ περὶ ἄμφω οὔσης μεσότητος, ποιήσει ἀμφότερα ὡς δεῖ· ἕπεται γὰρ τῇ ἐπιεικεῖ δόσει ἡ τοιαύτη λῆψις, ἡ δὲ μὴ τοιαύτη ἐναντία ἐστίν. αἱ μὲν οὖν ἑπόμεναι γίνονται ἅμα ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ, αἱ δ' ἐναντίαι δῆλον ὡς οὔ. Likewise he will accept both large and small amounts from the proper sources and under the proper conditions. Since virtue consists in the mean regarding both (taking and giving), he will do both as he ought because virtuous taking goes hand in hand with virtuous giving, while improper taking is contrary to virtuous giving. Accordingly, the operations that go hand in hand exist at the same time in the liberal man, but contrary operations obviously cannot.
                                     bb. (The liberal man’s reaction) to sadness.
                                            a’. Saddened by disordered giving. — 681
ἐὰν δὲ παρὰ τὸ δέον καὶ τὸ καλῶς ἔχον συμβαίνῃ αὐτῷ ἀναλίσκειν, λυπήσεται, μετρίως δὲ καὶ ὡς δεῖ· τῆς ἀρετῆς γὰρ καὶ ἥδεσθαι καὶ λυπεῖσθαι ἐφ' οἷς δεῖ καὶ ὡς δεῖ. If it should happen that he spends inopportunely and unsuccessfully, he will be sad but in a moderate and fitting manner, for it is characteristic of virtue to be pleased and saddened at the proper things and in the proper circumstances.
                                            b’. By the privation of wealth. — 682
καὶ εὐκοινώνητος δ' ἐστὶν ὁ ἐλευθέριος εἰς χρήματα· δύναται γὰρ ἀδικεῖσθαι, μὴ τιμῶν γε τὰ χρήματα, But the liberal man is disposed to share his wealth with others. He is even willing to suffer loss by not valuing money highly.
                                            c’. Is grieved at inappropriate retention of money. — 683
καὶ μᾶλλον ἀχθόμενος εἴ τι δέον μὴ ἀνάλωσεν ἢ λυπούμενος εἰ μὴ δέον τι ἀνάλωσεν, καὶ τῷ Σιμωνίδῃ οὐκ ἀρεσκόμενος. He is more grieved over failure to make an appropriate outlay than over an inopportune expenditure—a thing displeasing to Simonides.
                         ii.   How the act of the spendthrift is constituted. — 684
ὁ δ' ἄσωτος καὶ ἐν τούτοις διαμαρτάνει· οὔτε γὰρ ἥδεται ἐφ' οἷς δεῖ οὐδὲ ὡς δεῖ οὔτε λυπεῖται· ἔσται δὲ προϊοῦσι φανερώτερον. The spendthrift, however, sins in these matters too. Besides, he neither takes pleasure in the right things, nor is saddened when he should be. This will be clarified by what follows.
                   a.   In regard, first to opposition. — 685
εἴρηται δὴ ἡμῖν ὅτι ὑπερβολαὶ καὶ ἐλλείψεις εἰσὶν ἡ ἀσωτία καὶ ἡ ἀνελευθερία, καὶ ἐν δυσίν, ἐν δόσει καὶ λήψει· καὶ τὴν δαπάνην γὰρ εἰς τὴν δόσιν τίθεμεν. ἡ μὲν οὖν ἀσωτία τῷ διδόναι καὶ μὴ λαμβάνειν ὑπερβάλλει, τῷ δὲ λαμβάνειν ἐλλείπει, ἡ δ' ἀνελευθερία τῷ διδόναι μὲν ἐλλείπει, τῷ λαμβάνειν δ' ὑπερβάλλει, πλὴν ἐν μικροῖς. We have seen that extravagance and miserliness pertain to excess and defect, and occur in two actions, namely, giving and taking. Extravagance then abounds in giving and falls short in taking. On the other hand, miserliness falls short in giving and abounds in taking, except in trifling things.
Qui autem superabundat et cetera. Postquam philosophus determinavit de liberali, hic determinat de prodigo. Et primo determinat de eo, qui est totaliter prodigus. Secundo de eo qui est partim prodigus et partim illiberalis, ibi: sed multi prodigorum, et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo determinat de eo prodigo absolute; secundo comparat prodigum illiberali, ibi: dictum est autem a nobis, et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo ostendit respectu cuius prodigus superabundet. Secundo ostendit qualis sit prodigi actus, ibi, liberalitate utique et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod cum dicatur aliquis liberalis ex hoc quod expendit secundum proportionem suae substantiae; prodigus dicitur, qui superabundat proportionem suae substantiae expendendo vel dando. Et ex hoc concludit, quod tyranni, qui habent indeficientem divitiarum abundantiam, utpote omnia quae sunt communia sibi usurpantes, non dicuntur prodigi, quia multitudine eorum quae possident, non videtur esse facile quod in dando et expendendo superabundent proportionem propriarum divitiarum. 678. After the Philosopher has finished the study of the liberal man, he now [(II)B] begins the consideration of the spendthrift. First [A’] he treats the person who is altogether extravagant; and next [Lect. 4, B’] the person who is partly extravagant and partly liberal at “But, as we have noted etc.” (B. 1121 a 30). In regard to the first, lie does two things. Initially [1] he considers the spendthrift as such. Then [2] he makes a comparison between the spendthrift and the miser, at “We have seen etc.” He clarifies the initial point by a twofold distinction. First [1, a] he shows in what respect the spendthrift is excessive; and next [1, b], of what nature his act is, at “Since liberality is the mean etc.” Although I man may be called liberal when he spends according to his means, he is called extravagant when he spends or gives beyond his means. From this he concludes that tyrants, who have an inexhaustible supply of wealth-usurping as they do public goods for themselves-are not called extravagant. The reason is that it is not easy f or tyrants to exceed the amount of their riches by donations and expenditures because of the great amount of their possessions.
Deinde cum dicit: liberalitate utique etc., manifestat qualis sit actus prodigi. Et quia opposita ex invicem manifestantur, primo resumit ea quae dicta sunt de actu liberalis. Secundo ostendit qualis sit actus prodigi, ibi, prodigus autem, et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo resumit qualiter liberalis se habeat circa ea quae principaliter ad eum pertinent, scilicet circa dationem et delectationem dationis. Secundo qualiter se habeat in his circa quae est secundario liberalitas, ibi: et accipiet unde oportet et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod cum liberalitas sit quaedam medietas circa dationem et acceptionem pecuniarum, liberalis emittit pecunias dando et expendendo, et hoc secundum rationem rectam, in quae oportet et quaecumque alia oportet in huiusmodi observare, per quod differt liberalis a prodigo; et hoc facit tam in parvis quam in magnis: per quod differt liberalis a magnifico, qui est tantummodo circa magna, ut infra dicetur. Et hoc facit delectabiliter: per quod differt ab illiberali, qui in emissione pecuniarum contristatur. 679. Then [i, b], at “Since liberality.” he discloses what the act of the spendthrift is. Because opposites are mutually revealing, he first [b, i] resumes what was said about the act of the liberal man. Next [b, ii], he shows how the act of the spendthrift is constituted, at “The spendthrift, however, etc.” On the first point he proceeds in two ways. First [i, x] he reviews how the liberal man should conduct himself in the matters principally pertaining to him, i.e., in giving and in the pleasure of giving; and next [i, A in matters secondarily pertaining to him, at “Likewise he will accept.” He says first that, since liberality is a certain dealing with giving and taking of wealth, the liberal person, disposes of his funds by making gifts and disbursements—and this in agreement with right reason—in the proper way, of the proper things, and according to other appropriate circumstances. By this the liberal man is distinguished from the spendthrift; by the fact that he gives both in large and small amounts he is distinguished from the munificent man, who is concerned only with great donations; by the fact that he gives with pleasure he differs from the miser who is saddened by the giving away of his wealth.
Deinde cum dicit: et accipiet unde oportet etc., resumit quomodo liberalis se habeat circa ea quae secundario ad liberalitatem pertinent. Et primo quomodo se habeat circa acceptionem. Secundo quomodo se habeat circa tristitiam, ibi: si autem praeter optimum et bene et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod liberalis accipit unde oportet, et observat quaecumque oportet in accipiendo observari. Cum enim liberalitatis virtus medium teneat circa utrumque, scilicet acceptionem et dationem, liberalis utrumque faciet sicut oportet, quia ad decentem dationem sequitur quod sit decens acceptio. Sed si acceptio non sit decens, contraria est decenti dationi, quia ex contrariis causis procedunt. Decens enim datio procedit ex hoc, quod homo praefert bonum rationis cupiditati pecuniae. Sed indecens acceptio provenit ex hoc quod homo cupiditatem pecuniae praeponit bono rationis. Et quia ea quae seinvicem consequuntur simul fiunt in eodem, quae vero sunt contraria simul esse non possunt: inde est quod decens datio et decens acceptio, quae seinvicem consequuntur, simul adunantur in liberali. Sed indecens acceptio non simul invenitur in eo cum decenti acceptione, cui contrariatur. 680. Next [i, y], at “Likewise he will accept,” Aristotle reviews the way the liberal man should act in matters which secondarily pertain to liberality. He touches first [y, aa] on the liberal man’s reaction to taking; and next [y, bb], to sadness at “If it should etc.” He says first that the liberal person accepts from the proper sources and observes all proper conditions. Since the virtue of liberality abides by the golden mean in regard to both, i.e., taking and giving, the liberal man will perform both as he ought-worthy acceptance going hand in hand with worthy giving. But acceptance that is not virtuous is contrary to virtuous giving because the two proceed from contrary causes. Virtuous giving proceeds from the fact that a man prefers the reasonable good to the desire for wealth. But dishonorable taking arises from placing the desire of wealth before the reasonable good. Things that go hand in hand exist at the same time in the same subject, but not things that are contrary. Hence virtuous giving and taking that accompany one another are united in the liberal person, but dishonorable taking is not found in him together with virtuous taking, its contrary.
Deinde cum dicit: si autem praeter optimum etc., ostendit quomodo se habeat liberalis circa tristitiam, quae est de amissione pecuniae. Et circa hoc tria facit. Primo ostendit quomodo tristetur de inordinata datione. Et dicit quod si contingat ipsum aliquid de suis divitiis consumere praeter ordinem ad finem optimum et praeter hoc quod bene se habeat in dando secundum debitas circumstantias, de hoc tristatur, sicut et quilibet virtuosus tristatur si contingat ipsum aliquid facere quod sit contra virtutem, et tamen circa ipsam tristitiam modum rationis observat, ut scilicet tristitia sit moderata et secundum quod oportet. Quia ad virtutem pertinet, ut aliquis delectetur et tristetur in quibus oportet et secundum quod oportet. 681. Then [y, bb], at “If it should,” he explains how the liberal man reacts to sadness arising from the loss of wealth. He develops this point in three steps. First [bb, a’] he shows in what manner the liberal person is saddened by disordered giving, affirming that if some of his own money be lost by reason of foolish spending and unfortunate conditions, he becomes sad as any virtuous man is saddened by doing something contrary to virtue. In this sorrow, however, he observes the rule of reason with moderation and as he should. The reason is that it is characteristic of the virtuous person to be delighted and to be saddened by the right thing and in the right manner.
Secundo ibi: sed etiam bene communicativus etc., ostendit quomodo tristetur circa ablationem pecuniarum. Et dicit, quod liberalis est bene communicativus in pecuniis, idest promptus ad hoc, quod pecunias suas quasi communes cum aliis habeat. Potest enim absque tristitia sustinere, quod aliquis ei in pecuniis iniurietur, eo quod non multum pecunias appretiatur. 682. Next [bb, b’], at “But the liberal man,” he shows how the generous person is saddened by the privation of wealth, saying that he is disposed to share his wealth, i.e., is inclined to possess it in common, as it were, with others. He can, without grief, permit someone to injure him in money matters because he does not attach great importance to wealth.
Tertio ibi: et magis gravatus etc., ostendit qualiter tristetur circa indebitam retentionem pecuniae. Et dicit quod magis gravatur, idest tristatur, si non consumit dando vel expendendo, quam tristetur, si consumat aliquid quod non oportebat consumere; et hoc ideo, quia magis ad ipsum pertinet dare quam accipere vel conservare, quamvis hoc non placeret Simonidi idest cuidam poetae, qui contrarium fieri oportere dicebat. 683. Third [bb, c’], at “He is more grieved,” he discloses in what manner the liberal man is grieved at inappropriate retention of money, explaining that he is more grieved or saddened over not using his wealth in gifts or expenditures than over spending something which he should not have spent. The reason is that he is more concerned with giving than taking and keeping, although this would not please Simonides, a certain poet, who said we ought to do the opposite.
Deinde cum dicit: prodigus autem etc., ostendit ex praemissis qualis sit actus prodigi. Et dicit quod in omnibus praedictis prodigus peccat, idest non solum in dando et accipiendo, sed etiam in delectando et tristando; quia neque delectatur neque tristatur in quibus oportet et secundum quod oportet. Et hoc erit magis manifestum in sequentibus. 684. Then [b, ii], at “The spendthrift, however,” he explains by the premises how the act of the spendthrift is constituted, saying that the spendthrift sins in all the preceding matters, i.e., not only in giving and accepting but also in taking pleasure and grieving because he is neither delighted nor saddened by the right things and in the right way. This will be made clearer by what follows.
Deinde cum dicit: dictum est autem a nobis etc., comparat prodigalitatem illiberalitati. Et primo quantum ad oppositionem. Secundo quantum ad quantitatem peccati, ibi, quae quidem igitur et cetera. Dicit ergo primo dictum esse supra quod prodigalitas et illiberalitas se habent secundum superabundantiam et defectum in duobus, scilicet in datione et acceptione, et hoc ideo quia expensae, quae etiam ad liberalitatem pertinent, sub datione comprehenduntur. Contrarie autem in his superabundat et deficit prodigus et illiberalis. Prodigus enim superabundat in dando, et in hoc quod non accipiat. Illiberalis autem e contrario deficit in dando, et superabundat in accipiendo; nisi forte in parvis, quae illiberalis dat et non curat accipere. 685. Next [2], at “We have seen,” he compares extravagance to miserliness in regard, first [2, a] to opposition; and second [Lect. 4, (A’, 2), b] to the gravity of the sin, at “The things that” (B. 1121 a 16). He affirms, as was noted before (654), that extravagance and miserliness are constituted by excess and defect in two things, viz., taking and giving. He says this because expenditures, which pertain to liberality, are included under giving. And it is precisely in expenditures that the spendthrift and the miser exceed and fall short in opposite things. The spendthrift is excessive in giving and in not taking. But the miser, on the contrary, is deficient in giving and excessive in taking, except perhaps in trifling things that he gives and does not care to take.

The Gravity of Extravagance
Chapter 1
                   b.   He shows that miserliness is the more serious fault for three reasons.
                         i.    The first reason is taken from the mutability of extravagance. — 686-687
τὰ μὲν οὖν τῆς ἀσωτίας οὐ πάνυ συνδυάζεται· οὐ γὰρ ῥᾴδιον μηδαμόθεν λαμβάνοντα πᾶσι διδόναι· ταχέως γὰρ ἐπιλείπει ἡ οὐσία τοὺς ἰδιώτας διδόντας, οἵπερ καὶ δοκοῦσιν ἄσωτοι εἶναι· ἐπεὶ ὅ γε τοιοῦτος δόξειεν ἂν οὐ μικρῷ βελτίων εἶναι τοῦ ἀνελευθέρου. εὐίατός τε γάρ ἐστι καὶ ὑπὸ τῆς ἡλικίας καὶ ὑπὸ τῆς ἀπορίας, The things that are proper to extravagance are not increased very much at the same time, because a man cannot easily take nothing and at the same time give with an open hand to everyone. A generous simpleton-such the spendthrift seems to be-is soon separated from his money. A person of this sort, though, is somewhat better than the miser, for he is quickly set right both by age and want.
                         ii.   The second reason... based on the likeness of extravagance to liberality. — 688-689
καὶ ἐπὶ τὸ μέσον δύναται ἐλθεῖν. ἔχει γὰρ τὰ τοῦ ἐλευθερίου· καὶ γὰρ δίδωσι καὶ οὐ λαμβάνει, οὐδέτερον δ' ὡς δεῖ οὐδ' εὖ. εἰ δὴ τοῦτο ἐθισθείη ἤ πως ἄλλως μεταβάλοι, εἴη ἂν ἐλευθέριος· δώσει γὰρ οἷς δεῖ, καὶ οὐ λήψεται ὅθεν οὐ δεῖ. διὸ καὶ δοκεῖ οὐκ εἶναι φαῦλος τὸ ἦθος· οὐ γὰρ μοχθηροῦ οὐδ' ἀγεννοῦς τὸ ὑπερβάλλειν διδόντα καὶ μὴ λαμβάνοντα, ἠλιθίου δέ. He can attain the mean of virtue, for he possesses qualities of the liberal person. He gives and does not take, although he does neither of these things properly and as he ought. If indeed he performs them out of custom or by reason of some change, he will become liberal, for he will then give to the right persons and not take from the wrong sources. For this reason he does not seem to be entirely evil in the moral sense, for it is not characteristic of an evil or vicious person, but of a foolish one, to give excessively and not to take.
                         iii. The third reason taken from a defect in extravagance. — 690
ὁ δὲ τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον ἄσωτος πολὺ δοκεῖ βελτίων τοῦ ἀνελευθέρου εἶναι διά τε τὰ εἰρημένα, καὶ ὅτι ὃ μὲν ὠφελεῖ πολλούς, ὃ δὲ οὐθένα, ἀλλ' οὐδ' αὑτόν. In this way the spendthrift seems to be much better than the miser because of what has been said and because he benefits many people while the miser benefits no one, not even himself.
(II)B’  He considers the man who is a blend of spendthrift and miser.
            a.   He... explains how some spend thrifts sin in taking.
                   i.    He presents his proposition. — 691
ἀλλ' οἱ πολλοὶ τῶν ἀσώτων, καθάπερ εἴρηται, καὶ λαμβάνουσιν ὅθεν μὴ δεῖ, καὶ εἰσὶ κατὰ τοῦτο ἀνελεύθεροι. But, as we have noted, many spendthrifts take from tainted sources and in this way they are ungenerous.
                   ii.   He assigns two reasons. — 692-693
ληπτικοὶ δὲ γίνονται διὰ τὸ βούλεσθαι μὲν ἀναλίσκειν, εὐχερῶς δὲ τοῦτο ποιεῖν μὴ δύνασθαι· ταχὺ γὰρ ἐπιλείπει αὐτοὺς τὰ ὑπάρχοντα. ἀναγκάζονται οὖν ἑτέρωθεν πορίζειν. ἅμα δὲ καὶ διὰ τὸ μηδὲν τοῦ καλοῦ φροντίζειν ὀλιγώρως καὶ πάντοθεν λαμβάνουσιν· διδόναι γὰρ ἐπιθυμοῦσι, τὸ δὲ πῶς ἢ πόθεν οὐδὲν αὐτοῖς διαφέρει. They are inclined to take because they want to spend. But they cannot readily take enough, for their resources quickly vanish forcing them to acquire from others. Likewise they care nothing about what is right, and take from any quarter whatsoever. They want to give presents, so the how and the whence make no immediate difference to them.
            b.  How (spendthrifts) conduct themselves in giving. — 694
διόπερ οὐδ' ἐλευθέριοι αἱ δόσεις αὐτῶν εἰσίν· οὐ γὰρ καλαί, οὐδὲ τούτου ἕνεκα, οὐδὲ ὡς δεῖ· ἀλλ' ἐνίοτε οὓς δεῖ πένεσθαι, τούτους πλουσίους ποιοῦσι, καὶ τοῖς μὲν μετρίοις τὰ ἤθη οὐδὲν ἂν δοῖεν, τοῖς δὲ κόλαξιν ἤ τιν' ἄλλην ἡδονὴν πορίζουσι πολλά. For these reasons their donations are not liberal, being good neither in motive nor mode. But they make rich those who would better remain poor. They would give nothing to good men, yet are generous with flatterers and others who provide them with other pleasures.
            a.   The first is... many spendthrifts are intemperate. — 695
διὸ καὶ ἀκόλαστοι αὐτῶν εἰσὶν οἱ πολλοί· εὐχερῶς γὰρ ἀναλίσκοντες καὶ εἰς τὰς ἀκολασίας δαπανηροί εἰσι, καὶ διὰ τὸ μὴ πρὸς τὸ καλὸν ζῆν πρὸς τὰς ἡδονὰς ἀποκλίνουσιν. Therefore, many of them are intemperate, for being inclined to spend, they waste their resources by intemperance. Moreover, since they do not order their life to good, they turn aside to sensual pleasures.
             b.  He draws the second conclusion. — 696
ὁ μὲν οὖν ἄσωτος ἀπαιδαγώγητος γενόμενος εἰς ταῦτα μεταβαίνει, τυχὼν δ' ἐπιμελείας εἰς τὸ μέσον καὶ εἰς τὸ δέον ἀφίκοιτ' ἄν. The spendthrift then who will not learn (the way of virtue) suffers consequences. But with effort he may attain the mean and adopt the right attitude.
Quae quidem igitur prodigalitatis et cetera. Postquam philosophus ostendit oppositionem prodigalitatis ad illiberalitatem, hic ostendit quod illiberalitas excedit in gravitate peccati. Et hoc tribus rationibus. Quarum prima sumitur ex mutabilitate prodigalitatis, quia non de facili augetur, sed de facili removetur. Unde dicit, quod ea quae pertinent ad prodigalitatem non multum possunt augeri simul, ut scilicet aliquis nullo modo accipiat et superflue omnibus det, eo quod substantia, idest divitiae, velociter deserit eos qui dant indiscrete, quasi quidam ydiotae et irrationabiles, et tales videntur esse prodigi. Et quia vitium, quod non multum augetur, sed de facili curatur, est minus grave, inde est, quod prodigus non modicum est melior, idest minus malus illiberali. 686. After the Philosopher has explained the opposition between extravagance and miserliness, he now shows [b] that miserliness is the more serious fault for three reasons. The first reason [b. i] is taken from the mutability of extravagance: although not readily increased it is easily eliminated. Hence he says that the things belonging to extravagance cannot at the same time be increased very much, so that a person takes nothing and gives to everyone because resources or riches are quickly exhausted for those who spend recklessly, like the simple and senseless. And spendthrifts seem to be of this type. Since then a vice, which is not increased very much but easily remedied, is not so serious, it: follows that the spendthrift is somewhat better, i.e., less evil than the miser.
Prodigus enim de facili sanabilis est a suo vitio ex duobus. Uno quidem modo ab aetate, quia, quantum aliquis magis accedit ad senectutem, fit magis pronus ad retinendum, et ad non dandum. Quia enim divitiae appetuntur, ut per eas humanis defectibus subveniatur, consequens est ut, quanto aliquis maiores sentit defectus, tanto pronior sit ad retinendum, et ad non dandum. Secundo propter paupertatem, quae consequitur ex superflua prodigi datione. Paupertas autem impedit prodigalitatem tum propter impossibilitatem dandi, tum propter experientiam defectus. 687. The spendthrift is easily cured of his vice in two ways. In the first way by age because the older a man grows the more inclined he is to keep things and not give them away. The reason is that riches are desired to supply the needs of man, and as these needs become greater so a man is more prone to husband and not hand out his wealth. Second, the spendthrift is cured by poverty resulting from excessive giving, for poverty prevents extravagant spending both by reason of the impossibility of further giving and the experience of need.
Secundam rationem ponit ibi, et ad medium potest venire et cetera. Quae sumitur ex similitudine eius ad liberalitatem. Unde dicit, quod prodigus de facili potest reduci ad medium virtutis propter convenientiam quam habet cum liberali. Habet enim prodigus ea quae habet liberalis, quia scilicet libenter dat, et non de facili accipit. Differt autem a liberali, quia neutrum horum facit secundum quod oportet, et bene, idest secundum rationem rectam. Et ideo si perducatur ad hoc quod faciat praedicta secundum quod oportet, sive per assuetudinem, sive per quamcumque aliam transmutationem, puta aetatis vel fortunae, erit liberalis, ut scilicet det quibus oportet, et non accipiat unde non oportet. 688. At “He can attain” [b, ii] he gives the second reason, which is based on the likeness of extravagance to liberality. Hence he says that the spendthrift can easily be directed to the mean of virtue on account of the similarity he has with the liberal man. Since the spendthrift generously gives and does not readily take, he has qualities possessed by the liberal person. But he differs from the liberal man in not doing either of these actions properly and as he ought, i.e., according to right reason. Therefore, if he is induced to perform these things as he ought, either by custom or by some change in age or fortune he will become liberal so that he will give to the right persons and not take from the wrong sources.
Et ex hoc concludit, quod prodigus non videtur esse pravus secundum id quod pertinet proprie ad virtutem moralem, quae respicit directe appetitivam potentiam. Non enim pertinet ad malum sive corruptum appetitum, neque ad defectum virilis animi, quod aliquis superabundet in dando et in non accipiendo, sed hoc videtur pertinere ad insipientiam quamdam. Et sic videtur, quod prodigalitas non tam pertineat ad malitiam moralem, quae respicit pronitatem appetitus ad malum, quam secundum rationis defectum. 689. He concludes from this that the spendthrift does not seem to be evil precisely as it pertains to moral virtue, which directly regards the power of the appetite. It is not characteristic of an evil or perverted appetite or of an effeminate mind to give excessively and not to take. This belongs rather to a kind of stupidity. Thus it seems that extravagance does not belong so much to moral depravity, which regards the inclination of the appetite to evil, as to a lack of common sense.
Tertio ibi: secundum hunc autem modum etc., ponit tertiam rationem, quae sumitur ex effectu prodigalitatis. Unde dicit, quod prodigum esse multo meliorem illiberali, non solum apparet propter praedictas duas rationes, sed etiam propter hanc tertiam, quoniam prodigus multis prodest per suam dationem, licet sibi noceat inordinate dando. Sed illiberalis nulli prodest, in quantum deficit in dando, nec etiam prodest sibiipsi inquantum deficit in expendendo. 690. At “In this way” [b, iii] he presents the third reason taken from a defect in extravagance. That the spendthrift is much better than the miser is apparent not only from the two reasons already stated but also from a third, namely, the spendthrift helps many by his giving, although he may hurt himself by giving extravagantly. The miser, on the other hand, benefits no one for he fails in giving; he does not benefit even himself, for he fails in spending.
Deinde cum dicit: sed multi prodigorum etc., determinat de eo qui est commixtus ex prodigo et illiberali. Et circa hoc duo facit. Primo ostendit quomodo aliqui prodigi aliquid illiberalitatis habent. Secundo infert quasdam conclusiones ex dictis, ibi, propter quod intemperati et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo ostendit quomodo quidam prodigi male se habent in accipiendo. Secundo quomodo male se habent in dando, ibi, propter quod neque liberales et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo proponit quod intendit: et dicit quod multi qui sunt prodigi secundum superfluam dationem, sunt etiam secundum aliquid illiberales, inquantum accipiunt unde non oportet. 691. Then [II, B’], at “But, as we have noted,” he considers the man who is a blend of spendthrift and miser. First [1] he shows in what manner some spendthrifts have a bit of illiberality. Next [2] he draws some conclusions from what has been said, at “Therefore.” On the initial point he first [1, a] explains how some spendthrifts sin in taking; and then [1, b] how they conduct themselves in giving, at “For these reasons.” In regard to this first, he presents his proposition [a, i], saying that many who are extravagant in unnecessary donations are also ungenerous in some way, taking as they do from the wrong sources.
Secundo ibi: acceptivi autem etc., assignat duas rationes. Quarum prima assignat duas rationes. Quarum prima talis est. Quia tales proni sunt ad accipiendum propter hoc quod volunt consumere sua superflue dando et expendendo, et de facili consumunt; quia ea quae habent, cito eos deserunt. Unde ad hoc quod implere possint voluntatem suam circa superfluas dationes et expensas, coguntur aliunde inordinate acquirere quae non habent. 692. Next [a, ii], at “They are inclined” he assigns two reasons. The first is that spendthrifts are disposed to take because they want to spend their goods in superfluous gifts and expenditures. They readily succeed in this, for their resources are quickly depleted. Hence, in order that they may satisfy their desire regarding unnecessary gifts and disbursements, they are forced to acquire dishonestly from some other place the means they do not possess.
Secunda ratio est, quia magis dant ex quadam concupiscentia dandi, quam ex ratione recta, quasi intendentes ad aliquod bonum: unde volunt quidem dare; sed qualiter, aut unde dent, nihil apud eos differt, et ideo, quia nullam curam habent de bono, indifferenter undecumque accipiunt. 693. The second reason is that they give rather out of a desire of giving than according to right reason, tending, as it were, to some good. They want to give presents but it makes no difference to them how or whence these come. Consequently, they do not concern themselves about what is right and so take from any source without distinction.
Deinde cum dicit propter quod neque liberales etc., ostendit quomodo deficiant circa dationes. Et dicit quod quia nullam curam habent de bono, ideo dationes eorum non sunt liberales quia neque sunt bonae neque propter bonum neque modum debitum habent. Sed quandoque divites faciunt malos homines quos oporteret pauperes esse, quia, dum divitiis male utuntur, et sibi et aliis sunt nocivi. Et tamen hominibus, qui habent mores moderatos secundum virtutem nihil darent, in quo deficiunt in dando. Sed multa dant adulatoribus, vel aliis hominibus, qui eos qualitercumque delectant; puta hystrionibus, vel lenonibus; in quo superabundant in dando. 694. Then [i, b], at “For these reasons,” he explains how spendthrifts may be at fault in making donations. He declares that, because they do not care about what is right, their gifts are neither liberal nor good, either in motive or circumstance. But sometimes they make rich evil men who would be better off poor-men who abuse their riches and thereby cause harm both to themselves and others. Yet they would give nothing to men who regulate their lives according to virtue. Thus they are deficient in giving. They are, however, generous with sycophants or others who give them pleasure in any way whatsoever, e.g., buffoons or panderers. In this way they go to excess in giving.
Deinde cum dicit propter quod intemperati etc., inducit duas conclusiones ex praemissis. Quarum prima est, quod propter praemissa multi prodigorum sunt intemperati. Et hoc apparet ex duobus. Primo quidem, quia cum sint faciles ad consumendum sua, de facili etiam consumunt in intemperantias, puta in cibos, et venerea, a quibus multi retrahuntur timore expensarum. Secundo, quia cum non ordinent vitam suam ad bonum honestum, consequens est, quod declinent ad voluptates. Haec enim duo sunt propter se appetibilia. Honestum quidem secundum appetitum rationalem. Delectabile autem secundum appetitum sensitivum; utile autem refertur ad utrumque horum. 695. Next [2], at “Therefore,” he draws two conclusions from the premises. The first [2, a] is that many spendthrifts are intemperate. This is evident first, because (being inclined to spend), they readily waste their substance by intemperance in food and sex, from which many people are restrained by fear of the cost. Second, because they do not order their life to an honorable good, consequently they turn aside to the pleasures of sense. These two (the honorable and the pleasurable) are desirable in themselves—the honorable according to rational desire, the pleasurable according to sensual desire. The useful refers to both.
Secundam conclusionem ponit ibi prodigus quidem igitur et cetera. Et dicit quod ex praemissis patet, quod prodigus si non potest induci ad virtutem, transit in praedicta vitia. Si autem potiatur studio, scilicet virtutis, perveniet de facili ad medium et ut det et abstineat ab accipiendo secundum quod oportet, ut supra dictum est. 696. He draws the second conclusion [2, b], at “The spendthrift,” pointing out what is clear from the premises: that if the spendthrift cannot be attracted to virtue, he falls into the previously mentioned vices. But if he possesses zeal for virtue, he will easily attain the mean so that he will give and refrain from taking according to what he ought, as was stated before (688).

The Incurableness of Illiberality
Chapter 1
(II)C.   He treats illiberality.
      A’ He states a quality of illiberality. — 697-698
ἡ δ' ἀνελευθερία ἀνίατός τ' ἐστίν δοκεῖ γὰρ τὸ γῆρας καὶ πᾶσα ἀδυναμία ἀνελευθέρους ποιεῖν, καὶ συμφυέστερον τοῖς ἀνθρώποις τῆς ἀσωτίας· οἱ γὰρ πολλοὶ φιλοχρήματοι μᾶλλον ἢ δοτικοί. Illiberality, however, is incurable for it seems that old age and every other disability make men miserly. Besides, it is more innate to men than extravagance because more men are lovers of wealth than donors of it.
      B’ He distinguishes the... species of illiberality.
καὶ διατείνει δ' ἐπὶ πολύ, καὶ πολυειδές ἐστιν· πολλοὶ γὰρ τρόποι δοκοῦσι τῆς ἀνελευθερίας εἶναι. ἐν δυσὶ γὰρ οὖσα, τῇ τ' ἐλλείψει τῆς δόσεως καὶ τῇ ὑπερβολῇ τῆς λήψεως, οὐ πᾶσιν ὁλόκληρος παραγίνεται, ἀλλ' ἐνίοτε χωρίζεται, καὶ οἳ μὲν τῇ λήψει ὑπερβάλλουσιν, οἳ δὲ τῇ δόσει ἐλλείπουσιν. Likewise illiberality can greatly increase, and is very diversified since many species of it seem to exist. It is made up of two elements, namely, deficient giving and needless grasping, which are sometimes found separately and not always together in all subjects. Some indeed are always getting and others never giving.
οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἐν ταῖς τοιαύταις προσηγορίαις οἷον φειδωλοὶ γλίσχροι κίμβικες, πάντες τῇ δόσει ἐλλείπουσι, τῶν δ' ἀλλοτρίων οὐκ ἐφίενται οὐδὲ βούλονται λαμβάνειν, οἳ μὲν διά τινα ἐπιείκειαν καὶ εὐλάβειαν τῶν αἰσχρῶν δοκοῦσι γὰρ ἔνιοι ἢ φασί γε διὰ τοῦτο φυλάττειν, ἵνα μή ποτ' ἀναγκασθῶσιν αἰσχρόν τι πρᾶξαι· τούτων δὲ καὶ ὁ κυμινοπρίστης καὶ πᾶς ὁ τοιοῦτος· ὠνόμασται δ' ἀπὸ τῆς ὑπερβολῆς τοῦ μηδὲν ἂν δοῦναι· οἳ δ' αὖ διὰ φόβον ἀπέχονται τῶν ἀλλοτρίων ὡς οὐ ῥᾴδιον αὐτὸν μὲν τὰ ἑτέρων λαμβάνειν, τὰ δ' αὐτοῦ ἑτέρους μή· ἀρέσκει οὖν αὐτοῖς τὸ μήτε λαμβάνειν μήτε διδόναι. All those who are given names like stingy, grasping, close, fall short in giving. But they do not covet the goods of others, nor do they want to acquire them. With some this is due to a kind of moderation and fear of disgrace. They seem to be, or say that they are, careful about this in order not to be forced at times to do anything dishonorable. Among these are the cumin-splitter and anyone of the type designated before by reason of an excessive desire of not giving to anyone. Some again refrain from what is not theirs for fear that their taking of what belongs to others should make it easy for others to take what is theirs. Therefore, they are content neither to give nor to take.
                   a.   Those who take in a disgraceful way. — 703
οἳ δ' αὖ κατὰ τὴν λῆψιν ὑπερβάλλουσι τῷ πάντοθεν λαμβάνειν καὶ πᾶν, οἷον οἱ τὰς ἀνελευθέρους ἐργασίας ἐργαζόμενοι, πορνοβοσκοὶ καὶ πάντες οἱ τοιοῦτοι, καὶ τοκισταὶ κατὰ μικρὰ καὶ ἐπὶ πολλῷ. πάντες γὰρ οὗτοι ὅθεν οὐ δεῖ λαμβάνουσι, καὶ ὁπόσον οὐ δεῖ. κοινὸν δ' ἐπ' αὐτοῖς ἡ αἰσχροκέρδεια φαίνεται· πάντες γὰρ ἕνεκα κέρδους, καὶ τούτου μικροῦ, ὀνείδη ὑπομένουσιν. τοὺς γὰρ τὰ μεγάλα μὴ ὅθεν δὲ δεῖ λαμβάνοντας, μηδὲ ἃ δεῖ, οὐ λέγομεν ἀνελευθέρους, οἷον τοὺς τυράννους πόλεις πορθοῦντας καὶ ἱερὰ συλῶντας, ἀλλὰ πονηροὺς μᾶλλον καὶ ἀσεβεῖς καὶ ἀδίκους. Others again are immoderate in their taking by accepting anything and from any quarter, for example, those who engage in disreputable enterprises, those who live from the proceeds of prostitution, and such like, and usurers who lend small sums and at high rates. All of these receive more than they should and from reprehensible sources. Common to them is sordid gain because they all become infamous for the sake of a little money. People who wrongly take great sums from wrong sources are not called illiberal, for instance, usurpers who plunder cities and despoil sacred places but rather wicked, impious, and unjust.
                   b.   Who take in an unjust way. — 704
ὁ μέντοι κυβευτὴς καὶ ὁ λωποδύτης καὶ ὁ λῃστὴς τῶν ἀνελευθέρων εἰσίν· αἰσχροκερδεῖς γάρ. κέρδους γὰρ ἕνεκα ἀμφότεροι πραγματεύονται καὶ ὀνείδη ὑπομένουσιν, καὶ οἳ μὲν κινδύνους τοὺς μεγίστους ἕνεκα τοῦ λήμματος, οἳ δ' ἀπὸ τῶν φίλων κερδαίνουσιν, οἷς δεῖ διδόναι. ἀμφότεροι δὴ ὅθεν οὐ δεῖ κερδαίνειν βουλόμενοι αἰσχροκερδεῖς· καὶ πᾶσαι δὴ αἱ τοιαῦται λήψεις ἀνελεύθεροι. Among the illiberal, however, we count the gambler, the despoiler of the dead and the robber—shameful profit-makers. For the sake of evil gain, these engage in occupations having the stamp of infamy. Some run the risk of very great danger for gain, while others would take from friends to whom they should give. In both cases, those wishing to enrich themselves are makers of shameful profit. It is clear then that all taking of this kind is opposed to liberality.
      C’ He makes a comparison of illiberality with its opposite. — 705-706
εἰκότως δὲ τῇ ἐλευθεριότητι ἀνελευθερία ἐναντίον λέγεται· μεῖζόν τε γάρ ἐστι κακὸν τῆς ἀσωτίας, καὶ μᾶλλον ἐπὶ ταύτην ἁμαρτάνουσιν ἢ κατὰ τὴν λεχθεῖσαν ἀσωτίαν. περὶ μὲν οὖν ἐλευθεριότητος καὶ τῶν ἀντικειμένων κακιῶν τοσαῦτ' εἰρήσθω. Appropriately then illiberality is said to be the vice opposed to liberality, for it is a graver evil than extravagance. Likewise men sin more by illiberality than by extravagance. So far, therefore, we have discussed liberality and the opposite vices.
Illiberalitas autem insanabilis est et cetera. Postquam philosophus determinavit de prodigalitate, hic determinat de illiberalitate. Et circa hoc tria facit. Primo proponit quamdam conditionem illiberalitatis. Secundo distinguit illiberalitatis modos seu species, ibi: extendit autem in multum etc.; tertio comparat illiberalitatem ad suum oppositum, ibi, congrue utique illiberalitati et cetera. Dicit ergo primo quod vitium illiberalitatis est insanabile. Et huius assignat duas rationes. Quarum prima est quia vita humana et etiam res mundanae, ut plurimum tendunt in defectum; manifestum est autem ex experimento quod et senectus et quaelibet alia impotentia vel defectus facit homines illiberales, quia videtur homini quod pluribus indigeat. Et ideo magis cupit res exteriores quibus humanae indigentiae subvenitur. 697. After the Philosopher has finished the treatise on extravagance, he now [(II)C] treats illiberality, examining it under three headings. First [A’] he states a quality of illiberality. Next [B’], he distinguishes the modes, i.e., the species of illiberality, at “Likewise etc.” Last [C’], he makes a comparison of illiberality with its opposite at “Appropriately then etc.” He says first that illiberality is incurable, and assigns two reasons for this. The first reason is that human life, and even earthly things, tend to be defective for the most part. It is obvious from experience that old age and every other disability or defect make a man parsimonious, because it seems to him that he is very much in need. Therefore, he has a great desire for external things that supply the wants of man.
Secunda ratio est, quia illud ad quod homo naturaliter inclinatur, non de facili removetur ab eo. Magis autem inclinatur homo ad illiberalitatem, quam ad prodigalitatem. Cuius signum est, quod plures inveniuntur amatores et conservatores pecuniarum, quam datores, id autem quod naturaliter est in pluribus invenitur. In tantum autem natura inclinat ad amorem divitiarum, inquantum per eas vita hominis conservatur. 698. The second reason is this. That to which man is naturally inclined cannot easily be removed from him. But man is more inclined to illiberality than extravagance. A sign of this is that more lovers and custodians of money exist than donors. What is natural is found in the majority of cases. And nature inclines to the love of riches to the extent that man’s life is preserved by them.
Deinde cum dicit: extendit autem in multum etc., distinguit modos seu species illiberalitatis. Et circa hoc tria facit. Primo ostendit, quod illiberalitas attenditur secundum duo; scilicet secundum superfluum in accipiendo et secundum defectum in dando. Secundo ponit species, quae accipiuntur secundum defectum in dando, ibi, qui quidem enim in talibus et cetera. Tertio ponit species, quae accipiuntur secundum superfluam acceptionem, ibi: hi autem rursus secundum acceptionem et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod illiberalitas in multum augetur, ad multa etiam se extendit, et multiformis est, inquantum scilicet sunt multi modi illiberalitatis. Cum enim illiberalitas in duobus existat, scilicet in defectu dationis et in superabundantia acceptionis; non omnes illiberales in utroque peccant, quasi totam rationem illiberalitatis habentes. Sed dividitur aliquando in diversis; ita quod quidam superabundant in acceptione qui tamen non deficiunt in datione, sicut de prodigis supra dictum est. Alii vero deficiunt in datione, et tamen non superabundant in acceptione. 699. Then [B’], at “Likewise,” he distinguishes the modes or species of illiberality. On this point he does three things. First [i] he shows that illiberality is considered from two aspects, viz., excess in getting and defect in giving. Next [2], at “All those who,” he gives the species which are understood according to deficiency in giving. Last [3], at “Others again,” he gives the species that are able to be distinguished according to unnecessary taking. He says first that illiberality is increased greatly; it extends to a multitude of things and is diversified inasmuch as there are many kinds of illiberality. Although illiberality may exist in two forms, defect of giving and excess of taking, not all illiberal people sin in both ways as though they possessed the whole nature of illiberality. But it is found separately in various persons so that some abound in taking who nevertheless do not fall short in dispensing, like the spendthrift previously considered (678). Others, however, fall short in dispensing and, notwithstanding, do not abound in taking.
Deinde cum dicit: qui quidem enim etc., determinat modos eorum, qui in datione deficiunt. Et dicit, quod tales appellantur parci, eo quod parum expendunt, et tenaces, a defectu dationis quasi multum retinentes; dicuntur etiam kyminibiles, quasi venditores cymini, a quodam superexcessu tenacitatis, quia scilicet nec minimum aliquid darent absque recompensatione. Et tamen isti non superabundant in accipiendo; quia nec aliena appetunt, nec oblata multum curant accipere. Et hoc propter duas rationes. 700. Next [2], at “All those who,” he sets down the types of persons who are deficient in giving. He says that some are called stingy who spend very little; others are called grasping who retain nearly everything from a defect in giving. Still others are called closefisted, or cumin-splitters from an excessive tenacity they manifest in refusing to give the smallest thing without a return. However, these are not excessive in taking because they do not covet the goods of others, nor do they care much about accepting gifts. This happens for two reasons.
Quarum prima est, quia scilicet hoc dimittunt propter morum moderantiam et propter timorem turpitudinis. Videntur enim propter hoc custodire sua, et etiam hoc dicunt verbo, ne si sua dent cogantur aliquando propter penuriam aliquid operari; et inde est etiam, quod nolunt recipere aliena, turpe hoc existimantes: vel etiam dubitant ne ab his, qui eis darent, inducerentur ad aliquid indecens. Et de eorum numero videtur esse kyminibilis, id est cymini venditor, qui sic nominatur propter hoc quod in hoc superabundat quod nulli dare vult; et eadem ratio est de omnibus similibus. 701. The first reason is that they pass up these opportunities out of moral consideration and fear of turpitude. They seem to keep what is theirs—they even say so expressly—lest, if they give what they have, they may be forced sometimes to a shameful act because of need. Likewise, they are unwilling to accept the goods of others since they think it dishonorable. They even hesitate lest they be induced to something unseemly by those who gave to them. Among these seem to be the skinflint or the cumin-splitter, so named because he has an aversion to giving anyone even a tiny seed. The same reason holds in all similar cases.
Secunda ratio est, quia aliqui abstinent ab accipiendo aliena propter hoc, quod timent ne oporteat eos dare: quasi non sit facile, ut ipse ea quae sunt aliorum accipiat, et alii non accipiant ea quae sunt eius; et ideo placet eis quod neque dent, neque accipiant. 702. The second reason is that some refrain from taking other people’s goods because they fear they may have to give, as if it were not easy for men to take the things that belong to others and others not to take the things which are theirs. On this account they are content neither to give nor to take.
Deinde cum dicit: hi autem rursus etc., ponit modos illiberalitatis (qui accipiuntur secundum superfluam acceptionem). Et primo quantum ad eos qui turpiter accipiunt. Secundo quantum ad eos qui accipiunt iniuste, ibi, aleator quidem et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod quidam illiberales superabundant in acceptione, non curantes quid vel unde accipiant seu lucrentur. Quorum quidam lucrantur de vilibus et servilibus operationibus. Quidam vero lucrantur de turpibus et illicitis, puta de meretricio, vel de aliquo simili, sicut lenones. Quidam vero lucrantur per improbam exactionem, sicut usurarii, et qui saltem aliquid parvum volunt lucrari in aliquo multo quod dant vel mutuant. Omnes enim praedicti accipiunt unde non oportet, scilicet de servilibus vel turpibus operationibus, vel quantum non oportet, sicut usurarii, qui accipiunt ultra sortem. Quibus omnibus commune est quod turpiter lucrantur inquantum scilicet sustinent ut opprobrio habeantur propter aliquod, lucrum, et hoc parvum. Quia illi qui, ut magna lucrentur, accipiunt unde non oportet, vel quae non oportet, sicut tyranni, qui depraedantur civitates et templa, non dicuntur illiberales, sed magis dicuntur perniciosi, in homines, et impii, in Deum, et iniusti, quasi legis transgressores. 703. Then [3], at “Others again,” he mentions the species of illiberality in regard first [3, a ], to those who take in a disgraceful way; and next [3, b], who take in an unjust way, at “Among the illiberal.” He says first that certain illiberal persons are immoderate in taking, not caring what or whence they take or profit. Some benefit from cheap and servile operations. Others, like pimps, make profit from sordid and unlawful dealing, e.g., prostitution and the like. Still others enrich themselves by unjust exaction, for instance, usurers and those who want at least a little gain from a large gift or loan. All these receive from reprehensible sources, i.e., mean or shameful works, or they receive more than they should, like usurers who take more than the interest. All have profit, and this paltry, in common. nose who make enormous profits, and make them b y shameful means—they are considered disgraceful for this reason—are not called illiberal but rather wicked, unjust, and impious against God, as if they were criminals. Men of this caliber are not so designated even though they take when they ought not and what they ought not, for example, usurpers who despoil cities and temples.
Deinde cum dicit: aleator quidem etc., ponit illiberales, qui accipiunt iniuste, sicut aleator, qui lucratur ex ludo taxillorum. Et ille, qui spoliat mortuos, qui antiquitus cum magno apparatu sepeliebantur. Et latro qui spoliat vivos. Omnes enim isti turpiter lucrantur, inquantum propter lucrum negotia quaedam faciunt unde sunt opprobriosi. Quod etiam et de superioribus dictum est, sed in istis est aliqua specialis ratio turpitudinis. Quidam enim horum, scilicet spoliator mortuorum et latro, exponunt se magnis periculis propter lucrum, agentes ea quae legibus puniuntur: alii vero, scilicet aleatores, volunt lucrari ab amicis cum quibus ludunt, cum tamen magis conveniat secundum liberalitatem amicis aliquid dare. Et sic patet, quod utrique, dum volunt lucrari unde non oportet, sunt turpes lucratores. Et sic patet quod omnes praedictae sumptiones, id est acceptiones, sunt illiberales. 704. Next [3, b], at “Among the illiberal,” he mentions those who take unjustly, like the gambler who makes money by throwing dice, the fellow who steals from the dead (formerly buried in rich apparel), and the robber who plunders the living. All these are enriched by shameful means, inasmuch as, for the sake of gain, they engage in certain occupations considered disgraceful. This agrees with what was said about those persons just mentioned (703). But in these there is a special reason for turpitude. Some, for example, the despoiler of the dead and the robber expose themselves to great danger in doing things punishable by law. Others, namely, gamblers want to take something from their friends with whom they play, although it is more appropriate to liberality to give something to friends. It is obvious then that both types, by wanting to enrich themselves from improper sources, are makers of shameful profits. It is necessary, therefore, to say that all the previously mentioned taking or accepting is opposed to liberality.
Deinde cum dicit: congrue utique etc., determinat de illiberalitate per comparationem ad oppositum vitium. Et dicit, quod illiberalitas congrue denominatur ab oppositione liberalitatis. Semper enim peius vitium magis opponitur virtuti. Illiberalitas autem est peior prodigalitate, ut supra ostensum est; unde relinquitur quod magis opponatur liberalitati. Secunda ratio est, quia homines magis peccant secundum vitium quod dicitur illiberalitas, quam secundum vitium quod dicitur prodigalitas. Et propter hoc nominatur a privatione liberalitatis, quia pluries per hoc vitium corrumpitur liberalitas. 705. Then [C’], at “Appropriately then,” he explains illiberality by comparison with the opposite vice, saying that illiberality is fittingly named from the contrast with liberality. It always happens that the worse vice is more opposed to the virtue. But illiberality is worse than extravagance, as was shown before (686-690). Consequently, it remains that illiberality is more opposed to liberality. The second reason is that men commit graver sins by the vice of illiberality than by the vice of extravagance. Therefore, illiberality gets its name from the privation of liberality because liberality is frequently destroyed by this vice.
Ultimo autem epilogat quae dicta sunt, dicens, tanta dicta esse de liberalitate, et de oppositis vitiis. 706. Lastly, he sums up what has been said, stating that so far we have discussed liberality and the opposite vices.

Chapter 2
      A.  He shows what the matter of magnificence is.
            A’ He proposes the matter common to magnificence and liberality. — 707
δόξαιε δ' ἂν ἀκόλουθον εἶναι καὶ περὶ μεγαλοπρεπείας διελθεῖν. δοκεῖ γὰρ καὶ αὐτὴ περὶ χρήματά τις ἀρετὴ εἶναι· It seems logical to pass now to the consideration of magnificence which apparently is a certain virtue concerned with wealth.
            B’ He explains the difference between the two.
                   1.   HE PROPOSES THE DIFFERENCE. — 708
οὐχ ὥσπερ δ' ἡ ἐλευθεριότης διατείνει περὶ πάσας τὰς ἐν χρήμασι πράξεις, ἀλλὰ περὶ τὰς δαπανηρὰς μόνον· ἐν τούτοις δ' ὑπερέχει τῆς ἐλευθεριότητος μεγέθει. καθάπερ γὰρ τοὔνομα αὐτὸ ὑποσημαίνει, ἐν μεγέθει πρέπουσα δαπάνη ἐστίν. Unlike liberality it does not embrace all but only lavish expenditures of money; it is in wealth’s magnitude (as the name itself indicates) that magnificence exceeds liberality, although the amount expended is not out of proportion.
                   2.   HE MAKES CLEAR WHAT HE SAID. — 709
τὸ δὲ μέγεθος πρός τι· οὐ γὰρ τὸ αὐτὸ δαπάνημα τριηράρχῳ καὶ ἀρχιθεωρῷ. τὸ πρέπον δὴ πρὸς αὐτόν, καὶ ἐν ᾧ καὶ περὶ ὅ. But magnitude is a relative term, for the same expenditure is not fit for a captain of a trireme and a leader of a solemn mission to Delphi; it is fitting according to the spender, the thing, and the purpose.
            C’ He proves his proposition. — 710
ὁ δ' ἐν μικροῖς ἢ ἐν μετρίοις κατ' ἀξίαν δαπανῶν οὐ λέγεται μεγαλοπρεπής, οἷον τὸ
πολλάκι δόσκον ἀλήτῃ,
ἀλλ' ὁ ἐν μεγάλοις οὕτως. ὁ μὲν γὰρ μεγαλοπρεπὴς ἐλευθέριος, ὁ δ' ἐλευθέριος οὐδὲν μᾶλλον μεγαλοπρεπής.
The man, however, who spends small or moderate sums in a becoming manner is not called munificent, for instance, if he makes frequent donations that in the aggregate are large; only he who gives on a grand scale. The munificent man is indeed liberal, but man certain qualities pertaining to the one who is liberal and nothing more is not munificent.
      B.  (He shows) what the vices opposed to it are. — 711
τῆς τοιαύτης δ' ἕξεως ἡ μὲν ἔλλειψις μικροπρέπεια καλεῖται, ἡ δ' ὑπερβολὴ βαναυσία καὶ ἀπειροκαλία καὶ ὅσαι τοιαῦται, οὐχ ὑπερβάλλουσαι τῷ μεγέθει περὶ ἃ δεῖ, ἀλλ' ἐν οἷς οὐ δεῖ καὶ ὡς οὐ δεῖ λαμπρυνόμεναι· ὕστερον δ' ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν ἐροῦμεν. In this matter the habit of defect is called meanness, and of excess banausia (ostentation); the name apirocalia (lack of taste) is given to all other such defects that are not excessive in the sums expended on the right projects but in the wrong circumstances and with a certain vulgar display. We shall discuss these vices afterwards.
      A.  Magnificence.
            A’ He assigns to the munificent manner of spending.
                   1.   HE ATTRIBUTES... SIX QUALITIES: THE FIRST... — 712-713
ὁ δὲ μεγαλοπρεπὴς ἐπιστήμονι ἔοικεν· τὸ πρέπον γὰρ δύναται θεωρῆσαι καὶ δαπανῆσαι μεγάλα ἐμμελῶς. ὥσπερ γὰρ ἐν ἀρχῇ εἴπομεν, ἡ ἕξις ταῖς ἐνεργείαις ὁρίζεται, καὶ ὧν ἐστίν. αἱ δὴ τοῦ μεγαλοπρεποῦς δαπάναι μεγάλαι καὶ πρέπουσαι. τοιαῦτα δὴ καὶ τὰ ἔργα· οὕτω γὰρ ἔσται μέγα δαπάνημα καὶ πρέπον τῷ ἔργῳ. ὥστε τὸ μὲν ἔργον τῆς δαπάνης ἄξιον δεῖ εἶναι, τὴν δὲ δαπάνην τοῦ ἔργου, ἢ καὶ ὑπερβάλλειν. A munificent person is like a wise man, for he can judge rightly and spend great sums prudently. (As we said in the beginning, habit is determined by operations and is a product of them.) He makes great and dignified expenditures, and the effects are of a like nature. Thus his expenses will be great and also suited to the work. Therefore, the work must be worth the cost, and the cost equal to or in excess of the work.
                   2.   THE SECOND QUALITY... ON THE PART OF THE END. — 714
δαπανήσει δὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα ὁ μεγαλοπρεπὴς τοῦ καλοῦ ἕνεκα· κοινὸν γὰρ τοῦτο ταῖς ἀρεταῖς. Things of this kind he spends for the sake of good, and this is common to virtues.
                   3.   THE THIRD... TO SPEND GREAT SUMS CHEERFULLY. — 715
καὶ ἔτι ἡδέως καὶ προετικῶς· ἡ γὰρ ἀκριβολογία μικροπρεπές. Furthermore, he acts cheerfully and open-handedly, for closeness in reckoning is niggardly.
                   4.   THE FOURTH QUALITY. — 716
καὶ πῶς κάλλιστον καὶ πρεπωδέστατον, σκέψαιτ' ἂν μᾶλλον ἢ πόσου καὶ πῶς ἐλαχίστου. He plans how the best and most splendid work may be achieved rather than how he may acquire as much for a minimum cost.
                   5.   THE FIFTH... ONE WHO IS MUNIFICENT SHOULD BE LIBERAL. — 717
ἀναγκαῖον δὴ καὶ ἐλευθέριον τὸν μεγαλοπρεπῆ εἶναι. καὶ γὰρ ὁ ἐλευθέριος δαπανήσει ἃ δεῖ καὶ ὡς δεῖ· ἐν τούτοις δὲ τὸ μέγα τοῦ μεγαλοπρεποῦς, οἷον μέγεθος, περὶ ταῦτα τῆς ἐλευθεριότητος οὔσης, Likewise the munificent man is necessarily liberal, since the liberal person makes the right expenditures in the right manner; and it is in this that the greatness of the munificent person lies—a greatness in these matters being a kind of grand liberality.
                   6.   THE SIXTH QUALITY. — 718
καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς ἴσης δαπάνης τὸ ἔργον ποιήσει μεγαλοπρεπέστερον. οὐ γὰρ ἡ αὐτὴ ἀρετὴ κτήματος καὶ ἔργου. κτῆμα μὲν γὰρ τὸ πλείστου ἄξιον τιμιώτατον, οἷον χρυσός, ἔργον δὲ τὸ μέγα καὶ καλόν τοῦ γὰρ τοιούτου ἡ θεωρία θαυμαστή, τὸ δὲ μεγαλοπρεπὲς θαυμαστόν· καὶ ἔστιν ἔργου ἀρετή, μεγαλοπρέπεια, ἐν μεγέθει. Besides, for the same cost he will produce a more magnificent work, for the perfection of possession and work does not reside in the same thing. But the perfect possession consists of what is most valued and honored, for example, gold. On the other hand, the perfect work consists of what is great and good, for consideration of it brings about admiration. And truly a magnificent work is a cause of admiration, and the perfection of the work, magnificence, resides in its magnitude.
Videbitur autem consequens esse et cetera. Postquam philosophus determinavit de liberalitate, hic determinat de magnificentia. Et dividitur pars ista in duas partes. In prima inquirit materiam magnificentiae et oppositorum vitiorum. In secunda ostendit qualiter magnificentia et opposita vitia, circa propriam materiam operantur, ibi, magnificus autem scienti assimilatur, et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo ostendit, quae sit materia magnificentiae. Secundo ostendit, quae sint vitia ei opposita, ibi, talis autem habitus, et cetera. Circa primum tria facit. Primo proponit materiam communem magnificentiae et liberalitati. Secundo ostendit differentiam inter utrumque, ibi: non quemadmodum autem liberalitas, et cetera. Tertio probat propositum, ibi, qui autem in parvis, et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod post liberalitatem videtur esse conveniens, quod sequatur tractatus de magnificentia. Et ratio convenientiae est, quia magnificentia videtur esse quaedam virtus circa pecunias sicut et liberalitas. 707. After the Philosopher has finished the study of liberality, he now begins to consider magnificence, the treatment of which he divides into two parts. In the first part [I] he treats the matter of magnificence and the opposite vices. In the second [II] he explains in what manner magnificence and the opposite vices operate in their respective matter, at “A munificent person is like a wise man etc.” On the first point he does two things. First [I, A] he shows what the matter of magnificence is; and second [I, B] what the vices opposed to it are, at “In this matter etc.” To clarify the first division he does three things. First [I, A, A’] he proposes the matter common to magnificence and liberality. Next [I, A, B’] he explains the difference between the two, at “Unlike liberality etc.” Last [I, A, C] he proves his proposition, at “The man, however etc.” He says first it seems appropriate that the treatise on magnificence should follow that on liberality. The reason is that magnificence, like liberality, is apparently a virtue concerned with wealth.
Deinde cum dicit: non quemadmodum autem etc., ostendit differentiam quantum ad materiam inter liberalitatem et magnificentiam. Et circa hoc duo facit. Primo proponit differentiam. Secundo manifestat quod dixerat, ibi, magnitudo autem et cetera. Circa primum ponit duas differentias. Quarum prima est, quod liberalitas se extendit ad omnes operationes quae sunt circa pecunias, scilicet ad acceptiones, dationes et expensas, sed magnificentia est solum circa sumptus, idest expensas. Secunda differentia est, quia etiam in sumptibus sive in expensis, magnificentia excedit liberalitatem magnitudine expensarum. Magnificentia enim est solum circa magnas expensas, sicut ipsum nomen demonstrat. Sed liberalitas potest esse etiam circa moderatas vel etiam modicas. Nec tamen intelligendum est, quod quia magnitudo importat excessum quemdam, quod magnificus ita magnos sumptus faciat, quod excedat id quod debet fieri secundum rationem. Sed sumptus magnifici ita est cum magnitudine quod cum hoc est decens; decet enim et personam facientis, et opus in quo fiunt expensae, ut infra dicetur. 708. Then [1, A, B’], at “Unlike liberality,” he explains the difference between the matter of magnificence and liberality. He explains this point in a twofold manner. First [1, A, B’, 1] he proposes the difference. Next [1, A, B’, 2] he makes clear what he said, at “But magnitude etc.” Regarding the first he mentions two differences. The first is that liberality refers to all transactions concerned with money, viz., expenditures, receipts and donations. But magnificence refers only to disbursements or expenditures. The second difference is that in disbursements or expenditures magnificence exceeds liberality in the magnitude of the amount expended. Magnificence deals only in princely outlays, as the name implies, while liberality can be concerned also with moderate or excessive expenditures. Although magnitude indicates a kind of excess, we are not to understand that the munificent person spends on such a grand scale that he exceeds the bounds of reason, but his expenditures are made in amounts that are also in keeping with what is becoming. It is in keeping with both the one who spends and the projects on which the money is spent, as will be pointed out later (721-724).
Deinde cum dicit magnitudo autem etc., exponit quod dixerat; scilicet qualiter magnitudo sumptus conveniat magnifico. Et quia magnum dicitur relative, ut habetur in praedicamentis, ideo et hic dicitur, quod magnitudo sumptus accipitur per respectum ad aliquid aliud; puta ad illud, in quo fiunt expensae, vel ad personam expendentis; quia non idem sumptus dicitur esse magnus per comparationem ad trierarcham, id est principem galearum, quae habent tres ordines remorum, unde et trieres vocantur, et architheorum, idest principem speculationis. Puta si aliquis fuerit praefectus templi, vel etiam studii. Oportet enim sumptum esse decentem per comparationem ad ipsum qui expendit, et per comparationem ad id in quo expendit. Circa quod etiam oportet attendere circa quae illud fiat. Puta si fiunt expensae in aedificatione domus, oportet ulterius considerare cui domus illa aedificetur; utrum scilicet principi, vel privatae personae; quia scilicet secundum hoc diversi sumptus requiruntur. 709. Next [I, A, B, 2], at “But magnitude,” he explains what he said, i.e., the manner in which the greatness of the expense is becoming to a munificent person. Because the word “great” is predicated relatively, as stated in the Categories (Ch. 6, 5 b 15), it is said here that the greatness of the expenditure is judged in reference to something else, for instance, the thing for which the expenditures are made or the person spending. The reason is that not the same outlay is considered large for a triarch (a commander of galleys having three rows of oars and called a trireme) and for a leader of a solemn enterprise, i.e., the chief superintendent, like a master of a temple or a school. The expenditure must be suitable in comparison with the dispenser and the thing for which the money is spent. Likewise the purpose for which the thing is used must be taken into consideration. Thus if expenses are incurred for the building of a house, we must consider further for whom the house is intended, whether for a public official or a private person, because different expenditures are demanded for different purposes.
Deinde cum dicit: qui autem in parvis etc., probat quod dixerat, scilicet quod ad magnificentiam pertineat magnitudo sumptus. Quia ille qui expendit in rebus parvis vel etiam moderatis secundum quod dignum est, non dicitur magnificus; puta si multoties divisim expenderet multa in parvis rebus, ita quod omnes illae expensae congregatae facerent aliquid tantum quantum est illud quod expendit magnificus, nihilominus tamen magnificus non diceretur, etiam si prompte et liberaliter illa parva expenderet. Quia omnis magnificus est liberalis; non tamen sequitur, quod omnis liberalis sit magnificus. 710. Then [I, A, C’], at “The man, however,” he proves his statement, i.e., that great expenditure pertains to magnificence. The reason is that one who spends small or even moderate sums in a proper manner is not called munificent, for instance, if he frequently makes many separate disbursements for trifling things, so that all his expenditures taken together would make as great an amount as that which the munificent man spends, nevertheless he would not be called munificent even though he disbursed these small sums promptly and generously. Because every munificent person is liberal, it does not follow that every liberal person is munificent.
Deinde cum dicit: talis autem habitus etc., ostendit, quae sint vitia opposita magnificentiae. Et dicit, quod vitium oppositum habitui magnificentiae per modum defectus vocatur parvificentia. Sed vitium, quod opponitur ei per modum superabundantiae vocatur bannausia, a bannos, quod est fornax. Quia tales sicut in fornace omnia sua consumunt. Vocatur etiam apyrocalia, quasi sine experientia boni, quia scilicet inexperti sunt qualiter oporteat bonum operari: et si quae etiam sunt aliae tales nominationes. Quae quidem important superabundantiam, non quia excedant magnificum in magnitudine expensarum, circa quae oportet expendere; sed superabundant in hoc, quod excedunt rationem rectam in hoc, quod faciunt magnos sumptus cum quadam praeclaritate, in quibus non oportet et sicut non oportet. Ex quo patet quod medium et extrema in virtutibus moralibus non accipiuntur secundum quantitatem absolutam, sed per respectum ad rationem rectam. Subdit autem, quod de istis vitiis posterius dicetur in hoc eodem capitulo. 711. At “In this matter” [I, B ] he shows what vices are contrary to magnificence. He says that the vice opposed to the habit of magnificence by defect is called meanness; but the vice by excess, banausia (ostentation) from baunos meaning furnace,’ because such as have the vice consume all their goods as in a furnace. If other terms of this kind exist, they come under the name apirocalia (lack of taste): offenders being, as it were, without experience of what is suitable because they do not know how to do the proper thing. Such names signify excess not because they surpass the munificent person in the amount of disbursements on the right projects, but they are excessive in going beyond right reason, spending, with a certain display, great sums on the wrong things. It is obvious from this that the mean and the extremes in moral virtues are not taken according to absolute quantity but in relation to right reason. He adds that he will discuss these vices afterwards in this book (784-790).
Deinde cum dicit: magnificus autem etc., ostendit quomodo magnificentia et opposita vitia circa praedictam materiam se habeant. Et primo determinat de magnificentia. Secundo de vitiis oppositis, ibi, superabundans autem et bannausus et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo ponit quasdam proprietates magnifici, pertinentes ad modum expendendi. Secundo ostendit, in quibus magnificus expendat, ibi, est autem sumptuum et cetera. Circa primum ponit sex proprietates magnifici. Quarum prima est, quod magnificus assimilatur scienti. Quia scilicet, sicut ad scientem artificem pertinet cognoscere proportionem unius ad aliud, ita etiam ad magnificum pertinet cognoscere proportionem expensarum ad id in quo fiunt expensae. Potest enim magnificus ex virtute habitus sui considerare quid deceat expendere; et sic faciet magnas expensas prudenter, quod requiritur ad omnem virtutem moralem, ut scilicet prudenter operetur. 712. Next [II], at “A munificent person,” he explains in what manner magnificence and the opposite vices are concerned with the previously mentioned matter. First [II, A] he treats magnificence, and then [Lect. 7 (II) B] the opposite vices, at “One who sins etc.” (B. 1123 a 19). On the initial point he does two things. First [II, A, A’] he assigns to the munificent man certain qualities pertaining to the manner of spending. Then [Lect. 6, (II, A), B’] he shows on what objects the munificent person makes expenditures, at “Magnificence belongs etc.” (B. 1122 b 19). In regard to the first he attributes to the munificent person six qualities, the first (II, A, A’, 1] of which is that he is like a wise man. The reason is that, as it belongs to a wise craftsman to know the proportion of one thing to another, so also it belongs to the munificent man to know the proportion between expenditures and that for which the expenditures are made. In virtue of his habit the munificent man is able to judge what may be proper to spend. Thus he will make grand disbursements in a prudent way because prudent operation is required for every moral virtue.
Hoc autem quod dictum est, manifestat per hoc quod supra dictum est in secundo, quod quilibet habitus determinatur per operationes, et per obiecta quorum est habitus: quia scilicet determinati habitus sunt determinatorum operationum et obiectorum. Et quia operationes magnificentiae sunt expensae, et obiecta operationum sunt ea in quibus fiunt expensae magnae, consequens est, quod ad magnificum pertineat considerare et facere magnos sumptus et convenientes, quod non potest fieri sine prudentia. Oportet etiam quod opera, id est operata, sint talia, id est magna et decentia; per hunc enim modum expensae erunt magnae et convenientes operi operato, puta domui aedificandae, vel alicui huiusmodi. Sic igitur oportet, quod opus, in quo fiunt expensae sit tale quod sit dignum huiusmodi sumptu, id est expensa, sumptum autem, id est expensam, oportet esse talem ut proportionetur operi vel quod etiam superabundet. Quia enim difficillimum est medium attingere, si contingat a medio declinare, semper virtus declinat in id quod minus habet de malo, sicut fortis in minus timendo et liberalis (in plus) dando, et similiter magnificus in plus expendendo. 713. The Philosopher clarifies the statement by what was said in the second book (322), that every habit is determined by operations and objects of which it is the habit, because determined habits have their own proper operations and objects. Since the operations of magnificence are expenditures, and the objects of the operations are the things for which the expenditures are made, it is therefore the duty of the munificent man to consider and expend large and handsome sums, which cannot be done without prudence. In this way the vast outlay will be in keeping with the operation, for instance, the construction of a house or something of this sort. So then the project on which the money is spent must be such that it is worthy of the cost or expense and this ought to be worthy of the work, or in excess of it. It is very difficult to attain the mean; hence if a departure from the mean should occur, virtue always inclines to what has less evil, as the brave man to less fear, the liberal man to giving and so the munificent man to more spending.
Secundam proprietatem ponit ibi: consumet autem et cetera. Quae sumitur ex parte finis. Et dicit, quod magnificus consumet, scilicet expendendo, talia magna et decentia propter bonum honestum sicut propter finem; operari enim propter bonum est commune in omnibus virtutibus. 714. He gives the second quality [II, A, A’, 2], at “Things of this kind,” which is understood on the part of the end. The munificent person, he says, consumes grand and proper amounts for an honorable good as for an end. Now, to work for a good is common to all the virtues.
Tertiam proprietatem ponit ibi: et adhuc delectabiliter et cetera. Et dicit, quod ad magnificum pertinet delectabiliter magna expendere, et emissive, idest prompte, et sine difficultate emittendo. Quia quod aliquis sit multum diligens in ratiocinio, id est in computatione expensarum, pertinet ad parvificentiam. 715. At “‘Furthermore” [II, A, A’, 3] he presents the third consideration, saying that it is characteristic of the munificent man to spend great sums cheerfully and with an open hand, dispensing them promptly and readily. The reason is that great caution in accounting or computing expenses pertains to illiberality.
Quartam proprietatem ponit ibi: et qualiter optimum et cetera. Et dicit, quod magnificus magis intendit quomodo faciat opus optimum et decentissimum, quam quomodo minimum possit expendere ad opus intentum faciendum. 716. He introduces the fourth quality at “He plans” [II, A, A’, 4], affirming that the munificent person plans how he may accomplish the best and most splendid work rather than how he can spend the least in doing the desired work.
Quintam proprietatem ponit ibi: necessarium autem et cetera. Et dicit, quod necessarium est quod magnificus sit liberalis. Quia ad liberalem pertinet expendere ea quae oportet et sicut oportet. Et hoc etiam magnificus expendit; expendit enim circa magna et decentia opera, ut dictum est. Et hoc facit delectabiliter et emissive et propter bonum. Sed ad magnificum proprie pertinet, quod aliquid magnum circa hoc faciat, ac si magnificentia nihil aliud sit quam quaedam magnitudo liberalitatis circa praedicta. 717. He enumerates the fifth quality, at “Likewise the munificent” [II, A, A’, 5] when he says that one who is munificent should be liberal. The reason is that the liberal person should make the right expenditures in the right manner. The munificent man, too, acts in this way, for he makes outlays for great and noble achievements, as was just said (708); and he docs this cheerfully, generously, and for a good purpose. But it is characteristic of the munificent person to do something on a grand scale touching this matter. In fact magnificence is nothing other than a kind of magnified liberality concerning these things.
Sextam proprietatem ponit ibi: et ab aequali sumptu et cetera. Et dicit quod dum magnificus in aliquo magno opere facit magnas expensas, constituit opus magis magnificum ex aequalitate expensarum. Quia non ad idem pertinet virtus, idest ultimum et optimum in possessione divitiarum et in opere quo divitiae expenduntur. Quia virtus, idest maximum et optimum in possessionibus, est illud quod est plurimo pretio dignum et quod homines maxime honorant, idest appretiantur. Sed virtus operis est, quod sit magnum et bonum. Quia consideratio talis operis inducit admirationem. Et tale est opus magnificentiae, ut scilicet sit admirabile. Et sic patet, quod virtus operis, idest optima excellentia eius, est secundum magnificentiam cum magnitudine expensarum. 718. At “Besides, for the same cost” [II, A, A’, 6] he gives the sixth quality. He says that, although the munificent person incurs great expense for some noble work, he produces a more magnificent work with equal expenditure. This is so because excellence (what is ultimate and best) is not the same in possession of money and in a work for which money is spent. Excellence (what is greatest and best) in possessions is found in the most valued object, viz., gold, which men highly honor and prize. But excellence in a work is found in this that a work is great and good; for the contemplation of such a work gives rise to admiration-and this is what magnificence does. So it is evident that the “virtue” of a work, i.e., its greatest excellence corresponds to magnificence involving expenditures on a large scale.

The Objects of Magnificence
Chapter 2
      B’ He shows the principal object on which the munificent person should spend money.
                   a.   The principal objects for which the munificent should spend money.
                         i.    The principal objects... for which the munificent person disburses funds. — 719-720
ἔστι δὲ τῶν δαπανημάτων οἷα λέγομεν τὰ τίμια, οἷον τὰ περὶ θεούς, ἀναθήματα καὶ κατασκευαὶ καὶ θυσίαι, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ πᾶν τὸ δαιμόνιον, καὶ ὅσα πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν εὐφιλοτίμητά ἐστιν, οἷον εἴ που χορηγεῖν οἴονται δεῖν λαμπρῶς ἢ τριηραρχεῖν ἢ καὶ ἑστιᾶν τὴν πόλιν. Magnificence belongs to those princely outlays we call most honorable, like votive offerings to the gods, preparations, sacrifices and other things pertaining to divine worship. It belongs, also, to any lavish gifts made for the common good, such as a splendid donation for the benefit of all, or the fitting out of a trireme, or the giving of a banquet to the whole community.
                         ii.   Who should make such expenditures.
                               x.   FOR WHOM, IN GENERAL, SUCH EXPENDITURES ARE APPROPRIATE. — 721
ἐν ἅπασι δ' ὥσπερ εἴρηται, καὶ πρὸς τὸν πράττοντα ἀναφέρεται τὸ τίς ὢν καὶ τίνων ὑπαρχόντων· ἄξια γὰρ δεῖ τούτων εἶναι, καὶ μὴ μόνον τῷ ἔργῳ ἀλλὰ καὶ τῷ ποιοῦντι πρέπειν. But in all these things, as was just stated, reference is made to the agent—who he is and what possessions he has, for the disbursements must be commensurate with these circumstances and appropriate not only to the work but also to the spender.
                               y.   FOR WHOM, IN PARTICULAR, THEY ARE INAPPROPRIATE. — 722
διὸ πένης μὲν οὐκ ἂν εἴη μεγαλοπρεπής· οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν ἀφ' ὧν πολλὰ δαπανήσει πρεπόντως· ὁ δ' ἐπιχειρῶν ἠλίθιος· παρὰ τὴν ἀξίαν γὰρ καὶ τὸ δέον, κατ' ἀρετὴν δὲ τὸ ὀρθῶς. For this reason the poor man will not be munificent, since he has not the resources from which he may spend large sums becomingly. If he tries to do so, he is unwise for this would be improper and inopportune. And what is according to virtue is done rightly.
                               z.   FOR WHOM, IN PARTICULAR, THEY ARE APPROPRIATE. — 723-724
πρέπει δὲ [καὶ] οἷς τοιαῦτα προϋπάρχει δι' αὐτῶν ἢ τῶν προγόνων ἢ ὧν αὐτοῖς μέτεστιν, καὶ τοῖς εὐγενέσι καὶ τοῖς ἐνδόξοις καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα· πάντα γὰρ ταῦτα μέγεθος ἔχει καὶ ἀξίωμα. A great expenditure is suitable for those who have wealth themselves, from their parents, or from others transferring it to them; likewise for the noble and those renowned for fame or other similar public acclaim, since all these things have a certain greatness and distinction.
                         iii. He sums up his views. — 725
μάλιστα μὲν οὖν τοιοῦτος ὁ μεγαλοπρεπής, καὶ ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις δαπανήμασιν ἡ μεγαλοπρέπεια, ὥσπερ εἴρηται· μέγιστα γὰρ καὶ ἐντιμότατα· Such then, especially, is the munificent person, and as we have said, by such expenditures magnificence is exercised in the greatest and most honorable works;
                   b.   The secondary objects (for which the munificent person should spend money).
                         i.    The first. — 726
τῶν δὲ ἰδίων ὅσα εἰσάπαξ γίνεται, οἷον γάμος καὶ εἴ τι τοιοῦτον, or even in any private affair that happens once, for example, a wedding and the like;
                         ii.   The second kind. — 727
καὶ εἰ περί τι ἡ πᾶσα πόλις σπουδάζει ἢ οἱ ἐν ἀξιώματι, καὶ περὶ ξένων δὲ ὑποδοχὰς καὶ ἀποστολάς, καὶ δωρεὰς καὶ ἀντιδωρεάς· οὐ γὰρ εἰς ἑαυτὸν δαπανηρὸς ὁ μεγαλοπρεπὴς ἀλλ' εἰς τὰ κοινά, τὰ δὲ δῶρα τοῖς ἀναθήμασιν ἔχει τι ὅμοιον. or in any event of great interest to the whole city and the dignitaries; or in the reception and departure of foreign guests, in the presentation of gifts and in the repayment of favors. Yet the munificent man does not spend lavishly on himself but donates for the public welfare gifts that have a likeness to those consecrated to God.
                         iii. The third kind. — 728-729
μεγαλοπρεποῦς δὲ καὶ οἶκον κατασκευάσασθαι πρεπόντως τῷ πλούτῳ κόσμος γάρ τις καὶ οὗτος, καὶ περὶ ταῦτα μᾶλλον δαπανᾶν ὅσα πολυχρόνια τῶν ἔργων κάλλιστα γὰρ ταῦτα, It is the privilege of the munificent man to use his riches to build a home which is indeed an ornament, and to spend larger sums on whatever portions are of a permanent nature, for these are best.
καὶ ἐν ἑκάστοις τὸ πρέπον· οὐ γὰρ ταὐτὰ ἁρμόζει θεοῖς καὶ ἀνθρώποις, οὐδ' ἐν ἱερῷ καὶ τάφῳ. καὶ ἐπεὶ τῶν δαπανημάτων ἕκαστον μέγα ἐν τῷ γένει, καὶ μεγαλοπρεπέστατον ἁπλῶσ μὲν τὸ ἐν μεγάλῳ μέγα, ἐνταῦθα δὲ τὸ ἐν τούτοις μέγα, καὶ διαφέρει τὸ ἐν τῷ ἔργῳ μέγα τοῦ ἐν τῷ δαπανήματι· σφαῖρα μὲν γὰρ ἡ καλλίστη ἢ λήκυθος μεγαλοπρέπειαν ἔχει παιδικοῦ δώρου, ἡ δὲ τούτου τιμὴ μικρὸν καὶ ἀνελεύθερον· διὰ τοῦτό ἐστι τοῦ μεγαλοπρεποῦς, ἐν ᾧ ἂν ποιῇ γένει, μεγαλοπρεπῶς ποιεῖν τὸ γὰρ τοιοῦτον οὐκ εὐπέρβλητον καὶ ἔχον κατ' ἀξίαν τοῦ δαπανήματος. τοιοῦτος μὲν οὖν ὁ μεγαλοπρεπής· He will spend in a manner proper to each thing. The same expenditure is not appropriate to gods and men, nor in building a temple and a tomb. He will make an outlay for each thing according to the kind, being most munificent in spending a great amount on a great work. But the expense will be great in comparison with the things. What is great in regard to the work differs from what is great in cost considered in itself. A very pretty ball or jar takes on magnificence when presented as a gift to a child, although the price is trivial and not in the category of liberal. Hence the munificent person has the advantage of performing a great work in any category. And a work, great in its class and reasonable in its cost, can hardly be surpassed. This, then, is a description of the munificent person.
B.   He treats the opposite vices.
      A’ First, considering excess. — 732
ὁ δ' ὑπερβάλλων καὶ βάναυσος τῷ παρὰ τὸ δέον ἀναλίσκειν ὑπερβάλλει, ὥσπερ εἴρηται. ἐν γὰρ τοῖς μικροῖς τῶν δαπανημάτων πολλὰ ἀναλίσκει καὶ λαμπρύνεται παρὰ μέλος, οἷον ἐρανιστὰς γαμικῶς ἑστιῶν, καὶ κωμῳδοῖς χορηγῶν ἐν τῇ παρόδῳ πορφύραν εἰσφέρων, ὥσπερ οἱ Μεγαροῖ. καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα ποιήσει οὐ τοῦ καλοῦ ἕνεκα, ἀλλὰ τὸν πλοῦτον ἐπιδεικνύμενος, καὶ διὰ ταῦτα οἰόμενος θαυμάζεσθαι, καὶ οὗ μὲν δεῖ πολλὰ ἀναλῶσαι, ὀλίγα δαπανῶν, οὗ δ' ὀλίγα, πολλά. One who sins by excess, i.e., the vulgarian, is immoderate in spending contrary to what he ought, as has been pointed out. He expends great sums on paltry things, and his lavishness is out of harmony, figuratively speaking. He banquets buffoons with dishes fit for a marriage feast, gives presents to comedians, and rolls out a red carpet for their entry like the Megarians. In all such affairs he does not act to attain the good but to show off his wealth, hoping in this way for admiration. Where grand outlays are called for, he spends little; where small expenditures are in order, he lays out much.
      B’ Next (considering) defect. — 733
ὁ δὲ μικροπρεπὴς περὶ πάντα ἐλλείψει, καὶ τὰ μέγιστα ἀναλώσας ἐν μικρῷ τὸ καλὸν ἀπολεῖ, καὶ ὅ τι ἂν ποιῇ μέλλων καὶ σκοπῶν πῶς ἂν ἐλάχιστον ἀναλώσαι, καὶ ταῦτ' ὀδυρόμενος, καὶ πάντ' οἰόμενος μείζω ποιεῖν ἢ δεῖ. But the petty person falls short in everything; and after spending very much he will spoil the whole good effect for the sake of a trifle. Whatever expenditures he makes, he makes tardily and he takes care to spend as little as he can. Moreover, he does this glumly and is of the opinion that he has done more than he should.
      C’ Finally (considering) what is common to both. — 734
εἰσὶ μὲν οὖν αἱ ἕξεις αὗται κακίαι, οὐ μὴν ὀνείδη γ' ἐπιφέρουσι διὰ τὸ μήτε βλαβεραὶ τῷ πέλας εἶναι μήτε λίαν ἀσχήμονες. These, then, are habits of vice; yet they do not bring shame because they do not injure our neighbor and are not very disgraceful.
Est autem sumptuum et cetera. Postquam philosophus ostendit qualiter magnificus se habeat in expendendo, hic ostendit in quibus magnificus expendat. Et circa hoc duo facit. Primo ostendit in quibus expendit magnificus; secundo ostendit quomodo servat proportionem sumptuum ad ea in quibus expendat, ibi, et in singulis decens, et cetera. Circa primum duo facit: primo ostendit in quibus principaliter magnificus expendat. Secundo, in quibus expendat secundario, ibi propriorum autem et cetera. Circa primum tria facit. Primo ostendit, quae sunt principalia, in quibus magnificus expendit; secundo ostendit ad quos pertineat in talibus expendere, ibi, in omnibus autem quemadmodum dictum est, et cetera. Tertio epilogat quod dictum est, ibi, maxime quidem igitur, et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod magnificus facit sumptus circa ea quae sunt maxime honorabilia. Huiusmodi autem sunt duorum generum. Primum genus est eorum quae pertinent ad res divinas, puta cum aliqua donaria reponuntur in templis deorum, et praeparationes, puta templorum aedificia, vel aliquid aliud huiusmodi. Et etiam sacrificia ad idem pertinent. Gentiles autem non solum colebant deos, idest quasdam substantias separatas, sed etiam colebant Daemones, quos dicebant esse medios inter deos et homines. Et ideo subdit, quod ad idem genus pertinet quicquid expenditur circa cultum cuiuscumque Daemonis. Et loquitur hic philosophus secundum consuetudinem gentilium, quae nunc manifestata veritate est abrogata, unde, si aliquis nunc circa cultum Daemonum aliquid expenderet, non esset magnificus, sed sacrilegus. 719. After the Philosopher has shown in what manner the munificent person should be concerned with spending, he now [II, B’] shows the principal object on which the munificent person should spend money. He gives two explanations of this point. First [B’, 1] he explains for what things the munificent man should make expenditures; and next [B’, 2.], how he preserves proportion between the cost and the objects paid for, at “He will spend in a manner proper to each etc.” He manifests the initial point in a twofold manner. First [i, a] he sets forth the principal objects for which the munificent should spend money; and then [i, b], the secondary objects, at “or even in any private etc.” On this first point he does three things. First [a, i] he discloses what the principal objects are for which the munificent person disburses funds. Next [a, ii], he indicates who should make such expenditures, at “But in all these things etc.” Last [a, iii], he sums up his views, at “Such then, especially etc.” He says first that the munificent man lays out large amounts for things that are honorable in the highest degree. These sums are of two kinds. The first of them pertains to divine things (for example, the placing of votive offerings in the temples of the gods) and preparations (the building of the temple or some other things of this kind). Even sacrifices come under this heading. The gentiles, however, worshipped not only gods, i.e., certain separated substances, but also demons whom they held to be intermediaries between gods and men. Therefore, he adds that everything expended on the worship of any demon whatsoever belongs to this same classification. The Philosopher speaks here of a heathen custom that has been abrogated by the plain truth. Hence if someone now spent any money on the worship of a demon he would not be munificent but sacrilegious.
Secundum autem genus honorabilium sumptuum sunt ea quae magnifice fiunt per respectum ad bonum publicum, puta quod aliquis ad aliquid utile communitati praeclare et magnifice largiatur, quod oportet. Vel si aliquod officium committitur alicui a civitate, puta quod sit princeps trieris, idest exercitus navium, vel galearum, quod circa executionem officii faciat magnos sumptus. Vel etiam quod convivium faciat toti civitati, sicut solitum erat apud ---, ut habetur in II politicae. 720. The second kind of honorable expenditures are those made for the common good in a sumptuous manner: a person nobly and lavishly gives a becoming donation of something useful to the community; a man, charged with an office by the state like the captaincy of a trireme (a fleet of ships or galleys), makes great expenditures in the execution of that office; or someone gives a banquet for the whole community according to a custom, as is said in the second book of the Politics (Ch. 9, 11271 a 33; St. Th. Lect. 14, 317).
Deinde cum dicit: in omnibus autem etc., ostendit quibus competat tales sumptus facere. Et circa hoc tria facit. Primo ostendit in generali quibus competat tales sumptus facere; secundo concludit in speciali, quibus non competat, ibi: propter quod inops quidem etc.; tertio ostendit in speciali quibus competat, ibi, decet autem et eos et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod in omnibus quae expenduntur, sicut supra dictum est, oportet haberi respectum, non solum ad ea in quibus expenditur, (sed etiam ad eum qui expendit,) ut scilicet consideretur quis est qui expendit, utrum scilicet sit princeps vel privata persona, nobilis aut ignobilis; et etiam consideretur quas possessiones habeat, utrum scilicet magnas vel parvas. Oportet enim expensas esse dignas, idest bene proportionatas his, scilicet conditioni personae et divitiis, ita quod expensae non solum deceant tale opus in quo expenditur, sed etiam deceant facientem. 721. Next [a, ii], at “But in all these,” he shows for whom such expenditures are appropriate. Regarding this he does three things. First [ii, x] he explains for whom, in general, such expenditures are appropriate. Then [ii, y], at “For this reason the poor man,” he infers for whom, in particular, they are inappropriate. Finally [ii, z], at “A great expenditure etc.,” he shows for whom, in particular, they are appropriate. He says first that in all these things that are expended—as was just mentioned (712-713).we must have regard not only for the objects for which a Person spends money (so that we should consider whether the spender is a prince or a private person, a noble or a commoner) but also what possessions, large or small, he may have. Expenditures must be proper, i.e., well proportioned to the wealth and station of the person, so that the expenses may be suited not only to the work for which they are incurred but also to the spender.
Deinde cum dicit propter quod inops etc., concludit quos non deceant tales sumptus. Et dicit, quod propter praedicta inops, idest qui habet parvas divitias, non potest esse magnificus, quia non habet tot ex quibus possit convenienter multa consumere. Et si tentet ultra posse expendere, erit insipiens, quia hoc erit praeter dignitatem et praeter id quod fieri oportet et ita non pertinet ad virtutem magnificentiae. Quia secundum virtutem omnia fiunt recte idest secundum quod oportet. 722. Then [ii, y], at “For this reason,” he infers that such expenditures may not be appropriate. Because of what was just said, the poor man who has little wealth cannot be munificent, for he does not have so great an amount that he can rightly afford to spend much. If he attempts to spend more, he is foolish since it is contrary to good taste and beyond what is proper. So it does not pertain to the virtue of magnificence because, by means of virtue, all things are done correctly, i.e., properly.
Deinde cum dicit: decet autem et eos etc., ostendit quos deceat facere praedictos sumptus. Et accipit hoc secundum duo. Primo quidem secundum quantitatem divitiarum. Unde dicit quod praedictos sumptus facere decet illos homines quibus talia praeexistunt, id est qui habent magnas divitias ex quibus possunt multa consumere decenter, sive habeant huiusmodi divitias abundantes per seipsos, puta acquirendo eas per propriam industriam sive etiam habeant eas per progenitores quibus succedunt, sive etiam per quoscumque alios, per quos ad eos transeunt divitiae; puta cum relinquuntur haeredes extraneorum. 723. Next [ii, z], at “A great expenditure,” he discloses who may make these expenditures fittingly, understanding this in regard to two things. First he takes it according to the amount of riches. He says that great expenditures should be made by men who are wealthy, i.e., who possess great riches, much of which can be expended becomingly. It makes no difference whether they possess this abundant wealth of themselves, i.e., by acquiring it through their own industry, or have it from their parents (whose heirs they are), or even from ‘any others through whom riches come to them, for example, when they become heirs of those outside the family.
Secundo autem accipit propositum per conditionem personarum. Decet enim, quod faciant magnos sumptus nobiles genere et gloriosos, puta in honoribus constitutos, et quaecumque similia sunt; omnia enim huiusmodi habent in se quamdam magnitudinem, et quamdam dignitatem, ut deceat tales magnos sumptus facere. 724. Second, he considers the proposition according to the condition of persons. It is becoming that great sums be disbursed by the highborn and the renowned, i.e., those established in honor and other similar things. Everything of this nature has about it a certain greatness and decorum, so that such splendid donations may be made appropriately.
Deinde cum dicit: maxime quidem igitur etc., epilogat quae dicta sunt. Et dicit, quod talis est magnificus qualis supradictus est. Et in talibus sumptibus est magnificentia, sicut dictum est, scilicet in rebus divinis et communibus: huiusmodi enim inter omnia humana sunt maxima et honorabilissima. 725. Then [a, iii], at “Such, then,” he sums up his views, affirming that the munificent person is of the sort described above, and that magnificence consists in expenditures of this kind—as was stated in 719-720—viz., on things for divine worship and the public welfare, for such are the greatest and most honorable among all human goods.
Deinde cum dicit propriorum autem etc., ostendit in quibus secundario magnificus expendit. Et ponit circa hoc tres gradus. Quorum primus est quod magnificus magnos sumptus facit in his quae proprie ad ipsum pertinent, quae semel tantum fiunt, puta nuptiae, militia et si aliquid tale est. 726. Next [i, b], at “or even,” he shows on what secondary objects the munificent person spends money. He mentions three kinds of objects, the first [b, i] of which consists in the munificent man spending great sums on affairs pertaining properly to himself and happening only once, like marriage, military service, and so on.
Secundum gradum ponit ibi, et (si) circa aliquid et cetera. Et dicit, quod si tota civitas vel principes civitatis student ad aliquid faciendum, et circa hoc faciet magnos sumptus magnificus. Sicut si oporteat honorifice suscipere aliquos extraneos, puta principes vel reges, vel si oporteat eis mittere magna exenia, vel etiam si oporteat eis praesentialiter dona magna offerre. Vel si oporteat eis retribuere pro aliquibus beneficiis impensis, in omnibus his magnos sumptus faciet magnificus. Magnificus enim non est sumptuosus in se ipsum, ut scilicet multum expendat in proprium usum. Sed facit magnos sumptus in communia. Dona autem, quae magnifice aliquibus dantur, habent aliquid simile cum his quae Deo consecrantur, quia scilicet sicut Deo dona consecrantur, non quia eis Deus indigeat, sed propter reverentiam et honorem, ita etiam et magnis viris dona offeruntur magis propter honorem, quam propter indigentiam. 72.7. He gives the second kind [b, ii], at “or in any event.” If the whole city or the rulers are anxious to do something and a man makes great expenditures on this he will be munificent, for instance, if he should honorably receive some guests such as princes or kings, if he should give them great banquets, or even personally offer presents to them, or if he should repay certain favors received; in all these situations, the munificent person will spend large sums. He is not lavish with himself so that he spends much for his own use, but he makes great expenditures for the common good. The splendid gifts bestowed on some resemble those given to God. The reason is that, as offerings are consecrated to God not because He needs them but out of reverence and honor, so also presents are made to distinguished men more on account of honor than any need.
Tertium gradum ponit ibi, magnifici autem et cetera. Et dicit quod ad magnificum etiam pertinet praeparare domum convenienter propriis divitiis. Quia habere decentem domum pertinet ad hominis ornatum. Et in aedificiis faciendis magis intendit magnificus facere sumptus circa opera diuturna et permanentia, quam circa aliquos fragiles ornatus; puta circa columnas marmoreas in domo, quam circa fenestras vitreas. Ista enim, quae sunt magis permanentia, sunt optima. 728. Then [b, iii], at “It is the privilege,” he mentions the third kind, stating that it pertains to magnificence to build a home in the proper manner with one’s own riches, for a decent home adds to a man’s distinction. And in constructing buildings the munificent man desires to spend money rather on lasting and permanent parts than on fragile decorations, for instance, on marble columns in the house rather than on glass windows. Things that are more permanent are best.
Sic igitur ex praedictis patet, quod magnificus principaliter expendit circa res divinas et publicas. Sed circa ea quae pertinent ad privatas personas expendit secundario propter tres conditiones. Primo, quia semel fiunt. Secundo, quia communiter ad hoc insistitur. Tertio, quia sunt diuturna. Haec enim sunt quae afferunt etiam rebus privatis magnitudinem. 729. Hence, it is clear from what has been said that the munificent man spends money principally on the things destined for divine worship and the public welfare, but secondarily on things pertaining to private persons under three conditions: first that the things happen once, second that in addition the common good is pursued, third that they are of a permanent nature. These are the requisites making for greatness in private matters.
Deinde cum dicit: (et) in singulis decens etc., ostendit quomodo magnificus conservat debitam proportionem sumptuum ad ea in quibus expendit. Et dicit, quod magnificus in singulis expendit illud quod decet, et secundum speciem, et secundum quantitatem. Manifestum est enim quod non idem secundum speciem aut quantitatem congruit exhibere diis et hominibus, neque in templo et sepulcro construendo. Hoc tamen observabit, quod semper faciet magnum sumptum in genere illo. Unde magnificentissimum erit quando in magno facto magnum sumptum facit, sed hic, idest in hoc facto, faciet id quod est magnum in tali genere. Et ita quandoque differt magnum respectu operis ab eo quod est simpliciter magnum in expensa: puta, quod aliquis faciat pulcherrimam sphaeram, idest pilam, vel lecythum, idest aliquod vasculum ad dandum alicui puero, habet magnificentiam in genere puerilis doni, et tamen pretium pulcherrimae sphaerae secundum se consideratum est parvum, et non pertinens ad liberalem donationem. Et propter hoc manifestum est, quod ad magnificum pertinet ut in quolibet genere magnum aliquod opus faciat. In quo etiam facit sumptus secundum operis dignitatem; tale autem factum, scilicet quod est in genere suo magnum et habet sumptus convenientes, non est de facili superabile. 730. Next [B’, 2], at “He will spend,” he explains in what way the munificent person maintains the proportion Of costs appropriate to the things for which the expenditure is made, spending on each object what is fitting both in kind and quantity. It is obvious that not the same kind and quantity of outlay is suitably offered to gods and men, nor used in the construction of a temple and a tomb. He will see to it that he spends a sum large according to the kind of thing. Hence he will be very munificent when he makes a great expenditure on a great work. But in this work he will make what is great in this class. So, sometimes what is great in regard to the work differs from what is absolutely great in expense. From the fact that someone makes a very pretty globe, i.e., a ball, or a vase (a small vessel) as a gift to a boy, he is said to possess magnificence in the genus of children’s gifts, although the price of the beautiful globe in itself is small, not belonging to the class of generous donations. Obviously, therefore, the munificent person has the advantage of performing a great work in any genus, making expenditures commensurate with the merit of the work. A production of this sort, which is great according to its kind and reasonable in its cost, can hardly be surpassed.
Ultimo autem epilogando concludit, quod magnificus est talis, qualis dictus est. 731. Last, he succinctly states the conclusion that the munificent man is such as has been described.
Deinde cum dicit superabundans autem etc., determinat de oppositis vitiis. Et primo de superabundantia. Secundo de defectu, ibi, parvificus autem, et cetera. Tertio determinat communiter de utroque, ibi, sunt quidem et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod ille qui superabundat in sumptibus magnis, qui vocatur bannausus quasi in fornace sua consumens, excedit magnificum non quidem in absoluta sumptuum quantitate, sed in expendendo praeter id quod oportet; quia in superfluis sumptibus multa consumit, et vult splendidos sumptus facere praeter melodiam, idest praeter debitam proportionem (quod parabolice sive metaphorice dictum est), puta quia facit nuptialia convivia histrionibus et comoedis, idest repraesentatoribus multa tribuit et viam cooperit purpura, sicut faciunt Megares qui erant quidam cives Graeciae. Et omnia haec et similia facit, non propter aliquod bonum, sed solum ad ostentandum divitias, et propter hoc existimat quod in admiratione habeatur. Nec tamen ubique superflue expendit; sed quandoque deficit; quia ubi oporteret multa expendere, ibi expendit pauca, et ubi oporteret pauca expendere, ibi expendit multa, quia non attendit ad bonum, sed ad vanitatem. 732. Then [(II) B], at “One who sins by excess,” he treats the opposite vices: first [B, A’], considering excess; next [B, B’] defect, at “But the petty person etc.”; and last [B, C’] what is common to both, at “These, then, are.” He says that the man who is immoderate in grand outlays—called banausos because he consumes his goods as in a furnace—exceeds the munificent person not in the absolute amount spent but in spending in a way contrary to what he should. The reason is that he uses much money in superfluous expenses, and wants to make lavish expenditures contrary to harmony, i.e., against the right proportion—which is said by way of metaphor—for instance, he entertains buffoons and comedians with nuptial banquets, contributes much to actors, even rolling out the red carpet for their entry, as the Megarians (certain Greek citizens) are in the habit of doing. He does all these and similar things not for some good but for making a show of his riches, thinking that he will be admired for this reason. However, he does not always spend lavishly but sometimes he falls short. Where he ought to spend much, he spends little; but where little, much. The reason is that he does not keep his eye on the good but on vanity.
Deinde cum dicit: parvificus autem etc., determinat de vitio defectus. Et dicit quod parvificus est qui circa omnia deficit. Et ponit quinque proprietates eius. Quarum prima est quod, cum faciat magnas expensas pro modico, perdit quod non bene facit. Secunda proprietas est quod quicquid facit in sumptibus facit cum quadam tarditate. Tertia est quod semper intendit qualiter possit minimum expendere. Quarta est quod expendit cum tristitia. Quinta est quod omnia reputat se maiora facere quam oporteat. Videtur enim ei quod oporteret eum minus expendere. 733. Next [B, B’], at “But the petty person,” he considers the vice of defect and states that the petty person falls short in everything, assigning him five traits. The first is that when the petty person does make great expenditures he fails to do well because of a trifle. The second, what sums he expends he expends tardily. The third, he always keeps his mind on how he may spend the least. The fourth, he is a gloomy spender. The fifth, when he lays out everything, he thinks he has done more than he should, for it seems to him that he ought to spend less.
Deinde cum dicit: sunt quidem igitur etc., determinat communiter de utroque vitio. Et concludit ex praedictis quod praedicti duo habitus sunt quidem malitiae propter hoc quod contrariantur virtuti (per) recessum a medio, non tamen sunt opprobriosi, quia neque inferunt aliquod nocumentum proximo neque sunt multum turpes eo quod difficile est in magnis sumptibus non recedere a medio. 734. Then [B, C’], at “These, then,” he considers what is common to either vice. He comes to the conclusion that the two previously mentioned habits are certain vices because they are opposed to virtue by a departure from the mean. However, they are not opprobrious since they do not injure our neighbor in any way, and are not very disgraceful because it is difficult in disbursing large amounts not to depart from the mean.

Chapter 3
      A.  He sets forth his proposition. — 735
ἡ δὲ μεγαλοψυχία περὶ μεγάλα μὲν καὶ ἐκ τοῦ ὀνόματος ἔοικεν εἶναι, περὶ ποῖα δ' ἐστὶ πρῶτον λάβωμεν· διαφέρει δ' οὐδὲν τὴν ἕξιν ἢ τὸν κατὰ τὴν ἕξιν σκοπεῖν. Judging by the name, magnanimity seems to be concerned with great things the nature of which we should first understand. However, it does not matter whether we consider the habit or the man who operates according to the habit.
      B.  He explains it.
            A’ He exposes the matter of magnanimity generally.
                         a.   He exposes his viewpoint. — 736
δοκεῖ δὴ μεγαλόψυχος εἶναι ὁ μεγάλων αὑτὸν ἀξιῶν ἄξιος ὤν· A person seems to be magnanimous in thinking himself worthy of great things when he is worthy.
                         b.  The magnanimous person must be worthy of great things. — 737
ὁ γὰρ μὴ κατ' ἀξίαν αὐτὸ ποιῶν ἠλίθιος, τῶν δὲ κατ' ἀρετὴν οὐδεὶς ἠλίθιος οὐδ' ἀνόητος. μεγαλόψυχος μὲν οὖν ὁ εἰρημένος. But he who presumes this when it is not really so is foolish; yet the man who operates according to virtue in these matters is not unwise or foolish. Consequently, the magnanimous person is such as we have described.
                         c.   The magnanimous man should think himself worthy of great things. — 738
ὁ γὰρ μικρῶν ἄξιος καὶ τούτων ἀξιῶν ἑαυτὸν σώφρων, μεγαλόψυχος δ' οὔ· ἐν μεγέθει γὰρ ἡ μεγαλοψυχία, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ κάλλος ἐν μεγάλῳ σώματι, οἱ μικροὶ δ' ἀστεῖοι καὶ σύμμετροι, καλοὶ δ' οὔ. He who is worthy of small things and considers himself so is temperate, although he is not magnanimous. Magnanimity consists in greatness, as beauty consists in a good build. Short-statured people may be fair and well-proportioned but hardly handsome.
                         a.   First regarding the vice of excess.
ὁ δὲ μεγάλων ἑαυτὸν ἀξιῶν ἀνάξιος ὢν χαῦνος· ὁ δὲ μειζόνων ἢ ἄξιος οὐ πᾶς χαῦνος. The person who judges himself worthy of great things and is in fact unworthy is conceited. But one who judges himself worthy of greater things than he merits is not always said to be conceited.
                         b.  Then (regarding) the vice of defect. — 740
ὁ δ' ἐλαττόνων ἢ ἄξιος μικρόψυχος, ἐάν τε μεγάλων ἐάν τε μετρίων, ἐάν τε καὶ μικρῶν ἄξιος ὢν ἔτι ἐλαττόνων αὑτὸν ἀξιοῖ. καὶ μάλιστ' ἂν δόξειεν ὁ μεγάλων ἄξιος· τί γὰρ ἂν ἐποίει, εἰ μὴ τοσούτων ἦν ἄξιος; On the other hand, the man who thinks he deserves lesser things than he deserves—whether the things be great, ordinary, or little—is pusillanimous. This will be especially evident in one capable of splendid achievements. What would he have done if he had not this capability?
                   3.   HOW THE VIRTUE CONSISTS IN THE MEAN. — 741
ἔστι δὴ ὁ μεγαλόψυχος τῷ μὲν μεγέθει ἄκρος, τῷ δὲ ὡς δεῖ μέσος· τοῦ γὰρ κατ' ἀξίαν αὑτὸν ἀξιοῖ· οἳ δ' ὑπερβάλλουσι καὶ ἐλλείπουσιν. However, the magnanimous man holds an extreme in extension but a mean in appropriateness, for he thinks himself deserving in accord with his worth. Others exceed and fall short of this mean.
      B’ He exposes (the matter of magnanimity) specifically.
                   a.   (The magnanimous man) should deem himself deserving of the greatest things. — 742
εἰ δὴ μεγάλων ἑαυτὸν ἀξιοῖ ἄξιος ὤν, καὶ μάλιστα τῶν μεγίστων, περὶ ἓν μάλιστ' ἂν εἴη.ἡ δ' ἀξία λέγεται πρὸς τὰ ἐκτὸς ἀγαθά· μέγιστον δὲ τοῦτ' ἂν θείημεν ὃ τοῖς θεοῖς ἀπονέμομεν, καὶ οὗ μάλιστ' ἐφίενται οἱ ἐν ἀξιώματι, καὶ τὸ ἐπὶ τοῖς καλλίστοις ἆθλον· τοιοῦτον δ' ἡ τιμή· μέγιστον γὰρ δὴ τοῦτο τῶν ἐκτὸς ἀγαθῶν· περὶ τιμὰς δὴ καὶ ἀτιμίας ὁ μεγαλόψυχός ἐστιν ὡς δεῖ. If a man deems himself deserving of great things and especially of the greatest things when he deserves them, then he will be concerned with one particular object. He is said to be deserving in reference to external goods. But we place that external good highest which we attribute to the gods, which is desired most of all by prominent men and is the reward for virtuous action. Such a good is honor, for it is the best of all external goods. Therefore, the magnanimous man will manage honors and dishonors in a manner which is fitting.
                   b.   He manifests his proposition by experience. — 743
καὶ ἄνευ δὲ λόγου φαίνονται οἱ μεγαλόψυχοι περὶ τιμὴν εἶναι· τιμῆς γὰρ μάλιστα [οἱ μεγάλοι] ἀξιοῦσιν ἑαυτούς, κατ' ἀξίαν δέ. Even independent of reasoning, the magnanimous seem to be concerned about honors, for the great exalt themselves in dignity principally by honor.
ὁ δὲ μικρόψυχος ἐλλείπει καὶ πρὸς ἑαυτὸν καὶ πρὸς τὸ τοῦ μεγαλοψύχου ἀξίωμα. ὁ δὲ χαῦνος πρὸς ἑαυτὸν μὲν ὑπερβάλλει, οὐ μὴν τόν γε μεγαλόψυχον. The pusillanimous person is deficient in regard both to his own merit and the worthiness of the magnanimous man. But one who is presumptuous is excessive respecting his own merit although he does not exceed the merit of the magnanimous person.
                   a.   Magnanimity is related to the other virtues.
                         i.    First by a general argument. — 745
ὁ δὲ μεγαλόψυχος, εἴπερ τῶν μεγίστων ἄξιος, ἄριστος ἂν εἴη· μείζονος γὰρ ἀεὶ ὁ βελτίων ἄξιος, καὶ μεγίστων ὁ ἄριστος. But the magnanimous man as worthy of the greatest goods will be best. Since the better person is worthy of greater things, the best will be worthy of the greatest. Therefore, the magnanimous person must be truly good.
                               x.   WHAT MAKES MAGNANIMITY A SPECIAL VIRTUE. — 746
τὸν ὡς ἀληθῶς ἄρα μεγαλόψυχον δεῖ ἀγαθὸν εἶναι. What is great in every virtue pertains to magnanimity.
                               y.   HE REJECTS AN ERROR. — 747
καὶ δόξειεν ἂν εἶναι μεγαλοψύχου τὸ ἐν ἑκάστῃ ἀρετῇ μέγα. οὐδαμῶς τ' ἂν ἁρμόζοι μεγαλοψύχῳ φεύγειν παρασείσαντι, οὐδ' ἀδικεῖν· τίνος γὰρ ἕνεκα πράξει αἰσχρὰ ᾧ γ' οὐδὲν μέγα; It is never becoming for a magnanimous man to flee one about to give unsought advice, nor to practice injustice. Will not the man who considers nothing great be the one to do disgraceful deeds for gain?
                         ii.   By the things appearing in individual cases. — 748
καθ' ἕκαστα δ' ἐπισκοποῦντι πάμπαν γελοῖος φαίνοιτ' ἂν ὁ μεγαλόψυχος μὴ ἀγαθὸς ὤν. οὐκ εἴη δ' ἂν οὐδὲ τιμῆς ἄξιος φαῦλος ὤν· τῆς ἀρετῆς γὰρ ἆθλον ἡ τιμή, καὶ ἀπονέμεται τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς. To an observer of what happens in individual cases, that person will seem altogether ludicrous who thinks himself magnanimous when he is not really virtuous. One who is in fact evil will not be magnanimous nor deserving of honor, for honor is a reward of virtue and is attributed to the virtuous.
                   b.   Next drawing certain conclusions from what has been said. — 749
ἔοικε μὲν οὖν ἡ μεγαλοψυχία οἷον κόσμος τις εἶναι τῶν ἀρετῶν· μείζους γὰρ αὐτὰς ποιεῖ, καὶ οὐ γίνεται ἄνευ ἐκείνων. διὰ τοῦτο χαλεπὸν τῇ ἀληθείᾳ μεγαλόψυχον εἶναι· οὐ γὰρ οἷόν τε ἄνευ καλοκαγαθίας. Therefore, it seems that magnanimity is an embellishment of the virtues, since it makes virtue more excellent and does not exist without them. It is difficult to be truly magnanimous because this is not possible without goodness.
Magnanimitas autem circa magna quidem et cetera. Postquam philosophus determinavit de virtutibus quae sunt circa pecunias, hic determinat de virtutibus quae sunt circa honores. Et primo de magnanimitate quae est circa magnos honores. Secundo de quadam virtute innominata quae est circa moderatos honores, ibi, videtur autem et circa hunc esse virtus quaedam et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo investigat materiam magnanimitatis et oppositorum vitiorum. Secundo determinat actus et proprietates eorum, ibi: maxime quidem igitur circa honores et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo proponit quod intendit. Secundo manifestat propositum, ibi: videtur magnanimus esse et cetera. Dicit ergo primo quod ex ipso nomine magnanimitatis apparet quod magnanimitas est circa magna. Oportet autem primo accipere circa qualia magna sit. Et determinat de modo considerationis, quod nihil differt utrum loquamur de ipso habitu magnanimitatis, vel de eo qui disponitur secundum habitum, idest de magnanimo. 735. After the Philosopher has finished the treatise on the virtues concerning money, he treats here the virtues having to do with honors. First he considers magnanimity, which regards great honors [Lects. 8, 9, 10, 11]; and then a nameless virtue concerned with ordinary honors [Lect. 12], at “As we remarked in the beginning etc.” (B. 1125 b). In the first consideration he does two things. First [I] he investigates the matter of magnanimity and the opposite vices; and second [Lect. 9; II] their acts and properties, at “For the most part etc.” (B. 1124 a 4). On the first point he does two things. First [A] he sets forth his proposition; and next [B] he explains it, at “A person seems to be etc.” He says first: from its name, magnanimity apparently is concerned with great things. But at the beginning we must understand the nature of the things with which it deals. Then he designates the manner of consideration, viz., it does not matter whether we speak of the habit of magnanimity or of the man who is disposed by the habit, i.e., the magnanimous person.
Deinde cum dicit: videtur autem magnanimus esse etc., manifestat propositum. Et circa hoc duo facit. Primo manifestat materiam magnanimitatis in generali. Secundo in speciali, ibi, si autem utique magnis et cetera. Circa primum tria facit: primo ostendit quod magnanimitas est circa magna. Secundo ostendit quomodo circa eadem fiunt vitia opposita, ibi, qui autem magnis seipsum dignum facit etc.; tertio ostendit quomodo virtus in medio consistit, ibi: est autem magnanimus et cetera. Circa primum tria facit. Primo proponit quod intendit: dicens quod ille videtur esse magnanimus qui dignum seipsum aestimat magnis, idest ut magna faciat et magna ei fiant, cum tamen sit dignus. 736. Next [B], at “A person seems,” he explains his proposition by doing two things. First [A’] he exposes the matter of magnanimity generally; and then [B’] specifically, at “If a man etc.” On the first point he does two (three) things: First [A’, i] he shows that magnanimity refers to great things; and then [A’, 2], at “The person who judges etc.,” how the opposite vices occur in regard to the same matter. Last [A’, 3] he explains how the virtue consists in the mean, at “However, the magnanimous etc.” He treats the first point under three aspects. First [A’, i, a] he exposes his viewpoint, saying that a person seems to be magnanimous who thinks himself worthy of great things, viz., that he may perform great deeds and that great things should happen to him when in fact he is worthy.
Secundo ibi: qui enim non secundum dignitatem etc., ostendit quod ad magnanimum requiratur quod sit dignus magnis. Ille enim qui magnis se dignificat non secundum dignitatem, idest quorum non est dignus, est insipiens. Sapientis enim est in omnibus debitum ordinem servare. Nullus autem virtuosus est insipiens vel stultus; quia virtus operatur secundum rationem rectam, ut in secundo habitum est. Sic igitur patet quod magnanimus est ille qui dictus est, qui scilicet dignus est magnis quibus seipsum dignificat. 737. Then [A’, i, b], at “But he who presumes,” he teaches that the magnanimous person must be worthy of great things. One who thinks himself worthy of great things contrary to truth, i.e., of which he is not really worthy, is foolish. It is characteristic of a wise man to keep everything in proper order. But the virtuous man is neither unwise nor foolish because virtue operates according to right reason, as was affirmed in the second book (257, 322, 335). Consequently, it is clear that the magnanimous man is the person just described, i.e., one worthy of great things who thinks himself worthy.
Tertio ibi: qui enim parvis dignus etc., ostendit quod magnanimus dignificet seipsum magnis. Ille enim qui est dignus parvis, et his seipsum dignificat, potest dici temperatus, prout temperantia large sumitur pro quacumque moderatione. Non tamen potest dici magnanimus: quia magnanimitas consistit in quadam magnitudine, sicut pulchritudo proprie consistit in corpore magno. Unde illi qui sunt parvi, possunt dicit formosi propter decentiam coloris, et commensurati, propter debitam commensurationem membrorum, non tamen possunt dici pulchri propter magnitudinis defectum. 738. Finally [A’, i, c], at “He who is worthy,” he shows that the magnanimous man should think himself worthy of great things. One who is worthy of small things and considers himself so, can be called temperate in the sense that temperance is taken for any moderation whatsoever. However, he cannot be called magnanimous because magnanimity consists in a certain size, just as beauty properly consists in a good build. Hence those who are short can be called fair by reason of complexion or well-proportioned members but not handsome because they lack size.
Deinde cum dicit: qui autem magnis etc., ostendit quomodo circa magna se habeant opposita vitia. Et primo quomodo se habet circa magna vitium quod est in excessu; secundo quomodo ad hoc se habeat vitium quod est in defectu, ibi: qui autem minoribus quam dignus et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod ille qui aestimat seipsum dignum magnis cum sit indignus, vocatur chaymus, idest fumosus; quem possumus dicere ventosum, vel praesumptuosum. Sed ille qui est dignus magnis, et adhuc maioribus se dignum aestimat, non semper vocatur chaymus, eo quod difficile est mensuram rectam attingere, ut aliquis non maioribus vel minoribus se ipsum dignum aestimet. 739. Next [A’, 2], at “The person who judges” he shows in what manner the opposite vices should be concerned with great things, first [A’, 2, a] regarding the vice of excess; and then [A’, 2, b] the vice of defect, at “on the other hand etc.” Aristotle says first that the man who thinks himself worthy of great things when he is really unworthy is called conceited, i.e., puffed up-we can call him inflated or presumptuous. But the person who is really worthy of great things and thinks himself worthy of still greater things is not always called conceited, because it is difficult to find an exact norm so that someone may judge himself not worthy of great things.
Deinde cum dicit: qui autem minoribus quam dignus etc., ostendit quomodo se habeat ad magna vitium quod est in defectu. Et dicit quod ille qui aestimat seipsum dignum minoribus quam sit dignus, vocatur pusillanimus. Et hoc, sive sit dignus magnis, sive mediocribus, sive parvis, dum tamen adhuc minoribus seipsum dignificet. Maxime tamen vocatur pusillanimus ille, qui est dignus magnis, si illis magnis intendere recuset et intendat aliquibus minoribus; multo enim magis ad parva se deiiceret nisi esset magnis dignus. 740. Then [A’, 2, b], at “On the other hand,” he explains how the vice of defect is concerned with great things, saying that the man who thinks himself worthy of lesser things than he is worthy is called pusillanimous. This is so, whether in fact he is worthy of great, mediocre, or small things. However, the small-souled person is one who refuses to strive after great accomplishments and aims at certain petty undertakings when he is truly capable of what is great. He would bring himself down to affairs more trifling still, except for the fact that he is capable of great things.
Deinde cum dicit: est autem magnanimus etc., ostendit quomodo magnanimitas sit in medio. Videtur enim, si est circa magna, quod sit in extremo. Nam cum aequale medium sit inter magnum et parvum, magnum habet rationem extremi. Unde dicit quod magnanimus quidem quantum ad magna quibus seipsum dignificat, in extremo consistit. Sed inquantum hoc facit secundum quod oportet, consistit in medio, quia scilicet seipsum dignificat magnis secundum suam dignitatem. Medium enim virtutis non attenditur secundum quantitatem rei, sed secundum rationem rectam. Unde quantumcumque sit opus quod homo faciat, dummodo a ratione recta non recedat, non propter hoc est extra medium virtutis. Sed vitia opposita superabundant et deficiunt ab eo quod oportet. 741. Next [A’, 3], at “However, the magnanimous man,” he shows how magnanimity is in the mean, for, treating as it does of great things, magnanimity seems to consist in the extreme. Since the average is the mean between the large and the small, the great has the nature of an extreme. Hence he says that the magnanimous person holds an extreme in reference to great things of which he deems himself worthy. But he holds the mean inasmuch as he does this in an appropriate manner in considering himself deserving according to his worth. The mean of virtue is not Judged according to the quantity of the thing but according to right reason. Hence a man is not placed outside the mean of virtue by a work no matter what its size, provided he does not depart from reason. But the opposite vices exceed and fall short of what should be.
Deinde cum dicit: si autem utique magnis etc., manifestat materiam magnanimitatis in speciali. Et circa hoc tria facit. Primo ostendit quod magnanimitas est circa honores; secundo ostendit quomodo circa hoc se habeant vitia opposita, ibi: pusillanimis autem et cetera. Tertio ostendit quomodo magnanimitas se habeat ad alias virtutes, ibi: magnanimus autem siquidem et cetera. Primum autem ostendit dupliciter. Primo quidem per rationem; dicens quod si magnanimus dignificat se ipsum magnis tamquam eis dignus existens, consequens est quod maxime dignificet seipsum maximis. Et ulterius quod magnanimitas sit praecipue circa unum; quia id quod per excellentiam dicitur, uni attribuitur. Cum autem dicitur aliquis esse aliquibus dignus, talis dignitas refertur ad bona exteriora quae homini pro praemio dantur. Illud autem oportet ponere maximum quod Deo attribuitur et quod maxime desideratur ab his qui sunt in dignitate, et quod est praemium optimorum actuum. Huiusmodi autem est honor. Honorem enim Deo exhibemus. Honor etiam est quem requirunt hi qui sunt in dignitate. Honore etiam praemiantur virtuosi actus. Unde manifestum est quod honor est optimum inter omnia exteriora bona. Et ita sequitur quod magnanimitas maxime attendatur circa honores et opposita, inquantum scilicet magnanimus se habet sicut oportet circa talia. 742. Then [B’], at “If a man deems,” he explains the matter of magnanimity specifically, taking up three points. He shows first [B’, 1] that magnanimity is concerned with honor; second [B’, 2] how the opposite vices should deal with this matter, at “The pusillanimous person etc.”; and third [B’, 3] in what manner magnanimity is related to other virtues at “But the magnanimous man etc.” He explains the first point in two ways. First he reasons that if the magnanimous man deems himself worthy of great things when he is worthy of them, consequently [B’, i, a] he should deem himself deserving of the greatest things when he is deserving of the greatest. He says further that magnanimity is concerned with one object in particular, for what is predicated by excellence is attributed to one. When someone is said to be worthy of certain things, the worthiness refers to external goods which come to a man as a reward. But that must be placed highest which is attributed to God, which is desired especially by those in eminent positions, and which is the reward of the most noble deeds. Such is honor, for honor is shown to God, is sought by the prominent and is the reward of virtuous action. Obviously then honor is the best of all external goods. Consequently, magnanimity should give the greatest consideration to honors and dishonors, inasmuch as the magnanimous person manages things of this kind in the proper manner.
Secundo ibi: et sine ratione autem etc., manifestat propositum per experimentum; dicens quod etiam sine ratione apparet quod magnanimitas maxime est circa honorem ex hoc quod experimento videmus quod magnanimi maxime dignificant seipsos honore, sed non supra suam dignitatem. 743. Second [B’, i, b], at “Even independent of reasoning,” he manifests his proposition by experience, saying that, even without discussion, it is clear that magnanimity has to do with honor for the most part because experience shows the magnanimous deem themselves worthy of honor but not above their deserts.
Deinde cum dicit: pusillanimis autem etc., ostendit quomodo opposita vitia se habeant circa praedictam materiam. Et dicit quod pusillanimis deficit et per respectum ad se ipsum, quia scilicet dignificat se minoribus quam dignus sit; et etiam per respectum ad dignitatem magnanimi, quia videlicet dignificat se ipsum minoribus, quam magnanimus sit dignus. Sed chaymus, idest praesumptuosus, superabundat quidem per respectum ad seipsum, quia scilicet magnificat seipsum maioribus quam sit dignus: non tamen superabundat magnanimum, quia scilicet non dignificat seipsum maioribus, quam magnanimus sit dignus. 744. Next [B’, 2], at “The pusillanimous,” he explains in what manner the opposite vices should be concerned with the previously mentioned matter. He says that the small-souled person is deficient in regard to himself because he considers himself deserving of lesser things than he deserves, and also in regard to the worthiness of the magnanimous man because he considers himself deserving of lesser things than a magnanimous man deserves. But the conceited or presumptuous person is excessive in regard to himself because he makes himself greater than his worth, however, not in regard to the magnanimous man because he does not consider himself deserving of greater things than the magnanimous man deserves.
Deinde cum dicit magnanimus autem etc., determinat de magnanimitate per comparationem ad alias virtutes. Et circa hoc duo facit. Primo ostendit quod magnanimitas non est sine aliis virtutibus. Secundo infert quasdam conclusiones ex dictis, ibi, videtur quidem igitur et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo ostendit per rationem communem quod magnanimitas non est sine aliis virtutibus. Secundo ostendit idem per ea quae in singulis apparent, ibi, secundum singula autem et cetera. Circa primum tria facit: primo ostendit quod magnanimitas non est sine aliis virtutibus; secundo ostendit quid faciat magnanimitatem esse specialem virtutem, ibi: videtur autem esse etc.; tertio excludit quemdam errorem, ibi, et nequaquam utique congruit et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod cum magnanimus dignificet seipsum maximis bonis, et eis dignus existat, consequens est ut sit optimus. Maiori enim bono semper melior est dignus; et per consequens ille qui est maximis dignus oportet quod sit optimus. Oportet ergo, quod magnanimus vere sit bonus; alioquin non esset dignus maximis honoribus. 745. Then [B’, 3], at “But the magnanimous,” he compares magnanimity with other virtues: first [B’, 3, a] showing that magnanimity is related to the other virtues; and next [B’, 3, b] drawing certain conclusions from what has been said, at “Therefore it seems.” On the first point he does two things: he shows that magnanimity is related to the other virtues, first [i] by a general argument; and then [ii] by the things appearing in individual cases, at “To an observer etc.” Regarding the first he does two things. First [x] he explains what makes magnanimity a special virtue, at “What is great etc.”; and next [y] he rejects an error, at “It is never becoming etc.” Aristotle says first that when the magnanimous person deems himself worthy of the greatest goods and is really worthy of them, it follows that he is best. The. better man is always deserving of greater things, and consequently he who is deserving of the greatest must be best. Therefore, the magnanimous man must be truly good, otherwise he would not be deserving of the highest honors.
Deinde cum dicit: videtur autem esse magnanimi etc., ostendit per quid magnanimitas sit specialis virtus, cum concomitetur alias virtutes. Et dicit quod ad magnanimitatem videtur pertinere id quod est magnum in unaquaque virtute, propter hoc, quod non est dignus magno honore, qui non operatur magnum virtutis actum. Sic igitur circa actum alicuius alterius virtutis operatur illa virtus attendens id quod est proprium sibi. Puta fortitudo intendit fortiter agere, sed magnanimitas attendit magnum operari in fortiter agendo. Et quia moralia speciem habent ex fine quem intendunt, manifestum est quod magnanimitas et fortitudo specie differunt, licet circa idem operentur; quia scilicet non ad eamdem rationem motivi attendit utraque virtus. 746. Then [x], at “What is great,” he shows how magnanimity is a special virtue when it accompanies other virtues. He says that what is great in any virtue seems to pertain to magnanimity because one who does not perform a great act of virtue is not worthy of great honor. So, when that virtue strives for what is proper to itself, it performs an act of another virtue, for example, fortitude intends a courageous action, magnanimity strives for a great deed in the courageous action. Since moral acts take their species from the end to which they tend, it is clear that magnanimity and fortitude differ in species (although they operate in the same matter) because neither virtue follows the same motive.
Deinde cum dicit: et nequaquam utique etc., excludit quemdam errorem. Videtur enim quibusdam quod ad magnanimum pertineat, ut suo sensui semper innitatur et nullius alterius admonitionem sequatur. Et quod non dubitet cuicumque iniustitiam facere. Sed philosophus dicit hoc esse falsum. Quia nullus operatur aliquid indecens nisi propter appetitum alicuius. Sed magnanimus non tantum appretiatur quamcumque rem exteriorem, ut propter eam aliquid turpe operari velit. 747. Next [y], at “It is never becoming,” he rejects an error. Some seem to think that the magnanimous man should rely upon his own opinion and follow the advice of no one. Likewise, that he should not hesitate to do injustice to anyone. The Philosopher, however, says this is false because no one does a shameful deed except for the desire of something. But the magnanimous person does not place so great a value on any external thing that he would wish to do a shameful action for it.
Deinde cum dicit: secundum singula autem etc., manifestat quod dictum est, per ea quae in singulis apparent. Et dicit quod, si aliquis velit ad singularia intendere, omnino videbitur derisibilis ille, qui reputat se magnanimum nisi sit bonus, quia si sit malus non erit dignus honore. Nam honor est praemium virtutis. Unde magnanimus dignificat seipsum magnis honoribus. Unde non potest esse quod aliquis malus sit magnanimus. 748. Then [ii], at “To the observer” he explains the clause: “of what happens in individual cases.” He says that to someone willing to observe individual cases, that man will seem altogether ridiculous who judges himself magnanimous without being virtuous. The reason is that if a man is evil he is not deserving of honor, for honor is the reward of virtue. Hence the magnanimous man thinks himself worthy of great honors. Consequently, no evil person is able to be magnanimous.
Deinde cum dicit: videtur quidem igitur etc., infert duas conclusiones ex praemissis. Quarum prima est quod magnanimitas videtur esse quasi ornatus quidam omnium virtutum. Quia per magnanimitatem omnes virtutes efficiuntur maiores, eo quod ad magnanimitatem pertinet operari magnum in omnibus virtutibus. Et ex hoc crescunt virtutes. Et iterum non fit magnanimitas sine aliis virtutibus; et sic videtur superaddi aliis tamquam ornatus earum. Secunda conclusio est quod difficile est, esse vere magnanimum. Quia magnanimitas non potest esse sine bonitate virtutis, et etiam sine magna virtute, cui debeatur magnus honor. Hoc autem consequi est difficile. Unde difficile est hominem esse magnanimum. 749. Last [B’, 3, b], at “Therefore it seems’ “ he draws two conclusions from the premises. The first is that magnanimity seems to be an ornament of all the virtues because they are made more excellent by magnanimity, which seeks to perform a great work in all the virtues. In this way the virtues increase. Likewise, magnanimity accompanies the other virtues and so seems to be added to them as their ornament. The second conclusion is that it is difficult to be magnanimous because magnanimity cannot exist without the goodness of virtue, and even without great virtue to which honor is due. But it is difficult to attain this. Consequently, it is difficult for a man to be magnanimous.

The Acts of Magnanimity
Chapter 3
      A.  First as touching magnanimity.
      A’ How the magnanimous person should work on matter proper to him.
                   a.   The matter of magnanimity. — 750
μάλιστα μὲν οὖν περὶ τιμὰς καὶ ἀτιμίας ὁ μεγαλόψυχός ἐστι· For the most part the magnanimous man deals with honors and dishonors.
                   b.   How the magnanimous man deals with matter of this kind.
                         i.    The nature and mode of this man’s reaction to great honors. — 751
καὶ ἐπὶ μὲν ταῖς μεγάλαις καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν σπουδαίων μετρίως ἡσθήσεται, ὡς τῶν οἰκείων τυγχάνων ἢ καὶ ἐλαττόνων· ἀρετῆς γὰρ παντελοῦς οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο ἀξία τιμή, οὐ μὴν ἀλλ' ἀποδέξεταί γε τῷ μὴ ἔχειν αὐτοὺς μείζω αὐτῷ ἀπονέμειν· He takes moderate delight in great and desirable honors, receiving good things as his own or less than his due. In his opinion, honor is not an appropriate tribute to perfect virtue, but still he accepts it from men who have nothing greater to bestow on him.
                         ii.   The way... the magnanimous person should regard trifling honors. — 752
τῆς δὲ παρὰ τῶν τυχόντων καὶ ἐπὶ μικροῖς πάμπαν ὀλιγωρήσει· οὐ γὰρ τούτων ἄξιος· Honors given him by transitory things and for insufficient reasons he values very little as unworthy of him.
                         iii. In what manner the magnanimous should deal with dishonor. — 753
ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἀτιμίας· οὐ γὰρ ἔσται δικαίως περὶ αὐτόν. μάλιστα μὲν οὖν ἐστίν, ὥσπερ εἴρηται, ὁ μεγαλόψυχος περὶ τιμάς, He likewise counts of little value any dishonor that will be imputed to him unjustly. As we have said, then, the magnanimous man for the most part will be concerned with honors.
                   a.   How the magnanimous man should act in regard to such objects. — 754-755
οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ περὶ πλοῦτον καὶ δυναστείαν καὶ πᾶσαν εὐτυχίαν καὶ ἀτυχίαν μετρίως ἕξει, ὅπως ἂν γίνηται, καὶ οὔτ' εὐτυχῶν περιχαρὴς ἔσται οὔτ' ἀτυχῶν περίλυπος. οὐδὲ γὰρ περὶ τιμὴν οὕτως ἔχει ὡς μέγιστον ὄν. αἱ γὰρ δυναστεῖαι καὶ ὁ πλοῦτος διὰ τὴν τιμήν ἐστιν αἱρετά· οἱ γοῦν ἔχοντες αὐτὰ τιμᾶσθαι δι' αὐτῶν βούλονται· ᾧ δὲ καὶ ἡ τιμὴ μικρόν ἐστι, τούτῳ καὶ τἆλλα. διὸ ὑπερόπται δοκοῦσιν εἶναι. Moreover, he will observe moderation about wealth, power, good fortune, and adversity, no matter what may happen. He will not be exalted by prosperity nor cast down by misfortune, nor does he even regard honor as if it were a very great thing. Power and wealth should be desirable for the sake of honor; and those who possess them seek to be honored by reason of them. But a man to whom honor is a trifle will place little value on the other things. For this reason the magnanimous seem to be disdainful.
                   b.   How the objects benefit magnanimity.
                         i.    They increase it. — 756
δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ τὰ εὐτυχήματα συμβάλλεσθαι πρὸς μεγαλοψυχίαν. οἱ γὰρ εὐγενεῖς ἀξιοῦνται τιμῆς καὶ οἱ δυναστεύοντες ἢ πλουτοῦντες· ἐν ὑπεροχῇ γάρ, τὸ δ' ἀγαθῷ ὑπερέχον πᾶν ἐντιμότερον. διὸ καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα μεγαλοψυχοτέρους ποιεῖ· τιμῶνται γὰρ ὑπὸ τινῶν· κατ' ἀλήθειαν δ' ὁ ἀγαθὸς μόνος τιμητός· ᾧ δ' ἄμφω ὑπάρχει, μᾶλλον ἀξιοῦται τιμῆς. The goods of fortune seem to contribute something to magnanimity, for the noble, the powerful, and the rich are thought to be worthy of honor as possessing goods of great excellence. But anything that excels in goodness is held in greater honor. For this reason such things make men more magnanimous, since they are honored by some people, but in fact the good or virtuous man alone is to be honored. However, he who possesses both (virtue and goods of fortune) becomes more worthy of honor.
                         ii.   Without virtue they cannot make a man magnanimous. — 757-758
οἱ δ' ἄνευ ἀρετῆς τὰ τοιαῦτα ἀγαθὰ ἔχοντες οὔτε δικαίως ἑαυτοὺς μεγάλων ἀξιοῦσιν οὔτε ὀρθῶς μεγαλόψυχοι λέγονται· ἄνευ γὰρ ἀρετῆς παντελοῦς οὐκ ἔστι ταῦτα. ὑπερόπται δὲ καὶ ὑβρισταὶ καὶ οἱ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἔχοντες ἀγαθὰ γίνονται. ἄνευ γὰρ ἀρετῆς οὐ ῥᾴδιον φέρειν ἐμμελῶς τὰ εὐτυχήματα· οὐ δυνάμενοι δὲφέρειν καὶ οἰόμενοι τῶν ἄλλων ὑπερέχειν ἐκείνων μὲν καταφρονοῦσιν, αὐτοὶ δ' ὅ τι ἂν τύχωσι πράττουσιν. μιμοῦνται γὰρ τὸν μεγαλόψυχον οὐχ ὅμοιοι ὄντες, τοῦτο δὲ δρῶσιν ἐν οἷς δύνανται· τὰ μὲν οὖν κατ' ἀρετὴν οὐ πράττουσι, καταφρονοῦσι δὲ τῶν ἄλλων. ὁ μὲν γὰρ μεγαλόψυχος δικαίως καταφρονεῖ δοξάζει γὰρ ἀληθῶς, οἱ δὲ πολλοὶ τυχόντως. Men who possess goods of this kind without virtue are not justified in thinking themselves worthy of great things, nor are they rightly called magnanimous, for this supposes perfect virtue. But those having such things become evil by disdaining and harming others, since it is not easy to bear the goods of fortune with moderation. They are not able to endure good b fortune gracefully, but thinking themselves more excellent, they look down on others, and do as they please. Although not similar to the magnanimous man, they imitate him in the way they can, not by acting according to virtue, but in disdaining others. The magnanimous person justly disdains and properly glorifies others but many do not always act in this manner.
Maxime quidem igitur circa honores et cetera. Postquam philosophus inquisivit materiam magnanimitatis et oppositorum vitiorum, hic determinat de actibus et proprietatibus eorum. Et primo determinat de magnanimitate. Secundo de oppositis vitiis, ibi, deficiens autem pusillanimus et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo ostendit qualiter magnanimus operetur circa propriam materiam. Secundo determinat proprietates magnanimi, ibi: non est autem microkindinos et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo ostendit quomodo se habeat circa honores, qui sunt materia propria magnanimitatis. Secundo quomodo se habeat circa alia, ibi, sed adhuc, et circa divitias et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo resumit quod supra dictum est de materia magnanimitatis. Et dicit, quod ex supra dictis patet, quod maxime et principaliter dicitur aliquis esse magnanimus eo quod bene se habet circa honores, et opposita, scilicet inhonorationes. Eadem virtus est circa opposita, sicut fortitudo circa timores et audacias. 750. After the Philosopher has investigate&-the matter of magnanimity and the opposite vices, he now [II] studies their acts and properties, first [A] as touching magnanimity; and then [Lect. 11; B] the opposite vices, at “But the man who fails etc.” (B. 1125 a 16). On the initial point he does two things. First [A’] he shows how the magnanimous person should work on matter proper to him. Next [Lect. 10; B’] he defines the traits of the magnanimous person, at “The magnanimous man does not run risks foolishly etc.” (B. 1124 b 6). He explains the first point by a twofold procedure. Initially [1] he shows how the magnanimous man should conduct himself toward honors, the matter of magnanimity; and then [2] toward other things, at “Moreover, he will etc.” He treats the first in two ways. First [1, a] he resumes the previous discussion (735-749) about the matter of magnanimity, reaffirming what was clear from the premises, that someone is called magnanimous especially and principally from the fact that he conducts himself well in regard to honors and the opposites, viz., dishonors. The same virtue is concerned with opposites; fortitude, for instance, deals with fear and rashness.
Secundo ibi: et in magnis et studiosis etc., ostendit qualiter se habeat circa huiusmodi materiam. Et primo ostendit qualiter se habeat circa magnos honores; dicens, quod si magnanimo exhibeantur magni et boni honores et pro bonis actibus, moderate de eis delectatur. Contingit enim quod aliquis immoderate de aliquibus adeptis delectetur, ex eo quod ex insperato sibi adveniunt, et admiratur ea quasi quaedam maxima supra seipsum existentia. Sed, cum magnanimus adipiscitur maximos honores, existimat quasi quaedam bona proprie sibi convenientia, et adhuc minora quam ei debeantur. Considerat enim quod nullus honor exterius ab hominibus exhibitus est condignum praemium virtutis. Quia bonum rationis ex quo laudatur virtus, excedit omnia exteriora bona. Nec tamen propter hoc indignatur, quod sibi minora exhibentur, quam debeantur. Sed recipit aequanimiter, considerans, quod homines non habent aliqua maiora quae ei retribuant. 751. Then [1, b], at “He takes moderate delight,” he shows how the magnanimous man deals with matter of this kind. First [1, b, i] he shows the nature and mode of this man’s reaction to great honors, saying that great and desirable honors bestowed on the magnanimous for virtuous activity are a source of moderate delight to them. A man might take inordinate pleasure in goods acquired because they come to him unexpectedly, and value them far above their worth. But when the magnanimous person acquires things, he looks upon them as goods peculiarly suitable to him and, besides, less than his due. He judges that no honor outwardly shown to men is a sufficient reward of virtue. The reason is that the good of reason, for which virtue is praised, exceeds all external goods. Nevertheless, he is not displeased because lesser honors are bestowed on him than he deserves. But he accepts them with equanimity considering that men have nothing better to give him.
Secundo ibi: eum autem qui a contingentibus etc., ostendit quomodo se habeat circa parvos honores. Et dicit quod, si exhibeantur ei honores a contingentibus, id est si honoretur pro quibuscumque aliis rebus praeter virtutem, puta si honoretur propter divitias, vel propter aliquid huiusmodi, vel si honoretur in aliquibus parvis honoribus, tales honores contemnet, quia reputat se non esse talibus honoribus dignum. Non enim sufficit virtuoso, ut honoretur tamquam dives. 752. [1, b, ii], at “Honors given him,” he sets forth the way in which the magnanimous person should regard trifling honors. If honors are given him by transitory things and for any other reason than virtue (for example, if he is extolled for riches or the like, or by some insignificant honors), he will despise such honors because he considers himself undeserving of this type of thing. It is not enough for the virtuous to be honored like the rich.
Tertio ibi: similiter autem etc., ostendit quomodo se habeat circa inhonorationes. Et dicit quod etiam in hoc se habet moderate; sicut enim non extollitur magnis honoribus, ita animus eius non deiicitur per contumelias, quia considerat iniuste eas sibi inferri. Sic igitur manifestum est, quod magnanimus maxime laudatur circa honores. 753. Last [1, b, iii], at “He likewise counts,” he explains in what manner the magnanimous man should deal with dishonor, saying that here also he shows moderation. As his mind is not exalted by great honors, so it is not cast down by insults which he considers imputed to him unjustly. Hence it is obvious that the magnanimous person is especially praised in regard to honors.
Deinde cum dicit: sed adhuc et circa divitias etc., ostendit quomodo se habeat magnanimitas circa quasdam secundarias materias, puta circa divitias et circa alia huiusmodi. Et circa hoc duo facit. Primo ostendit quomodo magnanimus circa talia operetur. Secundo ostendit quomodo talia conferant ad magnanimitatem, ibi, videntur autem et bonae fortunae et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod quamvis magnanimus principaliter sit circa honores, est tamen adhuc secundario circa divitias et potentatum et omnia quae pertinent ad bonam fortunam, in quantum scilicet propter huiusmodi aliquis honoratur, et tam circa ista quam circa infortunia magnanimus moderate se habebit qualitercumque sibi accidat; ita scilicet quod neque si sit bene fortunatus superflue gaudebit, neque etiam, si infortunia patiatur, superflue tristabitur. 754. Then [2], at “Moreover, he will observe,” he shows in what way the magnanimous person should deal with secondary matters, for example, riches and so forth. On this point he does two things. First [2, a] he explains how the magnanimous man should act in regard to such objects; and next [2, b] how the objects benefit magnanimity, at “The goods of fortune etc.” He says first that, although the magnanimous person is concerned with honors principally, nevertheless secondarily he has to do with riches, power, and everything belonging to good fortune, inasmuch as someone is honored for these reasons. Likewise he will show moderation about such things and about misfortune, whatever may be the turn of events, so that he will not rejoice exceedingly in prosperity nor grieve unduly in adversity.
Quod probat per hoc quod supra dictum est quod etiam moderate se habet circa honorem, qui tamen est maximum aliquid inter omnia exteriora bona. Quod patet ex hoc, quod tam potentatus quam divitiae desiderantur propter honorem, prout scilicet homines habentes talia, volunt honorari per ipsa. Si ergo magnanimus ipsum honorem parvum aestimat, ut non superflue pro ipso gaudeat, multo magis et alia reputabit parva, ita quod non superflue gaudebit pro eis. Et inde est quod a quibusdam iudicantur esse despectores, pro eo, quod exteriora bona contemnunt, et sola interiora bona virtutis appretiantur. 755. He proves the point by the argument given before (741-742) that the magnanimous man conducts himself with moderation in regard to honors that are the greatest of all external goods. This is clear from the fact that both power and riches are desired for the sake of honor according as men who have such things want to be honored for them. If then the magnanimous person thinks honor itself of little account so that he does not rejoice in it exceedingly, for a greater reason he will judge the other things of small moment, so that he will not rejoice in them immoderately. As a consequence, some judge the magnanimous to be disdainful because they despise external goods and value only the internal goods of virtue.
Deinde cum dicit: videntur autem et bonae fortunae etc., ostendit quomodo exteriora bona fortunae conferant ad magnanimitatem. Et primo ostendit, quod conferunt ad magnanimitatem augentes eam quando sunt cum virtute; secundo ostendit, quod sine virtute non possunt magnanimum facere, ibi, qui autem sine virtute et cetera. Dicit ergo primo quod omnia exteriora bona fortunae videntur aliquid conferre ad magnanimitatem, in quantum scilicet propter ea aliqui reputantur digni honore, puta nobiles et potentes, vel divites. Omnia enim ista consistunt in quadam superexcellentia, prout scilicet nobiles excedunt ignobiles, et sic de aliis. Omne autem illud quod superexcedit in bono est magis honorabile. Honor enim est quaedam reverentia, quae debetur superexcellenti bono. Et quia magnanimus est dignus honore, inde est quod talia faciunt homines magis magnanimes, prout scilicet honorantur a quibusdam vulgaribus hominibus, qui sola haec bona cognoscunt. Sed secundum rei veritatem solus bonus, idest virtuosus, est honorandus. Quia scilicet honor est proprium praemium virtutis. Si autem aliquis habeat ambo simul, scilicet virtutem, et bona fortunae, fiet magis dignus honore, inquantum scilicet utroque modo est honorabilis, et secundum veritatem et secundum opinionem. Ipsa etiam bona fortunae organice deserviunt ad operationes virtutum. 756. Next [2, b], at “The goods of fortune,” he shows how external goods of fortune do confer something on magnanimity. He explains first [2, b, i] that they increase it when accompanying virtue; and second [2, b, ii] that without virtue they cannot make a man magnanimous, at “Men who possess.” He says that all external goods of fortune seem to add something to magnanimity inasmuch as, for these very things, some are judged worthy of honor, viz., the noble, the powerful, and the rich. All such goods consist of a certain great excellence, just as the noble surpass the baseborn in excellence, and so on. Everything that is surpassing in goodness is honorable in a high degree, for honor is a kind of reverence due to a very excellent good. Since the magnanimous person is worthy of honor, such goods consequently make men more magnanimous accordingly as they are honored by some people who recognize only these goods. But really only the good or virtuous man should be honored because honor is the proper reward for virtue. If someone should possess both at the same time, viz., virtue and the goods of fortune, he will become worthier of honor inasmuch as each matter is honorable. According to truth and opinion, even the goods of fortune are a help to virtuous operations after the manner of instruments.
Deinde cum dicit: qui autem sine virtute etc., ostendit quod bona fortunae sine virtute non possunt facere magnanimum. Et dicit quod illi qui habent talia bona sine virtute, non possunt iuste reputare se dignos magnis honoribus, unde nec recte magnanimi dicuntur, quia quod aliquis sit dignus magnis honoribus et quod sit magnanimus non potest contingere sine virtute perfecta, ut supra dictum est. Sed tales qui virtute carent propter excellentiam exteriorum rerum despiciunt alios, et iniuriantur eis, et in similia mala incidunt, eo quod non est facile quod aliquis moderate ferat bona fortunae sine virtute. Hoc enim est magnum opus virtutis, ut aliquis moderate se habeat in bonis fortunae. Unde cum illi, qui carent virtute, non possunt bene ferre fortunas, dum existimant quod simpliciter excellant alios quos in divitiis excellunt, contemnunt eos. Et quia non reputant aliquam excellentiam esse secundum operationem virtutis, ideo ipsi non curant operari aliquid boni, sed operantur quicquid venit eis ad cor. 757. Then [2, b, ii], at “Men who possess’ “ he establishes that goods of fortune without virtue cannot make a man magnanimous. He says that those who have goods of this kind without virtue cannot rightly esteem themselves deserving of great honors. Hence they are not correctly called magnanimous because it cannot happen that a man deserves great things and is magnanimous without perfect virtue, as was pointed out before (749). But because of the excellence of external goods men who lack virtue look down on others, do them injury, and fall into similar evils, since without virtue it is not easy for someone reasonably to bear the goods of fortune. To conduct oneself with moderation among the goods of fortune is a great work of virtue. Those who lack virtue cannot bear good fortune gracefully. Consequently, thinking themselves better absolutely, they despise those whom they exceed in riches. Since they do not consider that any excellence is acquired by virtue, they take no pains to do anything good but do whatever comes to mind.
Volunt enim imitari magnanimum, cum tamen non sint ei similes. Imitantur autem eum in quibus possunt; non quidem in hoc quod operentur secundum virtutem, quod maxime facit magnanimus; sed in hoc quod contemnunt alios, non tamen eodem modo sicut magnanimus. Nam magnanimus iuste contemnit scilicet malos, et vere glorificat scilicet bonos, sed multi, scilicet qui carent virtute, contemnunt et glorificant indifferenter qualitercumque contingit, contemnendo scilicet interdum bonos, et glorificando malos. 758. They want to imitate the magnanimous person when in fact they are not like him. They imitate him in the way they can, not I grant in operating according to virtue—a thing the magnanimous man does especially—but in despising others although, not in the same way as he does. The magnanimous person justly despises the wicked, and properly glorifies the virtuous. But many, who are without virtue, manifest disdain and honor indiscriminately, i.e., sometimes despise the virtuous and honor the wicked.

Properties of Magnanimity
Chapter 3
B’  He considers the traits of the magnanimous person.
            a.   The traits ... understood in comparison with externally connected things.
                   i.    The traits ... by a comparison with external dangers,
                         x.   FIRST. — 759-760
οὐκ ἔστι δὲ μικροκίνδυνος οὐδὲ φιλοκίνδυνος διὰ τὸ ὀλίγα τιμᾶν, μεγαλοκίνδυνος δέ, καὶ ὅταν κινδυνεύῃ, The magnanimous man does not run risks foolishly, nor is he a lover of danger since he places a high value on few things. But he does undergo danger for things of great worth.
                         y.   SECOND. — 761
ἀφειδὴς τοῦ βίου ὡς οὐκ ἄξιον ὂν πάντως ζῆν. When in danger, he exposes his life as if it were altogether unbecoming to continue living.
                   ii.   (The traits) by comparison with external benefits.
                         v.   FIRST. — 762
καὶ οἷος εὖ ποιεῖν, εὐεργετούμενος δ' αἰσχύνεται· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ὑπερέχοντος, τὸ δ' ὑπερεχομένου. He is good at helping others—which is a mark of the man of excellence, but he shies away from taking favors—a thing characteristic of a man of lesser gifts.
                         w.  SECOND. — 763
καὶ ἀντευεργετικὸς πλειόνων· οὕτω γάρ οἱ προσοφλήσει ὁ ὑπάρξας καὶ ἔσται εὖ πεπονθώς. He makes lavish, recompense, so that the man who gave in the beginning will receive abundantly and become a debtor.
                         x.   THIRD. — 764
δοκοῦσι δὲ καὶ μνημονεύειν οὗ ἂν ποιήσωσιν εὖ, ὧν δ' ἂν πάθωσιν οὔ ἐλάττων γὰρ ὁ παθὼν εὖ τοῦ ποιήσαντος, βούλεται δ' ὑπερέχειν, The magnanimous person likes to remember those he benefits but not those by whom he is or was treated generously. That man is less noble who gratefully receives benefits than he who bestows them. Hence it is in the bestowal that the magnanimous man wants to be eminent.
                         y.   FOURTH. — 765
καὶ τὰ μὲν ἡδέως ἀκούειν, τὰ δ' ἀηδῶς· διὸ καὶ τὴν Θέτιν οὐ λέγειν τὰς εὐεργεσίας τῷ Διί, οὐδ' οἱ Λάκωνες πρὸς τοὺς Ἀθηναίους, ἀλλ' ἃ πεπόνθεσαν εὖ. Likewise he gladly hears of the benefits he has bestowed but not of those he has received, For this reason Thetis did not recount to Jove [Iliad i. 503], nor the Spartans to the Athenians the favors they had done but the benefits received.
                         z.   FIFTH. — 766
μεγαλοψύχου δὲ καὶ τὸ μηδενὸς δεῖσθαι ἢ μόλις, ὑπηρετεῖν δὲ προθύμως, The magnanimous person likes to show himself in need of nothing or hardly anything, but to minister to the needs of others promptly.
                   iii. (The trait) by a comparison with honors.
                         x.   THE TRAIT. — 767
καὶ πρὸς μὲν τοὺς ἐν ἀξιώματι καὶ εὐτυχίαις μέγαν εἶναι, πρὸς δὲ τοὺς μέσους μέτριον· He acts with great dignity toward those in high places and the wealthy but with moderation toward the middle class.
                         y.   TWO REASONS FOR WHAT HE SAID. — 768-769
τῶν μὲν γὰρ ὑπερέχειν χαλεπὸν καὶ σεμνόν, τῶν δὲ ῥᾴδιον, καὶ ἐπ' ἐκείνοις μὲν σεμνύνεσθαι οὐκ ἀγεννές, ἐν δὲ τοῖς ταπεινοῖς φορτικόν, To attain excellence among the great is difficult and worthy of reverence, but among the mediocre it is easy. To seek respect from the great is not without nobility, but from the lowly is to make oneself irksome,
                         z.   AN ILLUSTRATION. — 770
ὥσπερ εἰς τοὺς ἀσθενεῖς ἰσχυρίζεσθαι· καὶ εἰς τὰ ἔντιμα μὴ ἰέναι, ἢ οὗ πρωτεύουσιν ἄλλοι· for instance, to display one’s power against the weak, and to avoid tasks that are generally honorable or at which others excel.
            b.  (The traits) in comparison with human acts.
                   i.    Pertaining to himself. — 771
καὶ ἀργὸν εἶναι καὶ μελλητὴν ἀλλ' ἢ ὅπου τιμὴ μεγάλη ἢ ἔργον, καὶ ὀλίγων μὲν πρακτικόν, μεγάλων δὲ καὶ ὀνομαστῶν. Leisure and slowness are marks of the magnanimous man, but where there is either great honor or great work he performs at least some great and noteworthy operations.
                   ii.   (Pertaining) then to others.
                         x.   IN REGARD TO TRUTH.
                               aa. First. — 772
ἀναγκαῖον δὲ καὶ φανερομισῆ εἶναι καὶ φανερόφιλον τὸ γὰρ λανθάνειν φοβουμένου, Of necessity he is an evident friend or enemy, for to be so in secret smacks of timidity.
                               bb.        Second. — 773
καὶ ἀμελεῖν τῆς ἀληθείας μᾶλλον ἢ τῆς δόξης, He cares more for the truth than the opinion of men.
                               cc. Third. — 774
καὶ λέγειν καὶ πράττειν φανερῶς παρρησιαστὴς γὰρ διὰ τὸ καταφρονητικὸς εἶναι, He speaks and works in the open, freely divulging things in public, since he pays little attention to others.
                               dd.        Fourth. — 775
καὶ ἀληθευτικός, πλὴν ὅσα μὴ δι' εἰρωνείαν [εἰρωνεία δὲ] πρὸς τοὺς πολλούς, He is truthful in his speech, excepting what he says in irony, which he uses with the common people.
                         y.   IN REGARD TO PLEASANTNESS. — 776
καὶ πρὸς ἄλλον μὴ δύνασθαι ζῆν ἀλλ' ἢ φίλον· δουλικὸν γάρ· διὸ καὶ πάντες οἱ κόλακες θητικοὶ καὶ οἱ ταπεινοὶ κόλακες. He cannot conform his life to that of another, except perhaps a friend, since this is servile. Because of servility all flatterers are obsequious and lowly people flatterers.
            a.   Some that exist in the soul.
                   i.    First. — 777
οὐδὲ θαυμαστικός· οὐδὲν γὰρ μέγα αὐτῷ ἐστίν. Nor is he given to admiration, for nothing seems great to him.
                   ii.   Next. — 778
οὐδὲ μνησίκακος· οὐ γὰρ μεγαλοψύχου τὸ ἀπομνημονεύειν, ἄλλως τε καὶ κακά, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον παρορᾶν. Nor is he mindful of injuries, since it is not becoming that a magnanimous person remembers evils at all, but rather despises them.
            b.  Others which exist in speech.
                   i.    First. — 779
οὐδ' ἀνθρωπολόγος· οὔτε γὰρ περὶ αὑτοῦ ἐρεῖ οὔτε περὶ ἑτέρου· οὔτε γὰρ ἵνα ἐπαινῆται μέλει αὐτῷ οὔθ' ὅπως οἱ ἄλλοι ψέγωνται· οὐδ' αὖ ἐπαινετικός ἐστιν· διόπερ οὐδὲ κακολόγος, οὐδὲ τῶν ἐχθρῶν, εἰ μὴ δι' ὕβριν. Neither is he a gossip, for he does not speak about himself or others. He is not anxious that he be praised, and he neither blames nor praises others. Therefore, he does not speak evil of his enemies except to ward off injuries.
                   ii.   Third (second). — 780
καὶ περὶ ἀναγκαίων ἢ μικρῶν ἥκιστα ὀλοφυρτικὸς καὶ δεητικός· σπουδάζοντος γὰρ οὕτως ἔχειν περὶ ταῦτα. In necessary or trivial matters he does not lament or seek help, for this is characteristic of one who cares excessively about these things.
            c.   Traits that exist in communication with others.
                   i.    In regard to external possessions. — 781
καὶ οἷος κεκτῆσθαι μᾶλλον τὰ καλὰ καὶ ἄκαρπα τῶν καρπίμων καὶ ὠφελίμων· αὐτάρκους γὰρ μᾶλλον. He is willing to possess unfruitful rather than fruitful and useful goods, for he is somewhat self-sufficient.
                   ii.   In regard to bodily movements. — 782-783
καὶ κίνησις δὲ βραδεῖα τοῦ μεγαλοψύχου δοκεῖ εἶναι, καὶ φωνὴ βαρεῖα, καὶ λέξις στάσιμος· οὐ γὰρ σπευστικὸς ὁ περὶ ὀλίγα σπουδάζων, οὐδὲ σύντονος ὁ μηδὲν μέγα οἰόμενος· ἡ δ' ὀξυφωνία καὶ ἡ ταχυτὴς διὰ τούτων. But the movements of the magnanimous man seem deliberate, his voice solemn and his speech measured. He is not hasty since he is concerned about few things. As he considers nothing too important, he is not given to contention from which sharpness of voice and hastiness of speech arise.
τοιοῦτος μὲν οὖν ὁ μεγαλόψυχος· Such then is the magnanimous person.
Non est autem microkindinos et cetera. Postquam philosophus ostendit qualiter magnanimus operetur circa propriam materiam, hic determinat proprietates magnanimi. Et circa hoc duo facit. Primo ponit proprietates magnanimi quae accipiuntur per comparationem ad materias virtutum. Secundo ponit proprietates, quae accipiuntur secundum dispositionem ipsius magnanimi, ibi, neque admirativus et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo proponit proprietates magnanimi, quae accipiuntur per comparationem ad res exteriores. Secundo per comparationem ad humanos actus, ibi, et otiosum esse et tardum et cetera. Circa primum tria facit. Primo ponit proprietates magnanimi per comparationem ad exteriora pericula, quae sunt materia fortitudinis. Secundo per comparationem ad exteriora beneficia, quae proprie pertinent ad liberalitatem, ibi: et potens benefacere etc.; tertio per comparationem ad honores, qui proprie pertinent ad magnanimitatem, ibi, et ad eos quidem qui in dignitate et cetera. Praetermittit autem de materia temperantiae, quia non habet de se aliquam magnitudinem, sed est circa ea quae sunt nobis et brutis communia, ut in tertio habitum est. Magnanimitatis autem est operari magnum in omnibus virtutibus, ut supra habitum est. 759. After the Philosopher has explained how the magnanimous man should work on proper matter, he here [B’] considers the traits of the magnanimous person. First [1] he proposes the traits that are taken by comparison with matters of the virtues; and then[2] those according to the inclination of the magnanimous man himself, at “Nor is he given to admiration etc.” On the initial point he proceeds in a twofold manner. First [1, a] he sets forth the traits of the magnanimous person, which are understood in comparison with externally connected things; and next [1, b] in comparison with human acts, at “Leisure and slowness etc.” In regard to the first he makes a triple enumeration. He enumerates the traits of the magnanimous person first [1, a, i] by a comparison with external dangers that are the matter of fortitude; then [1, a, ii] by a comparison with external benefits that properly pertain to liberality, at “He is good at helping others etc.”; and last [1, a, iii] by a comparison with honors that properly pertain to magnanimity, at “He acts with great dignity etc.” He passes over the matter of temperance, which does not have any greatness of itself but deals with material common to man and brute, as was stated in the third book (612). Nevertheless magnanimity tends to do what is great in all the virtues-this was pointed out before (746, 749).
Circa primum ponit duas proprietates; quarum prima est, quod magnanimus non est microcindinos, idest pro parvis periclitans, neque est philocindinos, idest amator periculorum, quasi prompte et de facili se ad pericula exponens. Et hoc ideo, quia nullus exponit se periculo, nisi propter aliquid quod multum appretiatur. Ad magnanimum autem pertinet pauca in tantum appretiari quod pro eis se velit periculis exponere. Unde non de facili, neque pro parvis rebus pericula subit. Est autem magnanimus megalokindinus, idest pro magnis periclitans, (quia) exponit se quibuscumque periculis pro magnis rebus, puta pro salute communi, pro iustitia, pro cultu divino et aliis huiusmodi. 760. Touching on the first point he sets forth two traits, the first [1, a, 1, x] of which is that the magnanimous man is not microkindinos, does not expose himself to dangers for trifles, nor is he philokindinos, i.e., a lover of danger, as it were exposing himself to dangers hastily and lightly. This is so because no one lays himself open to danger except for something having considerable value. But it is characteristic of the magnanimous man that he values few things to such a degree that he is willing to expose himself to dangers for them. Hence he does not undergo danger readily nor for insignificant things. However, the magnanimous man is megalokindinos, i.e., braves great dangers for great things because fie puts himself in all kinds of danger for great things, for instance, the common welfare, justice, divine worship, and so forth.
Secundam proprietatem ponit ibi: et cum periclitetur et cetera. Et dicit, quod magnanimus quando periculis se exponit, hoc facit vehementer, ita ut non parcat vitae suae quasi non sit dignum quod magis velit vivere, quam magna bona per mortem consequi. 761. He assigns the second trait [1, a, i, y] at “When in danger.” He affirms that the magnanimous person in exposing himself to danger acts ardently, so that he does not spare his own life, as if it were unfitting for him to prefer to live rather than gain great good by his death.
Deinde cum dicit: et potens benefacere etc., ponit quinque proprietates magnanimi, quae accipiuntur per comparationem ad beneficia, quae sunt propria liberalitati. Quarum prima est, quod magnanimus est potens benefacere, idest promptus ad beneficia largienda, sed verecundatur ab aliis beneficia accipere. Nam beneficia dare est excellentis, beneficia autem recipere est eius qui exceditur. Magnanimus autem semper intendit ad hoc, quod superexcedat in bono. 762. Next [1, a, ii], at “He is good,” he enumerates five traits of the magnanimous man, which are understood by comparison with benefits proper to liberality. The first [1, a, ii, v] is that the magnanimous person is proficient at doing good for others, i.e., prompt to bestow benefits, but is ashamed to accept favors from others. To receive favors pertains to one who has lesser gifts, while the magnanimous man tries to surpass others in virtue.
Secundam proprietatem ponit ibi: et retributivus plurium et cetera. Et dicit quod si magnanimus beneficia accipiat, semper studet ut retribuat maiora. Sic enim ille, qui incepit beneficia conferre, erit magis bene passus, id est beneficia recipiens, in quantum plura accepit quam dedit. 763. At “He makes lavish recompense,” he indicates the second trait [1, a, ii, w], saying that if the magnanimous person does accept benefits he is anxious to return greater ones. In this way the man who bestowed benefits in the beginning will rather receive them, i.e., becomes the recipient of benefits inasmuch as he receives more than he gave.
Tertiam proprietatem ponit ibi videntur autem et in memoria et cetera. Et haec quidem proprietas non est ex electione magnanimi, et consequitur ex dispositione ipsius. Ita enim est dispositus magnanimus, ut delectetur beneficia dare, invitus autem beneficia recipiat. Ea vero, quae nos delectant, frequenter cogitamus, et per consequens in memoria habemus. Ea vero quae non sunt nobis delectabilia raro cogitamus, et per consequens non multum in memoria tenemus. Et inde est, quod magnanimi videntur in memoria habere eos quibus dant beneficia, non autem eos a quibus recipiunt. Hoc enim est contrarium voluntati eius secundum quam vult superexcellere in bono, ille autem qui bene patitur, recipiendo scilicet beneficia, est minor eo qui beneficia confert. Secundum electionem autem magnanimus non obliviscitur beneficiorum. Sed studet ad hoc, quod maiora recompenset, sicut dictum est. 764. At “The magnanimous person likes to remember,” he gives the third trait [1, a, ii, x], which does not follow the choice but the disposition of the magnanimous man-he is so disposed that he cheerfully confers but unwillingly receives benefits. We think often about the things that delight us and consequently remember them. However, we rarely think of things which displease us and consequently hardly ever recall them. Accordingly it seems characteristic of the magnanimous person to remember those for whom he does favors but not those who do favors for him, since this is contrary to his desire of wanting to excel in goodness. That man who is properly receptive, i.e., accepts favors, is less noble than he who grants favors. The magnanimous man does not choose to be unmindful of favors received but is anxious to bestow greater favors, as was just said (763).
Quartam proprietatem ponit ibi: et haec quidem et cetera. Et dicit, quod magnanimus delectabiliter audit beneficia quae ipse contulit. Non autem delectabiliter audit beneficia quae recepit. Delectari siquidem potest in amore eius cui beneficia contulit. Sed de hoc quod ipse beneficia recepit, non delectatur. Et circa hoc ponit duo exempla. Quorum primum sumitur ex dictis Homeri, qui introducit Thetim, quam dicebant esse deam aquarum, accedentem ad Iovem, quem dicebant esse regem omnium deorum. Et quod Thetis non dixit Iovi beneficia quae ipsa Iovi contulerat, quasi hoc non esset ei acceptum, sed potius beneficia quae ipsa acceperat a Iove, quod Iupiter libenter audiebat. Aliud autem exemplum sumit ex historia Graecorum; in qua narratur quod quidam cives, scilicet Lacones Atheniensium auxilium implorantes non dixerunt eis beneficia quae fecerant, sed quae receperant. 765. At “Likewise,” he places the fourth trait [1, a, ii, y ], saying that the magnanimous person cheerfully listens to the benefits he has bestowed but does not enjoy hearing of the benefits he has accepted. He can take delight in the love of him on whom he has conferred benefits but does not find pleasure in the fact that he himself has accepted benefits. He gives two examples of this. The first is taken from the writings of Homer who represents Thetis (called the goddess of water) approaching Jove (called the king of all the gods). She does not recount the benefits she herself has conferred on Jove, as if this would not be acceptable to him, but rather the benefits she has received from Jove. To this Jupiter listened more willingly. The other example is taken from Greek history in which it is narrated that certain Spartans, when seeking the help of the Athenians, did not recite the favors they had done for the Athenians but the favors received from them.
Quintam proprietatem ponit ibi: magnanimi autem et cetera. Et dicit, quod ad magnanimum pertinet, quod exhibeat se tamquam nullo indigentem, vel non de facili, inquantum scilicet non petit aliquid neque accipit, sed quod sit promptus ad hoc quod aliis beneficium ministret. 766. He assigns the fifth trait [1, a, ii, z], at “The magnanimous person likes to show,” saying that it pertains to the magnanimous man not to show himself in need of anything at all or at least not readily, inasmuch as he does not ask for or take anything, but to be prompt to minister to the needs of others.
Deinde cum dicit et ad eos quidem qui in dignitate etc., ponit proprietatem magnanimi per comparationem ad honores. Et circa hoc tria facit. Primo ponit proprietatem. Et dicit, quod ad magnanimum pertinet, ut se magnum et honorabilem exhibeat ad illos qui sunt in dignitate et excellentia bonorum fortunae. Sed ad mediocres moderationem quamdam exhibet non utendo magnitudine sua ad eos. 767. Then [1, a, iii], at “He acts with great dignity,” he indicates a trait of the magnanimous person by a comparison with honors. He treats the first point in a threefold manner. First [1, a, iii, x] he names the trait, saying that it belongs to the magnanimous man to show himself noble and honorable to men of dignity and wealth, but to display a certain moderation with the middle class, not using a grand manner toward them.
Secundo ibi: hos quidem enim etc., inducit duas rationes eius quod dixerat. Quarum prima est quia omnis virtus nititur ad id quod est difficile et honorabile. Quod autem aliquis excellat in bono magnos viros, est difficile et venerabile. Sed quod aliquis excellat mediocres viros, facile est. 768. Second [1, a, iii, y ], at “To attain excellence,” he offers two reasons for what he said. The first is that every virtue strives for what is difficult and honorable. That someone should excel great men in virtue is difficult and worthy of honor, but to excel mediocre men is easy.
Secunda ratio est quia, quod aliquis inter magnos viros exhibeat se venerandum, pertinet ad quamdam animi virilitatem. Sed quod aliquis velit magnam reverentiam sibi exhiberi ab infimis personis, est eorum qui sunt aliis onerosi. 769. The second reason is that it is characteristic of a manly soul to show himself worthy of respect among the great. But to wish respect shown him by men of lowly rank is the attitude of a man who is a nuisance to others.
Tertio ibi, quemadmodum ad imbecilles etc., ponit exemplum. Et dicit, quod simili modo hoc quod dictum est est vitiosum, sicut et quod aliquis exhibeat se fortem contra imbecilles, et quod non aggrediatur difficilia quae sunt honorabilia et in quibus alii praecellunt. 770. Finally [1, a, iii, z], at “for instance,” he gives an illustration, stating that such a condition indicates lack of virtue, namely, that a man demonstrates his strength against the weak, and does not undertake difficult and honorable ventures in which others excel.
Deinde cum dicit: et otiosum esse etc., ponit proprietates magnanimi secundum actus humanos. Et primo quantum ad seipsum. Secundo per respectum ad alios, ibi: necessarium autem manifestum et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod ad magnanimum pertinet, quod sit otiosus, ex eo scilicet quod non multis negotiis se ingerit, et quod sit tardus, idest non de facili se ingerat negotiis. Sed solum illis actibus insistat qui pertinent ad aliquem magnum honorem, vel ad aliquod magnum opus faciendum. Et sic magnanimus est operativus paucorum. Sed operatur magna, et quae sunt digna nomine magno. 771. Next [1, b], at “Leisure and slowness” he distinguishes the traits of the magnanimous person by means of human acts pertaining first [1, b, i] to himself; and then [1, b, ii ] to others, at “Of necessity etc.” Aristotle says first that the magnanimous man is disposed to be leisurely, i.e., does not engage in many undertakings, and is disinclined, i.e., not readily occupied with business. He devotes himself only to those activities that are connected with some great honor or the accomplishment of some great work. Therefore, the magnanimous person performs at least some great operations that are worthy of the name.
Deinde cum dicit necessarium autem etc., ponit proprietates magnanimi circa actus humanos, qui sunt per comparationem ad alium. Et primo quantum ad veritatem. Secundo quantum ad delectationem. Haec enim praecipue requiruntur in convictu ad alios, ut infra dicetur; secundum ibi: et ad alium non posse vivere et cetera. Circa primum ponit quatuor proprietates. Quarum prima respicit interiorem affectum. Et dicit quod necessarium est, quod magnanimus manifestus sit amicus, et manifestus inimicus. Quia quod aliquis latenter amet vel odiat, provenit ex aliquo timore. Timor autem magnanimitati repugnat. 772. Then [1, b, ii], at “Of necessity,” he indicates the traits of the magnanimous person concerned with human acts that are related to another, first [1, b, ii, x] in regard to truth; and next [i, b, ii, y] in regard to pleasantness, at “He cannot conform.” These things are required especially for social intercourse with others, as will be explained later (816-849). To the first he ascribes four traits, the first [aa] of which regards internal inclination. The magnanimous man, he says, cannot make a secret of his friends and enemies. The reason is that a secret love or hatred of another arises from some fear, and fear is repugnant to a magnanimous person.
Secundam proprietatem ponit ibi: et curare et cetera. Et dicit quod ad magnanimum pertinet, quod magis curet de veritate, quam de opinione hominum. Non enim propter humanam opinionem recedit ab eo quod facere debet secundum virtutem. 773. At “He cares more” [bb] he notes the second trait, saying that it is characteristic of the magnanimous man to be more solicitous about the truth than the opinion of man. He does not depart from what he ought to do according to virtue because of what men think.
Tertiam proprietatem ponit ibi: et dicere et operari et cetera. Et dicit, quod ad magnanimum pertinet, quod manifeste loquatur et operetur, eo quod ipse est contemptivus aliorum. Et inde est, quod ipse libere propalat sua dicta et facta. Quod enim aliquis occultet ea quae facit vel dicit, provenit ex hoc quod timet alios. Nullus autem timet eos quos contemnit. Unde ista duo convertuntur ad invicem, ut scilicet aliquis sit libere propalativus et contemptivus. Non autem dicitur magnanimus esse contemptivus eo quod despiciat alios quasi privans eos debita reverentia; sed quia non appretiatur eos ultra quam debeat. 774. At “He speaks” [cc] he gives the third trait, saying that it is a mark of the magnanimous person to speak and work openly because he pays little attention to others. Consequently, he publicly divulges his words and deeds. That a man hides what he does and says arises from the fear of others. But no one fears those he contemns. Therefore, these two things are interchangeable, viz., that a man freely divulge things and that he cares little for others. However, we do not say that the magnanimous man cares little for others in the sense that he despises them—as it were depriving them of proper respect—but because he does not value them above their worth.
Quartam proprietatem ponit ibi: et veridicus et cetera. Et dicit, quod magnanimus in verbis suis non falsum, sed verum dicit; nisi forte aliqua ironice loquatur ex ludo. Utitur autem ironia in societate multorum. 775. At “He is truthful” [dd] he assigns the fourth trait, saying that the magnanimous man does not speak falsehood but the truth, except perhaps that he playfully utters certain things in irony. However, he does use irony in the company of the common people.
Deinde cum dicit et ad alium non posse vivere etc., ponit proprietatem magnanimi circa delectationem quae est in convictu. Et dicit, quod ad magnanimum pertinet ut non promptus sit ad convivendum cum aliis, nisi cum amicis; quod enim aliquis ingerat se familiaritatibus omnium, est servilis animi. Unde et omnes blanditores, qui volunt omnibus indifferenter placere, sunt obsequiosi, idest ad serviendum parati. Et e converso omnes humiles, qui scilicet sunt abiecti animi, sunt blanditores. 776. Next [1, b, ii, y], at “He cannot conform,” he indicates the trait concerned with pleasure that arises from companionship, saying that the magnanimous person does not easily associate with others; he finds company only with his friends. The servile soul has a tendency to occupy himself with the intimate affairs of everyone. Consequently all flatterers, who want to please everybody without distinction are obsequious, i.e., prepared to be subservient. People of low station who lack greatness of soul are flatterers.
Deinde cum dicit: neque admirativus etc., ponit proprietates magnanimi, quae accipiuntur secundum dispositionem ipsius. Et primo ponit quasdam, quae consistunt in corde. Secundo quasdam, quae consistunt in locutione, ibi, neque humaniloquus et cetera. Tertio ponit illas, quae consistunt in exteriori conversatione, ibi, et potens possedisse et cetera. Circa primum ponit duas proprietates. Quarum prima est, quod magnanimus non est promptus ad admirandum, quia admiratio est de rebus magnis. Sed magnanimo non est aliquid magnum eorum quae exterius occurrere possunt, quia tota intentio sua versatur circa interiora bona, quae sunt vere magna. 777. Then [2], at “Nor is he given,” he enumerates the traits of the magnanimous man which arise from his natural bent. Aristotle first [2, a] gives some that exist in the soul; then [2, b] others existing in speech, at “Neither is he a gossip etc.” Last [2, c], he sets forth those traits that exist in communication with others, at “He is willing etc.” In regard to the first he places two traits, the first [2, a, i] of which is that the magnanimous person is not quick to show admiration because this is prompted by great things. But there is nothing great for him among the things that can happen externally, because his whole life is busy with internal goods, which are truly great.
Secundam proprietatem ponit ibi: neque memor mali et cetera. Et dicit quod magnanimus non multum recordatur malorum, quae passus est. Et ad hoc inducit duas rationes. Quarum una est, quia non convenit magnanimo multa recordari, sicut neque admirari; eorum enim solemus multum recordari quae tamquam magna admiramur. Alia ratio est, quia ad magnanimum specialiter pertinet oblivisci malorum quae passus est, inquantum scilicet ea despicit, utpote a quibus minorari non potuit. Unde de Iulio Caesare Tullius dicit, quod nullius oblivisci solitus erat nisi iniuriarum. 778. Next [2, a, ii], at “Nor is he mindful,” he says that the magnanimous person is not too mindful of the evils he has suffered, giving two reasons for this. The first is that the magnanimous man refuses to remember many things, just as he refuses to wonder at them. Another reason is that the magnanimous person deliberately determines to forget injuries he has suffered inasmuch as he despises the things by which he could not be disparaged. Hence Cicero said of Julius Caesar that he was in the habit of forgetting nothing but injuries.
Deinde cum dicit: neque humaniloquus etc., ponit duas proprietates magnanimi circa locutionem eius. Quarum prima est, quod non multum loquitur de hominibus, quia particulares res hominum non multum appretiatur. Sed tota eius intentio est circa bona communia et divina. Unde nec de seipso multum loquitur, neque de aliis. Non enim est sibi curae, quod ipse laudetur, neque quod alii vituperentur. Unde neque ipse multum laudat alios, neque etiam male loquitur de aliis, nec etiam de inimicis, nisi propter iniuriam sibi ab eis illatam repellendam. 779. Then [2, b], at “Neither is he a gossip,” he gives two traits of the magnanimous man concerned with speech. First [2, b, i] he seldom speaks about men because he does not value highly their particular affairs. But his whole attention is taken up with the goods of the community and God. Consequently, he says little either about himself or others. He is not solicitous that lie be praised nor that others be blamed. Hence he does not have much praise for others nor does he speak evil of others, even his enemies, except to ward off an injury inflicted on him by them.
Secundam proprietatem ponit ibi: et de necessariis et cetera. Et dicit, quod de necessariis ad vitam humanam, vel quibuscumque aliis rebus neque etiam est planctivus, scilicet conquerendo vel murmurando si ei desint, neque deprecativus ut ei exhibeantur; haec enim pertinent ad illum qui studet circa necessaria vitae consequenda quasi circa aliqua magna, quod est contrarium magnanimitati. 780. At “In necessary or trivial” [2, b, ii] he assigns a third (second) trait, that the magnanimous person neither complains by lamenting and grumbling about his lack of the necessities of life and other things, nor asks that they be given to him. This is the characteristic of one who is anxious about the necessities of life, as if they were great things, and this view is contrary to magnanimity.
Deinde cum dicit: et potens possedisse etc., ponit proprietates magnanimi per comparationem ad exteriora. Et primo quantum ad exteriores possessiones. Et dicit quod magnanimus est promptus magis ad possidendum quaedam bona, id est honorabilia, et infructuosa, id est quae non sunt lucrosa, quam aliqua quae sunt lucrosa et utilia. Quia magis pertinet ad hominem sibi sufficientem, quod non indigeat aliunde lucrari. 781. Next [2, c], at “He is willing,” he indicates the traits that have a relation to external things, and first [2, c, i] in regard to external possessions. He says that the magnanimous man is more ready to own certain honorable and unfruitful goods which are profitless than goods which are profitable and useful. The reason is that a self-sufficient man has no need of profit from other quarters.
Secundo ibi: sed et motus lentus etc., ponit proprietatem magnanimi quantum ad motus corporales. Et dicit, quod motus magnanimi videtur esse lentus et vox eius videtur esse gravis et locutio eius videtur esse stabilis, id est tarda. Et horum rationem assignans dicit, quod non potest motus magnanimi esse festinus, cum ipse ad pauca operanda intendat. Similiter etiam magnanimus non est contentiosus, eo quod nihil exteriorum magnum existimat, nullus autem contendit nisi pro aliquo magno. Acuitas autem vocis, et velocitas locutionis accidit propter contentionem. Patet ergo quod ipsa affectio magnanimi requirit gravitatem vocis, et tarditatem locutionis et motus. Dicit autem philosophus in praedicamentis quod si aliquis naturaliter inclinatur ad aliquam passionem, puta ad verecundiam, oportet eum naturaliter habere talem colorem, qui competat verecundiae. Unde si aliquis habet naturalem aptitudinem ad magnanimitatem, consequens est etiam quod habeat naturalem dispositionem ad huiusmodi accidentia. 782. Then [2, c, ii], at “But the movements,” he gives the trait of the magnanimous man referring to bodily movements, stating that his movements seem deliberate, his voice solemn, his speech measured and slow. Assigning the reason for these things, Aristotle says that the movements of the magnanimous person cannot be hasty since he is intent on few things. Likewise he is not contentious because he holds nothing external of value. Now, no one contends except for something of value. But sharpness of voice and hastiness of speech are resorted to be cause of contention. Therefore, the temperament of the magnanimous man obviously requires a solemn voice together with deliberate speech and movement. The Philosopher says in the Categories (Ch. 8, 9 b 12 sq.) that if someone is naturally inclined to a passion, for example, bashfulness, he must have by nature that complexion which corresponds to bashfulness Hence if a man has a natural proneness toward magnanimity, consequently he should have a natural disposition to qualities of this kind.
Ultimo vero concludit epilogando, quod magnanimus talis est, qualis dictus est. 783. He concludes with the summary observation that the magnanimous man is just as we have described him.

Vices Opposed to Magnanimity
Chapter 3
B.   He now begins to treat the opposite vices.
      A’ What is common to each vice. — 784
ὁ δ' ἐλλείπων μικρόψυχος, ὁ δ' ὑπερβάλλων χαῦνος. οὐ κακοὶ μὲν οὖν δοκοῦσιν εἶναι οὐδ' οὗτοι οὐ γὰρ κακοποιοί εἰσιν, ἡμαρτημένοι δέ. But the man who fails by defect is small-souled, and the man who fails by excess is conceited. These people, however, do not seem to be criminals although they do sin.
      B’ Each (vice) in itself.
                   a.   The act proper to the small-souled man. — 785
ὁ μὲν γὰρ μικρόψυχος ἄξιος ὢν ἀγαθῶν ἑαυτὸν ἀποστερεῖ ὧν ἄξιός ἐστι, The small-souled person, although indeed worthy of excellent things, deprives himself of them.
                   b.   The cause of small-mindedness. — 786
καὶ ἔοικε κακὸν ἔχειν τι ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ἀξιοῦν ἑαυτὸν τῶν ἀγαθῶν, καὶ ἀγνοεῖν δ' ἑαυτόν· ὠρέγετο γὰρ ἂν ὧν ἄξιος ἦν, ἀγαθῶν γε ὄντων. οὐ μὴν ἠλίθιοί γε οἱ τοιοῦτοι δοκοῦσιν εἶναι, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ὀκνηροί. There seems something bad in such a man because he does not consider himself deserving of good. Besides, he does not really know himself; otherwise he would want the goods of which he is worthy. However, men of this kind are more lazy than stupid.
                   c.   The effect of small-mindedness. — 787
ἡ τοιαύτη δὲ δόξα δοκεῖ καὶ χείρους ποιεῖν· ἕκαστοι γὰρ ἐφίενται τῶν κατ' ἀξίαν, ἀφίστανται δὲ καὶ τῶν πράξεων τῶν καλῶν καὶ τῶν ἐπιτηδευμάτων ὡς ἀνάξιοι ὄντες, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τῶν ἐκτὸς ἀγαθῶν. This opinion (of themselves) seems to make them worse, for everybody strives after the things they deserve. But, thinking themselves unfitted, they forsake good works and undertakings, and even external goods.
                   a.   The cause of this vice. — 788
οἱ δὲ χαῦνοι ἠλίθιοι καὶ ἑαυτοὺς ἀγνοοῦντες, καὶ ταῦτ' ἐπιφανῶς· οὐ γὰρ ἄξιοι ὄντες τοῖς ἐντίμοις ἐπιχειροῦσιν, εἶτα ἐξελέγχονται· Conceited people are silly and obviously ignorant of their capability, for they set about those things to which honor is attached and thereupon they are discredited.
                   b.   The act of this vice. — 789
καὶ ἐσθῆτι κοσμοῦνται καὶ σχήματι καὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις, καὶ βούλονται τὰ εὐτυχήματα καὶ φανερὰ εἶναι αὑτῶν, καὶ λέγουσι περὶ αὐτῶν ὡς διὰ τούτων τιμηθησόμενοι. They adorn themselves with clothing and outward show, and such like. They want these goods of fortune to be indicative of themselves. They even talk about themselves in order to receive honor from their conversation.
      C’.      He compares one vice with the other. — 790-791
ἀντιτίθεται δὲ τῇ μεγαλοψυχίᾳ ἡ μικροψυχία μᾶλλον τῆς χαυνότητος· καὶ γὰρ γίνεται μᾶλλον καὶ χεῖρόν ἐστιν. ἡ μὲν οὖν μεγαλοψυχία περὶ τιμήν ἐστι μεγάλην, ὥσπερ εἴρηται. But small-mindedness is more opposed to magnanimity than presumption is. As more opposed, it is also worse. Magnanimity then is concerned with great honor, as was said.
Deficiens autem et cetera. Postquam philosophus determinavit de magnanimitate, hic determinat de vitiis oppositis. Et circa hoc tria facit: primo determinat id quod est commune utrique vitio. Secundo determinat de utroque secundum se, ibi, pusillanimus quidem enim et cetera. Tertio comparat unum alteri, ibi, opponitur autem magnanimitati et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod ille qui deficit a medio magnanimitatis, vocatur pusillanimus. Ille autem, qui superabundat, vocatur chaymus, id est fumosus, quem nos dicimus inflatum vel praesumptuosum. Non autem dicuntur esse mali, quantum ad hoc quod non sunt malefactores. Non enim alicui nocumentum inferunt, nec faciunt aliquid turpe. Sed tamen peccant in hoc quod recedunt a medio rationis. 784. After the Philosopher has finished the treatise on magnanimity, he now [B] begins to treat the opposite vices. Here he does two (three) things. First [A’] he determines what is common to each vice. Then [B’] he considers each in itself, at “The small-souled person etc.” Last [C’] he compares the one vice with the other, at “But small-mindedness etc.” He says first that the man who falls short of the mean of magnanimity is called small-souled. But he who exceeds the mean is said to be conceited, i.e., puffed up-what we call inflated or presumptuous. These persons are not said to be evil to the extent of being criminals, for they injure no one and do nothing disgraceful. However, they do sin in this: they depart from the mean of reason.
Deinde cum dicit: pusillanimis quidem enim etc., determinat de utroque vitiorum secundum se. Et primo de vitio quod est secundum defectum; secundo de vitio quod est secundum excessum, ibi, chaymi autem et cetera. Circa primum tria facit. Primo proponit proprium actum pusillanimi. Et dicit, quod pusillanimus, cum sit dignus bonis, privat seipsum illis quibus dignus est, dum scilicet non conatur ad operandum vel consequendum ea quae sibi competerent. 785. At “The small-souled person” [B’] he considers each vice: first [1] that which is according to defect; and next [2] that according to excess, at “Conceited people etc.” He discusses the first point in a threefold manner. First [i, a] he states the act proper to the small-souled man, saying that although such a man is worthy of good things, he deprives himself of those he deserves by not attempting to work or obtain things due to him.
Secundo ibi: et videbitur malum habere etc., ostendit causam pusillanimitatis. In qua quidem causa tria consideranda sunt per ordinem. Quod enim aliquis se privet bonis quibus dignus est, primo quidem contingit ex hoc quod non reputat se dignum talibus bonis, cum tamen sit dignus; hoc autem secundum contingit ex hoc quod ignorat suam conditionem. Cum enim proprium bonum sit cuilibet appetibile, si seipsum cognosceret pusillanimus, appeteret ea quibus est dignus, cum sint quaedam bona et de se appetibilia. Huiusmodi autem ignorantia non contingit ex insipientia, quia insipientes non sunt digni magnis; sed magis contingit ex quadam pigritia, per quam contingit, quod nolunt magnis se ingerere secundum suam dignitatem. Et hoc est tertium ex quo alia duo oriuntur. 786. Next [1, b], at “There seems,” he shows the cause of small-mindedness, pointing out that in this cause three things must be taken by turns. That a man deprive himself of goods he is deserving of happens first from the fact that he does not think himself worthy of such goods when in fact he is worthy. This occurs because he is ignorant of his ability. If the small-souled man knew himself, he would strive for the things he deserves because they are good and desirable, since one’s own good is desirable to everyone. Ignorance of this kind does not come from stupidity-for the stupid are not worthy of great things -but rather from a certain laziness by reason of which they are unwilling to engage in great things according to their dignity. This is the third source from which the other two arise.
Tertio ibi: talis autem opinio etc., ponit effectum pusillanimitatis. Et dicit quod talis opinio per quam alicui videtur, quod homo non sit dignus bonis quibus est dignus, videtur homines facere deteriores. Singuli enim homines appetunt illa, quae conveniunt eis secundum propriam dignitatem. Et ideo, quando nesciunt suam dignitatem, dupliciter detrimentum patiuntur suae bonitatis. Primo quidem, quia recedunt ab ipsis operationibus virtutum, et adinventionibus speculabilium veritatum, quasi indigni et insufficientes ad talia existentes: ex hoc autem, quod magna bona praetermittunt, efficiuntur peiores, quia magnorum bonorum exercitatio facit homines meliores. Secundo, quia per praedictam opinionem recedunt aliqui ab exterioribus bonis quibus sunt digni, quae instrumentaliter ad operationes virtutum deserviunt. 787. Third [ 1, c], at “This opinion,” he explains the effect of small-mindedness. A person’s opinion that he is unworthy of the goods he really deserves appears to make him worse. Individual men strive for the things befitting their own worth. Hence when they are ignorant of their worth, they suffer a twofold damage to their goodness. First, they abandon works of virtue and the pursuit of speculative truths, as if they were unfitted for and unequal to things of this kind. From this omission of great and good works, they become worse, since it is such actions that make men more virtuous. Second, by reason of this opinion they shirk certain external good works of which they are capable and which instrumentally serve for the performance of virtue.
Deinde cum dicit: caymi autem etc., determinat de vitio quod est per excessum. Et circa hoc duo facit. Primo enim proponit causam huius vitii. Et dicit quod chaymi, id est praesumptuosi, et sunt insipientes et ignorant suam conditionem; non quidem propter pigritiam, sicut pusillanimes, sed propter insipientiam. Et hoc apparet manifeste, quia ipsi conantur ad agendum vel consequendum aliqua honorabilia, ad quae eorum dignitas non se extendit; unde, quando in eorum operatione vel consecutione deficiunt, manifeste redarguendi apparent. 788. Then [2], at “Conceited people,” he discusses the vice of excess under two considerations. First [2, a], he gives the cause of this vice, saying that the conceited or presumptuous are both stupid and ignorant of their ability not because of laziness like the small-souled but because of stupidity. This is obvious because they attempt to do or attain certain honorable things utterly beyond their ability. So, when they fail in the action or accomplishment they manifestly appear to be discredited.
Secundo ibi: et veste ornantur etc., ponit actum huius vitii qui consistit in quadam exteriori magnificatione, in quantum scilicet magnificant seipsos. Primo quidem quibusdam exterioribus signis, dum scilicet ornatis utuntur vestibus, et etiam figura ornantur pompose incedentes, et alia huiusmodi faciunt ad manifestandum excellentiam suam in exterioribus bonis fortunae. Secundo, quia huiusmodi etiam verbis manifestant quasi per haec volentes assequi honorem. 789. Next [2, b], at “They adorn themselves,” he introduces the act of this vice, which consists in a kind of external glorification, inasmuch as the presumptuous greatly exalt themselves. First, they do this by certain external signs, that is, they wear elegant clothing and set off their figure by walking pompously. Likewise they do other things to show their excellence in the external goods of fortune. Second, they manifest things of this sort by words, as if wishing to achieve honor in this way.
Deinde cum dicit: opponitur autem etc., comparat praedicta vitia adinvicem. Et dicit quod pusillanimitas magis opponitur magnanimitati, quam chaymotes, id est praesumptio. Et huius assignat duas rationes. Quarum prima est, quia in secundo habitum est, vitium quod magis accidit propter maiorem inclinationem naturae humanae in ipsum magis opponitur virtuti quae ad hoc praecipue ordinatur ut reprimantur humanae inclinationes ad malum. Manifestum est autem, quod pluries accidit aliquos esse pusillanimes, qui scilicet omittunt facere bona quae possent, quam quod se extendant ad faciendum bona quae non possunt. Unde pusillanimitas magis opponitur virtuti. Alia ratio est, quia pusillanimitas deterior est, utpote faciens homines deteriores, ut supra habitum est. Quod autem est peius, magis virtuti opponitur. Et sic patet pusillanimitatem magis opponi virtuti. 790. At “But small-mindedness” [C’] he compares these two vices with one another, stating that small-mindedness is more opposed to magnanimity than conceit is. He assigns two reasons for this. The first reason, given in the second book (368), is that the vice, which occurs more frequently because of a stronger inclination of human nature toward it, is more opposed to virtue whose chief purpose is to restrain man’s inclination to evil. But some men are obviously more inclined to be small-souled (i.e., to omit the virtuous deeds possible to them) than to extend themselves in the performance of laudable feats beyond them. Hence small-mindedness is more opposed to virtue. The other reason is that small-mindedness is worse from the aspect of making men less virtuous, as was just stated (787). But what is worse is more opposed to virtue. Therefore, it is evident that small-mindedness is more opposed to virtue.
Ultimo autem concludit epilogando, quod magnanimitas est circa magnum honorem, ut dictum est. 791. He summarily concludes that magnanimity is concerned with great honor, as has been pointed out (346, 742-744, 750, 754).

The Virtue Concerned with Ordinary Honors
Chapter 4
ἔοικε δὲ καὶ περὶ ταύτην εἶναι ἀρετή τις, καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις ἐλέχθη, ἣ δόξειεν ἂν παραπλησίως ἔχειν πρὸς τὴν μεγαλοψυχίαν ὥσπερ καὶ ἡ ἐλευθεριότης πρὸς τὴν μεγαλοπρέπειαν. ἄμφω γὰρ αὗται τοῦ μὲν μεγάλου ἀφεστᾶσι, περὶ δὲ τὰ μέτρια καὶ μικρὰ διατιθέασιν ἡμᾶς ὡς δεῖ· As we remarked in the beginning, there appears to be a virtue that deals with honor and is compared to magnanimity as liberality is to magnificence. Neither of these virtues is in any way concerned with what is great, but both rightly dispose us in regard to mediocre and small things.
      a.   First by reasoning from similarity. — 793
ὥσπερ δ' ἐν λήψει καὶ δόσει χρημάτων μεσότης ἔστι καὶ ὑπερβολή τε καὶ ἔλλειψις, οὕτω καὶ ἐν τιμῆς ὀρέξει τὸ μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ καὶ ἧττον, καὶ τὸ ὅθεν δεῖ καὶ ὡς δεῖ. Just as one can take and give small sums of money according to a mean, and also according to excess and defect, so too one can desire honor more or less than he ought, and also from the source he ought and as he ought.
      b.   By the general manner of speaking.
            i.    The ordinary manner of usage. — 794
τόν τε γὰρ φιλότιμον ψέγομεν ὡς μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ καὶ ὅθεν οὐ δεῖ τῆς τιμῆς ἐφιέμενον, τόν τε ἀφιλότιμον ὡς οὐδ' ἐπὶ τοῖς καλοῖς προαιρούμενον τιμᾶσθαι. ἔστι δ' ὅτε τὸν φιλότιμον ἐπαινοῦμεν ὡς ἀνδρώδη καὶ φιλόκαλον, τὸν δ' ἀφιλότιμον ὡς μέτριον καὶ σώφρονα, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις εἴπομεν. We blame the ambitious man because he desires honor inordinately and from the wrong sources. Likewise we blame the unambitious man for not choosing to be honored even for the good that he does. On the other hand, it is a fact that we praise the ambitious person as noble and enamored of what is virtuous, but the unambitious person as moderate and temperate. We indicated this in our earlier discussion of the subject.
            ii.   Then (he) argues from this to the proposition. — 795
δῆλον δ' ὅτι πλεοναχῶς τοῦ φιλοτοιούτου λεγομένου οὐκ ἐπὶ τὸ αὐτὸ φέρομεν ἀεὶ τὸ φιλότιμον, ἀλλ' ἐπαινοῦντες μὲν ἐπὶ τὸ μᾶλλον ἢ οἱ πολλοί, ψέγοντες δ' ἐπὶ τὸ μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ. Clearly, inasmuch as the term lover of honor (or ambitious man) has been used in different contexts, the expression does not always receive the same meaning. But we praise him as more concerned about honor than most people and we blame him for desiring honor more than is right.
      a.   The uncertainty occurring here.
            i.    The uncertainty. — 796
ἀνωνύμου δ' οὔσης τῆς μεσότητος, ὡς ἐρήμης ἔοικεν ἀμφισβητεῖν τὰ ἄκρα. Since the mean lacks a name, being as it were abandoned, the extremes are not clearly distinguished.
            ii.   What the truth is. — 797
ἐν οἷς δ' ἔστιν ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἔλλειψις, καὶ τὸ μέσον· Now, where there is an excess and defect, there also is a mean. But people strive for honor more than is becoming and less than is becoming, hence also becomingly.
            iii. The basis for this uncertainty. — 798
ὀρέγονται δὲ τῆς τιμῆς καὶ μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ καὶ ἧττον· ἔστι δὴ καὶ ὡς δεῖ· ἐπαινεῖται δ' οὖν ἡ ἕξις αὕτη, μεσότης οὖσα περὶ τιμὴν ἀνώνυμος. φαίνεται δὲ πρὸς μὲν τὴν φιλοτιμίαν ἀφιλοτιμία, πρὸς δὲ τὴν ἀφιλοτιμίαν φιλοτιμία, πρὸς ἀμφότερα δὲ ἀμφότερά πως. ἔοικε δὲ τοῦτ' εἶναι καὶ περὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἀρετάς. Therefore, this unnamed habit as being a mean concerned with honor is praised. By comparison with ambition it seems to be contempt of honor, but by comparison with lack of ambition, love of honor. But by comparison with each, the habit seems to be one as well as the other. This seems to be true in regard to other virtues also.
      b.   The consequences of that uncertainty. — 799
ἀντικεῖσθαι δ' ἐνταῦθ' οἱ ἄκροι φαίνονται διὰ τὸ μὴ ὠνομάσθαι τὸν μέσον. However, here the extremes appear to be contradictory because the mean has no name.
Videtur autem et circa hunc et cetera. Postquam philosophus determinavit de magnanimitate, quae est circa magnum honorem, hic determinat de quadam alia virtute innominata, quae est circa mediocres honores. Et circa hoc tria facit. Primo proponit esse aliquam talem virtutem; secundo probat quod dixerat, ibi, quemadmodum autem in acceptione, etc.; tertio ostendit quomodo considerentur medium et extremum in hac virtute, ibi, innominata autem existente, et cetera. Dicit ergo primo quod, sicut prius in II dictum est, quaedam virtus videtur esse circa hunc, scilicet honorem, quae ita se habet ad magnanimitatem sicut liberalitas ad magnificentiam. Ambae enim istae virtutes, scilicet liberalitas et illa de qua nunc loquimur, distant ab illis duabus, scilicet magnificentia et magnanimitate, sicut a quodam magno; quia scilicet magnanimitas est circa magnum honorem, magnificentia autem circa magnos sumptus. Sed duae virtutes, scilicet liberalitas et illa de qua nunc agimus, disponunt nos circa parva et moderata, vel honores, vel divitias. 792. After the Philosopher has concluded his study of magnanimity, which treats of honors on a grand scale, he now considers a certain unnamed virtue having to do with ordinary honors. To explain it he does three things. First [1] he points out i that such a virtue exists at times. Next [2] he proves his statement, at “Just as one can etc.” Last [3], he explains in what manner the mean and the extreme may be considered in this virtue, at “Since the mean lacks a name etc.” lie says first, as was stated in the second book (346-348), that there appears to be a virtue concerned with honor. That virtue seems to be related to magnanimity as liberality is to magnificence. Both these virtues, i.e., liberality and the virtue under consideration, are separated from magnificence and magnanimity as from something great. The reason is that magnanimity deals with great honors and magnificence with great expenditures. But the two virtues, liberality and the virtue under consideration, dispose us in regard to small and mediocre things, either honors or riches.
Deinde cum dicit quemadmodum autem etc., probat quod dixerat. Et primo per rationem a simili sumptam. Secundo per communem usum loquendi, ibi, philotimum enim et cetera. Dicit ergo primo quod, sicut in acceptione et datione pecuniarum, scilicet parvarum et mediocrium, est medietas et superabundantia et defectus, ut supra habitum est, ita etiam et in appetitu honoris parvi vel mediocris contingit aliquem se habere plus quam oportet, et minus quam oportet, quantum ad intentionem appetitus. Et etiam ex causa unde non oportet, inquantum scilicet unus ex pluribus vel maioribus cupit honorari, quam oporteat, et alius ex paucioribus vel minoribus. Contingit etiam, quod aliquis appetat honorari secundum quod oportet quantum ad omnia. Et sic patet, quod circa parvos vel moderatos honores est accipere medium virtuosum, et extrema vitiosa, sicut et circa moderatas pecunias. 793. Then [2], at “Just as one can,” he proves his statement, first [2, a] by reasoning from similarity; and second [2, b] by the general manner of speaking, at “We blame the ambitious man etc.” He says that in taking and giving of small or ordinary sums of money there is a mean-and also an excess and defect-as was said before (679, 710-711). Likewise in the desire of small or mediocre honors, it happens that a man strives more or less than he ought, or for improper reasons inasmuch as one desires to be honored for more or greater things than he ought and another for fewer and lesser things. Likewise it happens that a man strives to be honored rightly in all things. So, clearly there is reason to hold for a mean of virtue and extremes of vice in small or mediocre honors as in smaller sums of money.
Deinde cum dicit philothimum enim etc., manifestat propositum per communem usum loquendi. Et circa hoc duo facit. Primo proponit communem usum loquendi. Secundo ex eo argumentatur ad propositum, ibi, manifestum autem et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod quandoque vituperamus philotimum, idest amatorem honoris, quasi appetat honorem magis quam oportet et unde non oportet. Et similiter quandoque vituperamus eum qui non est amator honoris, quasi non velit bona operari ex quibus honoretur. E contrario autem quandoque laudamus eum, qui est amator honoris, quasi existentem virilem, idest magnum animum habentem, et quasi amatorem boni, scilicet virtuosi actus, cui debetur honor. Et similiter quandoque laudamus eum, qui non est amator honoris, quasi moderantem et temperantem seipsum, ut non excedat suam conditionem, sicut dictum est in secundo. 794. Next [2, b], at “We blame the ambitious man,” he explains his proposition by an ordinary use of words. On this point he does two things. First [2, b, i] he indicates the ordinary manner of usage; and then [2, b, ii] he argues from this to the proposition, at “Clearly, inasmuch etc.” He says first that sometimes we blame the ambitious man, i.e., the lover of honor, for desiring honor more than he ought and from an improper source. Likewise, we blame at times the unambitious person for not wanting to do those good actions by reason of which he would be honored. On the other hand, we praise at times one who is a lover of honor as being manly or having a noble soul, and as a lover of the good, i.e., virtuous action to which honor is due. Again we praise occasionally a man who does not love honor—as it were regulating and ruling himself—so that he does not exceed his ability, as was stated in the second book (345-348).
Deinde cum dicit manifestum autem etc., argumentatur ex praedicto usu loquendi. Et dicit quod, quia quandoque laudamus amatorem honoris, quandoque autem vituperamus, manifestum est quod multipliciter dicitur amator honoris; et ideo non ad idem referimus laudem et vituperium. Sed laudamus amatorem honoris prout magis studet ad ea quae sunt honoris, quam vulgaris multitudo. Vituperamus autem inquantum magis cupit honores quam oporteat. Et eadem ratio est de non amatore honoris. Unde sequitur quod medium circa hoc est laudabile, prout scilicet honor et appetitur et contemnitur secundum quod oportet, extrema autem sunt vituperabilia, inquantum scilicet appetitur honor plus vel minus quam oportet. 795. At “Clearly, inasmuch” [2, b, ii] he draws a conclusion from this manner of speaking, saying that at times we praise then again we blame the lover of honor. But it is obvious that one is called a lover of honor in various senses, and for this reason we do not praise and blame him for the same thing. But we praise the lover of honor according as he is more concerned than the general run of people for the things pertaining to honor. We blame him, however, inasmuch as he desires honors more than is proper. The same line of reasoning applies to one who does not love honor. Consequently, the mean in this matter is praiseworthy according as honor and desire for honor are valued at their true worth. However, the extremes are blameworthy insofar as one desires more than he ought or less than he ought.
Deinde cum dicit: innominata autem existente etc., determinat de medio et extremis circa hanc virtutem. Et circa hoc duo facit. Primo ostendit dubietatem, quae circa hoc contingit. Secundo ostendit, quid ex illa dubietate sequatur, ibi, opponi autem et cetera. Circa primum tria facit. Primo proponit dubietatem. Et dicit, quod quia medietas circa appetitum honoris est innominata et sic videtur esse quasi deserta, quia non designatur aliquo nomine, inde est quod extrema videntur esse dubia, inquantum quandoque laudantur, quandoque vituperantur. 796. Next [3], at “Since the mean,” he treats the mean and the extreme of this virtue. On this point he does two things. First [3, a] he shows the uncertainty occurring here; and then [3, b] the consequences of that uncertainty, at “However, here the extremes etc.” He discusses the first point under three headings. First [3, a, i] he indicates the uncertainty with the observation that, since the mean concerned with desire for honor has no name-and so, because of this lack, appears as if passed over the extremes do not seem consequently to be clearly drawn, inasmuch as they are sometimes praised, sometimes blamed.
Secundo ibi: in quibus autem etc., ostendit qualiter in hac materia se habeat veritas circa medium et extrema. Et dicit quod in quibuscumque invenitur superabundantia et defectus, ibi etiam oportet esse medium. Et ideo, cum aliqui appetant honorem et magis et minus quam oporteat, consequens est, quod etiam aliqui appetant secundum quod oportet, quod pertinet ad rationem medii. 797. Then [3, a, ii], at “Now, where there is,” he explains what the truth is concerning mean and extremes. He says that whenever we find an excess and defect, there also we must find a mean. Therefore, since some strive for honor both more and less than they ought, it follows that some strive as they ought—which belongs to the notion of a true mean.
Tertio ibi: laudatur igitur etc., ostendit rationem praedictae dubietatis: quia enim est medium accipere circa honores, habitus medius laudatur. Et quia est innominatus, nominatur nominibus extremorum, inquantum per comparationem ad unum extremum, videtur habere similitudinem cum alio extremo. Habitus enim medius per comparationem ad superfluum amorem honoris videtur esse contemptus honoris; per comparationem autem ad contemptum honoris videtur esse amor honoris et per comparationem ad utrumque videtur esse utrumque aliqualiter. Et hoc etiam apparet in aliis virtutibus. Nam fortis per comparationem ad timidum videtur esse audax, per comparationem autem ad audacem videtur esse timidus. Sic ergo in proposito extrema vituperantur secundum se considerata, laudantur autem secundum quod attribuuntur medio. 798. Finally [3, a, iii ],at “Therefore, this unnamed habit etc.,” he shows the basis for this uncertainty. Because there is reason to accept a mean in regard to honors, the habit of the medium is praised. Likewise, because unnamed, it is designated by the names of extremes, as by a comparison with one of the extremes it seems to have a likeness to the other extreme. By comparison with excessive love of honor, the medium appears to have contempt of honor; but by comparison with contempt of honor, love of honor; by comparison with each it appears to be one as well as the other in some way. This is evident also in other virtues, for the brave man seems reckless by comparison with the timid man but timid by comparison with the reckless man. So, then, in our proposition the extremes considered in themselves are censured but as attributed to the mean they are praised.
Deinde cum dicit: opponi autem etc., ostendit, quod ex praedicta dubietate sequitur quod extrema vitia solum adinvicem videantur opponi, non autem ad medium virtutis, propter hoc, quod est innominatum. 799. Then [3, b], at “However, here,” he explains how it follows from this uncertainty that the extremes seem opposed only to one another but not to the mean of virtue because the as well as the other in some way. This mean has no name.

Meekness and Its Opposed Vices
Chapter 5
      A.  He shows how the mean and the extreme are discovered for anger. — 800
πραότης δ' ἐστὶ μεσότης περὶ ὀργάς· ἀνωνύμου δ' ὄντος τοῦ μέσου, σχεδὸν δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄκρων, ἐπὶ τὸ μέσον τὴν πραότητα φέρομεν, πρὸς τὴν ἔλλειψιν ἀποκλίνουσαν, ἀνώνυμον οὖσαν. ἡ δ' ὑπερβολὴ ὀργιλότης τις λέγοιτ' ἄν. Meekness is a kind of moderation concerned with anger. The mean in the strict sense being without a name (and the extremes nearly so), we refer to meekness as the mean, although it inclines to the defect which is also nameless. However, the excess can be called irascibility.
      B.  Then he discusses them.
            A’ He treats meekness.
                   1.   WHAT BELONGS TO MEEKNESS AS... A VIRTUE. — 801
τὸ μὲν γὰρ πάθος ἐστὶν ὀργή, τὰ δ' ἐμποιοῦντα πολλὰ καὶ διαφέροντα. ὁ μὲν οὖν ἐφ' οἷς δεῖ καὶ οἷς δεῖ ὀργιζόμενος, ἔτι δὲ καὶ ὡς δεῖ καὶ ὅτε καὶ ὅσον χρόνον, ἐπαινεῖται· πρᾶος δὴ οὗτος ἂν εἴη, εἴπερ ἡ πραότης ἐπαινεῖται. βούλεται γὰρ ὁ πρᾶος ἀτάραχος εἶναι καὶ μὴ ἄγεσθαι ὑπὸ τοῦ πάθους, ἀλλ' ὡς ἂν ὁ λόγος τάξῃ, οὕτω καὶ ἐπὶ τούτοις καὶ ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον χρόνον χαλεπαίνειν· Anger is a passion arising from many and various causes. Hence a man who is angry over the right things, with the right persons, and moreover in the right way, at the right time, and for the right interval is praised. He is a meek man. But if meekness is an object of praise, the meek man seeks to be undisturbed and not controlled by passion, but to be angry at the things and for the length of time that reason directs.
ἁμαρτάνειν δὲ δοκεῖ μᾶλλον ἐπὶ τὴν ἔλλειψιν· οὐ γὰρ τιμωρητικὸς ὁ πρᾶος, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον συγγνωμονικός. However, he seems to sin more on the side of defect, for the meek person is not vindictive but rather forgiving.
            B’ (He treats) the opposite vices.
                   1.   FIRST THE VICES OF DEFECT.
                         a.   The defect of anger... is censurable for three reasons... the first. — 803-804
ἡ δ' ἔλλειψις, εἴτ' ἀοργησία τίς ἐστιν εἴθ' ὅ τι δή ποτε, ψέγεται. οἱ γὰρ μὴ ὀργιζόμενοι ἐφ' οἷς δεῖ ἠλίθιοι δοκοῦσιν εἶναι, καὶ οἱ μὴ ὡς δεῖ μηδ' ὅτε μηδ' οἷς δεῖ· δοκεῖ γὰρ οὐκ αἰσθάνεσθαι οὐδὲ λυπεῖσθαι, But the defect—either a certain apathy or something of the kind—is censured, for a man seems to be foolish who does not get angry at the things he should both in regard to the manner, the time, and the persons. Such a one appears not to feel things nor to be pained at them.
                         b.  Second. — 805
μὴ ὀργιζόμενός τε οὐκ εἶναι ἀμυντικός, Moreover, he who does not get angry will not stand up for himself;
                         c.   Third. — 806
τὸ δὲ προπηλακιζόμενον ἀνέχεσθαι καὶ τοὺς οἰκείους περιορᾶν ἀνδραποδῶδες. and it is considered slavish to endure insults to oneself and to suffer one’s associates to be insulted.
                   2.   THEN THOSE OF EXCESS.
                         a.   This vice takes place in many ways. — 807-808
ἡ δ' ὑπερβολὴ κατὰ πάντα μὲν γίνεται καὶ γὰρ οἷς οὐ δεῖ, καὶ ἐφ' οἷς οὐ δεῖ, καὶ μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ, καὶ θᾶττον, καὶ πλείω χρόνον, οὐ μὴν ἅπαντά γε τῷ αὐτῷ ὑπάρχει. οὐ γὰρ ἂν δύναιτ' εἶναι· τὸ γὰρ κακὸν καὶ ἑαυτὸ ἀπόλλυσι, κἂν ὁλόκληρον ᾖ, ἀφόρητον γίνεται. The excess can happen in all likely ways, for a man can be angry with the wrong people, at the wrong things, more than he should, more readily than he should, and for a longer time than he should. However, all these excesses do not belong to the same man who certainly would not be able to survive, for evil which is complete destroys itself and would be unendurable.
                         b.  He considers its species
                               i.    Three kinds of excess in anger. First. — 809
οἱ μὲν οὖν ὀργίλοι ταχέως μὲν ὀργίζονται καὶ οἷς οὐ δεῖ καὶ ἐφ' οἷς οὐ δεῖ καὶ μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ, παύονται δὲ ταχέως· ὃ καὶ βέλτιστον ἔχουσιν. συμβαίνει δ' αὐτοῖς τοῦτο, ὅτι οὐ κατέχουσι τὴν ὀργὴν ἀλλ' ἀνταποδιδόασιν ᾗ φανεροί εἰσι διὰ τὴν ὀξύτητα, εἶτ' ἀποπαύονται. ὑπερβολῇ δ' εἰσὶν οἱ ἀκρόχολοι ὀξεῖς καὶ πρὸς πᾶν ὀργίλοι καὶ ἐπὶ παντί· ὅθεν καὶ τοὔνομα. Those persons are hot-tempered who become angry too readily, with the wrong people, at the wrong things, and more than they should. They do quiet down quickly—a very commendable trait which belongs to them because they do not retain anger, but in accord with their openness retaliate in a flare-up of temper, and then become tranquil. But the irascible (acrocholi) are intense in their excess, and get angry on every occasion and at every turn. It is from this that the name is derived.
                               ii.   Second. — 810
οἱ δὲ πικροὶ δυσδιάλυτοι, καὶ πολὺν χρόνον ὀργίζονται· κατέχουσι γὰρ τὸν θυμόν. παῦλα δὲ γίνεται ὅταν ἀνταποδιδῷ· ἡ γὰρ τιμωρία παύει τῆς ὀργῆς, ἡδονὴν ἀντὶ τῆς λύπης ἐμποιοῦσα. τούτου δὲ μὴ γινομένου τὸ βάρος ἔχουσιν· διὰ γὰρ τὸ μὴ ἐπιφανὲς εἶναι οὐδὲ συμπείθει αὐτοὺς οὐδείς, ἐν αὑτῷ δὲ πέψαι τὴν ὀργὴν χρόνου δεῖ. εἰσὶ δ' οἱ τοιοῦτοι ἑαυτοῖς ὀχληρότατοι καὶ τοῖς μάλιστα φίλοις. However, the sullen are angry for a long time and are mollified with difficulty, for they do not relinquish their anger. But they are appeased when they have taken vengeance. The infliction of punishment calms the surge of anger and brings delight in place of sadness. When this is not done they are glum because they do not externally express their anger, and no one can prevail upon them. In this case time is needed to absorb the anger. Such persons are burdensome to themselves and especially to their friends.
                               iii. Third. — 811
χαλεποὺς δὲ λέγομεν τοὺς ἐφ' οἷς τε μὴ δεῖ χαλεπαίνοντας καὶ μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ καὶ πλείω χρόνον, καὶ μὴ διαλλαττομένους ἄνευ τιμωρίας ἢ κολάσεως. We call those persons ill-tempered who are angry at the wrong things, more than they should be, for too long a time, and who are not appeased until they inflict vengeance and punishment.
                   3.   HE COMPARES THESE TWO VICES WITH ONE ANOTHER. — 812
τῇ πραότητι δὲ μᾶλλον τὴν ὑπερβολὴν ἀντιτίθεμεν· καὶ γὰρ μᾶλλον γίνεται· ἀνθρωπικώτερον γὰρ τὸ τιμωρεῖσθαι· καὶ πρὸς τὸ συμβιοῦν οἱ χαλεποὶ χείρους. Excess is more opposed to meekness, for it happens more frequently since man is prone to take vengeance, and it makes the ill-tempered worse to live with.
      A.  This cannot be determined with certitude. — 813
ὃ δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς πρότερον εἴρηται, καὶ ἐκ τῶν λεγομένων δῆλον· οὐ γὰρ ῥᾴδιον διορίσαι τὸ πῶς καὶ τίσι καὶ ἐπὶ ποίοις καὶ πόσον χρόνον ὀργιστέον, καὶ τὸ μέχρι τίνος ὀρθῶς ποιεῖ τις ἢ ἁμαρτάνει. ὁ μὲν γὰρ μικρὸν παρεκβαίνων οὐ ψέγεται, οὔτ' ἐπὶ τὸ μᾶλλον οὔτ' ἐπὶ τὸ ἧττον· ἐνίοτε γὰρ τοὺς ἐλλείποντας ἐπαινοῦμεν καὶ πράους φαμέν, καὶ τοὺς χαλεπαίνοντας ἀνδρώδεις ὡς δυναμένους ἄρχειν. ὁ δὴ πόσον καὶ πῶς παρεκβαίνων ψεκτός, οὐ ῥᾴδιον τῷ λόγῳ ἀποδοῦναι· ἐν γὰρ τοῖς καθ' ἕκαστα κἀν τῇ αἰσθήσει ἡ κρίσις. As was observed in previous discussions and made plain, it is not easy to determine how, at what, and how long one ought to be angry, or when one acts rightly or makes a mistake. Persons, who transgress slightly, either in great or lesser things, are not blamed. In fact, sometimes we praise men as meek who are wanting in anger, and as manly and competent to rule who abound in anger. However, it is not readily ascertain able by reason to what extent and in what manner a transgressor is blameworthy, for judgment is to be made according to sense perception in individual cases.
      B.  What is clear in this matter. — 814-815
ἀλλὰ τό γε τοσοῦτον δῆλον, ὅτι ἡ μὲν μέση ἕξις ἐπαινετή, καθ' ἣν οἷς δεῖ ὀργιζόμεθα καὶ ἐφ' οἷς δεῖ καὶ ὡς δεῖ καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα, αἱ δ' ὑπερβολαὶ καὶ ἐλλείψεις ψεκταί, καὶ ἐπὶ μικρὸν μὲν γινόμεναι ἠρέμα, ἐπὶ πλέον δὲ μᾶλλον, ἐπὶ πολὺ δὲ σφόδρα. δῆλον οὖν ὅτι τῆς μέσης ἕξεως ἀνθεκτέον. αἱ μὲν οὖν περὶ τὴν ὀργὴν ἕξεις εἰρήσθωσαν. But it is evident in these matters that the mean habit is praiseworthy according to which we are angry with the right people, about the right things, in the right manner, and so on in other circumstances. Likewise, it is evident that excess and defect are blameworthy, in such a way however that if they are slight, they can be tolerated; if greater, then more blameworthy; and if very great, then very blameworthy. But obviously one must adhere to the mean habit. We have now discussed the habits concerned with anger.
Mansuetudo autem est quidem et cetera. Postquam philosophus determinavit de virtutibus respicientibus bona exteriora, scilicet divitias et honores, hic determinat de mansuetudine, quae respicit exteriora mala ex quibus aliquis provocatur ad iram. Et circa hoc duo facit. Primo determinat de mansuetudine et vitiis oppositis. Secundo respondet tacitae quaestioni, ibi, quod autem in prioribus dictum est et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo ostendit quomodo circa iram inveniuntur medium et extrema; secundo de eis determinat, ibi, passio quidem enim et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod mansuetudo est quaedam medietas circa iras. In qua tamen materia medium proprie acceptum est innominatum, et fere etiam extrema, quia non expressis nominibus distinguuntur. Nomen autem mansuetudinis assumitur ad significandum medium, cum tamen ex vi nominis magis declinet ad defectum irae. Dicitur enim aliquis mansuetus ex eo quod non irascitur quasi manu assuetus ad similitudinem bestiarum quae iracundiam deponunt manibus hominum assuetae. Ipse etiam defectus inordinatus irae est innominatus. Dicitur enim aliquis mansuetus qualitercumque non irascatur, sive bene, sive male. Sed superabundantia vocatur iracundia. 800. After the Philosopher has finished the consideration of the virtues dealing with external goods, riches, and honors, he now considers meekness, which deals with the external evils which provoke people to anger. On this point he does two things. First [I] he treats meekness and its opposed vices; and then [II] he answers an implied question, at “As was observed.” On the initial point he does two things. First [I, A] he shows how the mean and the extreme are discovered for anger; and then [I, B] he discusses them, at “Anger is a passion etc.” He says first that meekness is a certain mean for anger. However, in this matter the mean taken in the proper sense has received no name. The same can almost be said about the extremes because they are not distinguished by explicit names. The name meekness is taken to signify a mean, although the word implies a lack of anger. People are called meek because they are not violent, as it were like domesticated animals who lose their irascibility. Even the disordered lack of anger has not been given a name. Someone is said to be meek who is not angry for any reason whatsoever, either good or bad. However, the excess is called rage or irascibility.
Deinde cum dicit: passio quidem enim etc., determinat de mansuetudine et vitiis oppositis. Et primo de mansuetudine. Secundo de vitiis oppositis, ibi: defectus autem et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo ostendit quid conveniat mansuetudini secundum quod ponitur virtus. Secundo quid conveniat ei secundum nominis proprietatem, ibi, peccare autem videtur et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod iracundia ponitur vitium extremum, quia importat quendam superexcessum irae quae est passio quaedam quae ex multis et differentibus rebus fit, et ita secundum horum diversitatem contingit in ira accipere medium et extrema. Ille igitur qui irascitur in quibus rebus oportet et etiam quibus personis oportet et insuper medio modo se habet in modo irascendi, quia irascitur sicut oportet et quando oportet et quanto tempore oportet, talis homo laudatur; et iste est mansuetus, si tamen nomen mansuetudinis in laudem accipiatur. Videtur enim ad hoc disponi mansuetus, ut primo quidem interius iudicium rationis non perturbetur ab ira, secundo ut in exteriori actione non ducatur ab ira, sed secundum ordinationem rationis et in his rebus et in tanto tempore irascatur. 801. Then [I, B], at “Anger is a passion,” he first [A’] treats meekness; and then [B’], the opposite vices. He treats the first point from two aspects. Initially [A’, I] he explains what belongs to meekness as it is considered a virtue; and then [A’, 2] what belongs to it according to the real meaning of the word, at “However, he seems to sin etc.” He says first that irascibility is considered the vice of the extreme because it implies an excess of anger which is a passion arising from many and various causes. So, according to the diversity of these things, a mean and an extreme are found in anger. Consequently, the praiseworthy man is the one who is angry about the right things, at the right people, and in due moderation (since he is angry as he should be, when he should be, and as long as he should be). However, if the word meekness is used as a compliment, it would seem that the meek man is so disposed: first, that he is not disturbed internally in the judgment of reason by anger; second, he is not led by anger in external choice, for reason determines the objects of anger and the length of time within which anger should react.
Deinde cum dicit: peccare autem etc., ostendit quid pertineat ad mansuetum secundum nominis proprietatem. Et dicit quod secundum hoc videtur magis peccare in hoc quod accedit ad defectum. Cum enim dicitur aliquis mansuetus, significatur quod non sit punitivus, sed magis remittat et condonet poenas, quod pertinet ad defectum irae. Nam ira est appetitus vindictae quae fit per poenam. 802. Next [A’, 2], at “However, he seems to sin,” he explains, in accord with the true meaning of the word, the character of the meek man who (he says) in this respect seems to err more in approaching the defect. When we call a person meek, we signify that he is not inclined to punish but to forgive and remit punishments. This is a thing belonging to a lack of anger which is a desire for vengeance achieved by punishment.
Deinde cum dicit: defectus autem etc., determinat de vitiis oppositis. Et primo de vitio defectus. Secundo de vitio superabundantiae, ibi, superabundantia autem et cetera. Tertio comparat haec duo vitia adinvicem, ibi, mansuetudini autem magis et cetera. Dicit ergo primo quod defectus a medio in ira, sive vocetur inirascibilitas per oppositum ad iracundiam, sive qualitercumque aliter, vituperatur. 803. At “But the defect” [B’], he treats the opposite vices, taking up first [B’, i] the vices of defect; and then [B’, 2] those of excess, at “The excess etc.” Last [B’, 3], he compares these two vices with one another, at “Excess is more opposed etc.” He says that the defect of the mean in anger is censured whether we call it apathy or any other name whatsoever.
Et quia Stoici dicebant omnem iram esse vituperabilem, ideo consequenter ostendit quod defectus irae quandoque est vituperabilis triplici ratione: quarum primam ponit, ibi non irasci enim et cetera. Et est talis. Omne quod pertinet ad insipientiam est vituperabile; quia laus virtutis est in hoc quod operatur secundum rectam rationem prudentiae. Sed ad insipientiam videtur pertinere quod aliquis non irascatur in rebus in quibus oportet irasci et eo modo et tempore quo oportet irasci et quibus personis irasci oportet. Manifestum est enim quod ira causatur ex tristitia. Tristitia autem est sensus nocumenti. Si igitur aliquis non irascitur in quibus oportet irasci, consequens est quod non doleat de eis et ita quod non sentiat ea esse mala, quod pertinet ad insipientiam. Patet ergo quod defectus irae est vituperabilis. 804. Since the Stoics were of the opinion that all anger is censurable, he consequently shows that the defect of anger sometimes is censurable for three reasons [B’, i, a]. He proposes the first reason at “a man seems to be foolish etc.” Whatever indicates, a lack of wisdom is blameworthy because virtue is praised for working in accord with the right understanding of prudence. But for a man to fail to be angry at the things, in the manner, at the time, and with the persons he should be angry seems to denote a lack of wisdom. It is evident that anger is caused by sadness. But sadness is a feeling of injury. If then someone fails to be angry at the things he should, he does not grieve for them and so does not feel they are evil. This pertains to a lack of wisdom. Therefore it is clear that a defect of anger is blameworthy.
Secundam rationem ponit ibi, et non iratus et cetera. Ira enim est appetitus vindictae. Qui ergo non irascitur in quibus debet irasci, sequitur quod non vindicet ea quae debet vindicare, quod est vituperabile. Non est autem haec ratio sic intelligenda quasi non possit aliqua vindicta fieri ex iudicio rationis sine ira; sed quia motus irae excitatus ex iudicio rationis facit promptiorem ad recte vindicandum. Nisi enim appetitus sensitivus adiuvaret ad exequendum iudicium rationis, frustra esset in natura humana. 805. He gives the second reason [B’, i, b] at “Moreover, he who does not get angry.” Anger is a desire for vengeance. Hence one who is not angry at the things he should, accordingly does not punish the actions he ought to punish. This is blameworthy. However, this explanation is not to be understood as if another vengeance cannot be taken according to the judgment of the reason without anger, but as if the movement of anger stirred up by the judgment of the reason makes one more prompt to take vengeance in the right way. If the sensitive appetite did not help to carry out the judgment of the reason, it would be useless in human nature.
Tertiam rationem ponit ibi iniuriantem autem et cetera. Et dicit quod ad servilem animum pertinet quod aliquis despiciat familiares suos et quod sustineat iniuriantes sibi, ita scilicet quod non repellat iniurias debito modo. Hoc autem consequitur ex defectu irae, quia per hoc redditur homo piger et remissus ad repellendum iniurias. Unde patet quod defectus irae est vituperabilis. 806. He introduces the third reason [B’, i, c] at “and it is considered,” saying only a cringing man suffers his household to be insulted and permits others to injure him without repelling the injury with due force. This follows from a defect of anger which renders a man slothful and remiss in warding off injury. Hence it is evident that the defect of anger is blameworthy.
Deinde cum dicit superabundantia autem etc., determinat de superabundantia irae. Et primo ostendit quod hoc vitium multipliciter contingit. Secundo determinat de speciebus ipsius, ibi: qui quidem iracundi et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod superabundantia irae potest fieri secundum omnes circumstantias: inquantum scilicet contingit quod aliquis irascatur quibus personis non oportet et in quibus rebus non oportet et magis quam oportet et velocius etiam provocetur ad iram et pluri tempore duret ira quam oportet. Non tamen omnes isti excessus inveniuntur in uno homine, tum propter molestiam quam ipse ex sua ira pateretur, tum etiam quia aliis molestus existens inter homines vivere non posset. 807. Then [B’, 2], at “The excess can happen,” he treats the excess of anger. First [B’, 2, a] he shows that this vice takes place in many ways; and second [B’, 2, b] he considers its species, at “These persons are hot-tempered etc.” He says first that excess of anger can occur according to all the circumstances. It happens that someone is angry with the wrong people and in the wrong things, that he is provoked too much and too easily angered, that he is angry too long. However, all these excesses are not found in one man, both because of the trouble he himself would suffer from his own anger, and also because, being burdensome to all, he could not live with others.
Et ita etiam est universaliter loquendo de malo; quia si esset integrum, seipsum destrueret. Fieret enim importabile tollendo subiectum a quo portari debet si sit. Quod enim nihil est, non potest dici malum, cum malum privatio sit; quodlibet autem ens inquantum huiusmodi, est bonum. Unde patet quod malum non aufert totum bonum, sed aliquod particulare bonum cuius est privatio. Sicut caecitas aufert visum, non autem aufert animal, quo sublato iam non esset caecitas. Ex quo patet quod malum non potest esse integrum; quia sic auferendo totum bonum auferret etiam se ipsum. 808. This is universally true of evil —if it were complete, it would destroy itself. It could not continue to exist in taking away the subject by which it must be sustained if it is to continue to be. What does not exist can hardly be called evil, because evil is a privation of good. But every being precisely as existing is good. Obviously then evil does not take away good entirely, but some particular good of which evil is a privation. In such a way blindness takes away sight but does not destroy the animal. If the animal were destroyed, blindness would cease to exist. Manifestly, then, evil cannot be complete because in so taking away the good entirely, it would destroy itself.
Deinde cum dicit: qui quidem igitur iracundi etc., ponit tres species superabundantiae in ira. Circa quarum primam dicit quod illi qui dicuntur iracundi, id est prompti ad iram, velociter irascuntur et etiam quibus personis non oportet et in quibus rebus non oportet et vehementius quam oportet; non tamen multo tempore durat eorum ira, sed velociter ab ea requiescunt, et hoc est optimum in eis. Quod accidit quia non retinent iram interius in corde, sed statim prorumpit exterius, quia vel retribuunt statim vindictam vel qualitercumque manifestant iram suam per aliqua signa propter velocitatem motus irae; et sic ira exterius exhalante requiescunt. Sicut etiam calor inclusus magis conservatur, evaporans autem citius evanescit. Ad hanc autem speciem irae maxime videntur disponi cholerici propter subtilitatem et velocitatem colerae. In hac autem velocitate superabundantiam obtinent acrocholi, id est extremi in ira, ab acros quod est extremum, et ethymos, quod est ira; qui sunt acuti et prompti ut irascantur circa omnia, unde et nominantur. 809. Next [B’, 2, b], at “Those persons,” he presents three kinds of excess in anger. The first [2, b, i] is that of those called hot-tempered, those easily aroused to wrath, readily becoming angry both with the wrong persons, and at the wrong things, and too vehemently. However, their anger does not last long but quickly subsides. This is very fortunate in a way for them that anger is not retained internally in their heart, but immediately bursts forth externally because they either take vengeance at the time or show their anger in some other way by clear indications with a burst of temper. In this way, when their anger is expressed they quiet down. So, also, heat which is shut up is kept at a higher degree, but when dispersed in vapor it disappears rather quickly. To this kind of anger the choleric seem disposed most readily by reason of the subtlety or speed of the bile. It is from this speed that excess is acquired by the irascible or acrocholi, i.e., those excessive in anger, from acros meaning extreme and cholos meaning anger, because they are intense and quick in anger.
Secundam speciem ponit ibi, amari autem et cetera. Et dicit quod amari secundum iram dicuntur quorum ira difficile solvitur; et diu irascuntur, quia retinent iram in corde. Tunc autem eorum ira quiescit, quando retribuunt vindictam pro iniuria illata: punitio enim facit quiescere impetum irae, dum loco tristitiae praecedentis inducit delectationem, in quantum scilicet aliquis delectatur de vindicta. Sed si hoc non fiat quod puniant, graviter affliguntur interius; quia enim non manifestant iram suam, nullus potest persuadendo eorum iram mitigare quae ignoratur, sed cum hoc ad hoc quod eorum ira digeratur necessarium est longum tempus per quod paulatim tepescat et extinguatur accensio irae. Tales autem, qui sic iram retinent diuturnam sunt sibiipsis molestissimi et praecipue amicis cum quibus delectabiliter non possunt convivere, et propter hoc vocantur amari. Ad hanc autem speciem superabundantiae maxime videntur disponi melancolici, in quibus impressiones susceptae diu propter humoris grossitiem perseverant. 810. He presents the second kind (of anger) [2, b, ii], at “However, the sullen,” saying that some are called sullen whose anger is dispelled with difficulty and lasts a long time because they keep it pent up in their hearts. But they cease to be angry only when they have satisfaction for the injury inflicted. Punishment calms the surge of passion when the previous sadness is replaced by delight, inasmuch as a man takes pleasure in vengeance. But if this does not happen, that is, if punishment is not inflicted, they are sorely grieved inwardly, since they do not show their anger. No one can persuade them to moderate this wrath that is not indulged. But the dissolution of anger requires a long time in which the fire of wrath may cool off gradually and be extinguished. Such persons who retain anger for a long time are a trial to themselves and especially their friends with whom they cannot live pleasantly. For this reason they are called sullen. To this kind of excess, the melancholic seem particularly inclined because the influence received from the coarseness of the humor lasts a long time in them.
Tertiam speciem ponit ibi, difficiles autem et cetera. Et dicit quod illos dicimus difficiles sive graves qui irascuntur in quibus non oportet et magis quam oportet et pluri tempore quam oportet; et non commutantur ab ira sine hoc quod crucient, vel puniant eos quibus irascuntur. Non enim est in eis diuturnitas irae ex sola retentione irae ut possit tempore digeri, sed ex proposito firmato ad puniendum. 811. He introduces the third kind (of anger) [2, b, iii], at “We call those persons,” saying that some are called ill-tempered or morose who are angry at improper things, in an improper degree and for an improper length of time, and do not leave anger until they wreak vengeance on or punish those with whom they are angry. Indeed their anger lasts long not because of a retention alone that can be dissolved in time but because of a firm resolve to inflict punishment.
Deinde cum dicit mansuetudini autem etc., comparat praedicta adinvicem. Et dicit quod superabundantia irae magis opponitur mansuetudini quam defectus: quod probat duplici ratione. Primo quidem quia in pluribus accidit. Homo enim magis inclinatur naturaliter ad puniendum post iniuriam sibi illatam; licet quando non est iniuriam passus naturaliter inclinetur homo ad mansuetudinem. Secundo quia illi qui superabundant in ira, magis sunt difficiles ad convivendum. Et in hoc sunt deteriores, unde et magis contrariantur bono virtutis. 812. Then [B’, 3], at “Excess is more opposed,” he compares the things just treated with one another, stating that the excess of anger is more opposed to meekness than the defect is. He proves this by two arguments: first, it is the usual occurrence. Man is inclined more naturally to inflict punishment after suffering an injury to himself, while he is naturally inclined to meekness when he has not suffered any injury. The second reason is that the excessive in anger are more difficult to live with and to this extent are worse. Hence they are more in opposition to the good of virtue.
Deinde cum dicit: quod autem in prioribus etc., respondet tacitae quaestioni: scilicet in quibus, et qualiter homo debeat irasci. Et circa hoc duo facit: primo ostendit quid circa hoc non possit determinari per certitudinem. Secundo quid sit in hoc manifestum, ibi sed quod quidem tale et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod sicut dictum est in II et ibidem manifestatum, non est facile determinare qualiter sit irascendum, et in quibus, vel qualibus rebus, et quanto tempore, et usque ad quem terminum recte facit, qui irascitur et usque ad quem terminum peccat. Ille enim qui parum recedit a medio vel in maius vel in minus, non vituperatur; sed potius quandoque eos qui deficiunt in ira laudamus et vocamus eos mansuetos; illos autem, qui parum excedunt, vocamus viriles, quasi potentes, et aptos ad principandum propter promptitudinem ad vindictam, quae competit principibus. Sed per quantum et qualem recessum a medio aliquis vituperetur vel non vituperetur, non de facili potest ratione determinari, quia huius rei iudicium consistit in singularibus et in sensu, non tam exteriori quam interiori aestimatione. 813. Next [II], at “As was observed,” he answers an implied question, namely, at what things and in what manner ought a man be angry. On this point he does two things. First [II, A] he affirms that this cannot be determined with certitude; and second [II, B] he states what is clear in this matter, at “But it is evident etc.” He says first that, as was observed in the second book (379) and there made clear, it is not easy to determine in what manner one should be angry, i.e., at things of what nature, for how long a time, and up to what point one acts correctly or errs in becoming angry. One who departs a little from the mean, either in great or small matters, is not blamed. In fact, at times we praise those who are somewhat deficient in anger and call them meek, but those who are a little excessive we call manly, as if able and qualified to rule by reason of their promptness for vengeance, which is appropriate to rulers. It is not easy to determine by reason the extent and kind of deviation from the mean for which a man should or should not be blamed. The reason is that judgment in this case depends on particulars and on sense perception which is more an interior than an exterior evaluation.
Deinde cum dicit: sed quod quidem tale etc., ostendit quid sit in talibus manifestum. Et dicit manifestum esse, quod laudabilis est medius habitus, secundum quem irascimur quibus oportet et in quibus rebus oportet et secundum quod oportet et similiter de aliis circumstantiis, et quod superabundantia et defectus sunt vituperabiles; ita tamen quod, si in parvum fiant, tolerabile est, si autem plus fiant, magis vituperabile est. Si autem multum fiant, valde vituperabile est. Unde semper se debet aliquis ad medium trahere. 814. At “But it is evident” [II, B] he shows what is obvious in these matters, saying it is evident that the mean according to which we are angry with the right persons, at the right things, and so on with regard to the other circumstances, is praiseworthy. Likewise, it is evident that excess and defect are blameworthy, in such a way however that if they are slight they can be tolerated; if they are greater, they are more blameworthy; and if very great, they are blameworthy in the highest degree. Hence a man ought to draw himself towards the mean.
Ultimo autem epilogat, quod dictum est de habitibus, qui sunt circa iram. 815. Last, he says in the epilogue that we have discussed the habits that deal with anger.

      A.  He investigates the virtue concerned with pleasantness and sadness arising from the serious actions of men.
            A’ A mean and extremes are found.
ἐν δὲ ταῖς ὁμιλίαις καὶ τῷ συζῆν καὶ λόγων καὶ πραγμάτων κοινωνεῖν οἳ μὲν ἄρεσκοι δοκοῦσιν εἶναι, οἱ πάντα πρὸς ἡδονὴν ἐπαινοῦντες καὶ οὐθὲν ἀντιτείνοντες, ἀλλ' οἰόμενοι δεῖν ἄλυποι τοῖς ἐντυγχάνουσιν εἶναι· Some men seem to be obsequious in association with others and in interchange of words and deeds. They praise everything for the sake of pleasantness, and never contradict anyone, being of the opinion that unpleasantness ought to be avoided.
                   2.   THE VICE WHICH PERTAINS TO THE DEFECT. — 817
οἱ δ' ἐξ ἐναντίας τούτοις πρὸς πάντα ἀντιτείνοντες καὶ τοῦ λυπεῖν οὐδ' ὁτιοῦν φροντίζοντες δύσκολοι καὶ δυσέριδες καλοῦνται. Others, on the contrary, always find fault, taking care to emphasize anything unpleasant. They are called perverse and quarrelsome.
                   3.   THE CONCLUSION... THE MEAN IS PRAISEWORTHY. — 818
ὅτι μὲν οὖν αἱ εἰρημέναι ἕξεις ψεκταί εἰσιν, οὐκ ἄδηλον, καὶ ὅτι ἡ μέση τούτων ἐπαινετή, καθ' ἣν ἀποδέξεται ἃ δεῖ καὶ ὡς δεῖ, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ δυσχερανεῖ· These habits being reprehensible, obviously the mean habit is laudable—that habit according to which a person approves what he should and also disapproves what he should.
            B’. He examines (the mean and extremes).
                   1.   FIRST THE MEAN.
                         a.   The name of the mean habit.
                               i.    The mean habit has no name. — 819
ὄνομα δ' οὐκ ἀποδέδοται αὐτῇ τι, This mean habit has not been given a name.
                               ii.   He gives the habit a name from friendship. — 820
ἔοικε δὲ μάλιστα φιλίᾳ. τοιοῦτος γάρ ἐστιν ὁ κατὰ τὴν μέσην ἕξιν οἷον βουλόμεθα λέγειν τὸν ἐπιεικῆ φίλον, τὸ στέργειν προσλαβόντα. But it has a remarkable resemblance to friendship, for the man who is disposed according to the mean habit is a man worthy of friendship, assuming that he loves us.
                               iii. How this virtue differs from friendship.
                                     x.    THE DIFFERENCE. — 821
διαφέρει δὲ τῆς φιλίας, ὅτι ἄνευ πάθους ἐστὶ καὶ τοῦ στέργειν οἷς ὁμιλεῖ· οὐ γὰρ τῷ φιλεῖν ἢ ἐχθαίρειν ἀποδέχεται ἕκαστα ὡς δεῖ, ἀλλὰ τῷ τοιοῦτος εἶναι. ὁμοίως γὰρ πρὸς ἀγνῶτας καὶ γνωρίμους καὶ συνήθεις καὶ ἀσυνήθεις αὐτὸ ποιήσει, However, since this virtue is with out passion or affection for people with whom we associate, it differs from friendship. A man does not take particular things as becoming because he is influenced by love or hatred but because he is disposed in this way. He will act similarly with strangers, intimates, and outsiders.
                                     y.    A FALSE UNDERSTANDING OF IT. — 822
πλὴν καὶ ἐν ἑκάστοις ὡς ἁρμόζει· οὐ γὰρ ὁμοίως προσήκει συνήθων καὶ ὀθνείων φροντίζειν, οὐδ' αὖ λυπεῖν. Nevertheless, in particular cases, he does the proper thing; it is not becoming to treat intimates and strangers in the same way, nor similarly to show displeasure toward them.
                         b.   Properties (of the mean habit).
                               i.    First. — 823
καθόλου μὲν οὖν εἴρηται ὅτι ὡς δεῖ ὁμιλήσει, Therefore, as has been pointed out, he always communicates with others in an amiable manner.
                               ii.   Second. — 824
ἀναφέρων δὲ πρὸς τὸ καλὸν καὶ τὸ συμφέρον στοχάσεται τοῦ μὴ λυπεῖν ἢ συνηδύνειν. Considering it honorable and useful, he aims to cause no offense, and even to give pleasure, for he is concerned with pleasure and sadness which occur in social intercourse.
                               iii. Third. — 825
ἔοικε μὲν γὰρ περὶ ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας εἶναι τὰς ἐν ταῖς ὁμιλίαις γινομένας· τούτων δ' ὅσας μὲν αὐτῷ ἐστὶ μὴ καλὸν ἢ βλαβερὸν συνηδύνειν, δυσχερανεῖ, καὶ προαιρήσεται λυπεῖν· κἂν τῷ ποιοῦντι δ' ἀσχημοσύνην φέρῃ, καὶ ταύτην μὴ μικράν, ἢ βλάβην, ἡ δ' ἐναντίωσις μικρὰν λύπην, οὐκ ἀποδέξεται ἀλλὰ δυσχερανεῖ. Any virtuous man of this type will refuse to give pleasure and will choose to cause pain over what is dishonorable and harmful to himself or to the person doing an injury or a great wrong. Although his opposition brings not a little offense, he will disregard it.
                               iv.  Fourth. — 826
διαφερόντως δ' ὁμιλήσει τοῖς ἐν ἀξιώμασι καὶ τοῖς τυχοῦσι, καὶ μᾶλλον ἢ ἧττον γνωρίμοις, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ κατὰ τὰς ἄλλας διαφοράς, ἑκάστοις ἀπονέμων τὸ πρέπον, He converses differently with persons in high places and with others, with friends, and with acquaintances. Likewise, according to other differences he attributes what is becoming to each.
                               v.   Fifth. — 827
καὶ καθ' αὑτὸ μὲν αἱρούμενος τὸ συνηδύνειν, λυπεῖν δ' εὐλαβούμενος, τοῖς δ' ἀποβαίνουσιν, ἐὰν ᾖ μείζω, συνεπόμενος, λέγω δὲ τῷ καλῷ καὶ τῷ συμφέροντι. καὶ ἡδονῆς δ' ἕνεκα τῆς εἰσαῦθις μεγάλης μικρὰ λυπήσει. ὁ μὲν οὖν μέσος τοιοῦτός ἐστιν, οὐκ ὠνόμασται δέ· He primarily strives to give pleasure and declines to inflict pain, considering that future events may be of greater importance. (I speak of what is honorable and useful.) But he will cause grief especially in a slight degree for the sake of a pleasure in a good that is to come. The mean then is of this nature but is nameless.
                   2.   (HE DEFINES) THE EXTREMES.
                         a.   The vice that belongs to the excess of pleasantness. — 828
τοῦ δὲ συνηδύνοντος ὁ μὲν τοῦ ἡδὺς εἶναι στοχαζόμενος μὴ διά τι ἄλλο ἄρεσκος, ὁ δ' ὅπως ὠφέλειά τις αὑτῷ γίνηται εἰς χρήματα καὶ ὅσα διὰ χρημάτων, κόλαξ· Of those who are agreeable, the man who aims at being pleasant without personal profit is called affable, but he who does so for money and things valued in terms of money is called a flatterer.
                         b.  He refers to the opposite vice. — 829
ὁ δὲ πᾶσι δυσχεραίνων εἴρηται ὅτι δύσκολος καὶ δύσερις. But the individual who is a trial to everyone is called quarrelsome and perverse, as has been stated.
                         c.   He compares the two vices. — 830
ἀντικεῖσθαι δὲ φαίνεται τὰ ἄκρα ἑαυτοῖς διὰ τὸ ἀνώνυμον εἶναι τὸ μέσον. However, the extremes seem to be mutually opposed because the mean is nameless.
In colloquiis autem et convivere et cetera. Postquam philosophus determinavit de virtutibus, quae respiciunt res exteriores, hic determinat de virtutibus, quae respiciunt actus humanos. Et primo in seriis. Secundo in ludicris, ibi, existente autem requie et cetera. In actibus autem seriosis est duo considerare, scilicet delectationem et veritatem. Primo ergo determinat de virtute quae est circa delectationes et tristitias in seriosis actibus hominum; secundo de virtute quae est circa veritatem, ibi, circa eadem autem fere est et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo ostendit circa delectationes et tristitias humanorum actuum esse medium et extrema. Secundo determinat de eis, ibi, nomen autem non redditur et cetera. Circa primum tria facit. Primo proponit vitium pertinens ad superabundantiam delectationis. Et dicit, quod circa colloquia humana, per quae maxime homines adinvicem convivunt secundum proprietatem suae naturae, et universaliter circa totum convictum hominum qui fit per hoc quod homines sibi invicem communicant in sermonibus et in rebus, quidam videntur esse placidi, quasi hominibus placere intendentes. Unde omnia laudant, quae ab aliis dicuntur et fiunt, ad hoc, quod delectabiles se eis exhibeant. Et in nullo contradicunt eis quibus convivunt, ne eos contristent; aestimantes, quod oportet omnibus convivere sine tristitia. 816. After the Philosopher has considered virtues relating to external things, now he considers the virtues that relate to human actions. First [I] lie treats the serious; and then [Lect. 16, II] the humorous actions, at “Since recreation should have a place etc.” (B. 1127 b 33). In the investigation of the serious actions, he examines pleasantness and veracity. First [A] he investigates the virtue concerned with pleasantness and sadness arising from the serious actions of men; and then [Lect. 15, B] the virtue concerned with veracity, at “Likewise, the mean opposed to boasting etc.” (B. 1127 a 13). He develops the first point in a twofold fashion. Initially [A’] he shows that a mean and extremes are found in regard to pleasantness and sadness in human acts; and then [B’] he examines these, at “This mean habit has not etc.” He discusses the first from three aspects. First [A’, 1] he presents the vice pertaining to the excess of pleasantness. He says that in human conversation (by which men especially associate with one another according to a natural tendency) and generally in all human companionships (made possible by the fact that men communicate with one another in words and deeds) some seem to be obsequious, as it were straining to please men. Wherefore, they praise everything that others say and do for the purpose of making themselves agreeable. They never contradict people for fear of giving offense, thinking they must live without causing pain to anyone.
Secundo ibi: qui autem contrario his etc., ponit vitium quod pertinet ad defectum in talibus. Et dicit, quod illi, qui contrario modo se habent ad placidos, volunt contrariari omnibus quae dicuntur vel fiunt, quasi intendentes alios contristare, et nihil curantes praetermittere ne alios contristent: et isti vocantur discoli et litigiosi. 817. Second [A’, 2], at “Others, on the contrary,” he introduces the vice that pertains to the defect in such matters. He states that people who are cross-grained wish to be contrary to everything said or done as if trying to make others sad and taking care to emphasize anything that will make life unpleasant for others. These persons are called perverse or quarrelsome.
Tertio ibi: quoniam quidem igitur etc., concludit esse quendam medium habitum laudabilem. Et dicit, quod quia praedicti habitus, qui sunt in extremo sunt vituperabiles, manifestum est quod medius habitus est laudabilis, secundum quem aliquis acceptat ea quae ab aliis dicuntur vel fiunt, vel etiam despicit, et contradicit secundum quod oportet. 818. Last [A’, 3], at “These habits’ he draws the conclusion that the mean is praiseworthy, saying that these habits, which consist in an extreme, are unworthy of praise. Obviously, then, the mean habit is worthy of praise—that habit by which a man accepts what others say or do, or rightly rejects and contradicts it.
Deinde cum dicit: nomen autem non redditur et cetera. Determinat de praedictis. Et primo de medio; secundo de extremis, ibi, condelectantis autem et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo determinat de nomine medii habitus; secundo de eius proprietatibus, ibi, universaliter quidem igitur et cetera. Circa primum tria facit. Primo proponit medium habitum esse innominatum. 819. Next [B’], at “This mean habit,” he defines the previous matter: first [B’, 1] the mean; and then [B’, 2] the extremes, at “Of those who are etc.” He handles the initial point in a twofold manner. First [B’, 1, a] he treats the name of the mean habit; and then [B’, 1, b] its properties, at “Therefore, as has been pointed out.” He considers the name under three headings. First [a, i] he states that the mean habit has no name.
Secundo ibi: assimulatur autem etc., nominat ipsum per similitudinem amicitiae. Et dicit, quod ista virtus maxime assimilatur amicitiae, quia communicat cum ea in actu exteriori, maxime proprio ei, qui est delectabiliter convivere ad amicos. Ille enim, qui est dispositus secundum medium habitum huius virtutis, taliter se habet in delectabili convictu ad alios, sicut dicimus competere amico, cuius scilicet amicitia moderatur ratione, quod pertinet ad amicitiam honesti. Non enim omnis amicitia est secundum virtutem, ut infra dicetur. Et si ita esset, quod ille qui habet istam virtutem, assumeret affectum dilectionis ad eos quibus convivit, esset omnino talis qualis est omnino virtuosus. 820. Second [a, ii], at “But it has” he gives the habit a name from a resemblance to friendship. This virtue, he says, is very much like friendship because there is agreement in the external act which is especially proper to friendship, viz., to live amicably with friends. That person, who is disposed according to the mean habit of this virtue, conducts himself in agreeable association with others in a manner becoming to a friend whose friendship is moderated by reason-a thing that pertains to honorable friendship. Not every friendship is virtuous, as will be pointed out later (1574-1577). If the man who has this virtue should love those with whom he lives, his friendship will be entirely virtuous.
Tertio ibi: differt autem ab amicitia etc., ostendit differentiam huius virtutis ad veram amicitiam. Et circa hoc duo facit. Primo ponit differentiam. Secundo excludit falsum intellectum, ibi, verumtamen et in singulis et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod haec virtus differt a vera amicitia, quia ista virtus est et sine amore, qui est passio appetitus sensitivi, et sine dilectione ad eos quibus colloquitur, quae pertinet ad appetitum intellectivum. Non enim ex hoc acceptat singula ab aliis dicta vel facta, sicut oportet, quia afficiatur ad eos odio vel amore; sed quia est ita dispositus secundum habitum. Et huius signum est quia hoc observat non solum ad amicos, sed communiter ad omnes ignotos et notos, consuetos et inconsuetos. Et est simile de liberalitate. Amicus enim dona confert amicis propter amorem. Liberalis autem non ex eo quod amat, sed ex eo quod est talis, ut facile emittat pecuniam. 821. Last [a, iii], at “However, since,” he shows how this virtue differs from friendship. He treats this point in a twofold manner. First [iii, x] he presents the difference; and then [iii, y] rejects a false understanding of it, at “Nevertheless, in particular cases etc.” He says first that, since this virtue is without love (which is a passion of the sensitive appetite) and without affection (which pertains to the intellective appetite) for those with whom we associate, it differs from true friendship. A man does not take the particular things said or done by others as becoming, because he is influenced by hatred or love of them but because he is disposed in this way by habit. This is proved by the fact that he observes the same not only with friends but generally with all acquaintances and strangers, intimates and outsiders. Liberality is like this. A friend gives gifts to his friends because he loves; the liberal man however gives not because he loves but because his nature is to be a free spender.
Deinde cum dicit verumtamen et in singulis etc., excludit falsum intellectum praedictorum. Quia enim dixerat quod similiter se habet haec virtus ad ignotos et notos, posset aliquis intelligere similitudinem istam quantum ad omnia. Est autem intelligenda praedicta similitudo quantum ad hoc commune, quod est delectabiliter omnibus convivere; est autem differentia quantum ad speciales modos convivendi; quia in singulis facit secundum quod congruit, non autem convenit quod similiter aliquis delectet aut contristet consuetos et extraneos. 822. Then [iii, y], at “Nevertheless,” he rejects a false understanding of these things. Since he just stated (821) that this virtue is practiced alike toward strangers and acquaintances, a man might consider this likeness as extending to everything. But the previously mentioned likeness must be taken as referring to this common characteristic, which is to live agreeably with others. There is a difference in regard to the special ways of living with others. The reason is that the virtue affects the proper actions in particular cases, for a person should not delight or displease intimates and outsiders in the same way.
Deinde cum dicit universaliter quidem etc., ponit proprietates quinque huius virtutis quarum prima sumitur ex modo colloquendi. Et dicit quod, sicut dictum est, in universali omnibus colloquitur sicut oportet. 823. At “Therefore, as has been” [B’, 1, b], he enumerates the five properties of this virtue; the first [b, i] of which is taken from the manner of communicating with others. As has been noted (821), one having this virtue always communicates with others in a becoming way.
Secundam ponit ibi: referens autem et cetera. Quae sumitur ex parte finis. Et dicit, quod tendit ad hoc quod sine tristitia, vel etiam cum delectatione aliis convivat. Et hoc refert ad bonum honestum, et ad conferens, idest utile, quia est circa delectationes et tristitias quae fiunt in colloquiis, in quibus principaliter et proprie consistit convictus humanus. Hoc enim est proprium hominum respectu aliorum animalium, quae sibi in cibis vel in aliis huiusmodi communicant. 824. At “Considering,” Aristotle gives the second property [b, ii], which is understood on the part of the end, saying that one having this virtue aims at living with others without offense or even with pleasure. This end pertains to a good that is honorable and advantageous, i.e., useful, because it is concerned with pleasure and sadness occurring in associations in which human companionship principally and fittingly consists. This is proper to men in contrast to animals who share food and the like in common.
Tertiam proprietatem ponit ibi: horum autem et cetera. Quae sumitur per comparationem ad tristitiam. Et dicit quod quandoque habens hanc virtutem refugit delectare alium, quin immo eligit contristare ipsum. Et hoc dupliciter. Uno quidem modo ex parte suiipsius, puta si non sit sibi honestum, ut cum alius loquitur verba turpia, vel si etiam sit sibi nocivum, puta cum alius loquitur in detrimentum eius; alio modo ex parte illius cui convivit, puta si dicat vel faciat aliquid quod ad propriam suiipsius magnam inhonestatem pertineat, vel etiam sit ei multum nocivum. Et per hoc quod ei contradicitur ingeritur ei parva tristitia. Sic enim non acceptabit virtuosus quod ab aliis dicitur vel fit, sed magis reprehendet. 825. At “Any virtuous man,” he introduces the third property [b, iii], which is understood by comparison with pain, saying that the man who possesses this virtue sometimes refuses to give pleasure to another, in fact sometimes chooses to cause pain. This may take place in two ways. In one way it can happen on his part: if a thing is not honorable to him, for instance, another uses indecent language; or if a thing is harmful to him, for instance, another injures him in word. In the other way, it can happen on the part of the person he lives with. This person may say or do something pertaining to his own great disgrace, or he may be greatly harmed. By reason of the fact that he is contradicted he is grieved to some extent. So the virtuous man will not take what is said by others, or if he does he will nonetheless reprove them.
Quartam proprietatem ponit ibi: differenter autem colloquitur et cetera. Quae sumitur per comparationem ad diversas personas. Et dicit quod hic virtuosus diversimode colloquitur et conversatur cum his qui sunt in dignitatibus constituti et cum quibuscumque privatis personis. Et similiter diversimode cum magis vel minus notis, et secundum alias diversitates personarum. Singulis enim attribuit quod est conveniens. 826. At “He converses differently” he introduces the fourth property [b, iv], which is understood by comparison with different persons. He says that a virtuous man speaks and converses in a different way with persons in high places and with private persons, with friends and with acquaintances, and so on according to other distinctions of persons, ascribing to each individual what is appropriate.
Quintam proprietatem ponit ibi: et per se quidem et cetera. Quae sumitur per comparationem delectationis ad tristitiam. Et dicit, quod per se quidem intendit delectare et renuit contristare; tamen aliquando parum contristat considerans futura, si praeponderent praesenti contristationi, quantum ad honestatem et utilitatem, vel etiam quantum ad futuram delectationem magnam, cui locus paratur per praesentem contristationem. Concludit autem, quod talis est medius habitus, cum tamen sit innominatus, licet apud nos possit affabilitas nominari. 827. At “He primarily strives,” he presents the fifth property [b, v] which is taken by comparison of pleasure with pain. He affirms that the virtuous man primarily strives to give pleasure and declines to inflict pain. However, at times he causes some grief considering that future events will outweigh the existing affliction in what concerns decency and utility or even a future important consideration, the evidence for which is provided by the present distress. He concludes that the mean habit is like this but is without a name, although we can call it affability.
Deinde cum dicit condelectantis autem etc., determinat de oppositis vitiis. Et circa hoc tria facit. Primo determinat de vitio quod pertinet ad superabundantiam delectationis. Et dicit quod ille qui superabundat in condelectando, si hoc non faciat propter aliud, vocatur placidus; si autem hoc faciat, vel propter adipiscendam pecuniam, vel quicquid aliud pecunia aestimari potest, vocatur blanditor sive adulator. 828. Then [B’, 2], at “Of those who,” he defines the opposite vices, doing three things. First [B’, 2, a] he treats the vice belonging to the excess of pleasantness. He says that the man who is immoderate in being pleasant—if he does not act for something else—is called obsequious. But if he acts to acquire money or any other thing computable in money, he is called a sycophant or a flatterer.
Secundo ibi, qui autem omnes contristat etc., determinat de opposito vitio. Et dicit, quod ille qui omnes contristat, vocatur litigiosus et dyscolus, ut dictum est. 829. Next [B’, 2, b], at “But the individual,” he refers to the opposite vice, saying that the individual who is a trial to everyone is called contentious and perverse, as has been stated previously (817).
Tertio ibi opponi autem videntur etc., comparat praedicta duo vitia adinvicem. Et dicit, quod extrema videntur opponi sibiinvicem, non autem virtuti, quia medium virtutis est innominatum. 830. Finally [B’, 2, c], at “However, the extremes, “ he compares the two vices one with the other, saying that the extremes seem to be opposed to one another but not to the virtue because the mean of the virtue is nameless.

Chapter 7
B.   A virtue ... that possesses a mean in the same human actions.
      A’ He explains his intention.
περὶ τὰ αὐτὰ δὲ σχεδόν ἐστι καὶ ἡ τῆς ἀλαζονείας καὶ εἰρωνείας μεσότης· ἀνώνυμος δὲ καὶ αὐτή. Likewise, the mean opposed to boasting treats of almost the same subject, and it too is nameless.
            2.   WE MUST TREAT THIS VIRTUE.
                   a.   First (reason). — 832
οὐ χεῖρον δὲ καὶ τὰς τοιαύτας ἐπελθεῖν· μᾶλλόν τε γὰρ ἂν εἰδείημεν τὰ περὶ τὸ ἦθος, It is not a loss to examine these matters, for in making the investigation we will learn more about particular habits.
                   b.   Second. — 833
καθ' ἕκαστον διελθόντες, καὶ μεσότητας εἶναι τὰς ἀρετὰς πιστεύσαιμεν ἄν, ἐπὶ πάντων οὕτως ἔχον συνιδόντες. Observing what is so in all cases, we are assured that virtues are certain median states.
ἐν δὴ τῷ συζῆν οἱ μὲν πρὸς ἡδονὴν καὶ λύπην ὁμιλοῦντες εἴρηνται, περὶ δὲ τῶν ἀληθευόντων τε καὶ ψευδομένων εἴπωμεν ὁμοίως ἐν λόγοις καὶ πράξεσι καὶ τῷ προσποιήματι. We have already discussed the people who cause pleasure or pain in their association with others. In like manner we will now investigate those persons who manifest truth and falsehood by words, operations, and pretense.
      B’ He defines his proposition. —
                   a.   What belongs to the mean and extremes in this matter. — 835
δοκεῖ δὴ ὁ μὲν ἀλαζὼν προσποιητικὸς τῶν ἐνδόξων εἶναι καὶ μὴ ὑπαρχόντων καὶ μειζόνων ἢ ὑπάρχει, ὁ δὲ εἴρων ἀνάπαλιν ἀρνεῖσθαι τὰ ὑπάρχοντα ἢ ἐλάττω ποιεῖν, ὁ δὲ μέσος αὐθέκαστός τις ὢν ἀληθευτικὸς καὶ τῷ βίῳ καὶ τῷ λόγῳ, τὰ ὑπάρχοντα ὁμολογῶν εἶναι περὶ αὑτόν, καὶ οὔτε μείζω οὔτε ἐλάττω. The boaster simulates non-existent qualities, or claims a greater distinction than he really has. On the contrary, the dissembler denies or minimizes the qualities he has. But the man who observes the mean is admirable, being truthful both in life and speech, acknowledging that his own qualities are neither more nor less excellent than they really are.
                   b.   How the things... discussed pertain to the median habit and the extremes. — 836
ἔστι δὲ τούτων ἕκαστα καὶ ἕνεκά τινος ποιεῖν καὶ μηδενός. ἕκαστος δ' οἷός ἐστι, τοιαῦτα λέγει καὶ πράττει καὶ οὕτω ζῇ, ἐὰν μή τινος ἕνεκα πράττῃ. Each of these acts may be done both for the sake of something else and for nothing other than itself. As a man is, so he speaks, acts, and lives, unless some other cause affects him.
                   c.   The median habit is praiseworthy. — 837
καθ' αὑτὸ δὲ τὸ μὲν ψεῦδος φαῦλον καὶ ψεκτόν, τὸ δ' ἀληθὲς καλὸν καὶ ἐπαινετόν. οὕτω δὲ καὶ ὁ μὲν ἀληθευτικὸς μέσος ὢν ἐπαινετός, οἱ δὲ ψευδόμενοι ἀμφότεροι μὲν ψεκτοί, μᾶλλον δ' ὁ ἀλαζών. A lie is intrinsically evil and to be avoided but the truth is both good and to be praised. So, the man who speaks the truth is worthy of praise as being better, while the above two who do not tell the truth are worthy of blame, more especially the boaster.
            2.   HE INVESTIGATES THEM.
                   a.   First the virtue.
                         i.    What truthful person we are discussing. — 838
περὶ ἑκατέρου δ' εἴπωμεν, πρότερον δὲ περὶ τοῦ ἀληθευτικοῦ. οὐ γὰρ περὶ τοῦ ἐν ταῖς ὁμολογίαις ἀληθεύοντος λέγομεν, οὐδ' ὅσα εἰς ἀδικίαν ἢ δικαιοσύνην συντείνει ἄλλης γὰρ ἂν εἴη ταῦτ' ἀρετῆς, ἀλλ' ἐν οἷς μηδενὸς τοιούτου διαφέροντος καὶ ἐν λόγῳ καὶ ἐν βίῳ ἀληθεύει τῷ τὴν ἕξιν τοιοῦτος εἶναι. We will discuss both, but first the truthful man. We are not going to investigate the person who speaks the truth in his agreements nor on any subject pertaining to right or its b violation, for this belongs to another virtue. But we do intend to study the person who manifests the truth by his conversation and way of living (insofar as he does this from habit) in matters not touching justice and injustice.
                         ii.   What is especially characteristic of this person. — 839
δόξειε δ' ἂν ὁ τοιοῦτος ἐπιεικὴς εἶναι. ὁ γὰρ φιλαλήθης, καὶ ἐν οἷς μὴ διαφέρει ἀληθεύων, ἀληθεύσει καὶ ἐν οἷς διαφέρει ἔτι μᾶλλον· ὡς γὰρ αἰσχρὸν τὸ ψεῦδος εὐλαβήσεται, ὅ γε καὶ καθ' αὑτὸ ηὐλαβεῖτο· ὁ δὲ τοιοῦτος ἐπαινετός. Such a man seems to observe moderation, for he is a lover of the truth and, being truthful where it makes little difference, he will speak the truth all the more where it does matter. He will fear a lie as disgraceful because he feared it in itself. Such a man is worthy of praise.
                         iii. To what extreme the person is most inclined. — 840
ἐπὶ τὸ ἔλαττον δὲ μᾶλλον τοῦ ἀληθοῦς ἀποκλίνει· ἐμμελέστερον γὰρ φαίνεται διὰ τὸ ἐπαχθεῖς τὰς ὑπερβολὰς εἶναι. He turns aside from the truth more by understatement, for this seems rather prudent since overstatements are irritating.
                   b.   Then the opposite vices.
                         i.    The vice pertaining to excess.
                               x.   IN HOW MANY WAYS WE MAY COMMIT... BOASTING. — 841-842
ὁ δὲ μείζω τῶν ὑπαρχόντων προσποιούμενος μηδενὸς ἕνεκα φαύλῳ μὲν ἔοικεν οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἔχαιρε τῷ ψεύδει, μάταιος δὲ φαίνεται μᾶλλον ἢ κακός· εἰ δ' ἕνεκά τινος, ὁ μὲν δόξης ἢ τιμῆς οὐ λίαν ψεκτός, ὡς ὁ ἀλαζών, ὁ δὲ ἀργυρίου, ἢ ὅσα εἰς ἀργύριον, The person who boasts more excellent talents than he possesses for 10 no ulterior motive has a semblance of evil; otherwise, he would not find pleasure in lying. He is really, though, more vain than evil. But one who boasts for something else, like glory or honor, does not deserve great blame. However, the man who boasts for the sake of money or objects valued in money is more vicious.
                               y.   IN WHAT RESPECT WE MAY... TAKE INTO ACCOUNT BOASTING. — 843
ἀσχημονέστερος οὐκ ἐν τῇ δυνάμει δ' ἐστὶν ὁ ἀλαζών, ἀλλ' ἐν τῇ προαιρέσει· κατὰ τὴν ἕξιν γὰρ καὶ τῷ τοιόσδε εἶναι ἀλαζών ἐστιν· ὥσπερ καὶ ψεύστης ὃ μὲν τῷ ψεύδει αὐτῷ χαίρων, ὃ δὲ δόξης ὀρεγόμενος ἢ κέρδους. A boaster is constituted not by capability but by choice. He is such in accordance with a habit, as is the case with the liar who finds pleasure in lying itself, or the one who lies because he desires glory or profit.
                               z.   IN WHAT WAY...WE. COMMIT... BOASTING. — 844-845
οἱ μὲν οὖν δόξης χάριν ἀλαζονευόμενοι τὰ τοιαῦτα προσποιοῦνται ἐφ' οἷς ἔπαινος ἢ εὐδαιμονισμός, οἱ δὲ κέρδους, ὧν καὶ ἀπόλαυσίς ἐστι τοῖς πέλας καὶ διαλαθεῖν ἔστι μὴ ὄντα, οἷον μάντιν σοφὸν ἰατρόν. διὰ τοῦτο οἱ πλεῖστοι προσποιοῦνται τὰ τοιαῦτα καὶ ἀλαζονεύονται· ἔστι γὰρ ἐν αὐτοῖς τὰ εἰρημένα. Therefore, people who boast for the sake of fame simulate qualities that win praise and admiration. Those who boast for the sake of gain pretend things more closely connected with profit and things whose absence is not clearly apparent. For this reason many braggarts pretend to be doctors, soothsayers, or wise men, for the qualities mentioned are verified in them.
                         ii.   The vice pertaining to defect.
                               x.   HE COMPARES THIS VICE WITH BOASTING. — 846
οἱ δ' εἴρωνες ἐπὶ τὸ ἔλαττον λέγοντες χαριέστεροι μὲν τὰ ἤθη φαίνονται· οὐ γὰρ κέρδους ἕνεκα δοκοῦσι λέγειν, ἀλλὰ φεύγοντες τὸ ὀγκηρόν· Dissemblers, however, who say less than what is true seem to be more gracious. For they apparently speak not to acquire gain but to avoid offense and vanity.
                               y. HE POINTS OUT ITS DIFFERENCE. — 847-848
μάλιστα δὲ καὶ οὗτοι τὰ ἔνδοξα ἀπαρνοῦνται, οἷον καὶ Σωκράτης ἐποίει. οἱ δὲ τὰ μικρὰ καὶ φανερὰ [προσποιούμενοι] βαυκοπανοῦργοι λέγονται καὶ εὐκαταφρονητότεροί εἰσιν· καὶ ἐνίοτε ἀλαζονεία φαίνεται, οἷον ἡ τῶν Λακώνων ἐσθής· καὶ γὰρ ἡ ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἡ λίαν ἔλλειψις ἀλαζονικόν. οἱ δὲ μετρίως χρώμενοι τῇ εἰρωνείᾳ καὶ περὶ τὰ μὴ λίαν ἐμποδὼν καὶ φανερὰ εἰρωνευόμενοι χαρίεντες φαίνονται. Some people especially deny qualities about themselves that bring renown, as Socrates did. Others, who disclaim insignificant and obvious things are called affected humbugs (blato-panurgi). They are readily despised; and at times they seem guilty of ostentation, like the Spartans by their clothing. For this reason excess and immoderate deficiency seem characteristic of the boastful. Still others who moderately employ dissimulation, even dissembling about things obvious and ready at hand, seem rather agreeable.
                         iii. The opposition of vices among themselves. — 849
ἀντικεῖσθαι δ' ὁ ἀλαζὼν φαίνεται τῷ ἀληθευτικῷ· χείρων γάρ. As being more vicious, the boaster seems more opposed to the truthful man.
Circa eadem autem est fere et cetera. Postquam philosophus determinavit de virtute, quae tenet medium in humanis actibus quantum ad delectationem, hic determinat de virtute quae tenet medium in eisdem humanis actibus quantum ad veritatem. Et circa hoc duo facit. Primo dicit de quo est intentio; secundo determinat propositum, ibi, videtur utique iactator, et cetera. Circa primum tria facit. Primo proponit quamdam virtutem mediam esse oppositam iactantiae. Secundo ostendit, quod de hac virtute est tractandum, ibi, non malum autem et cetera. Tertio ostendit differentiam huius virtutis ad praecedentem, ibi, in convivere utique et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod medietas opposita iactantiae est fere circa eadem cum praedicta virtute, quia est circa actus humanos. Sed non secundum idem; quia non secundum delectationem, sed secundum aliquid aliud, ut post dicetur; et tamen ipsa medietas est innominata sicut et praedicta virtus. 831. After the Philosopher has finished the treatise on the virtue possessing the mean in human actions in regard to amiability, he now [B] treats a virtue called veracity, which possesses a mean in the same human actions. First [A’] he explains his intention; and then [B’] he defines his proposition, at “The boaster simulates etc.” He develops the first point in three ways. First [A’, 1] he discloses that a certain virtue is a mean opposed to boasting. Next [A’, 2], at “It is not a loss etc.,” he shows that we must treat this virtue. Last [A’, 3], at “We have already discussed etc.,” he explains the difference between this and the preceding virtue. He says first that the mean opposed to boasting treats about nearly the same subject as the previous virtue. The reason is that it is concerned with human actions, but not in relation to the same thing, since it does not regard pleasantness but another topic to be discussed shortly (838). As in the case of the previous virtue, this mean too is nameless.
Deinde cum dicit: non malum autem etc., ostendit quare necessarium est determinare de hac virtute. Et ponit ad hoc duas rationes. Circa quarum primam dicit, quod non est malum, immo utile ad scientias morales, pertranseunter tractare de huiusmodi virtutibus, quia per hoc magis sciemus ea quae pertinent ad mores, si pertranseamus tractando ea, quae pertinent ad singulos habitus. Quia cognitio rerum moralium perficitur per hoc quod particularia cognoscuntur. 832. Then [A’, 2], at “It is not a loss,” he explains why it is necessary to investigate this virtue, giving two reasons. First [A’, 2, a] he says that it is not profitless but in fact useful to moral science to treat the virtues as we go along. In this way we will learn better what pertains to morals if, as we proceed, we treat the material pertaining to individual habits. The reason is that the science of moral matters is completed by a knowledge of particulars.
Secundam rationem ponit ibi: et medietates et cetera. Et dicit, quod considerando in singulis ita se habere, magis certificabimur, quod virtutes sint medietates quaedam. 833. At “Observing what,” he presents the second reason [A’, 2, b]. We shall be assured that the virtues are kinds of median states by seeing how this is the case in the individual virtues.
Deinde cum dicit: in convivere utique etc., determinat differentiam huius virtutis ad praecedentem. Et dicit, quod de illis, qui aliqualiter se habent ad delectationem vel tristitiam in convictu et collocutione dictum est. Restat autem dicendum de illis qui secundum veritatem et falsitatem se habent in sermonibus et operationibus secundum veritatem vel secundum fictionem factis. 834. Next [A’, 3], at “We have already,” he defines the difference between this and the preceding virtue. He states that we have already considered (816-830) the people who in some way give pleasure or pain in their association and conversation with others. But we must still discuss those people who are truthful or deceitful in their words and actions or who simulate these qualities by their deeds.
Deinde cum dicit: videtur utique etc., determinat de virtutibus et vitiis. Et primo ponit virtutem et vitia contraria. Secundo determinat de eis, ibi, de utrisque autem dicemus et cetera. Circa primum tria facit. Primo ostendit quid pertineat ad medium et extrema in hac materia. Secundo ostendit qualiter ea, quae dicta sunt, pertineant ad medium habitum et extremos, ibi, est autem horum singula etc.; tertio ostendit medium habitum esse laudabilem, extremos autem esse vitiosos, ibi, per se autem et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod iactator, qui peccat per superabundantiam, simulat aliqua gloriosa, et hoc dupliciter: uno modo quia simulat sibi inesse aliqua gloriosa quae non insunt; alio modo quia simulat ea quae insunt maiora esse quam sint. Ille autem qui peccat per defectum dicitur esse eyron, et hoc dupliciter: uno modo quia negat sibi inesse gloriosa quae insunt; alio modo quia dicit ea esse minora quam sint. Ille vero qui tenet medium dicitur autochiastos, id est per se admirabilis, quia scilicet non quaerit magis in admiratione esse quam sibi secundum se conveniat; vel dicitur autophastos, id est per se manifestus, quia talem se manifestat qualis est. Est enim verax inquantum de se confitetur ea quae sunt; et hoc non solum sermone, sed etiam vita; inquantum scilicet exterior sua conversatio conformis est suae conditioni, sicut et sua locutio. 835. Then [B’], at “The boaster simulates,” he treats the virtues and vices. First [B’, 1] he presents the virtue and the opposite vices; and then [B’, 2], at “We will discuss both etc.,” he investigates them. He handles the first point from three aspects. First [B’, 1, a] he shows what belongs to the mean and extremes in this matter. Next [B’, 1, b], at “Each of these etc.,” he explains how the things which were discussed pertain to the median habit and the extremes. Third [B’, 1, c], at “A lie is intrinsically etc.,” he reveals that the mean habit is praiseworthy but the extremes, vicious. He says first that the boaster who sins by excess pretends certain praiseworthy qualities, and this in two ways. In one way he pretends to have some distinctions that he does not possess. In the other way, he claims distinctions greater than they really are. But the person who sins by defect is called a dissembler. However, the man who possesses the mean is said to be autocastos, i.e., admirable in himself, because he does not seek to be admired more than becomes him. He is also said to be autophastos, i.e., essentially sincere, manifesting himself to be what he is. He is truthful inasmuch as the things he divulges about himself are true. He does this not only by word but also by his manner of living, according as his exterior conduct and his speech conform to his nature.
Deinde cum dicit: est autem horum singula etc., ostendit qualiter praedicta pertineant ad tres habitus dictos. Et dicit, quod unumquemque praedictorum actuum contingit dupliciter facere. Uno modo propter aliquid aliud; puta cum aliquis negat se esse talem qualis est, propter timorem. Alio modo non propter aliquid aliud, sed propter hoc quod in tali actu delectatur. Et hoc proprie pertinet ad habitum. Quia unusquisque secundum qualitatem sui habitus loquitur et operatur et vitam ducit, nisi quandoque aliter operetur propter aliquid aliud emergens. 836. At “Each of these” [B’, 1, b], he explains how these things pertain to the three specified habits, saying that each of the above-mentioned acts may happen in two ways. In one way, it may be done for the sake of something else, for instance, a man denies that he is what he is because of fear; in the other way, not for the sake of something else but because he takes delight in the act itself. This property belongs to a habit, since everyone speaks, acts and lives according to the quality of his habit. Of course at times he may act differently because something else arises.
Deinde cum dicit: per se autem mendacium etc., ostendit quid in praedictis habitibus sit laudabile et vituperabile. Et dicit quod mendacium secundum se est pravum et fugiendum, verum autem est bonum et laudabile. Ad hoc enim signa sunt instituta quod repraesentent res secundum quod sunt. Et ideo si aliquis repraesentat rem aliter quam sit, mentiendo, inordinate agit et vitiose. Qui autem verum dicit, ordinate agit et virtuose. Manifestum est autem quod ille qui verum dicit, medium tenet, quia significat rem secundum quod est; veritas enim in aequalitate consistit quae est medium inter magnum et parvum. Qui autem mentitur est in extremo, quia vel secundum superabundantiam, quia plus dicit quam sit, vel secundum defectum, quia minus dicit quam sit. Unde patet quod ambo sunt vituperabiles, sed magis iactator qui excedit ad plus, quia plus recedit a vero: in aequali enim invenitur minus, non autem maius. 837. Then [B’, 1, c], at “A lie is intrinsically etc.,” he discloses what deserves praise and what blame in the habits mentioned, saying that a lie is essentially evil and to be avoided, but truth is good and to be praised. Signs were instituted to represent things as they are. Therefore, if a person represents a thing otherwise than it is by lying, he acts in an inordinate and vicious manner. But if he speaks the truth, he acts in an orderly and virtuous manner. Now, it is clear that the man who speaks the truth possesses the mean because he designates a thing as it is. The truth consists in an equality that is a mean between great and small. But the person who lies stands in an extreme either by excess because he affirms more than really is, or by defect because less than really is. Hence, it is evident that both are blameworthy. But the boaster who sins by excess deserves more blame since he departs farther from the truth; for the less, not the more, is found in the mean.
Deinde cum dicit: de utrisque autem etc., determinat de praedictis habitibus. Et primo de virtute. Secundo de vitiis oppositis, ibi, maiora autem existentibus et cetera. Circa primum tria facit. Primo determinat de quo veraci sit agendum. Secundo ostendit quid ad eum principaliter pertineat, ibi, videbitur utique talis et cetera. Tertio ostendit ad quod extremum magis declinet, ibi, in minus autem et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod de praedictis habitibus dicendum est, sed prius de veraci. Non autem intendimus nunc de eo qui veritatem loquitur in confessionibus iudiciorum, puta cum aliquis interrogatus a iudice confitetur quod verum est; neque etiam de eo qui verum dicit in quibuscumque pertinentibus ad iustitiam vel iniustitiam; haec enim pertinent ad aliam virtutem, scilicet ad iustitiam. Sed de illo veridico intendimus qui verum dicit et vita et sermone in talibus, quae non habent differentiam iustitiae et iniustitiae. Sed verum dicit solum propter dispositionem habitus: sicut etiam supra dictum est de virtute praemissa, quod delectabiliter vult aliis convivere non propter amorem, sed propter dispositionem sui habitus, ita etiam et haec virtus verum dicit non propter servandam iustitiam, sed propter aptitudinem quam habet ad verum dicendum. 838. Next [B’, 2], at “We will discuss both,” he investigates the previously mentioned habits, treating first [B’, 2, a] the virtue and then [B’, 2, b] the opposite vices, at “The person who boasts etc.” He treats the first point in a threefold manner. First [a, i] he determines what truthful person we are discussing. Next [a, ii], at “Such a man etc.,” he shows what is especially characteristic of this person. Third [a, iii], at “He turns aside etc.,” he explains to what extreme the person is more inclined. He says first that we must talk about these habits, but first about the truthful man. However, we do not have in mind now the person who speaks the truth in judicial testimony, for example, a witness who reveals the truth when questioned by a judge; nor the person who speaks the truth in any matter touching right—this pertains to another virtue, viz., justice. But we are directing our attention to that truthful man who manifests the truth in his life and conversation in matter not having distinction of justice and injustice. However, he manifests the truth only by reason of the disposition of the habit, as was said before about a previous virtue (821) that it aims at living pleasantly with others, not by reason of love but by reason of its habit. So, too, this virtue shows the truth not on account of the observance of justice but on account of the inclination it has to manifest the truth.
Deinde cum dicit: videbitur utique etc., ostendit quid maxime pertineat ad veracem de quo intendit. Et dicit quod talis videtur in suis verbis et factis moderationem habere vitando excessum et defectum. Amat enim veritatem et verum dicit etiam in illis in quibus non multum refert ad nocumentum vel profectum: et multo magis in illis in quibus dicere verum vel falsum, facit aliquam differentiam ad nocumentum vel iuvamentum alterius. Et hoc ideo quia abhorret mendacium secundum se tamquam quoddam turpe, et non solum secundum quod cedit in nocumentum alterius: talem autem dicit esse laudabilem. 839. At “Such a man” [a, ii], Aristotle explains what particularly pertains to the truthful man we have in mind, saying he is one who apparently observes moderation in his actions, avoiding excess and defect. He loves truthfulness and the truth even where damage or profit is of little importance. The reason is that he hates a lie as something shameful in itself, and not only because it injures another. A person of this kind is to be commended.
Deinde cum dicit: in minus autem etc., ostendit ad quod extremum magis declinat. Et dicit quod si aliquando difficile sit omnino ad punctum dicere veritatem, magis vult declinare ad minus quam ad maius. Hoc enim videtur magis ad prudentiam pertinere, eo quod homines superabundanter de se ipsis loquentes, efficiuntur aliis onerosi, quia per hoc videntur aliis se velle praeferre. 840. Then [a, iii], at “He turns aside,” he explains to what extreme the truthful man more inclines, affirming that since sometimes it is quite difficult to tell the exact truth, he wishes to lean towards understatement rather than overstatement, This seems to pertain more to prudence since men tend to excess, and when speaking about themselves, they become tiresome to others. The reason for annoyance is that they seem in this to prefer themselves to others.
Deinde cum dicit: maiora autem etc., determinat de vitiis oppositis. Et circa hoc tria facit. Primo determinat de vitio quod pertinet ad superabundantiam. Secundo de vitio quod pertinet ad defectum, ibi, eyrones autem et cetera. Tertio determinat de oppositione vitiorum ad virtutem, ibi: opponi autem videtur et cetera. Circa primum tria facit. Primo ostendit quot modis committatur vitium iactantiae quod excedit in plus. Secundo ostendit secundum quid praecipue vitium iactantiae attendatur, ibi: non in potentia autem etc.; tertio ostendit in quibus vitium iactantiae praecipue committatur, ibi: qui quidem igitur gloriae gratia iactant et cetera. 841. Next [B’, 2, b], at “The person who boasts,” he examines the opposite vices. He considers this point under three aspects. First [b, i] he investigates the vice pertaining to excess; next [b, ii] the vice pertaining to defect, at “Dissemblers, however etc.”; and last [b, iii] the opposition of vices among themselves, at “As being more vicious etc.” He treats the first point in a threefold manner. First [i, x] he shows in how many ways we may commit the vice of boasting which is an extreme by excess. Second [i, y], at “A boaster is constituted etc.,” he explains in what respect we may especially take into account the vice of boasting. Finally [i, z], at “Therefore, people who etc.,” he shows in what things we may principally commit the vice of boasting.
Dicit ergo primo, quod quandoque aliquis iactat de se quae non sunt, vel maiora quam sint, non propter aliquem alium finem, sed quia in hoc delectatur, et talem dicit habere quamdam mali similitudinem, alioquin non gauderet de mendacio. Hoc enim ex inordinatione animi provenit. Non tamen talis est omnino malus, quia non intendit aliquam malitiam. Sed est vanus, inquantum delectatur in re, quae secundum se, nec est bona nec utilis. Secundo modo contingit quod aliquis se iactat propter appetitum gloriae vel honoris et talem dicit non esse multum vituperabilem, in quantum scilicet gloria et honor habent quamdam affinitatem cum rebus honestis propter quas aliqui laudantur et honorantur. Tertio modo aliqui se iactant causa argenti, vel cuiuscumque alterius quod argento aestimari potest. Et talem dicit esse magis deformem, quia propter minus bonum mentitur. 842. He states first that sometimes a man says boastfully about himself things that are untrue or exaggerated, not for some other purpose but for the enjoyment he gets out of it. Such a man is said to have a semblance of evil, otherwise he would not find pleasure in lying, for this arises from a disordered soul. However, he is not at all evil since he does not intend any malice; he is only vain for taking pleasure in a thing which is really neither good nor useful. In another way, a person speaks boastfully about himself because he wants glory or honor. This person really ought not to be blamed since glory and honor have a certain relationship to honorable things for which people are praised and honored. in still another way, people brag about themselves for the sake of money or some other thing that can be valued in money. An individual belonging to this class is more vicious because he lies for an inferior good.
Deinde cum dicit: non in potentia autem etc., ostendit secundum quid praecipue attenditur iactantia. Et dicit quod non iudicatur aliquis iactator ex eo quod habet aliquid vel non habet unde se potest sic iactare, sed ex eo quod hoc eligit. Dicitur enim aliquis iactator secundum habitum quem consequitur talis electio; sicut etiam (est) de quocumque mendaci qui dicitur mendax ex eo quod eligit mentiri, vel quia gaudet de ipso mendacio, vel quia mentitur propter appetitum gloriae vel lucri. 843. At “A boaster is constituted” [i, y], he explains in what respect we may take boasting into account, saying that a man is not considered a boaster from the fact that he has or has not the capability, but from the fact that he chooses to boast. He is called a boaster according to the habit that this choice follows. It is the same with any liar who is such in choosing to lie, or finding pleasure in lying, or lies out of his desire for fame or profit.
Deinde cum dicit: qui quidem igitur etc., ostendit de quibus praecipue aliqui se iactant. Manifestum est autem quod illi qui de ipsa iactantia gaudent, indifferenter de quibuscumque se iactant. Illi vero qui iactant se causa gloriae fingunt talia quae videantur esse laudabilia, sicut sunt virtuosa opera vel quae pertinent ad felicitatem, sicut nobilitas divitiae et alia huiusmodi. Illi vero qui iactant se causa lucri, fingunt talia in quibus alii delectentur, alioquin nihil lucrarentur, et iterum observant quod sint talia illa de quibus se iactant quae, si non sint vera, possit hoc latere, ita quod eorum mendacium non deprehendatur. 844. Then [i, z], at “Therefore, people who,” he explains the things that people usually boast about. Obviously, persons who find enjoyment in boasting boast indiscriminately. But those who boast for the sake of fame pretend things that seem worthy of praise, like virtuous works, or that have reference to good fortune, like the dignity of wealth and so on. Those, however, who boast for the sake of profit pretend things in which others find pleasure, otherwise it would profit them nothing. Again, when the things they boast about are not true, they take care that this fact can be hidden so their lie may not be discovered.
Et ponit exemplum de duobus: scilicet de his quae pertinent ad medicinam; quia omnes desiderant sanitatem, nec potest a quibuscumque deprehendi, utrum aliquis in medicando erret. Alia autem sunt quae pertinent ad divinationes futurorum, de quibus naturaliter homines sollicitantur, et circa quae non de facili mendacium deprehenditur. Et ideo illi qui iactant se propter lucrum, praecipue fingunt se esse medicos vel sapientes in divinando. Quamvis hoc quod dicit sapientem possit referri ad hoc quod tales se iactent de cognitione divinorum, quae est desiderabilis et latens. 845. He takes an example from two fields: first, from things belonging to medicine, since everyone wants health and no one can find out whether the doctor makes a mistake; second, from divination, which naturally disturbs men and where they cannot easily discover a lie. For this reason people who boast for profit especially pretend to be doctors or men wise in foretelling the future. Perhaps his use of the word “wise” can be referred to this that these men boast that they have a knowledge of divine things that is desirable and hidden.
Deinde cum dicit: eyrones autem etc., determinat de vitio quod pertinet ad defectum. Et circa hoc duo facit. Primo comparat hoc vitium iactantiae. Secundo ostendit diversitatem huius vitii, ibi: maxime autem et isti et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod irones qui minus de seipsis dicunt quam sit, videntur habere mores magis gratiores quam iactatores, quia non videntur talia dicere gratia lucri, sed quasi fugientes tumorem superbiae. 846. Next [b, ii], at “Dissemblers, however,” he considers the vice belonging to the defect. On this point he docs two things. First [ii. x] he compares this vice with boasting; and then [ii, y] points out its difference at “Some people especially etc.” He says first that dissemblers who minimize the truth about themselves seem to have more pleasing ways than boasters, because they apparently do not speak this way for the sake of gain but as if fleeing from vanity.
Deinde cum dicit: maxime autem et isti etc., ostendit quomodo diversimode hoc vitium contingat. Et dicit quod quidam sunt qui maxime de se negant ea quae videntur ad magnam gloriam pertinere, sicut Socrates qui negabat se esse scientem. Quidam vero sunt qui in quibusdam parvis et manifestis volunt ostendere quod non fingant de se maiora quam sint, et isti vocantur blancopanurghy, quasi in quadam astutia simulationis suas delitias habentes; panurghy enim Graece dicuntur astuti, blancon autem idem est quod deliciosum. Hos autem dicit esse de facili contemptibiles, quia nimis manifesta est eorum simulatio. Et talis defectus in exterioribus quandoque videtur ad iactantiam pertinere, dum per hoc volunt se ostendere meliores et magis moderatos, sicut Laconii qui deferebant vestimenta magis despecta quam deceret statum eorum, quia tam superabundantia exteriorum quam etiam immoderatus defectus videtur ad iactantiam pertinere, inquantum per utrumque ostenditur quaedam hominis excellentia. 847. At “Some people especially” [ii, y] he explains how this vice is practiced in different ways, saying there are some who especially deny about themselves things pertaining to great renown, for example, Socrates denied that he was wise. There are others who want to show by certain insignificant and obvious things that they do not pretend more excellent things about themselves than they possess. Such are called blato-panurgi, i.e., men who have their delight in a certain cunning pretense. Panurgi is a Greek word for “cunning fellow,” while blaton means something done amusingly. These, he says, are readily despised because their pretense is too obvious. A defect of this nature in external things sometimes seems to pertain to boasting when in this way they want to appear better and more observant of moderation, like the Spartans who wore clothing humbler than became their state. For this reason an excess and an immoderate deficiency in externals seem to pertain to boasting precisely because a certain singularity in a man is displayed in case of each.
Quidam vero sunt qui moderate utuntur hoc vitio, quia neque omnino negant de se gloriosa, neque etiam assumunt aliqua nimis parva et utuntur hoc vitio in his quae non sunt prompta et manifesta, et tales videntur esse gratiosi, ut supra dictum est. 848. Still others exercise this vice in a mitigated form, since they neither altogether deny famous deeds done by themselves nor do they even attribute to themselves negligible qualities, practicing the vice in matter obvious and at hand. People like this seem to be pleasing, as was just said (846).
Deinde cum dicit: opponi autem videtur etc., determinat de oppositione vitii ad virtutem. Et dicit quod magis videtur opponi veridico iactator, inquantum est deterior sicut dictum est. Semper enim peius vitium magis virtuti opponitur. 849. Then [b, iii], at "As being more vicious," he considers the opposition between the vice and the virtue, saying that the boaster is more in opposition to the truthful man because more vicious, as we have already noted (837). The worse vice is always more opposed to virtue.

Chapter 8
      A.  There can be a virtue and vice having to do with amusement. — 850-851
οὔσης δὲ καὶ ἀναπαύσεως ἐν τῷ βίῳ, καὶ ἐν ταύτῃ διαγωγῆς μετὰ παιδιᾶς, δοκεῖ καὶ ἐνταῦθα εἶναι ὁμιλία τις ἐμμελής, καὶ οἷα δεῖ λέγειν καὶ ὥς, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἀκούειν. διοίσει δὲ καὶ τὸ ἐν τοιούτοις λέγειν ἢ τοιούτων ἀκούειν. δῆλον δ' ὡς καὶ περὶ ταῦτ' ἔστιν ὑπερβολή τε καὶ ἔλλειψις τοῦ μέσου. Since recreation should have a place in out life and our social living by means of playful conversation, this would be a suitable time for a discussion of what things are proper to say and hear. In matters of this nature, speaking and listening are different, but it is clear that we have both excess and defect in respect to the mean.
      B.  He treats the virtue and the opposite vices concerned with amusement.
            A'. The nature of each habit.
                         a.   What belongs to excess. — 852
οἱ μὲν οὖν τῷ γελοίῳ ὑπερβάλλοντες βωμολόχοι δοκοῦσιν εἶναι καὶ φορτικοί, γλιχόμενοι πάντως τοῦ γελοίου, καὶ μᾶλλον στοχαζόμενοι τοῦ γέλωτα ποιῆσαι ἢ τοῦ λέγειν εὐσχήμονα καὶ μὴ λυπεῖν τὸν σκωπτόμενον· People who engage in too much derision are buffoons and nuisances wanting laughter at any cost. They try more to get a laugh than to converse politely and avoid offending the persons they mock.
                         b.  The nature of the vice by defect. — 853
οἱ δὲ μήτ' αὐτοὶ ἂν εἰπόντες μηδὲν γελοῖον τοῖς τε λέγουσι δυσχεραίνοντες ἄγροικοι καὶ σκληροὶ δοκοῦσιν εἶναι. On the other hand, persons who say nothing funny and are disagreeable to those who do, seem uncultured and rude.
                         c.   The nature of the mean in amusement. — 854
οἱ δ' ἐμμελῶς παίζοντες εὐτράπελοι προσαγορεύονται, οἷον εὔτροποι· But men indulging in jest with good taste are called witty, like those who give a humorous turn to things.
τοῦ γὰρ ἤθους αἱ τοιαῦται δοκοῦσι κινήσεις εἶναι, ὥσπερ δὲ τὰ σώματα ἐκ τῶν κινήσεων κρίνεται, οὕτω καὶ τὰ ἤθη. Actions of this kind seem to belong to character, for as bodies are judged from their movements, so too are characters.
                   3.   THE EXTREME IS SOMETIMES TAKEN FOR THE MEAN. — 856
ἐπιπολάζοντος δὲ τοῦ γελοίου, καὶ τῶν πλείστων χαιρόντων τῇ παιδιᾷ καὶ τῷ σκώπτειν μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ, καὶ οἱ βωμολόχοι εὐτράπελοι προσαγορεύονται ὡς χαρίεντες· ὅτι δὲ διαφέρουσι, καὶ οὐ μικρόν, ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων δῆλον. Since laughter is quite popular, most people take more pleasure in fun and in joking reproach of others than they should. Hence they are pleased with buffoons who are called witty. However, from what has been said it is obvious that buffoons are quite different from persons of wit.
            B’ What is proper to each habit.
                         a.   How the witty person conducts himself in general.
                               i.    That the use of clean fun pertains to the mean habit. — 857
τῇ μέσῃ δ' ἕξει οἰκεῖον καὶ ἡ ἐπιδεξιότης ἐστίν· τοῦ δ' ἐπιδεξίου ἐστὶ τοιαῦτα λέγειν καὶ ἀκούειν οἷα τῷ ἐπιεικεῖ καὶ ἐλευθερίῳ ἁρμόττει· Tact belongs to the mean habit of this virtue. It is characteristic of a tactful person to tell and listen to such tales as become a decent and liberal man.
                               ii.   Proof for what he has said. — 858
ἔστι γάρ τινα πρέποντα τῷ τοιούτῳ λέγειν ἐν παιδιᾶς μέρει καὶ ἀκούειν, καὶ ἡ τοῦ ἐλευθερίου παιδιὰ διαφέρει τῆς τοῦ ἀνδραποδώδους, καὶ πεπαιδευμένου καὶ ἀπαιδεύτου. Now, the witty person speaks and listens to what is becoming in jest. But the jesting of the liberal man differs from that of the servile man; the jesting of the cultured man from that of the uncultured.
                               iii. The jesting of the cultured and the uncultured person differs. — 859
ἴδοι δ' ἄν τις καὶ ἐκ τῶν κωμῳδιῶν τῶν παλαιῶν καὶ τῶν καινῶν· τοῖς μὲν γὰρ ἦν γελοῖον ἡ αἰσχρολογία, τοῖς δὲ μᾶλλον ἡ ὑπόνοια· διαφέρει δ' οὐ μικρὸν ταῦτα πρὸς εὐσχημοσύνην. Anyone can see this in the comedies of the ancient and modern authors. In the earlier plays obscene language appears and is an object of laughter; in the later it is rather implied. This difference towards obscenities is of no small importance for decency.
                         b.  How (the witty person) especially acts in friendly banter.
                               i.    He asks (a) question. — 860
πότερον οὖν τὸν εὖ σκώπτοντα ὁριστέον τῷ λέγειν μὴ ἀπρεπῆ ἐλευθερίῳ, ἢ τῷ μὴ λυπεῖν τὸν ἀκούοντα ἢ καὶ τέρπειν; We must determine, then, whether a man is good at raillery because he says what becomes a liberal man, or because he does not offend his listener, or because he even delights him.
                               ii.   He answers the second part. — 861
ἢ καὶ τό γε τοιοῦτον ἀόριστον; ἄλλο γὰρ ἄλλῳ μισητόν τε καὶ ἡδύ. τοιαῦτα δὲ καὶ ἀκούσεται· ἃ γὰρ ὑπομένει ἀκούων, ταῦτα καὶ ποιεῖν δοκεῖ. This norm is indefinite to the extent that what is hateful to one person is pleasing to another. But each will listen to the things which give him pleasure, while he seems to encourage the things which he permits.
                               iii. Something is settled as to the first part. — 862-863
οὐ δὴ πᾶν ποιήσει· τὸ γὰρ σκῶμμα λοιδόρημά τι ἐστίν, οἱ δὲ νομοθέται ἔνια λοιδορεῖν κωλύουσιν· ἔδει δ' ἴσως καὶ σκώπτειν. ὁ δὴ χαρίεις καὶ ἐλευθέριος οὕτως ἕξει, οἷον νόμος ὢν ἑαυτῷ. τοιοῦτος μὲν οὖν ὁ μέσος ἐστίν, εἴτ' ἐπιδέξιος εἴτ' εὐτράπελος λέγεται. The virtuous person will not employ every kind of jest, for some jokes are in fact an insult. But legislators forbid the making of some insulting remarks. Actually they should forbid all reviling. Here the pleasing and liberal man will be as it were a law unto himself. Therefore, either the witty or the tactful person possesses the mean in this matter.
                   2.   WHAT IS PROPER TO THE EXTREME BY EXCESS. — 864
ὁ δὲ βωμολόχος ἥττων ἐστὶ τοῦ γελοίου, καὶ οὔτε ἑαυτοῦ οὔτε τῶν ἄλλων ἀπεχόμενος εἰ γέλωτα ποιήσει, καὶ τοιαῦτα λέγων ὧν οὐδὲν ἂν εἴποι ὁ χαρίεις, ἔνια δ' οὐδ' ἂν ἀκούσαι. However, the buffoon, less vicious than the derider, spares neither himself nor others for the sake of a laugh. Likewise, he says such things as the polite person would never think of saying-would not in fact listen to.
                   3.   WHAT PERTAINS TO THE EXTREME BY DEFECT. — 865
ὁ δ' ἄγροικος εἰς τὰς τοιαύτας ὁμιλίας ἀχρεῖος· οὐθὲν γὰρ συμβαλλόμενος πᾶσι δυσχεραίνει. δοκεῖ δὲ ἡ ἀνάπαυσις καὶ ἡ παιδιὰ ἐν τῷ βίῳ εἶναι ἀναγκαῖον. But the lout is useless at these conversations, contributing nothing and making everyone uncomfortable. Nevertheless, recreation and jest seem to be necessary for human life.
      C.  The difference between this and those virtues already considered. — 866
τρεῖς οὖν αἱ εἰρημέναι ἐν τῷ βίῳ μεσότητες, εἰσὶ δὲ πᾶσαι περὶ λόγων τινῶν καὶ πράξεων κοινωνίαν. διαφέρουσι δ' ὅτι ἣ μὲν περὶ ἀλήθειάν ἐστιν, αἳ δὲ περὶ τὸ ἡδύ. τῶν δὲ περὶ τὴν ἡδονὴν ἣ μὲν ἐν ταῖς παιδιαῖς, ἣ δ' ἐν ταῖς κατὰ τὸν ἄλλον βίον ὁμιλίαις. In human living there are three median courses, all of which regard communication in speech and action. They differ, however, for one deals with truthfulness and the others with what is pleasing. Of this second class, one concerns pleasure taken in amusements, the other concerns pleasure in things according to another aspect of life, viz., conversations.
Existente autem requie et cetera. Postquam philosophus determinavit de virtutibus quae sunt circa humanos actus seriosos, hic determinat de quadam virtute quae est circa ludicra. Et circa hoc tria facit: primo ostendit quod circa ludos, potest esse virtus et vitium. Secundo determinat de virtute quae circa ludos existit et de vitiis oppositis, ibi, qui quidem in derisione et cetera. Tertio ostendit differentiam huius virtutis ad supradictas, ibi, tres igitur quae dictae sunt et cetera. Circa primum, considerandum est, quod circa id quod est secundum se malum et non potest habere rationem boni, non est virtus et vitium, ut in II ostensum est; si igitur ludus nullam rationem boni posset habere, non esset circa ludum aliqua virtus. 850. After the Philosopher has finished the consideration of the virtues dealing with human actions of a serious nature, he now considers a certain virtue which deals with amusement [II]. He develops this point in three ways. First [A] he shows there can be it virtue and vice having to do with amusement. Next [B], at “People who engage in too much etc.,” he treats the virtue and the opposite vices concerned with amusement. Third [C], at “In human living there are etc.,” he explains the difference between this and those virtues already considered. In regard to the first we must consider that, as has been shown (329), there can be no corresponding virtue and vice concerned with what is intrinsically evil and incapable of having an aspect of good. Consequently, if no aspect of good can be found in amusement there will be no virtue connected with it.
Habet autem aliquam rationem boni, inquantum est utilis humanae vitae. Sicut enim homo indiget a corporalibus laboribus interdum desistendo quiescere, ita etiam indiget ut ab intentione animi qua rebus seriis homo intendit interdum anima hominis requiescat: quod quidem fit per ludum. Et ideo dicit quod, cum sit quaedam requies hominis ab anxietate sollicitudinum in hac vita et in conversatione humana per ludum, et sic ludus habet rationem boni utilis, consequens est quod in ludis possit esse quaedam conveniens collocutio hominum adinvicem; ut scilicet homo dicat et audiat qualia oportet et sicut oportet; et tamen in talibus multum differt dicere et audire. Multa enim aliquis homo decenter audit quae non decenter diceret. Ubicumque autem est differentia eorum quae oportet fieri et eorum quae non oportet ibi non solum est medium, sed etiam superabundantia et defectus a medio. Unde circa ludum contingit esse medium virtutis et extrema. 851. But amusement does have an aspect of good inasmuch as it is useful for human living. As man sometimes needs to give his body rest from labors, so also he sometimes needs to rest his soul from mental strain that ensues from his application to serious affairs. This is done by amusement. For this reason Aristotle says that, since there should be some relaxation for man from the anxieties and cares of human living and social intercourse by means of amusement—thus amusement has the aspect of useful good—it follows that in amusement there can be a certain agreeable association of men with one another, so they may say and hear such things as are proper and in the proper way. Yet, in matters of this kind, talking and listening are very different, for a man properly listens to things he could not properly say. But wherever difference exists between the things that ought to be done and ought not to done, there is found not only a mean but also excess and defect in regard to this mean. Hence we have a virtuous mean and extremes concerned with amusement.
Deinde cum dicit: qui quidem in derisione etc., determinat de medio et extremis. Et primo ostendit quid sit circa unumquodque eorum. Secundo ostendit quid unicuique eorum conveniat, ibi, medio autem habitui et cetera. Circa primum tria facit. Primo ostendit quid sit medium et extremum in ludo. Secundo ostendit quod hoc pertineat ad diversitatem morum, ibi, moris enim et cetera. Tertio ostendit quod quandoque extremum accipitur pro medio, ibi, redundante autem risu et cetera. Circa primum tria facit. Primo ostendit quid pertineat ad superabundantiam. Et dicit, quod illi qui superabundant in derisione ludi, dicuntur bomolochi, idest raptores templi ad similitudinem milvorum, qui volabant circa templum, ut raperent intestina animalium immolatorum. Ita et isti insidiantur ad hoc quod possint aliquid rapere, quod convertant in derisionem. Et ideo tales sunt onerosi, quia desiderant undecumque facere risum; ad quod magis student, quam ad hoc, quod dicant aliqua decora, idest honesta, et quod non turbent illum cui ingerunt convicium ex ludo. Magis enim volunt dicere aliqua turpia, vel ex quibus alii turbentur, quam quod non inducant homines ad risum. 852. At “People who engage” [B] he considers the mean and the extremes. First [A] he speaks about the nature of each habit; then [B’], at “Tact belongs etc.,” he shows what is proper to each habit. He discusses the first point in a threefold manner: initially [A’, 1] he explains what the mean and the extremes in amusement are; then [A’, 2] at “Actions of this kind etc.,” he shows that they belong to a difference of character; last [A’, 3], at “Since laughter is quite etc.,” he discloses that the extreme is sometimes taken for the mean. He treats this first point from three aspects. In the beginning [A’, 1, a] he shows what belongs to excess, saying that those who indulge excessively in playful derision are bomolochi or temple plunderers because of a resemblance to birds of prey who used to fly over the temple to pounce upon the entrails of sacrificed animals. In that way these people lie in wait so they can pounce upon something to turn into a laugh. On this account persons of this kind are a nuisance because they want to make laughter out of everything. They make more effort to do this than to engage in becoming or polite conversation and avoid disturbing the man they heap with playful reproach. They would rather tell scandalous stories, even at the risk of offending others, than (not) cause men to laugh.
Secundo ibi: qui autem neque ipsi etc., ostendit quid sit vitium per defectum. Et dicit quod illi qui neque volunt dicere aliquid ridiculum et molesti sunt illis qui dicunt, dum ex hoc irrationabiliter turbantur, videntur esse agrii, idest agrestes, et duri, quasi qui non emolliantur delectatione ludi. 853. Second [A’, 1, b], at “On the other hand,” he explains the nature of the vice by defect, stating that men who never want to say anything funny and are disagreeable to the people who do (these being reasonably disturbed) seem to be uncultured or boorish and coarse, like those who are not mellowed by amusing recreation.
Tertio ibi: moderate autem ludentes etc., ostendit quid sit medium in ludo. Et dicit, quod illi qui moderate se habent in ludis vocantur eutrapeli, quasi bene vertentes, quia scilicet ea quae dicuntur vel fiunt convenienter in risum convertunt. 854. Third [A’, 1, c], at “But men indulging,” he explains the nature of the mean in amusement, saying that men who devote themselves to amusement in moderation are called witty (eutrapeli), as it were, good at turning because they becomingly give an amusing turn to what is said and done.
Deinde cum dicit moris enim etc., ostendit quod praedicta pertineant ad diversitatem morum. Et dicit quod praedicti motus, scilicet quod aliquis velit facere risum vel superabundanter vel diminute vel moderate est quoddam indicium interioris moralis dispositionis. Sicut enim per motus corporales exteriores discernuntur interiores corporum dispositiones, ita etiam per exteriores hominum operationes discernuntur interiores mores. 855. Then [A’, 2], at “Actions of this kind,” he shows that the actions just mentioned belong to different habits. lie says that these movements by which a person wishes to amuse others too much, or too little, or in a moderate way are indications of internal dispositions of habit. As external movements of bodies clearly indicate their internal dispositions, so external actions manifest internal characters.
Deinde cum dicit: redundante autem risu etc., ostendit quomodo extremum quandoque sumitur pro medio. Et dicit, quod quia risus ad multos redundat, et multi sunt qui magis quam oportet delectantur in ludo, et in hoc quod dicant aliis convitia iocosa, inde est, quod apud eos bomolochi vocantur eutrapeli, quia sunt eis gratiosi. Superabundant enim in ludo quem plures hominum superabundanter diligunt. Differunt tamen non parum bomolochi ab eutrapelis, ut ex supradictis patet. 856. At “Since laughter is quite” [A’, 3], he explains how the extreme sometimes is taken for the mean. He says that many people bubble over with laughter and take more pleasure than they should in jest and in joking reproach of others. Hence, they give the name witty to buffoons who please them by excessive indulgence in jest which the majority of men love immoderately. Nevertheless, as is clear from what was said before (852-854), buffoons are quite different from witty people.
Deinde cum dicit: medio autem habitui etc., ostendit quid proprie pertineat ad praedictos habitus. Et primo ostendit quid proprie pertineat ad medium virtutis. Secundo quid ad extremum superabundantiae, ibi, bomolochus autem etc.; tertio quid pertineat ad extremum defectus, ibi, agrios autem et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo ostendit qualiter se habeat eutrapelus universaliter circa ludum. Secundo qualiter se habeat specialiter circa convicia iocosa, ibi: et utrum igitur et cetera. Circa primum tria facit. Primo proponit, quod ad medium habitum pertinet, convenientibus ludis uti. Et dicit, quod ad medium habitum huius virtutis pertinet id quod est proprium epydexiotis, idest bene aptati et dispositi ad hoc, quod cum hominibus conversetur. Ad talem enim pertinet quod dicat et audiat talia ludicra quae congruant viro modesto et liberali, qui scilicet liberum animum habet a servilibus passionibus. 857. Next [B’] at “Tact belongs,” he shows what properly belongs to the preceding habits. First [B’, 1] he explains what is peculiar to the mean of the virtue; and then [B’, 2], at “However, the buffoon etc.,” what is proper to the extreme by excess. Finally [B’, 3], at “But the lout etc.,” he discloses what pertains to the extreme by defect. He handles the initial point from two aspects. First [B’, 1, a] he shows how the witty person conducts himself in general with reference to fun; and then [B’, 1, b], at “We must determine etc.,” how he acts especially in friendly banter. He considers this first in a threefold way. In the beginning [a, i] he brings out that the use of clean fun pertains to the mean habit. He affirms that what is characteristic of a tactful person (epydexiotis), i.e., of a man well-fitted and prepared to engage in conversation with others, belongs to the mean habit of this virtue. It is proper to men of this sort to narrate and listen to such amusing incidents as become a decent and liberal man who possesses a soul free from slavish passions.
Secundo ibi: est enim quaedam etc., probat et inducit rationem ad hoc quod dixerat: quia scilicet ubicumque est invenire aliquid quod decenter fieri potest, hoc pertinet ad virtutem. Sed contingit aliquem ludentem dicere et audire quaedam convenientia. Et hoc patet ex differentia ludorum. Ludus enim liberalis hominis, qui scilicet intendit propria sponte bonum agere, differt a ludo hominis servilis, qui circa servilia occupatur. Et ludus hominis disciplinati, qui scilicet instructus est qualiter debeat ludere, differt a ludo hominis indisciplinati, qui nulla disciplina in ludo refrenatur. Unde manifestum est, quod ad medium habitum virtutis pertinet decentia in ludo dicere et audire. 858. Next [a, ii], at “Now, the witty person,” he gives a reason as proof for what he has said, viz., that wherever something is found that can be done in a becoming manner, there is a thing that belongs to virtue. But it happens that a witty person says and listens to what is becoming. This is obvious from the different kinds of jest. The jesting of the liberal man who spontaneously strives to act virtuously differs from the jesting of the servile man who is engaged in disreputable activities. The jesting of the cultured man who has been instructed how he should recreate differs from the jesting of the uncultured man who has not been trained by any instruction in jesting. Hence, it is clear that it pertains to the mean habit of virtue to speak and listen to what is becoming in jesting.
Tertio ibi: videbit autem utique aliquis etc., inducit quoddam signum ad supradicta, quod scilicet differat ludus disciplinati et indisciplinati. Et dicit, quod hoc maxime apparet considerando tam in veteribus, quam in novis comoediis, id est repraesentationibus collocutionum hominum adinvicem. Quia si alicubi in talibus narrationibus occurreret aliquod turpiloquium, ex hoc quibusdam generabatur derisio, dum talia turpia in risum vertebantur. Quibusdam vero generabatur suspicio, dum scilicet suspicabantur eos, qui turpia loquebantur, habere aliquod malum in corde. Manifestum est autem quod non parum differt ad honestatem hominis, utrum dicat in ludendo turpia vel honesta. 859. Last [a, iii], at “Anyone can see,” he introduces a proof for the previous statement that the jesting of the cultured and the uncultured person differs. This, he says, is particularly evident in considering the conversation of the players with one another in the old and new comedies or plays. The evidence is that where these narratives in places contain obscene language, some create derision when they turn the obscene words into laughter; but others create a suspicion when they imply that those who were speaking in an obscene manner had evil in their hearts. However, obviously it is of great importance to human decency whether a man in playful conversation speaks obscenely or properly.
Deinde cum dicit: et utrum igitur etc., ostendit qualiter se habeat virtuosus circa convicia iocosa. Et circa hoc tria facit. Primo movet quaestionem, utrum scilicet determinandum sit quod aliquis bene convicietur in ludo ex parte eorum quae dicit, quia scilicet dicit ea quae decet dicere liberalem hominem, id est virtuosum et modestum. Vel non determinatur penes hoc bene convicians, sed potius ex parte finis vel effectus, quia scilicet intendit non contristare audientem. Vel etiam quod plus est, intendit eum delectare. 860. At “We must determine” [B’, 1, b], he explains how the virtuous man conducts himself regarding jesting insults. On this point Aristotle does three things. First [b, i] he asks the question whether we must decide that a person does well at raillery by reason of the things which he says, i.e., because he says what is becomingly said by a liberal man who is virtuous and decent; or that lie is not determined according to this but rather by reason of the end or effect, i.e., because he aims not to offend his listener; or, what is more, aims to give him pleasure.
Secundo ibi: vel et tale quidem etc., respondet quaestioni quantum ad secundum membrum. Et dicit quod hoc est indeterminatum, quid scilicet contristet vel delectet audientem, quia scilicet diversis diversa sunt odibilia et delectabilia, talia autem unusquisque libenter audiet, quae sunt sibi delectabilia. Illa enim quae aliquis patienter sustinet audire, haec facere videtur, scilicet ingerendo ea aliis, dummodo non intendat eos contristare. 861. Then [b, ii], at “This norm is indefinite,” he answers the second part of the question, saying that it is indeterminate what may offend or please the listener because different things are odious and pleasant to different people. Everyone will gladly listen to what pleases him. And, as long as no offense is intended, a man seems to promote those things which he patiently hears by co-operating in them with others.
Tertio ibi: non utique omne etc., ostendit aliquid esse determinatum quantum ad primum membrum, scilicet quantum ad convicia quae dicuntur. Manifestum est enim quod virtuosus non faciet, idest non proponet omne convicium, quia convicium est quaedam contumelia; dum tale quid in convicio dicitur, ex quo homo infamatur, et hoc prohibent dicere legispositores. Sunt autem quaedam convicia, quae non prohibent, quae oportet dicere propter delectationem, vel propter hominum emendationem, quae fit dummodo fiat absque infamia. Ille enim qui se habet in conviciando sicut gratiosus et liberalis vir, est sibi ipsi lex, dum scilicet per propriam electionem vitat ea quae lex prohibet, et utitur his quae lex concedit. 862. Third [b, iii], at “The virtuous person,” he shows that something is settled as to the first part, viz., as to affronts that are offered. It is clear that the virtuous man does not make use of every reproach, since reproach is a kind of insult. Besides, legislators forbid the hurling of any insult that defames a man. They do not forbid reproachful remarks that are fittingly uttered for amusement or for a man’s correction (a thing to be managed without loss of good name). That man who acts in a pleasing and polite manner in raillery seems to be a law unto himself, provided. that by his own choice he avoids the things forbidden by the law and makes use of the things sanctioned by the law.
Ultimo autem concludit, quod talis qualis dictus est, est medius, sive nominetur epydissius, id est aptus, sive eutrapelus, id est bene vertens. 863. Finally, he comes to the conclusion that the man possessing the mean is such as was described, whether he is called epidexios, i.e., tactful, or eutrapelos, i.e., witty.
Deinde cum dicit: bomolochus autem etc., determinat de vitio superabundantiae. Et dicit, quod bomolochus est minor derisore, quia scilicet derisor intendit aliquem confundere, quod non intendit bomolochus, sed solum intendit risum facere. Et neque recedit a se ipso neque ab aliis, si debeat risum facere, quia scilicet exempla sua, et aliorum dicta et facta convertit in risum; et talia dicit, quorum nullum diceret homo gratiosus, id est virtuosus, et quaedam eorum non solum non diceret sed nec etiam audiret. 864. Next [B’, 2], at “However, the buffoon,” he explains the viciousness of the excess, saying that the buffoon is less vicious than the mocker because the mocker tries to put another to shame while the buffoon does not aim at this but only at getting a laugh. The latter spares neither himself nor others in attempting to create laughter, since he makes fun both of his own tales and of the sayings and deeds of others. Besides, he says things that a polite and virtuous person would not say, and some that he should not say and should not even listen to.
Deinde cum dicit: agrios autem etc., determinat de vitio defectus. Et dicit, quod ille qui est agrios, idest agrestis, est inutilis ad tales collocutiones, scilicet ludicras; nihil enim confert ad eas, sed in omnibus contristatur. Et in hoc est vitiosus, dum totaliter abominatur ludum, qui est necessarius ad vitam humanam sicut requies quaedam. 865. Then [B’, 3], at “But the lout,” he treats the vice by defect, saying that the man who is uncultured, i.e., boorish, is useless at these witty conversations. He contributes nothing to them but is disagreeable to everyone. He is vicious in that he completely abhors jest, which is necessary for human living as a kind of recreation.
Deinde cum dicit: tres igitur etc., ostendit differentiam huius virtutis ad praedictas duas. Et dicit quod tres sunt medietates praedictae in vita humana, quae omnes sunt circa communicationem sermonum et operum. Differunt autem abinvicem, quia una earum consistit circa veritatem in dictis vel factis. Aliae vero duae circa delectabile. Quarum una consistit circa delectationem quae est in ludis, alia vero consistit circa delectationem quae est in colloquiis quae est secundum aliam vitam, consistentem scilicet in seriis. 866. Next [C], at “In human living there are,” he deduces the difference between this virtue and the two previously discussed, stating that in human life there are the three median states mentioned, all of which regard communication in words and works. But they differ among themselves, since one of them deals with truthfulness in speech and action, while the others pertain to what is pleasing. One of these concerns pleasure taken in amusement; the other concerns pleasure taken in conversation according to our usual way of living, i.e., in serious matters.

Chapter 9
A.  He shows that shame is not a virtue.
      A’ He investigates the genus of shame.
            1.   HE PRESENTS HIS PROPOSITION. — 867
περὶ δὲ αἰδοῦς ὥς τινος ἀρετῆς οὐ προσήκει λέγειν· πάθει γὰρ μᾶλλον ἔοικεν ἢ ἕξει. Shame is not properly spoken of as a virtue because it is more like a passion than a habit.
                   a.   By means of a definition of shame. — 868
ὁρίζεται γοῦν φόβος τις ἀδοξίας, In any case shame is defined as fear of disgrace.
                   b.   By the effect of shame. — 869-870
καὶ ἀποτελεῖται τῷ περὶ τὰ δεινὰ φόβῳ παραπλήσιον· ἐρυθραίνονται γὰρ οἱ αἰσχυνόμενοι, οἱ δὲ τὸν θάνατον φοβούμενοι ὠχριῶσιν. σωματικὰ δὴ φαίνεταί πως εἶναι ἀμφότερα, ὅπερ δοκεῖ πάθους μᾶλλον ἢ ἕξεως εἶναι. Like fear, shame is brought about by reason of danger, for people who feel ashamed blush, and those who fear death grow pale. Both qualities are in some measure modifications of the body, and so pertain rather to passion than habit.
      B’ He examines its subject.
            1.   AT WHAT AGE IT IS BECOMING.
                   a.   He presents his proposition. — 871
οὐ πάσῃ δ' ἡλικίᾳ τὸ πάθος ἁρμόζει, ἀλλὰ τῇ νέᾳ. This passion is not becoming to persons of every age but only to the young.
                   b.   Shame is becoming to adolescence. — 872
οἰόμεθα γὰρ δεῖν τοὺς τηλικούτους αἰδήμονας εἶναι διὰ τὸ πάθει ζῶντας πολλὰ ἁμαρτάνειν, ὑπὸ τῆς αἰδοῦς δὲ κωλύεσθαι· καὶ ἐπαινοῦμεν τῶν μὲν νέων τοὺς αἰδήμονας, We are of the opinion that it is well for the young to feel shame because, living according to their emotions, many of them would fall into sin but are restrained by shame. Moreover, we are in the habit of praising youngsters who have a sense of shame.
                   c.   Shame is not becoming to... old age. — 873
πρεσβύτερον δ' οὐδεὶς ἂν ἐπαινέσειεν ὅτι αἰσχυντηλός· οὐδὲν γὰρ οἰόμεθα δεῖν αὐτὸν πράττειν ἐφ' οἷς ἐστὶν αἰσχύνη. But no one praises an old man because he is shamefaced, for we think it unbecoming of him to commit acts giving rise to shame.
                   a.   It is not becoming to the virtuous person. — 874
οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐπιεικοῦς ἐστὶν ἡ αἰσχύνη, εἴπερ γίνεται ἐπὶ τοῖς φαύλοις οὐ γὰρ πρακτέον τὰ τοιαῦτα· Likewise, shame is not characteristic of a virtuous person but follows evil actions such as must not be done.
                   b.   He answers certain frivolous objections against his thesis.
                         i.    First. — 875-876
εἰ δ' ἐστὶ τὰ μὲν κατ' ἀλήθειαν αἰσχρὰ τὰ δὲ κατὰ δόξαν, οὐδὲν διαφέρει· οὐδέτερα γὰρ πρακτέα, ὥστ' οὐκ αἰσχυντέον· φαύλου δὲ καὶ τὸ εἶναι τοιοῦτον οἷον πράττειν τι τῶν αἰσχρῶν. If some actions are shameful in fact and others only considered such, this does not matter for neither kind should be done, and so should not be objects of shame. The wicked, however, perform disgraceful actions of this kind.
                         ii.   Second. He proves in two ways that this (shame belongs to the virtuous person) is untenable.
                               x.   SHAME... REGARDS FAILINGS FOR WHICH BLAME IS DUE. — 877-878
τὸ δ' οὕτως ἔχειν ὥστ' εἰ πράξαι τι τῶν τοιούτων αἰσχύνεσθαι, καὶ διὰ τοῦτ' οἴεσθαι ἐπιεικῆ εἶναι, ἄτοπον· ἐπὶ τοῖς ἑκουσίοις γὰρ ἡ αἰδώς, ἑκὼν δ' ὁ ἐπιεικὴς οὐδέποτε πράξει τὰ φαῦλα. It is unreasonable to hold that if a man is so constituted that he is ashamed if he does a disgraceful action, he is considered virtuous on this account. Shame is felt because of acts voluntarily done, and no virtuous man voluntarily does evil.
                               y.   HE EXCLUDES THE PRECEDING OBJECTION. — 879
εἴη δ' ἂν ἡ αἰδὼς ἐξ ὑποθέσεως ἐπιεικές· εἰ γὰρ πράξαι, αἰσχύνοιτ' ἄν· οὐκ ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο περὶ τὰς ἀρετάς. Shame will be a virtue resulting from the supposition of something else, viz., if a man did such an act, he would be ashamed. But virtue does not work this way.
                         iii. Third. — 880-882
εἰ δ' ἡ ἀναισχυντία φαῦλον καὶ τὸ μὴ αἰδεῖσθαι τὰ αἰσχρὰ πράττειν, οὐδὲν μᾶλλον τὸν τὰ τοιαῦτα πράττοντα αἰσχύνεσθαι ἐπιεικές. But, if shamelessness and the absence of shame at doing dishonorable actions is evil, it is not on that account virtuous to be ashamed to do things of this kind.
B. He says a similar thing about continence which... is not a virtue. — 883-884
οὐκ ἔστι δ' οὐδ' ἡ ἐγκράτεια ἀρετή, ἀλλά τις μικτή· δειχθήσεται δὲ περὶ αὐτῆς ἐν τοῖς ὕστερον. νῦν δὲ περὶ δικαιοσύνης εἴπωμεν. Likewise, continence is not a virtue but has a mixture of virtue. Hence, we shall consider this in a later treatise, but now we must treat justice.
De verecundia autem ut quadam et cetera. Postquam philosophus determinavit de medietatibus quae sunt virtutes, hic determinat de quadam medietate quae non est virtus, scilicet de verecundia. Et primo ostendit verecundiam non esse virtutem; secundo inducit simile de continentia; quae cum sit laudabilis, non est virtus, ibi: non est autem neque continentia et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo inquirit genus verecundiae. Secundo ostendit subiectum ipsius, ibi: non omni utique aetati et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo proponit quod intendit. Et dicit, quod de verecundia non convenit loqui sicut de quadam virtute. Sed magis assimilatur passioni quam habitui, qui est genus virtutis. 867. After the Philosopher has completed the treatise on the median qualities that are virtues, he now treats a median quality that is not a virtue, viz., shame. First [A] he shows that shame is not a virtue. Then [B], at “Likewise, continence is not etc.,” he says a similar thing about continence, which, although laudable, is not a virtue. He discusses the first point from two aspects. First [A] he investigates the genus of shame; and then [B’], at “This passion is not etc.,” he examines its subject. He treats this first in a twofold manner. Initially [A’, 1] he presents his proposition, saying that shame is not properly called a virtue. But shame is more like a passion than a habit which is the genus of virtue.
Secundo ibi, determinatur igitur etc., probat propositum dupliciter. Primo quidem per definitionem verecundiae. Dicitur enim verecundia esse timor ingloriationis, idest confusionis quae opponitur gloriae. Sed timor est passio quaedam. Ergo verecundia est in genere passionis. 868. Next [A’, 2.], at “In any case,” he proves his proposition in two ways: first [A’, 2, a] by means of a definition of shame. Shame is said to be fear of disgrace or confusion which is the opposite of glory. But fear is a certain passion. Consequently, shame belongs to the genus of passion.
Secundo ibi: perficitur autem circa pericula etc., probat idem per effectum verecundiae. Circa quod considerandum est quod passiones sunt motus appetitus sensitivi qui utitur organo corporali. Unde passiones omnes cum aliqua corporali transmutatione fiunt; similiter autem se habet in generali quantum ad hoc de verecundia et de timore qui est circa pericula mortis, quantum ad hoc scilicet quod utraque passio indicatur per transmutationem corporalis coloris. 869. Then [A’, 2, b], at “Like fear,” he proves the same thing by the effect of shame. In this regard we must consider that passions are movements of the sensitive appetite that uses bodily organs. Hence all the passions are accompanied by some corporeal change. Shame and fear—which is concerned with the danger of death—have a general resemblance in that each passion is judged by a change in the color of the body.
Sed in speciali differunt; quia illi qui verecundantur rubescunt, illi autem qui timent mortem pallescunt. Cuius differentiae ratio est quia natura spiritus et humores transmittit ad locum ubi sentit defectum. Sedes autem vitae est in corde; et ideo quando periculum vitae timetur, spiritus et humores recurrunt ad cor. Et ideo exteriora quasi deserta pallescunt. Honor autem et confusio in exterioribus est, et ideo, quando homo timet per verecundiam (periculum) honoris, recurrentibus humoribus et spiritibus ad exteriora, homo rubescit. Sic igitur patet quod et verecundia et timor mortis sunt quaedam corporalia, inquantum scilicet habent corporalem transmutationem annexam, quod videtur magis ad passionem quam ad habitum pertinere. Et ita patet quod verecundia non est virtus. 870. But they have particular differences, since people who are ashamed blush, while those who fear death turn pale. The reason for this difference is that the spirit and the humors naturally rush to the place feeling the need. Now, the seat of life is the heart, and so when danger of death is feared, the spirit and the humors speed to the heart. Consequently, the surface of the body, being as it were deserted, grows pale. On the other hand, honor and confusion are numbered among external things. Therefore, since a man fears the loss of honor by shame, he blushes as the humors and spirits stream back to the surface. It is evident then that both shame and fear of death are certain alterations of the body inasmuch as they are accompanied by a change. Because this apparently belongs rather to passion than habit, it is obvious that shame is not a virtue.
Deinde cum dicit: non omni utique aetati etc., ostendit quid sit subiectum conveniens verecundiae. Et primo ostendit cui aetati conveniat. Secundo ostendit cui conditioni, ibi, neque enim studiosi et cetera. Circa primum tria facit. Primo proponit quod intendit, scilicet quod passio verecundiae non convenit omni aetati, sed iuvenili. 871. At “This passion” [B’], he discloses what is the fitting subject of shame. First [B’, 1] he shows at what age it is becoming; and then [B’, 2], at “Likewise shame is not etc.,” for what condition. He develops the first point in a threefold fashion. First [B’, 1, a] he presents his proposition, viz., that it is not becoming to persons of every age but to the young.
Secundo ibi, existimamus enim etc., probat quod iuvenili aetati congruat verecundia. Et hoc dupliciter. Uno modo per proprietatem iuventutis. Quia scilicet iuvenes propter fervorem aetatis vivunt secundum passiones. Et ideo proni sunt ad multipliciter peccandum. Et ab hoc prohibentur per verecundiam, per quam turpitudinem timent. Et ideo iuvenes decet verecundia. Alio modo probat idem per humanam consuetudinem. Iuvenes enim verecundos laudare consuevimus. 872. Then [B’, 1, b], at “We are of the opinion,” he proves in two ways that shame is becoming to adolescence. In one way he shows this from the peculiar nature of youth, namely, that on account of the intense desires of their age they live according to their emotions. For that reason they are inclined to sin in various ways. But they are restrained from this because of shame by which they fear disgrace. Therefore, shame is becoming to youth. In the other way he gives evidence of the same thing from usage. We are accustomed to praise young people who have a sense of shame.
Tertio ibi: senem autem nullus etc., ostendit quod alii aetati, scilicet senili, non congruit verecundia. Et dicit quod nullus laudat senem de hoc quod est verecundus. Quia existimamus quod non oporteat eum aliquod turpium operari pro quibus consuevit esse verecundia. Tum quia propter longitudinem temporis reputamus eos esse expertos. Tum quia, cessante fervore aetatis, reputamus quod propter passionem non debeat aliquid turpe operari. 873. Third [B’, 1, c], at “But no one praises,” he explains that shame is not becoming to another period of life, i.e., old age, saying that no one praises an old man for feeling shame. The reason is that we think it unbecoming of him to do any shameful deed from which shame usually arises. Besides, we think both that old men have been proved by their years and that they ought not to do any shameful act from passion after the fire of youth has subsided.
Deinde cum dicit neque enim studiosi etc., ostendit cui condicioni hominum competat vel non competat verecundia. Et circa hoc duo facit. Primo ostendit quod non competat virtuoso. Secundo excludit quasdam cavillationes contra propositum, ibi, si enim sunt haec quidem et cetera. Dicit ergo primo quod neque ad virtuosum pertinet verecundia. Verecundia enim est respectu pravorum. Sed virtuosus non operatur prava. Quia virtus est quae bonum facit habentem et opus eius bonum reddit. Ergo verecundia non competit virtuoso. 874. Next [B’, 2], at “Likewise, shame is not” he shows to what condition shame is or is not becoming. He handles this point under two headings. First [B’, 2, a] he explains that it is not becoming to the virtuous person. Then [B’, 2, b], at “If some actions etc.,” he answers certain frivolous objections against his thesis. He says that shame does not belong to the man of virtue, for it occurs in regard to evil deeds. But the virtuous man does not do wicked actions because virtue is a quality which makes good both its possessor and his work. Therefore, shame is not becoming to a virtuous person.
Deinde cum dicit: si enim sunt haec etc., excludit tres obviationes contra praedicta. Quarum prima est. Quia posset aliquis dicere quod verecundia non solum est de his quae secundum veritatem sunt turpia quae contrariantur virtuti, sed etiam de his quae sunt turpia secundum opinionem. 875. Then [B’, 2, b], at “If some actions,” he answers three objections dealing with what has just been said. The first [b, i] is that someone might say that shame arises not only from truly disgraceful acts, which are contrary to virtue, but also from actions believed to be disgraceful.
Sed ipse dicit quod nihil differt ad propositum; quia virtuoso neutra sunt operanda: scilicet neque turpia secundum veritatem, neque turpia secundum opinionem. Et ideo non imminet virtuoso quod de aliquo verecundetur. Sed hoc pertinet ad pravum, ut sit talis quod operetur aliquid turpium, vel secundum veritatem vel secundum opinionem. 876. But Aristotle says that it does not make any difference for our thesis, since the morally good man must not do things shameful either according to truth or opinion, and so is not in danger of being ashamed of anything, But the wicked person characteristically is of the sort who perform acts certainly disgraceful or held to be such.
Secundam obviationem ponit ibi: sic autem ad turpia habere et cetera. Posset enim aliquis dicere quod licet virtuosus non habeat aliquid de quo verecundetur, est tamen ita dispositus, ut si aliquid talium operaretur, de hoc verecundaretur. Si quis ergo propter hoc existimaret quod verecundia competeret studioso, probat hoc esse inconveniens dupliciter. 877. He introduces a second objection at “It is unreasonable” [b, ii]. A person could say that, although the man of virtue does not have anything to be ashamed of, nevertheless he is so disposed that if he did something of the kind, he would be ashamed of it. Therefore, in case anyone should think on this account that shame belongs to the virtuous person, he proves in two ways that this is untenable.
Primo quidem quia verecundia, proprie loquendo, non respicit nisi voluntarios defectus, quibus debetur vituperium. Sed hoc repugnat virtuti quod aliquis voluntarie operetur malum. Ergo non competit ei verecundia propter rationem praedictam. Secus autem esset si verecundia esset eorum quae involuntarie possunt accidere, sicut aegritudo involuntarie accidit homini. Unde virtuoso etiam sano potest competere curare de medico propter infirmitatem quae posset accidere. 878. First [ii, x] he says that shame, strictly speaking, regards only voluntary failings for which blame is due. But it is inconsistent with virtue that someone should voluntarily do evil. Therefore, shame does not belong to virtue for the reason just given. The case would be otherwise if shame were among the things which can happen involuntarily like sickness. Hence, it can be proper for the virtuous man even when well to be solicitous about a doctor on account of the sickness that can happen.
Secundo excludit praedictam obviationem ibi: erit autem utique et cetera. Et dicit quod secundum praedictam obviationem verecundia esset quiddam virtuosum ex suppositione, quia scilicet verecundaretur virtuosus si turpia operaretur. Hoc autem non est de his quae proprie conveniunt virtuosis. Immo absolute eis conveniunt, sicut patet circa omnes virtutes. Unde relinquitur quod verecundia non proprie conveniat virtuoso. 879. Second [ii, y], he excludes the preceding objection at “Shame will be.” He says that if the objection were valid, shame would be a certain conditional virtuous state, for the virtuous man would be ashamed if he were to do wrong. But a conditional state (that a man would be ashamed) is not one of the qualities that properly belong to virtuous people. Rather, it belongs to them absolutely, as is the case of all the virtues. We must conclude then that shame is not a special quality in a virtuous person.
Tertiam obviationem ponit ibi, si autem inverecundia et cetera. Posset enim aliquis concludere quod quia inverecundia et non verecundari de turpi operatione est quiddam pravum, quod propter hoc verecundari sit virtuosum. 880. At “But if shamelessness” [b, iii] he gives a third objection. Someone could draw the conclusion that, because shamelessness and the absence of shame concerning a disreputable operation is an evil thing, for this reason shame is virtuous.
Sed ipse dicit hoc non esse necessarium: quia utrumque, scilicet tam verecundia quam inverecundia, supponit operationem turpem, quae non competit virtuoso. Qua tamen supposita, convenientius est quod eam aliquis aspernetur per verecundiam quam quod de ea non curet per inverecundiam. Ex his etiam apparet quod verecundia non sit virtus; nam si esset virtus, inesset virtuoso. 881. But Aristotle says that this is not a necessary inference because both shame and shamelessness suppose a dishonorable act which is not attributable to a morally good man. On this basis it is more reasonable that a man should reject the disgraceful operation by reason of shame than not care about it by reason of shamelessness. From this it is clear also that shame is not a virtue, for if it were a virtue it would exist in a virtuous person.
Est autem attendendum quod supra posuit passionem laudabilem, scilicet Nemesym, de qua hic mentionem non facit quia non est intentionis suae de his passionibus hic determinare: hoc enim magis pertinet ad rhetoricam, ut patet in II rhetoricae. Unde nec hic de verecundia determinavit nisi ostendens eam non esse virtutem, et relinquitur idem intelligendum de Nemesi. 882. We must take into account that the Philosopher previously (356) treated the praiseworthy passion of righteous indignation (nemesis), and that here he does not mention it because it is not his intention to treat these passions on this occasion. This matter pertains rather to rhetoric, as is clear from the second book of the Rhetoric (Ch. 9, 1386 b 9 sq.). Hence, neither does he here consider shame except to show that it is not a virtue. He leaves the same thing to be understood about righteous indignation.
Deinde cum dicit: non est autem etc., inducit simile de continentia; quae cum sit laudabilis, non est virtus, sed habet aliquid virtutis admixtum. Continens enim sequitur rationem rectam, quod pertinet ad virtutem. Patitur tamen concupiscentias pravas vehementes, quod pertinet ad defectum virtutis. Et de his dicetur infra in septimo. Satis autem convenienter inducit similitudinem de continentia, quia verecundia maxime requiritur ubi abundant passiones pravae, quod convenit continentibus, ut dictum est. 883. Then [B], at “Likewise, continence,” he introduces something similar concerning continence which, although laudable, is not a virtue but has an admixture of virtue. Certainly, the continent man follows right reason, and this pertains to virtue. Nevertheless, he suffers vehement and evil desires, and this pertains to lack of virtue. We will discuss these subjects afterwards in the seventh book (1435-1454). It is enough that he brings out in a fitting manner shame’s resemblance to continence because shame is especially necessary where evil passions abound, as they do in continent people. We have already remarked this (873).
Ultimo autem continuat se ad sequentia, dicens quod dicendum est deinceps de iustitia. Et in hoc terminatur sententia quarti libri. 884. Finally, he makes a connection with what follows, saying that we must next discuss justice. With this the teaching of the fourth book comes to an end.