CHAPTER 13 444B7–445B2
τὰ δὲ μὴ ἀναπνέοντα ὅτι μὲν ἔχει αἴσθησιν τοῦ ὀσφραντοῦ, φανερόν· καὶ γὰρ ἰχθύες καὶ τὸ τῶν ἐντόμων γένος πᾶν ἀκριβῶς καὶ πόρρωθεν αἰσθάνεται, διὰ τὸ θρεπτικὸν εἶδος τῆς ὀσμῆς, ἀπέχοντα πολὺ τῆς οἰκείας τροφῆς, οἷον αἵ τε μέλιτται [ποιοῦσι πρὸς τὸ μέλι] καὶ τὸ τῶν μικρῶν μυρμήκων γένος, οὓς καλοῦσί τινες κνῖπας, καὶ τῶν θαλαττίων αἱ πορφύραι, καὶ πολλὰ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν τοιούτων ζῴων ὀξέως αἰσθάνεται τῆς τροφῆς διὰ τὴν ὀσμήν.	444b7 It is clear that the ones that do not breathe have sensation of the odorous. For both fish and the whole class of insects keenly sense from a distance because of the nutritive species of odor, although they are very far from their proper food. So do bees in relation to honey; and the genus of small ants some call “hexapods”; and, among marine animals, the purple-fish. And many other such animals acutely sense their food because of odor.
ὅτῳ δὲ αἰσθάνεται, οὐχ ὁμοίως φανερόν. διὸ κἂν ἀπορήσειέ τις τίνι αἰσθάνονται τῆς ὀσμῆς, εἴπερ ἀναπνέουσι μὲν γίγνεται τὸ ὀσμᾶσθαι μοναχῶς (τοῦτο γὰρ φαίνεται ἐπὶ τῶν ἀναπνεόντων συμβαῖνον πάντων), ἐκείνων δ΄ οὐθὲν ἀναπνεῖ, αἰσθάνεται μέντοι, εἰ μή τις παρὰ τὰς πέντε αἰσθήσεις ἑτέρα. τοῦτο δ΄ ἀδύνατον· τοῦ γὰρ ὀσφραντοῦ ὄσφρησις, ἐκεῖνα δὲ τούτου αἰσθάνεται,	444b15 But what they sense it with is not so clear. Therefore someone might raise the difficulty what it is they sense odor with, since smelling takes place in all animals that do breathe in one and the same way: for this is what seems to happen in all animals that do breathe, but none of these animals breathe, and yet they do sense. Unless there is some other sense besides the five? But this is impossible: for the odorous is the object of the sense of smell, and the odorous is what they sense.
ἀλλ΄ οὐ τὸν αὐτὸν ἴσως τρόπον, ἀλλὰ τοῖς μὲν ἀναπνέουσι τὸ πνεῦμα ἀφαιρεῖ τὸ ἐπικείμενον ὥσπερ πῶμά τι (διὸ οὐκ αἰσθάνεται μὴ ἀναπνέοντα), τοῖς δὲ μὴ ἀναπνέουσιν ἀφῄρηται τοῦτο, καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῶν ὀφθαλμῶν τὰ μὲν ἔχει βλέφαρα τῶν ζῴων, ὧν μὴ ἀνακαλυφθέντων οὐ δύναται ὁρᾶν, τὰ δὲ σκληρόφθαλμα οὐκ ἔχει, διόπερ οὐ προσδεῖται οὐδενὸς τοῦ ἀνακαλύψοντος, ἀλλ΄ ὁρᾷ ἐκ τοῦ δυνατοῦ ὄντος αὐτοῖς εὐθύς.	444b21 But perhaps not in the same way. In the ones that breathe, the breath removes something that lies over as a covering, which is why they do not sense when they are not breathing. But in the ones that do not breathe this is absent. It is similar with the eyes. Some animals have eyelids, and when these are not opened they cannot see at all. But animals that have hard eyes do not have these, and so they do not need anything to open them; rather, they see immediately by the faculty in them.
ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ζῴων ὁτιοῦν οὐδὲν δυσχεραίνει τῶν καθ΄ αὑτὰ δυσωδῶν τὴν ὀσμήν, ἂν μή τι τύχῃ φθαρτικὸν ὄν, ὑπὸ τούτων δ΄ ὁμοίως φθαρεῖται καθάπερ καὶ οἱ ἄνθρωποι ὑπὸ τῆς τῶν ἀνθράκων ἀτμίδος καρηβαροῦσι καὶ φθείρονται πολλάκις· οὕτως ὑπὸ τῆς τοῦ θείου δυνάμεως καὶ τῶν ἀσφαλτωδῶν φθείρεται [445a] τἆλλα ζῷα, καὶ φεύγει διὰ τὸ πάθος. αὐτῆς δὲ καθ΄ αὑτὴν τῆς δυσωδίας οὐδὲν φροντίζουσιν (καίτοι πολλὰ τῶν φυομένων δυσώδεις ἔχει τὰς ὀσμάς), ἐὰν μή τι συμβάλληται πρὸς τὴν γεῦσιν ἢ τὴν ἐδωδὴν αὐτοῖς.	444b28 Likewise, none of the other animals disdains what is of itself foul with respect to odor, unless something happens to be injurious, and they are inured by such things in the same way. Just as human beings suffer cold in the head from coal-smoke, and are often injured by it, and are injured by the power of sulfur, so other animals also avoid these because of the affection. But they do not care about the foulness itself in itself—although many growing things have foul odors—but only whether it affects the taste or the food.
ἔοικε δ΄ ἡ αἴσθησις ἡ τοῦ ὀσφραίνεσθαι, περιττῶν οὐσῶν τῶν αἰσθήσεων καὶ τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ ἔχοντος μέσον τοῦ περιττοῦ, καὶ αὐτὴ μέση εἶναι τῶν τε ἁπτικῶν, οἷον ἁφῆς καὶ γεύσεως, καὶ τῶν δι΄ ἄλλου αἰσθητικῶν, οἷον ὄψεως καὶ ἀκοῆς. διὸ καὶ τὸ ὀσφραντὸν τῶν θρεπτικῶν ἐστὶ πάθος τι (ταῦτα δ΄ ἐν τῷ ἁπτῷ γένει), καὶ τοῦ ἀκουστοῦ δὲ καὶ τοῦ ὁρατοῦ, διὸ καὶ ἐν ἀέρι καὶ ἐν ὕδατι ὀσμῶνται. ὥστ΄ ἐστὶ τὸ ὀσφραντὸν κοινόν τι τούτων ἀμφοτέρων, καὶ τῷ τε ἁπτῷ ὑπάρχει καὶ τῷ ἀκουστῷ καὶ τῷ διαφανεῖ· διὸ καὶ εὐλόγως παρείκασται ξηρότητος ἐν ὑγρῷ καὶ χυτῷ οἷον βαφή τις εἶναι καὶ πλύσις. πῶς μὲν οὖν εἴδη δεῖ λέγειν καὶ πῶς οὐ δεῖ τοῦ ὀσφραντοῦ, ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον εἰρήσθω.	445a4 The senses exist in an odd number, and an odd number has a middle. The sense for smelling seems to be a middle between the tactile senses, touch and taste, and those that sense through something else, sight and hearing. Thus the odorous is an affection of nourishment; the objects of the former senses are in the same genus. But it is also in the genus of the visible and the audible; thus things are smelled both in air and in water. So the odorous is something common to both; it is both in the genus of the tangible, and in that of the transparent and the audible. Therefore odorous enchymous dryness in moistness and fluidity is reasonably compared to a tincture and a wash. Let this much be said, then, about how we should speak of species of the odorous, and how we should not.
ὃ δὲ λέγουσί τινες τῶν Πυθαγορείων, οὐκ ἔστιν εὔλογον· τρέφεσθαι γάρ φασιν ἔνια ζῷα ταῖς ὀσμαῖς.	445a16 What some Pythagoreans say is not reasonable: they say that some animals are nourished by odors.
πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ ὁρῶμεν ὅτι τὴν τροφὴν δεῖ εἶναι συνθετήν (καὶ γὰρ τὰ τρεφόμενα οὐχ ἁπλᾶ ἐστιν, διὸ καὶ περιττώματα γίγνεται τῆς τροφῆς, ἢ ἐν αὐτοῖς ἢ ἔξω, ὥσπερ τοῖς φυτοῖς, ἐπεὶ δ΄ οὐδὲ τὸ ὕδωρ ἐθέλει αὐτὸ μόνον ἄμεικτον ὂν τρέφεινσω ματῶδες γάρ τι δεῖ εἶναι τὸ συστησόμενονἔτι πολὺ ἧττον εὔλογον τὸν ἀέρα σωματοῦσθαι)·	445a17 For, first, we see that food must be composite, for what is nourished is also non-simple. This is also why a superfluity of food is produced, whether inside, or, in the case of plants, outside. Moreover, water alone is not going to nourish by itself for what is going to build up has to be something bodily. Moreover, it is much less reasonable that air should become bodily.
πρὸς δὲ τούτοις, ὅτι πᾶσιν ἔστι τοῖς ζῴοις τόπος δεκτικὸς τῆς τροφῆς, ἐξ οὗ ἕλκον λαμβάνει τὸ σῶμα· τοῦ δ΄ ὀσφραντοῦ ἐν τῇ κεφαλῇ τὸ αἰσθητήριον, καὶ μετὰ πνευματώδους εἰσέρχεται ἀναθυμιά σεως, ὥστ΄ εἰς τὸν ἀναπνευστικὸν βαδίζοι ἂν τόπον. ὅτι μὲν οὖν οὐ συμβάλλεται εἰς τροφὴν τὸ ὀσφραντόν, ᾗ ὀσφραντόν, δῆλον·	445a23 In addition to this, we see that all animals have a place that is able to receive food, from which, after the food enters, the body receives it. But the place for the odorous is in the head, and odor enters with the breath, and so goes to the place for breathing. It is clear, then, that the odorous as such does not contribute to nourishment.
ὅτι μέντοι εἰς ὑγίειαν, καὶ ἐκ τῆς αἰσθήσεως καὶ ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων φανερόν, ὥστε ὅπερ ὁ χυμὸς ἐν τῷ θρεπτικῷ καὶ πρὸς τὰ τρεφόμενα, τοῦτ΄ ἐστὶ πρὸς ὑγίειαν τὸ [445b] ὀσφραντόν.	445a29 But it is clear that it does contribute to health, both from observation and from what has been said. Thus the odorous is to health what flavor, in nourishing part, is to nourishment.
καθ΄ ἕκαστον μὲν οὖν αἰσθητήριον διωρίσθω τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον.	445b1 Let this be the determination, then, with respect to each sensitive part.

Commentary
Postquam philosophus ostendit quod homines et quaedam alia animalia odorant respirando, hic inquirit quomodo animalia non respirantia odorant.	444b7 After the Philosopher has shown that men and certain other animals smell by breathing, here he inquires into the way non-breathing animals smell.
Et circa hoc duo facit. Primo ostendit quid circa huiusmodi animalia sit manifestum. Secundo quid circa ea sit dubium, ibi, quomodo autem et cetera.	On this point he does two things. First he shows what is clear in such animals; second what is unclear, where he says But what they sense with it (444b 15).
Dicit ergo primo manifestum esse quod animalia quae non respirant, sentiant odorabile, ex hoc quod videmus pisces et omne genus entomorum, idest insectorum animalium, sicut sunt formicae, apes, et huiusmodi, acute sentire de longe nutrimentum suum, quando distant a proprio cibo, plus quam per proprium visum possent id percipere. Unde manifestum est, quod id percipiunt propter nutritivam speciem odoris, scilicet inquantum sentiunt illam odoris speciem, quae proportionatur sapori, et indicat qualitatem nutrimenti.	Accordingly he first says that it is clear that animals that do not breathe sense the odorous, because, as we see, fish and the whole class of insects—that is, partitioned animals such as ants, bees, and the like—acutely sense their nourishment from a distance, when they are too distant from their proper food to be able to perceive it by their own sense of sight. Hence it is clear that they perceive it because the nutritive species of odor—that is, inasmuch as they perceive the kind of odor that is analogous to flavor, and indicates quality of nourishment.
Et ponit exemplum de apibus, quae longe moventur ad suum cibum quaerendum, scilicet mel, et de quibusdam formicis parvis, quae habent sex pedes, et quibusdam animalibus aliis, quae purpurae vocantur propter colorem, et similiter multa animalia non respirantia inveniuntur, quae acute a remotis sentiunt suam escam propter odorem.	He gives the example of bees, which are moved from a distance to seek honey; and that of small six-legged ants, which are also moved from a distance to seek their food; and that of certain other animals called purple-fish because of their color. Likewise many non-breathing animals are found that acutely sense their food from a distance because of odor.
Deinde cum dicit quomodo autem ostendit quid circa huiusmodi animalia sit dubium.	444b15 Then, when he says But what they sense it with, he shows what the difficulty is with such animals.
Et circa hoc tria facit. Primo movet dubitationem. Secundo solvit, ibi, sed non forte eodem. Tertio manifestat solutionem magis per simile, ibi, similiter autem et aliorum.	On this point he does three things. First he raises the difficulty. Second he solves it, where he says But perhaps not in the same way (444b21). Third he clarifies the solution by means of a comparison, where he says Likewise, none of the other animals (444b28).
Dicit ergo primo, quod, cum manifestum sit quod praedicta animalia sentiunt odorem, non est manifestum quomodo sentiant odorem. Et ratio dubitationis est, quia omnia animalia respirantia percipiunt odorem uno modo, scilicet respirando. Hoc enim per experimentum apparet accidere in omnibus animalibus respirantibus. Sed circa praedicta animalia apparet quod non respirant et tamen sentiunt odorabile.	Accordingly he first says that although it is clear that the above-mentioned animals perceive odor, what they sense it with is not so clear. The reason for the difficulty is that all breathing animals sense odor in one and the same way, namely by breathing: for it is clear from experience that this seems to happen in all breathing animals. But in the case of the abovementioned animals, it is clear that they do not breathe, and that yet they do sense the odorous.
Posset autem aliquis assignare rationem, dicens quod quodam alio sensu, qui est propter quinque sensus nominatos, huiusmodi animalia sentiunt odorabile; et posset videri responsio probabilis, quia sentire est pati quoddam, unde diversus modus sentiendi est quasi diversus modus patiendi, qui indicat diversitatem potentiae passivae, sicut diversus modus agendi significat diversitatem virtutis activae: videmus enim quod quanto calor est fortior tanto calefactio est vehementior; et sic ex parte passivorum quae alio modo patiuntur, aliam potentiam passivam habere videntur; et sic quae alio modo sentiunt videntur habere alium sensum.	However, one might give a reason for this difference by saying that such animals sense the odorous by some other sense besides the five senses to which names have been given. This answer might seem probable for the following reason. To sense is to be affected by something, and so a different mode of sensing is as it were a different mode of being affected that indicates a difference of passive power. It is like the way in which a different mode of acting signifies a difference of active power; as we see, the stronger heat is, the more vehement is the action of heating. Likewise, then, on the side of what is passive, what is affected in a different mode seems to have a different passive power, and thus what senses in a different mode seems to have a different sense-power.
Sed quod alio modo sentiant odorabile est impossibile; quia ubi est idem sensibile est idem sensus. Potentiae enim distinguuntur secundum obiecta. Idem autem est sensibile, quod sentiunt utraque animalia, scilicet odorabile. Unde non potest esse alius et alius sensus.	But it is impossible for them to sense the odorous in a different mode, because where there is the same sensible object there is the same sense-power, for powers are distinguished according to objects. But it is the same sensible object that both kinds of animal sense, namely the odorous. Hence it cannot be that the sense-powers are different.
Deinde cum dicit sed non forte solvit praemissam dubitationem per hoc quod idem odorabile sentiunt cum eodem sensu, sed non eodem modo.	444b21 Then, when he says But perhaps not in the same way, he solves the difficulty presented as follows: the two kinds of animal perceive the same object of smell, and with the same sense-power, but not in the same way.
Considerandum enim est quod modus sentiendi potest diversificari dupliciter.	For it must be considered that the mode of sensing can be varied in two ways.
Uno modo per se, quod est secundum diversam habitudinem sensibilis ad sensum; et talis diversitas in modo sentiendi diversificat sensum; puta quod unus sensus sentit sensibile coniunctum, sicut tactus, alius autem sensibile remotum, sicut visus.	One is per se: this is according to the different relationships of sensible objects to sense-powers, and such variation in mode of sensing makes for different senses. For example, one sense, such as touch, perceives an object united to it, but another, such as sight, perceives a remote object.
Est et alia diversitas in modo sentiendi per accidens, quae non diversificat sensum et attenditur secundum remotionem prohibentis; et talis diversitas in modo sentiendi est in proposito, quia in animalibus respirantibus per respirationem removetur quoddam quod per modum cooperculi subiacet organo odoratus; et ideo quando non respirant impediuntur ab odorando propter huiusmodi cooperculum. Sed animalia non respirantia carent huiusmodi cooperculo, et ideo non indigent respiratione ad odorandum, sicut videmus in oculis, quod quaedam animalia, habent palpebras, quae si non aperiantur, non possunt huiusmodi animalia videre.	But there is another variation in mode of sensing that is accidental: this does not make for different sense-powers; rather, it is understood with respect to removal of an impediment. It is this kind of variation in mode of sensing that is under discussion. For in animals that breathe, something that lies over the organ of smell a covering is removed by the breathing, and so when they are not breathing they are prevented from smelling because of this covering. But animals that do not breathe lack such a covering, and so they do not need to breathe in order to smell.
Huiusmodi autem palpebras dedit natura animalibus indigentibus acutiori visu propter securitatem oculi ut oculus conservetur. Unde animalia habentia duros oculos, quasi non indigentia acuto visu, non habent huiusmodi palpebras, et ideo non indigent aliquo motu aperiente palpebras ad videndum, sed statim oculos habent ad videndum, et facultatem nullo remoto.	Likewise we see that some animals have eyelids, and if these are not opened such animals cannot see. Nature gave such eyelids to animals that need a more acute sense of sight in order to preserve their eyes, which are soft. Hence animals that have hard eyes—animals that, as it were, do not need an acute sense of sight—do not have such eyelids, and so do not need any movement of opening the eyelids in order to see. Rather the eye has the faculty for seeing immediately, without the removal of anything.
Deinde cum dicit similiter autem manifestat praedictam solutionem per aliud simile per olfactum, in quo est quaedam alia diversitas, inter animalia, quae non diversificat sensum. Nullum enim aliorum animalium, praeter hominem, graviter fert ea quae habent foetidum odorem secundum seipsa, idest non per comparationem ad nutrimentum.	444b28 Then, when he says Likewise, none of the other animals, he clarifies the above-mentioned solution through another comparison involving the sense of smell, in which there is another variation among animals that does not make for difference of sense-power. None of the other animals besides the human being is pained by what has foul odor of itself—that is, not in relation to nourishment.
Et hoc quidem superius dixerat. Sed poterat esse circa haec dubitatio ex hoc quod quaedam animalia videntur huiusmodi foetidos odores fugere.	He said this above, but there might be a difficulty on the point, because some animals seem to avoid foul odors of this kind; and so he has returned to the point to remove this difficulty.
Et ideo repetit ut hanc dubitationem removeret; et dicit, quod alia animalia non fugiunt odores secundum se foetidos nisi per accidens, inquantum, scilicet accidit huiusmodi foetidum odorem esse corruptivum. Cum enim odor causetur ex calido, humido et sicco, ut supra dictum est: quandoque contingit quod foetidus odor provenit ex magna distemperantia in praedictis qualitatibus, et sic simul cum odore immutatur medium ad aliquam pessimam passivam dispositionem, quae corrumpit corpora aliorum animalium, sicut et hominis; quam quidem immutationem alia animalia sentiunt per sensum tactus, et ideo fugiunt huiusmodi foetida.	He says that the other animals do not avoid odors that are of themselves foul except accidentally, that is, inasmuch as a foul odor of this kind happens to be injurious. For since odor is caused by heat, moisture, and dryness, as was said above, it sometimes happens that a foul odor comes from a great disorder in the qualities mentioned, and so, in receiving the odor, the medium is simultaneously altered to an extremely harmful condition that destroys the bodies of the other animals as well as that of the human being. The other animals sense this alteration by touch, and so flee such foul things.
Et ponit exemplum, quod homines patiuntur gravedinem capitis a fumo carbonum propter eius distemperantiam et quandoque usque ad corruptionem. Similiter est de sulphure. Unde animalia fugiunt huiusmodi corruptiva propter passionem corporis, quam sentiunt; sed de ipsa foetiditate odoris secundum se considerata non curant, quamvis multa terrae nascentium habeant foetidos odores nisi secundum quod foetiditas odoris repraesentat aliquod circa gustum, vel circa convenientiam proprii nutrimenti.	He gives the example of human beings suffering cold in the head from coal-smoke, because of its disorder, sometimes to the point of destruction; and it is the same with sulfur. Hence animals avoid these destructive things because of the affection of destruction they perceive. But they do not care about the foulness itself of the odor considered in itself—although many things that grow from the earth have foul odors—but only according as the foulness of the odor represents something concerning taste, or concerning the suitability of their proper nourishment.
Deinde cum dicit videtur autem comparat sensum odoratus ad alios sensus.	445a4 Then when he says The senses exist in an odd number, be compares the sense of smell to other senses.
Et primo determinat veritatem. Secundo excludit errorem, ibi, quod autem quidam.	First he determines the truth. Second he eliminates an error, where he says What some Pythagoreans say (445a16).
Circa primum considerandum est quod secundum consuetudinem Pythagoricorum philosophus utitur huiusmodi proprietate numeri ad ostendendum comparationem sensuum. Numerus enim impar non potest dividi in duo media, sicut par; sed in medio remanet aliquid indivisum inter duas partes aequales, sicut in quinario remanet unitas media inter duo et duo. Cum autem sensus sint in impari numero constituti, scilicet quinario, duo eorum sunt tactivi, quia scilicet sentiunt suum sensibile coniunctum non per medium extraneum, scilicet tactus et gustus; duo autem eorum, scilicet visus et auditus, sentiunt suum sensibile remotum per alia, idest per extrinseca media. Odoratus autem in medio utrorumque, unde et cum utriusque convenit:	On the first point it must be considered that, following the custom of the Pythagoreans, the Philosopher here uses a property of number in order to draw a comparison among the senses. An odd number cannot be divided into two halves like an even one: rather there remains something undivided in the middle between two equal parts, as in a group of five there remains an intermediate unit between two groups of two. Now the senses are set up in an odd number, that is, a group of five. Two of them are tactile, because they do not perceive their objects, which are united to them, through external media, and these are touch and taste. Two of them, namely sight and hearing, perceive their remote objects through something else, that is, external media. But smell is in the middle between the two groups of two, and so it also has something in common with both groups.
cum tactu quidem et gustu, qui sunt sensus nutrimenti, ut dicitur in secundo de anima, inquantum odorabile est quaedam passio nutritivorum secundum quod odor proportionatur sapori. Et sic tangibilia et gustabilia sunt in eodem genere cum odoribus: et est idem genus visibilis et audibilis et odorabilis, inquantum scilicet utraque cognoscuntur per medium extraneum. Unde odorant animalia per aerem et aquam, sicut vident et audiunt.	It has something in common with touch and taste, which are the senses of nourishment, as is said in On the Soul II inasmuch as the odorous is an affection of nourishment, according as odor is analogous to flavor, and thus objects of touch and taste are in the same genus with objects of taste. The genus of the visible and the audible is the same as that of the odorous inasmuch as both are apprehended through external media; hence animals smell through air and water, just as they also see and hear through them.
Et sic patet quod odorabile est aliquid commune utrisque. Inest enim tactuali, secundum quod est passio nutrimenti, et sic concurrit in eodem cum tangibili et gustabili qualitate; et similiter inest perspicuo et audibili, idest percipitur per medium perspicuum, per quod videtur, et per quod etiam auditur, idest per aerem et aquam; licet non inquantum huiusmodi sunt perspicua, sed inquantum sunt susceptiva enchymae siccitatis, ut supra dictum est. Et ideo a quibusdam rationabiliter ista duo assimilantur, ut esse enchymae siccitatis odoriferae in humido aqueo et fusibili, idest aereo propter facilem diffusionem, sit sicut tinctura quaedam, quae refertur ad immutationem medii a colore, et sicut lotura, quae refertur ad sapores, quia scilicet odor habet convenientiam cum utrisque.	Thus it is clear that the odorous is something common to both genera of sensible objects. For it is in the genus of the tangible according as it is an affection of nourishment and thus comes together in the same genus with the tangible and tastable qualities. Likewise, it is in the genus of the transparent and the audible—that is, it is perceived through the transparent medium through which a thing is seen as well as heard, namely air and water, although it is perceived through these not inasmuch they are transparent, but inasmuch as they are receptive of enchymous dryness, as was said above. And so some reasonably compare it to two things: the being of odorous enchymous dryness in moistness of water and fluidity—that is, fluidity of air—is, because of its ready diffusion, like a tincture—which refers to alteration of a medium by color—and like a wash—which refers to flavors—for odor has something in common with both.
Et post hoc epilogando concludit, dictum esse quomodo oporteat distinguere species odorabilis, et quomodo non, inquantum scilicet accipiuntur odores secundum seipsos.	After this, as an epilogue, he concludes that it has been said how we should distinguish species of the odorous, and how we should not, namely inasmuch as odors are taken in themselves.
Deinde cum dicit quod autem excludit errorem.	445a16 Then when he says What some Pythagoreans say, he eliminates an error.
Et circa hoc tria facit. Primo narrat erroneam opinionem. Secundo improbat eam, ibi, primum quidem enim. Tertio respondet tacitae obiectioni, ibi, quod quidem igitur.	On this point he does three things. First he relates the erroneous opinion. Second he disproves it, where he says For, first, we see that food (445a17). Third he responds to a tacit objection, where he says But it is clear (445a29).
Dicit ergo primo, non esse rationabile quod quidam Pythagorici dixerunt, quaedam animalia nutriri odoribus: secundum quos, odoratus non esset medius inter sensus, ut dictum est, sed omnino connumerandus est sensibus nutrimenti. Movebantur autem ad hoc dicendum, quod videbant homines et animalia confortari odoribus.	Accordingly he first says that what some Pythagoreans said—that some animals are nourished by odors—is not reasonable. According to them, smell would not be intermediate among the senses, as was said, but would have to be completely included with the senses of nourishment. They were moved to say this because they saw that human beings and other animals are fortified by odors.
Deinde cum dicit primum quidem improbat praedictam opinionem duabus rationibus.	445a17 Then, when he says For, first, we see that food, he disproves the above-mentioned opinion by two arguments.
Quarum prima est, quia oportet cibum compositum esse ex pluribus elementis. Simplicia enim elementa non nutriunt, quia animalia, quae ex his nutriuntur, composita sunt ex elementis. Ex eisdem autem nutritur aliquid ex quibus est: ut dictum est in secundo de generatione. Et per huiusmodi signum concludit quod ex cibis generatur aliqua superfluitas interius, sicut patet in animalibus intra quorum corpora sunt quaedam loca deputata ad congregationem superfluitatum, vel exterius emittitur, sicut patet de gummis arborum et de aliis huiusmodi. Si autem aliquod animal vel planta, nutriretur simplici elemento, nulla fieret superfluitas, cum non sit ibi aliqua difformitas partium: cum autem nullum elementum sit aptum nutritioni propter simplicitatem. Adhuc amplius aqua habet speciale impedimentum quare sola non possit nutrire sine commixtione alicuius terrestris; sicut agricultores adhibent fimum, ut aqua commixta nutriat plantas: quia nutrimentum constituit et generat aliquid in substantia nutriti, et ideo oportet quod sit aliquid corporale et solidum, quod non competit aquae. Unde aqua sola non potest nutrire, et multo minus aer: unde relinquitur quod odor nutrire non possit. Manifestum est enim quod odor, cum sit qualitas, secundum se non potest nutriendo constituere substantiam, nisi forte ratione susceptivi, quod est aer vel aqua. Et si odor esset evaporatio vel fumalis exhalatio, ut antiqui dixerunt, adhuc ratio remanet, quia utrumque pertinet ad naturam aeris, ut supra dictum est.	The first is that food must be composed of more than one element. For simple elements do not nourish, because animals that are nourished by them are composed of the four elements, and a thing is nourished by the same things by which it exists, as was said in On Generation II. He concludes that a sign of this is that a superfluity is produced from food: whether within, as is evident in animals, in the bodies of which are places assigned for the gathering of superfluities, or outside, in the case of plants, the superfluities of which are immediately expelled outward, as is clear in the case of gums of trees and other such things. If an animal or plant were nourished by one simple element, no superfluity would occur, since in a simple element there is uniformity of parts. And although no one element is suitable for nutrition, because of its simplicity, water in addition has a special impediment because of which it cannot nourish alone, without the admixture of something earthen, which is why farmers add manure to nourish plants with water mixed with something: nourishment builds up and generates something in the substance of what is nourished, and so it has to be something bodily and solid, which is not true of water. Hence water alone cannot nourish, and much less can air. And hence it remains that neither can odor nourish: for it is clear that odor, since it is a quality, cannot of itself build up a substance by nourishing it, except perhaps by reason of what is receptive of it, namely air or water. Even if odor were evaporation, or exhalation of smoke, as the Ancients said, the argument would still stand, because both of these pertain to the nature of air, as was said above.
Secundam rationem ponit ibi, cum his. Et dicit quod in omnibus animalibus est aliquis locus, in quo primo recipitur cibus scilicet stomachus, unde derivatur ad singulas partes corporis. Quia vero animalia plurima respirando odorant, si consideremus ipsum odorabile, manifestum est quod sentitur organo circa cerebrum existente, ut supra dictum est. Ipse autem aer respiratus, cum quo odor attrahitur, vadit ad locum respirativum, idest ad pulmonem. Manifestum est autem quod in animalibus, neque cerebrum neque pulmo est locus recipiens cibum. Unde manifestum est quod odor non nutrit, confortat autem propter immutationem, quae est a calido humido et sicco, et propter delectationem, sicut et malus odor corrumpit, ut supra dictum est.	445a23 Then, when he says In addition to this, we see, he presents the second argument. He says that all animals have a place in which food is first received—that is, the stomach—from which it is drawn off into individual parts of the body. If we consider the odorous itself, it is clear (since most animals smell by breathing) that it is perceived by an organ near the brain, as was said above. But the air inbreathed, with which odor is drawn in, goes to the place for breathing, that is, the lung. Now it is clear that neither the brain nor the lung is the place in animals that first receives food. Hence it is clear that odor does not nourish. But it does fortify because of alteration by heat, moistness, and dryness, and because of pleasure; just as bad odor is destructive, as was said above.
Deinde cum dicit quod quidem respondet tacitae obiectioni. Posset enim aliquis obiicere. Si odor non nutrit, ergo ad nihil est utilis. Sed ipse respondet quod licet non nutriat, tamen confert ad sanitatem, sicut manifestum est ad sensum et per ea quae supra dicta sunt. Unde concludit quod sicut sapor ordinatur ad nutritionem, ita odor ad sanitatem.	445a29 Then, when he says But it is clear, he responds to a tacit objection. For one might object: if odor does not nourish, it is utterly useless. He answers that although it does not nourish, nevertheless it does contribute to health, as is clear from observation, and from what has been said above. Hence he concludes that, as flavor is ordered to nutrition, so odor is ordered to health.
Ultimo autem epilogando concludit quod dictum est de sensibilibus secundum unumquodque organum sensus.	445b1 Finally, by way of epilogue, he concludes that sensible objects have been discussed with respect to each organ of sense.

CHAPTER 14 445B3–446A20
Ἀπορήσειε δ΄ ἄν τις, εἰ πᾶν σῶμα εἰς ἄπειρον διαιρεῖται, ἆρα καὶ τὰ παθήματα τὰ αἰσθητά, οἷον χρῶμα καὶ χυμὸς καὶ ὀσμὴ καὶ ψόφος, καὶ βαρῦ καὶ κοῦφον, καὶ θερμὸν καὶ ψυχρόν, καὶ σκληρὸν καὶ μαλακόν, ἢ ἀδύνατον.	445b3 But someone will raise an objection: if every body is infinitely divisible, are sensible affections also? For instance, color and flavor and odor and sound, and heaviness and coldness, and hot and light, and hard and soft.
ποιητικὸν γάρ ἐστιν ἕκαστον αὐτῶν τῆς αἰσθήσεως (τῷ δύνασθαι γὰρ κινεῖν αὐτὴν λέγεται πάντα), ὥστ΄ ἀνάγκη, εἰ ἡ δύναμις, καὶ τὴν αἴσθησιν εἰς ἄπειρα διαιρεῖσθαι καὶ πᾶν εἶναι μέγεθος αἰσθητόν (ἀδύνατον γὰρ λευκὸν μὲν ὁρᾶν, μὴ ποσὸν δέ)·	445b6 But this is impossible. For each of these is something that activates a sense-power. For all are named from the fact that they are able to move a sense-power. Necessarily, then, sense is infinitely divisible, and every magnitude is sensible. For it is impossible to see something that is white but not a quantity.
εἰ γὰρ μὴ οὕτως, ἐνδέχοιτ΄ ἂν εἶναί τι σῶμα μηδὲν ἔχον χρῶμα μηδὲ βάρος μηδ΄ ἄλλο τι τοιοῦτον πάθος, ὥστ΄ οὐδ΄ αἰσθητὸν ὅλως· ταῦτα γὰρ τὰ αἰσθητά. τὸ ἄρ΄ αἰσθητὸν ἔσται συγκείμενον οὐκ ἐξ αἰσθητῶν. ἀλλ΄ ἀναγκαῖον· οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἔκ γε τῶν μαθηματικῶν.	445b11 For if this is not so, then there can be a body that has no color, or heaviness, or other such affection, and so is not sensible at all: for these are the sensible objects. Therefore, there will be something sensible composed of what is not sensible. But it necessarily is, for it is not composed of mathematical objects.
ἔτι τίνι κρινοῦμεν ταῦτα καὶ γνωσόμεθα; ἢ τῷ νῷ; ἀλλ΄ οὐ νοητά, οὐδὲ νοεῖ ὁ νοῦς τὰ ἐκτὸς μὴ μετ΄ αἰσθήσεως.	445b15 Moreover, what will we assign them to other than intellect, or how will we know them? But they are not intelligible, for intellect does not understand what is outside except with sensation.
ἅμα δ΄ εἰ ταῦτ΄ ἔχει οὕτως, ἔοικε μαρτυρεῖν τοῖς τὰ ἄτομα ποιοῦσι μεγέθη· οὕτω γὰρ ἂν λύοιτο ὁ λόγος. ἀλλ΄ ἀδύνατα· εἴρηται δὲ περὶ αὐτῶν ἐν τοῖς λόγοις τοῖς περὶ κινήσεως.	445b17 But if this is so, it seems to support those who make indivisible magnitudes: thus the discussion is resolved. But this is impossible, as was said before in the discussions of motion.
περὶ δὲ τῆς λύσεως αὐτῶν ἅμα δῆλον ἔσται καὶ διὰ τί πεπέρανται τὰ εἴδη καὶ χρώματος καὶ χυμοῦ καὶ φθόγγων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων αἰσθητῶν. ὧν μὲν γάρ ἐστιν ἔσχατα, ἀνάγκη πεπεράνθαι τὰ ἐντός· τὰ δ΄ ἐναντία ἔσχατα, πᾶν δὲ τὸ αἰσθητὸν ἔχει ἐναντίωσιν, οἷον ἐν χρώματι τὸ λευκὸν καὶ τὸ μέλαν, ἐν χυμῷ γλυκὺ καὶ πικρόν· καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις δὴ πᾶσίν ἐστιν ἔσχατα τὰ ἐν αντία.	445b20 With the resolution of this, it will at the same tine also be made clear why the species of color and flavor and sounds and other sensible objects are limited. For what is inside the extremes is necessarily determinate, and extremes are contraries. But every kind of sensible object has contrariety, for instance black and white in color, sweet and bitter in flavor. And so in all the others there are extremes that are contraries.
τὸ μὲν οὖν συνεχὲς εἰς ἄπειρα τέμνεται ἄνισα, εἰς δ΄ ἴσα πεπερασμένα· τὸ δὲ μὴ καθ΄ αὑτὸ συνεχὲς εἰς πεπερασμένα εἴδη.	445b27 A continuum, then, is divisible into an infinite number of unequal parts, but into a finite number of equal species. And what is not of itself continuous is divisible into finite species.
ἐπεὶ οὖν τὰ μὲν πάθη ὡς εἴδη λεκτέον, ὑπάρχει δὲ συνέχεια ἀεὶ ἐν τούτοις, ληπτέον ὅτι τὸ δυνάμει καὶ τὸ ἐνεργείᾳ ἕτερον· καὶ διὰ τοῦτο τὸ μυριοστημόριον λανθάνει [446a] τῆς κέγχρου ὁρωμένης, καίτοι ἡ ὄψις ἐπελήλυθεν, καὶ ὁ ἐν τῇ διέσει φθόγγος λανθάνει, καίτοι συνεχοῦς ὄντος ἀκούει τοῦ μέλους παντός· τὸ δὲ διάστημα τὸ τοῦ μεταξὺ πρὸς τοὺς ἐσχάτους λανθάνει. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις αἰσθητοῖς τὰ μικρὰ πάμπαν· δυνάμει γὰρ ὁρατά, ἐνεργείᾳ δ΄ οὔ, ὅταν μὴ χωρὶς ᾖ· καὶ γὰρ ἐνυπάρχει δυνάμει ἡ ποδιαία τῇ δίποδι, ἐνεργείᾳ δ΄ ἤδη ἀφαιρεθεῖσα.	445b29 We must speak of the affections as “species,” although they exist in a continuity and in these parts. Therefore, we must take it that what is in potentiality and what is in actuality are different. For this reason a tenth of a thousandth of a grain of millet escapes the notice of sight, although sight goes over it. And the sound in a diesis escapes notice, although all of the singing, which is continuous, is heard. The distance between the extremes escapes notice. It is similar with the extremely small in other sensible objects. They themselves are visible in potentiality, but not in actuality when they are net separated. Thus a one-foot length exists in potentiality in something two feet long, and exists in actuality when it is divided off.
χωριζόμεναι δ΄ αἱ τηλικαῦται ὑπεροχαὶ εὐλόγως μὲν ἂν καὶ διαλύοιντο εἰς τὰ περιέχοντα, ὥσπερ καὶ ἀκαριαῖος χυμὸς εἰς τὴν θάλατταν ἐγχυθείς.	446a7 But it is reasonable that separated parts of such extremely small size are dissolved into the surroundings, like a tiny amount of flavor poured into the sea.
οὐ μὴν ἀλλ΄ ἐπειδὴ οὐδ΄ ἡ τῆς αἰσθήσεως ὑπεροχὴ καθ΄ αὑτὴν αἰσθητὴ οὐδὲ χωριστή (δυνάμει γὰρ ἐνυπάρχει ἐν τῇ ἀκριβεστέρᾳ ἡ ὑπεροχή), οὐδὲ τὸ τηλικοῦτον αἰσθητὸν χωριστὸν ἔσται ἐνεργείᾳ αἰσθάνεσθαι. ἀλλ΄ ὅμως ἔσται αἰσθητόν· δυνάμει τε γάρ ἐστιν ἤδη, καὶ ἐνεργείᾳ ἔσται προσγενόμενον. ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἔνια μεγέθη καὶ πάθη λανθάνει, καὶ διὰ τίν΄ αἰτίαν, καὶ πῶς αἰσθητὰ καὶ πῶς οὔ, εἴρηται.	446a10 But there is no extremity of the sense-power to correspond to that of the sensible object itself, even if it is separated. The extreme smallness is in potentiality to a surer sense-power. And a separated sensible object of such a size will not be sensed in actuality. Still, it will be a sensible object, for there is already the power, and it will be in actuality when a sense-power comes to it. Thus it has been said that some magnitudes and affections escape notice; and for what cause; and the way in which they are sensible objects, and the way in which they are not.
ὅταν δὲ δὴ ἐνυπάρχῃ τούτῳ τοσαῦτα ὥστε καὶ ἐνεργείᾳ αἰσθητὰ εἶναι, καὶ μὴ μόνον ὅτι ἐν τῷ ὅλῳ ἀλλὰ καὶ χωρίς, πεπερασμένα ἀνάγκη εἶναι τὸν ἀριθμόν, καὶ χρώματα καὶ χυμοὺς καὶ φθόγγους.	446a16 But since there are quantities existing within so as to be sensible in actuality, and not only as in the whole, but also separately, they—colors and flavors and sounds—are necessarily finite according to some number.

Commentary
Postquam philosophus determinavit de organis sensuum et de sensibilibus, hic determinat quasdam quaestiones circa sensum et sensibilia	445b3 After the Philosopher has determined about sense-organs and sensible objects, here he determines some questions about the sense-power and sensible objects.
et primo movet quamdam quaestionem circa ipsa sensibilia. Secundo movet aliam circa immutationem sensus a sensibili, ibi, obiiciet utique aliquis. Tertio movet tertiam circa ipsum sensum, ibi, est autem quaedam obiectio.	First he raises a question about sensible objects themselves. Second he raises another about alteration of the sense-power by a sensible object, where he says But someone will raise an objection (Ch. 15, 446a20). Third he raises a third about the sense-power itself, where he says But there is also another such objection (Ch. 16, 447a 12).
Circa primum tria facit. Primo movet quaestionem, ibi, aut impossibile. Tertio solvit, ibi de solutione autem eorum.	On the first point he does three things. First he raises the question. Second be introduces arguments about it, where he says But this is impossible (445b6). Third he solves it, where he says With the resolution of this (445b20).
Dicit ergo primo, quod omne corpus in infinitum dividitur: hoc enim est de ratione continui, ut patet in libro physicorum. Qualitates autem sensibiles, quae passiones dicuntur, ut dicitur in praedicamentis, sunt in corpore aliquo sicut in subiecto. Est ergo quaestio, quam quis obiicere potest, utrum et ipsae qualitates sensibiles, scilicet color et sapor et alia huiusmodi in infinitum dividantur.	Accordingly be first says that every body is infinitely divisible: for this is of the nature of a continuum, as is clear in the book the Physics. But sensible qualities—which are called affections, as is said in the Categories —are in a body as in their subject. Therefore there is a question someone can raise in objection: whether sensible qualities themselves, such as color and flavor and so on, are infinitely divisible also.
Deinde cum dicit aut impossibile obiicit ad quaestionem motam.	445b6 Then, when he says But this is impossible, he raises objections concerning the question posed.
Et primo ad ostendendum quod qualitates sensibiles non dividuntur in infinitum. Secundo ad oppositum, ibi, si enim non sic. Tertio excludit quamdam solutionem, ibi, sed si haec habent sic.	First he raises objections to show that sensible qualities are not infinitely divisible. Second be raises objections on the other side, where he says For if this is not so (445b11). Third he eliminates a false solution, where he says But if this is so (445b 17).
Dicit ergo primo, quod impossibile videtur qualitates sensibiles dividi in infinitum, quia unaquaeque praedictarum sensibilium qualitatum est nata agere in sensum. In hoc enim propria ratio uniuscuiusque earum consistit, ut moveat sensum, sicut ad rationem coloris pertinet quod possit movere visum. Si ergo praedictae qualitates in infinitum dividuntur, consequens erit quod sensus, id est ipsum sentire, in infinitum dividatur, secundum quod moveri dividitur in infinitum secundum divisionem magnitudinis, secundum quam aliquid movetur: et ita sequeretur, quod sicut id quod movetur pertransit quamlibet magnitudinem, ita sentiens sentiret omnem magnitudinem quantumcumque parvam, et sic omnis magnitudo esset sensibilis.	Accordingly he first says that it seems impossible for sensible qualities to be divided infinitely, because each of the above-mentioned sensible qualities naturally acts on a sense-power. For the proper nature of each of them consists in this: it is able to move a sense-power; for example, it belongs to the nature of color to be able to move the sense of sight. If, then, the above-mentioned qualities are infinitely divisible, the consequence will be that sense—that is, the act of sensing itself—is infinitely divisible. Now an instance of being moved is infinitely divisible according to division of the magnitude through which a thing is moved; and so it would follow that, as something moved goes through every part of the magnitude, so one who senses would sense any magnitude, however small, and so every magnitude would be sensible.
Subdit autem rationem quare non concludit etiam puncta esse sensibilia; quia impossibile est videre album quod non sit quantum; et eadem ratio est de sensibilibus aliis. Huius autem ratio est quia sensus est virtus in magnitudine, cum sit actus organi corporei: et ideo non potest pati nisi ab habente magnitudinem. Activum enim debet esse proportionatum passivo.	But he adds a reason why he does not conclude that even points are perceptible to sense: because it is impossible to see something white that is not a quantity; and the argument is the same with respect to other sensible objects. The reason for this is that a sense-power is a power in a magnitude, since it is the actuality of a bodily organ, and so it can be affected only by what has magnitude: for what is active must be proportioned to what is passive.
Relinquitur autem pro inconvenienti omnem magnitudinem esse sensibilem: quod quomodo sit intelligendum, infra patebit; unde concludi potest, quod qualitates sensibiles non dividuntur in infinitum.	There remains the problem that every magnitude is perceptible; how is this is to be understood will be made clear below. Hence it can be concluded that sensible qualities are not infinitely divisible.
Deinde cum dicit si enim obiicit ad oppositum duabus rationibus. Quarum prima talis est. Si qualitates sensibiles non dividantur, contingit esse aliquod corpus minimum transcendens divisionem sensibilium qualitatum nullam habens sensibilem qualitatem, idest neque colorem, neque gravitatem, neque aliquod aliud huiusmodi; et ita huiusmodi corpus non erit sensibile, quia solae praedictae qualitates sunt sensibiles. Cum igitur huiusmodi parva corpora sint partes totius corporis, quod est sensibile, sequitur quod corpus sensibile sit compositum non ex sensibilibus. Sed necesse est sensibile corpus ex sensibilibus componi. Non enim potest dici, quod corpus sensibile componatur ex mathematicis, scilicet corporibus, in quibus consideratur quantitas, sine qualitatibus sensibilibus. Relinquitur ergo quod oportet qualitates sensibiles in infinitum dividi.	445b11 Then, when he says For if this is not so, he raises objections on the opposite side with two arguments. The first is this. If sensible qualities are not infinitely divisible, then there can be a minimal body that transcends division of sensible qualities and has no sensible quality, i.e. neither color nor heaviness nor any other such quality. And so such a body will not be sensible, because only the qualities mentioned are sensible objects. Therefore, since these tiny bodies are parts of a whole body that is sensible, it will follow that a sensible body is composed of what is not sensible. But a sensible body is necessarily composed of what is sensible, for it cannot be said that a sensible body is composed of mathematical bodies, in which quantity is considered without sensible qualities, Therefore it remains that sensible qualities must be infinitely divisible.
Secundam rationem ponit ibi, amplius quoniam. Et procedit ratio sua ex hoc quod, anima nata est cognoscere omnia vel secundum sensum, vel secundum intellectum, ut habitum est in tertio de anima.	445b15 He presents the second argument where he says Moreover, what will we assign them to. His argument proceeds from the point that the soul by nature knows all things, whether by sense or intellect, as was established in On the Soul III.
Si ergo praedicta minima corpora, quae transcendunt divisionem qualitatum sensibilium, non fuerint sensibilia, utpote sensibilibus qualitatibus carentia, non possunt iudicari nisi per intellectum, ut cognoscantur per ipsum. Sed non potest dici quod sunt intelligibilia. Nihil enim eorum quae sunt extra animam, intellectus intelligit, nisi cum sensu eorum, idest simul ea sentiendo. Si ergo huiusmodi minima corpora non sentiuntur, intelligi non poterunt.	Accordingly, if the above-mentioned minimal bodies that transcend division of sensible qualities are not sensible because they lack sensible qualities, they can be assigned only to intellect as the power that knows them. But it cannot be said that they are intelligible: for intellect understands none of the things outside the soul except with sensation of them—that is, by simultaneously sensing them. If, therefore, these minimal bodies are not sensed, they will not be able to be understood.
Dicit autem hoc ad excludendum opinionem Platonis, qui posuit formas intellectas esse extra animam. Secundum autem Aristotelem res intellectae sunt ipsae naturae rerum, quae sunt in singularibus, quae quidem secundum quod in singularibus sunt, cadunt sub apprehensione sensus: intellectus autem apprehendit huiusmodi naturas abstracte, et attribuit eis quasdam intentiones intelligibiles, scilicet esse genus vel speciem; quae quidem intentiones sunt solum in intellectu, non autem exterius. Unde solus intellectus eas cognoscit.	He says this to eliminate an opinion of Plato, who held that the forms understood exist outside the soul. But according to Aristotle the things understood are the very natures of things in singulars, which, inasmuch as they are in singulars, fall under the apprehension of the sense-power. But the intellect apprehends these natures in an absolute way and assigns to them certain intelligible intentions, namely that of being a genus or species. These intentions exist only in the intellect, not outside it: hence only the intellect knows them.
Deinde cum dicit sed, si haec excludit falsam responsionem. Posset enim aliquis dicere, quod ex quo posita divisione magnitudinis in infinitum, sequitur inconveniens, quicquid dicatur de sensibilibus qualitatibus, sive quod dividantur in infinitum, sive quod non; videtur hoc attestari opinionem illorum, qui ponunt aliquas magnitudines indivisibiles. Per hunc enim modum praedicta dubitatio solvetur. Si enim corpus non est divisibile in infinitum, non sequetur aliqua corpora esse insensibilia, si in infinitum non dividetur qualitas sensibilis. Sed hoc est impossibile, scilicet aliquas magnitudines esse indivisibiles, ut patet per ea quae dicta sunt in sermonibus de motu, id est in sexto physicorum.	445b17 Then, when he says But if this is so, he eliminates a false response. One might argue as follows. A problem follows from positing the infinite divisibility of magnitude, whatever may be said about sensible qualities, whether that they are infinitely divisible or not. This, then, seems to support the opinion of those who posit indivisible magnitudes, because the difficulty is solved in this way: for if a body is not infinitely divisible, then, since sensible quality is not infinitely divisible, it will not follow that there are bodies that cannot be sensed. But this opinion that some magnitudes are indivisible is impossible, as is evident from what was said in the discussions of motion, that is, in Physics VI
Deinde cum dicit de solutione solvit praedictam quaestionem, quam moverat de divisione sensibilium qualitatum.	445b20 Then, when he says With the resolution of this, he solves the question he raised above about division of sensible qualities.
Et primo agit de formali divisione earum quae est generis in species. Secundo de divisione quantitativa, ibi, continuum quidem igitur.	And first he treats their formal division, that is, of genus into species. Second their quantitative division, where he says A continuum, then (445b27).
Dicit ergo primo, quod cum solutione praedictarum dubitationum, simul manifestandum erit quare sunt finitae species coloris, et saporis, et aliorum huiusmodi: hoc enim supra determinandum promiserat.	Accordingly be first says that, together with the solution of the abovementioned difficulties, at the same time it will have to be made clear why the species of color and flavor and other such things are finite: for he promised above that this would be determined.
Et huius rationem assignat, quia, si est devenire ad ultimum ex parte utriusque extremi necesse est ea quae in medio sunt, esse finita, ut probatum est in primo posteriorum. Manifestum est autem quod in quolibet genere sensibilium est quaedam contrarietas quae est maxima distantia. Et ideo contraria oportet esse ultima: sicut in colore, album et nigrum; in sapore, dulce et amarum; et in aliis similiter. Unde relinquitur quod species mediae sunt finitae.	He gives the following reason for this. If it is possible to reach the furthest point starting from either extreme, what is in the middle is necessarily finite, as was proved in Posterior Analytics I. Now it is clear that in any genus of sensible objects there is a contrariety that is the greatest distance, and so the contraries must be the extremes, for instance black and white in color, sweet and bitter in flavor, and likewise in the others. Hence it remains that intermediate species are finite.
Deinde cum dicit continuum quidem solvit prius motam quaestionem de divisione quantitativa sensibilium qualitatum.	445b27 Then, when he says A continuum, then, he solves the question raised earlier about quantitative division of sensible qualities.
Et primo praesupponit quaedam. Secundo procedit ad solvendum, ibi, quoniam igitur passiones.	First he makes some presuppositions. Second he proceeds to solve the question where he says We must speak of the affections (445b29).
Circa primum, praesupponit duo.	On the first point he makes two presuppositions.
Quorum primum est quod continuum quodammodo dividitur in infinita. Si enim fiat divisio in partes aequales, non poterit divisio in infinitum procedere, dummodo continuum sit finitum. Quia, si ab unoquoque finito semper subtrahatur aliquid ad mensuram palmi, totaliter consumetur. Si vero fiat divisio per partes inaequales, procedit divisio in infinitum: puta si totum dividatur in dimidium, et iterum dimidium in dimidium, quod est quarta pars totius, in infinitum procedet divisio.	The first is that a continuum is in a way divisible into an infinite number of parts, and in another way into a finite number. For if a division into equal parts is made, it will not be able to proceed to infinity as long as the continuum is finite, because if one repeatedly removes something the size of a palm from anything finite, it will be completely taken away. But if a division into unequal parts is made, it will proceed to infinity: for instance, if a whole is divided in half, and again the half in half, which is a quarter of the whole, the division will proceed to infinity.
Secunda suppositio est quod id quod non est secundum se continuum, sed per accidens, sicut color et alia huiusmodi, dividitur per se quidem formaliter in species finitas, sicut paulo ante dictum est.	The second supposition is that what is continuous not of itself but accidentally, for example color and other such things, is of itself formally divided into finite species, as was said a little before.
Deinde cum dicit quoniam ergo procedit ad solvendum principalem quaestionem quae erat de divisione sensibilium qualitatum.	445b29 Then, when he says We must speak of the affections, he proceeds to solve the principal question, which was about division of sensible qualities.
Et quia ad hanc quaestionem, rationem assumpserat ex apparentia sensus, ideo primo inquirit de divisione in infinitum quantum ad ipsum sentire. Secundo excludit propositum, quantum ad ipsa sensibilia, ibi, cum autem utique.	Because he had taken his argument on this question from what appears in sensation, first he inquires about division to infinity with respect to the act of sensing itself. Second he concludes to his proposal with respect to sensible things themselves, where he says But since there are quantities (446a16).
Circa primum duo facit. Primo inquirit utrum sentire procedat in infinitum secundum partes existentes in toto. Secundo, utrum secundum partes separatas, ibi, separatae.	On the first point he does two things. First he inquires whether sensing proceeds to infinity with respect to parts existing in a whole. Second, whether it does so with respect to separated parts, where he says But it is reasonable (446a7).
Dicit ergo primo, quod, quia passiones, idest sensibiles qualitates dicendae sunt quasi quaedam species et formae, quae non sunt infinitae secundum se consideratae, sicut dictum est, et cum existunt in continuo sicut in subiecto, secundum cuius divisionem per accidens dividitur, consequens est quod sicut in continuo aliud est in actu, sicut pars separata, et aliud in potentia, scilicet pars in continuo existens non separata, ita etiam in his qualitatibus, quae sunt divisibiles per accidens, pars separata est actus existens, unde potest actu sentiri; pars autem indivisa est in potentia, et ideo non sentitur in actu.	Accordingly he first says that because we must speak of the affections—that is, the sensible qualities—as “species” and forms that are not, considered in themselves, infinite, as was said; and nevertheless they exist in a continuum as their subject, by division of which they are accidentally divided; it follows that, as in a continuum there is something in actuality—namely a separated part—and something else in potentiality—namely a part existing in the continuum unseparated—so also in these qualities that are divisible accidentally a separated part exists in actuality, and hence can be sensed in actuality, but a part not divided off exists in potentiality, and so is not sensed in actuality.
Et inde quod quamvis superveniat visus, tamen aliqua pars eius minima, puta decima millesima, latet visum; et similiter quamvis totus cantus continuus audiatur, tamen auditum aliquid latet parvum de cantu, puta diesis, quod est minimum in melodia, quasi distantia quaedam toni et semitoni: huiusmodi autem distantia media inter ultima latet. Et ita est in aliis sensibus, quod ea quae sunt omnino parva, latent omnino sensuum. Sunt enim sensibilia in potentia, non autem in actu, nisi quando separantur: sic videmus in magnitudinibus quod linea unius pedis est in potentia in linea bipedali, sed tunc est actu quando dividitur a toto.	And thus, although sight goes over a grain of millet, nevertheless some tiny part of the latter—say a tenth of a thousandth—escapes the notice of sight. Likewise, although a whole continuous singing is heard, nevertheless some small part of the singing—such as a diesis, which is the smallest unit in melody, being a distance between a tone and a semitone—escapes the notice of hearing. For this kind of intermediate distance between the extremes escapes notice. And so in the case of other sensible objects what is extremely small altogether escapes the notice of the sense-power. For it is visible in potentiality, but not in actuality, except when it is separated. Similarly we see in magnitudes that a one-foot line exists in potentiality in a two-foot fine, but exists in actuality when it is divided from the whole.
Patet autem ex praemissis falsum esse quod quidam mathematici dicunt, quod nihil simul totum videtur, sed visus percurrit per partes visibiles ac si videret sic continuum, sicut et moveri. Decipiuntur autem in hoc, quod partes continui non sunt visibiles actu, sed solum in potentia. Unde visus utitur toto visibili ut quodammodo uno indivisibili in suo genere, nisi forte utatur partibus non divisis ut divisis, sicut cum sigillatim inspicit unamquamque. Sed tamen nec in hoc procedit visus usque ad quascumque minimas partes, quia sic sentire divideretur in infinitum, quod supra dimissum est pro inconvenienti.	It is clear from the foregoing that what some mathematicians say is false: that nothing is seen whole all at once, but rather sight runs over the parts of a visible object as if seeing were a continuum, like being moved. They are mistaken in this, because the parts of a continuum are visible not in actuality, but only in potentiality. Hence sight takes a visible whole as an indivisible unit belonging to a genus of its own—unless it takes parts that are not divided off as if they were, as when it looks at each, one by one. Nevertheless, even this does not reach as far as every minimal part, because then sensing would be infinitely divisible, which was dismissed above as inconsistent.
Deinde cum dicit separatae autem ostendit quod etiam partes separatae non sunt in infinitum sensibiles.	446a7 Then, when he says But it is reasonable, he shows that not even parts separated off are infinitely perceptible by sense.
Et primo ex parte ipsarum partium. Secundo ex parte ipsius sensus, ibi, quinimmo.	First from the point of view of the parts themselves. Second from the point of view of the sense-power itself, where he says But there is no extremity (446a10).
Dicit ergo primo, quod, si partes in parvitate superabundantes, separantur a toto, rationabiliter videtur quod non possunt permanere propter parvitatem virtutis conservantis, quia virtus corporalis dividitur secundum divisionem magnitudinis, ut patet in septimo physicorum; et ideo minima separata convertuntur in corpus continens, puta aerem vel aquam, sicut patet de aliquo liquore saporoso, qui infunditur mari.	Accordingly he first says that if extremely small parts are separated from a whole, it seems reasonable, because of the smallness of their power of self -preservation, that they cannot continue to last; for bodily power is divided according to division of magnitude, as is clear from Physics VII. And so those separated minimal parts are immediately converted into the surrounding body, for instance air or water, as is clear in the case of flavored drink poured into the sea.
Et ex hoc patet, quare corpus mathematicum est divisibile in infinitum, in quo consideratur sola ratio quantitatis in qua nihil est repugnans divisioni infinitae. Sed corpus naturale, quod consideratur sub tota forma, non potest in infinitum dividi, quia, quando iam ad minimum deducitur, statim propter debilitatem virtutis convertitur in aliud. Unde est invenire minimam carnem, sicut dicitur in primo physicorum: nec tamen corpus naturale componitur ex mathematicis, ut obiiciebatur.	From this it is clear why a mathematical body—in which only the nature of quantity, which has nothing to oppose infinite division, is considered—is infinitely divisible. But a natural body, which is considered under a whole form, cannot be infinitely divided, because once it is reduced to its smallest part, it is immediately, because of the weakness of its power, changed into something else. Hence one can find a smallest part of flesh, as is said in Physics I. But a natural body is not, as was said in objection, composed out of mathematical ones.
Deinde cum dicit quinimmo quoniam ostendit propositum ex parte ipsius sensus. Ad cuius evidentiam sciendum est, quod quanto virtus sensitiva est excellentior, tanto minorem immutationem organi a sensibili percipit. Manifestum est autem quod quanto minus est sensibile, tanto maiorem immutationem facit organi; et ideo indiget excellentiori virtute sensus ad hoc quod sentiatur in actu. Manifestum est autem quod potentia sensitiva non crescit in infinitum, sicut nec aliae virtutes naturales.	446a10 Then, when he says But there is no extremity, he shows the proposal from the point of view of the sense-power itself. For evidence on this point it must be known that the more excellent a sensitive power is, the more it can perceive a smaller alteration of the organ by a sensible object. But it is clear that the smaller a sensible object is, the smaller the alteration it causes of the organ, and so the more excellent power of sense it needs in order to be sensed in actuality. But it is clear that sensitive power cannot be increased infinitely, any more than can other natural powers.
Unde etiam si corpora sensibilia in infinitum dividerentur, tamen non semper inveniretur superabundantia sensus in excellentia virtutis, secundum ipsam superabundantiam sensibilis in parvitate; nec etiam hoc esset superabundanti parvitate sensibilis separata remanente; quia superabundans parvitas sensibilis, est in potentia ut sentiatur a certiori et perfectiori sensu: qui si non adsit, non poterit actu sentiri, sed tamen erit sensibile, quantum est in se; iam enim ex quod separatum est, habet potentiam activam ad immutandum sensum, et quando sensus adveniet sentietur in actu. Sic igitur patet verum esse quod supra dixit, nullam magnitudinem esse invisibilem, scilicet quantum est in se, quamvis sit invisibilis propter defectum visus.	Hence even if sensible bodies were infinitely divisible, nevertheless there would not always be extremity of the sense-power in superiority of power to correspond to the extremity of the sensible object in smallness—not even if the extreme smallness of the sensible object continued to last when separated. For the extreme smallness of the sensible object exists in potentiality, to be perceived by a surer and more perfect sense-power, and if the latter is not present, it will not be able to be sensed in actuality. Still, it will be a sensible object in itself, for already, by being separated, it has active power to alter a sense, and when a sense comes to it, it will be perceived in actuality. Therefore it is clear that what be said above is true, that no magnitude is invisible—that is, in itself, although a magnitude may be invisible because of imperfection of sight.
Concludit ergo quod dictum est quod quaedam magnitudines et passibiles qualitates lateant sensum, et propter quam causam; et quomodo sint sensibilia, et quomodo non.	Therefore he concludes that it has been said that some magnitudes and affective qualities escape the notice of the sense-power; and for what cause; and the way in which they are sensible objects, and the way in which they are not.
Deinde cum dicit cum autem concludit ex praemissis quod, cum aliquae partes sensibilium corporum, hoc modo habeant quantitatem ut sint actu sensibilia, non solum in toto existentes, sed etiam divisim, necesse est quod huiusmodi partes sint finitae secundum aliquem numerum, sive in coloribus, sive in sonis. Et sic, secundum quod actu sunt sensibilia, in infinitum non dividuntur.	446a16 Then, when he says But since there are quantities, he concludes from the foregoing that since some parts of sensible bodies have quantity in this way—so as to be sensible in actuality not only when existing in a whole, but also when divided off—parts of this kind are necessarily finite according to some number, whether in the case of colors or flavors or sounds. And thus, according as they are perceptible in actuality, they are not infinitely divisible.

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CHAPTER 15 446A20–447A11
ἀπορήσειε δ΄ ἄν τις, ἆρ΄ ἀφικνοῦν ται ἢ τὰ αἰσθητὰ ἢ αἱ κινήσεις αἱ ἀπὸ τῶν αἰσθητῶν (ὁποτέρως ποτὲ γίγνεται ἡ αἴσθησις), ὅταν ἐνεργῶσιν, εἰς τὸ μέσον πρῶτον, οἷον ἥ τε ὀσμὴ φαίνεται ποιοῦσα καὶ ὁ ψόφος· πρότερον γὰρ ὁ ἐγγὺς αἰσθάνεται τῆς ὀσμῆς, καὶ ὁ ψόφος ὕστερον ἀφικνεῖται τῆς πληγῆς. ἆρ΄ οὖν οὕτω καὶ τὸ ὁρώμενον καὶ τὸ φῶς,	446a20 But someone will raise an objection: do either the sensible objects or the movements caused by the sensible objects—however sensation occurs—first reach a midpoint when they act? Odor and sound seem to do this: for one who is closer senses odor earlier, and sound arrives after the striking. Is it the same, then, in the case of a visible object and light?
καθάπερ καὶ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς φησιν ἀφικνεῖσθαι πρότερον τὸ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἡλίου φῶς εἰς τὸ μεταξὺ πρὶν πρὸς τὴν ὄψιν ἢ ἐπὶ τὴν γῆν;	446a26 Empedocles says that light from the sun in this way arrives at a midpoint before arriving at the sense of sight or the earth.
δόξειε δ΄ ἂν εὐλόγως τοῦτο συμβαίνειν· τὸ γὰρ κινούμενον κινεῖταί ποθέν ποι, ὥστ΄ ἀνάγκη εἶναί τινα καὶ χρόνον ἐν ᾧ κινεῖται ἐκ θατέρου πρὸς θάτερον· ὁ δὲ [446b] χρόνος πᾶς διαιρετός, ὥστε ἦν ὅτε οὔ πω ἑωρᾶτο ἀλλ΄ ἔτ΄ ἐφέρετο ἡ ἀκτὶς ἐν τῷ μεταξύ.	446a28 It might be thought reasonable that this is what happens. For what is moved is moved from something to something, and so there is necessarily a time in which it is moved from one to the other. But every length of time is divisible. Thus there was a time when the ray was not seen, but was still being brought in the medium.
καὶ εἰ καὶ ἅπαν ἅμα ἀκούει καὶ ἀκήκοε, καὶ ὅλως αἰσθάνεται καὶ ᾔσθηται, καὶ μή ἐστι γένεσις αὐτῶν, ἀλλ΄ εἰσὶν ἄνευ τοῦ γίγνεσθαι, ὅμως οὐδὲν ἧττον, ὥσπερ ὁ ψόφος ἤδη γεγενημένης τῆς πληγῆς οὔ πω πρὸς τῇ ἀκοῇδηλοῖ δὲ τοῦτο καὶ ἡ τῶν γραμμάτων μετασχημά τισις, ὡς γιγνομένης τῆς φορᾶς ἐν τῷ μεταξύ· οὐ γὰρ τὸ λεχθὲν φαίνονται ἀκηκοότες διὰ τὸ μετασχηματίζεσθαι φερόμενον τὸν ἀέραἆρ΄ οὖν οὕτω καὶ τὸ χρῶμα καὶ τὸ φῶς; οὐ γὰρ δὴ τῷ πως ἔχειν τὸ μὲν ὁρᾷ τὸ δ΄ ὁρᾶται, ὥσπερ ἴσα ἐστίν· οὐθὲν γὰρ ἂν ἔδει που ἑκάτερον εἶναι· τοῖς γὰρ ἴσοις γιγνομένοις οὐδὲν διαφέρει ἢ ἐγγὺς ἢ πόρρω ἀλλήλων εἶναι.	446b2 Everything simultaneously hears and has heard, and in general senses and has sensed. There is no generation of sensations; they have no coming into being. Nevertheless sound is not already at the sense of hearing when the blow is struck. The reconfiguration of letters when they are carried through a medium makes this clear: people apparently have not heard what was said, because the air carried is reconfigured in being carried. It is thus in the case of color and light: for it is not the case that this sees and that is seen if they are related in just any way. This is how it is with things that are equal: neither has to be in a particular place, since when things are made equal, it makes no difference if they are either near to or far from one another.
ἢ περὶ μὲν τὸν ψόφον καὶ τὴν ὀσμὴν τοῦτο συμβαίνειν εὔλογον· ὥσπερ γὰρ ὁ ἀὴρ καὶ τὸ ὕδωρ, συνεχῆ μέν, μεμέρισται δ΄ ἀμφοτέρων ἡ κίνησις. διὸ καὶ ἔστι μὲν ὡς τὸ αὐτὸ ἀκούει ὁ πρῶτος καὶ ὁ ὕστερος καὶ ὀσφραίνεται, ἔστι δ΄ ὡς οὔ.	Now this [travelling through successive positions in the medium] may with good reason take place as regards Sound and Odour, for these, like [their media] Air and Water, are continuous, but the movement of both is divided into parts. This too is the ground of the fact that the object which the person first in order of proximity hears or smells is the same as that which each subsequent person perceives, while yet it is not the same.
δοκεῖ δέ τισιν εἶναι ἀπορία καὶ περὶ τούτων· ἀδύνατον γάρ φασί τινες ἄλλον ἄλλῳ τὸ αὐτὸ ἀκούειν καὶ ὁρᾶν καὶ ὀσφραίνεσθαι· οὐ γὰρ οἷόν τ΄ εἶναι πολλοὺς καὶ χωρὶς ὄντας ἓν ἀκούειν καὶ ὀσφραίνεσθαι· τὸ γὰρ ἓν χωρὶς ἂν αὐτὸ αὑτοῦ εἶναι. ἢ τοῦ μὲν κινήσαντος πρώτου, οἷον τῆς κώδωνος ἢ λιβανωτοῦ ἢ πυρός, τοῦ αὐτοῦ καὶ ἑνὸς ἀριθμῷ αἰσθάνονται πάντες, τοῦ δὲ δὴ ἰδίου ἑτέρου ἀριθμῷ, εἴδει δὲ τοῦ αὐτοῦ, διὸ ἅμα πολλοὶ ὁρῶσι καὶ ὀσμῶνται καὶ ἀκούουσιν;	446b13 On the other hand, it is reasonable for this to happen in the case of sound and odor. For air and water are indeed in a way continua, but the movements of both are divisible. For this reason too, it is the same thing that the first person and the last person hears and smells, but in a way it is not. But there seems to some to be an objection also about this. For some say that it is impossible for each person, by means of what is different, to hear and see and smell the same thing. For it is not possible for many who stand apart from one another to hear and smell the same thing, that is, for it to be cut off from itself. On the other hand, all sense the original mover—for example the quince, or incense, or fire—which is numerically one and the same. What is individual is numerically different, but specifically the same. Therefore many simultaneously see and smell and hear.
ἔστι δ΄ οὔτε σώματα ταῦτα, ἀλλὰ πάθος καὶ κίνησίς τις (οὐ γὰρ ἂν τοῦτο συνέβαινεν), οὔτ΄ ἄνευ σώματος.	446b25 But these things are not bodies, but an affection and a movement. For otherwise this would not happen. Nor are they independent of body.
περὶ δὲ τοῦ φωτὸς ἄλλος λόγος· τῷ ἐνεῖναι γάρ τι τὸ φῶς ἐστιν, ἀλλ΄ οὐ κίνησίς τις.	446b27 But the account of light is different, for there is light through some one single being, but there is not a movement.
ὅλως δὲ οὐδὲ ὁμοίως ἐπί τε ἀλλοιώσεως ἔχει καὶ φορᾶς· αἱ μὲν γὰρ φοραὶ εὐλόγως εἰς τὸ μεταξὺ πρῶτον ἀφικνοῦνται (δοκεῖ δ΄ ὁ ψόφος εἶναι φερομένου [447a] τινὸς κίνησις), ὅσα δ΄ ἀλλοιοῦται, οὐκέτι ὁμοίως·	446b28 In general, alteration and transfer are not alike. For it is reasonable that transfers should first reach a midpoint; and sound seems to be a movement of transfer. But what is altered is not like this.
ἐνδέχεται γὰρ ἀθρόον ἀλλοιοῦσθαι, καὶ μὴ τὸ ἥμισυ πρότερον, οἷον τὸ ὕδωρ ἅμα πᾶν πήγνυσθαι.	447a1 For it can happen that a whole is altered all at once, not half of it first, for example when a whole body of water is solidified all at once.
οὐ μὴν ἀλλ΄ ἂν ᾖ πολὺ τὸ θερμαινόμενον ἢ πηγνύμενον, τὸ ἐχόμενον ὑπὸ τοῦ ἐχομένου πάσχει, τὸ δὲ πρῶτον ὑπ΄ αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἀλλοιοῦντος μεταβάλλει καὶ ἀνάγκη ἅμα ἀλλοιοῦσθαι καὶ ἀθρόον. ἦν δ΄ ἂν καὶ τὸ γεύεσθαι ὥσπερ ἡ ὀσμή, εἰ ἐν ὑγρῷ ἦμεν καὶ πορρωτέρωθεν πρὶν θιγεῖν αὐτοῦ ᾐσθανόμεθα.	447a3 Nevertheless, if what is heated or solidified is large, what is contiguous is affected by the contiguous. But the first is necessarily altered, all at once and instantaneously, by the very thing that is acting. And tasting would be like odor if we existed in moisture, and sensed it from a distance before touching it.
εὐλόγως δὴ ὧν ἐστι μεταξὺ τοῦ αἰσθητηρίου, οὐχ ἅμα πάντα πάσχει, πλὴν ἐπὶ τοῦ φωτὸς διὰ τὸ εἰρημένον, διὰ τὸ αὐτὸ δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ ὁρᾶν· τὸ γὰρ φῶς ποιεῖ τὸ ὁρᾶν.	447a8 But it is reasonable, where the sensitive part has a medium, that not all of it be affected all at once, except in the case of light, because of what was said above, and, for the same reason, in the case of seeing: for light causes seeing.

Commentary
Postquam philosophus prosecutus est quaestionem primam pertinentem ad ipsa sensibilia, hic accedit ad quaestionem secundam, quae pertinet ad immutationem sensus a sensibilibus.	446a20 After the Philosopher bas followed up the first question, which concerns sensible things themselves, here he proceeds to the second question, which concerns the alteration of the sense-power by sensible objects.
Et circa hoc tria facit. Primo movet quaestionem. Secundo argumentatur ad ipsam, ibi, quemadmodum et Empedocles. Tertio solvit, ibi, vel circa sonum.	On this point he does three things. First he raises the question. Second he argues it, where he says Empedocles says (446a26). Third he solves it, where he says On the other hand (446b 13).
Circa primum considerandum est, quod, sicut supra habitum est, quidam posuerunt sensum immutari a sensibilibus per modum cuiusdam defluxus, ita quod ipsa sensibilia et defluentia ab eis, perveniunt usque ad sensum: ipse vero posuit quod sensibilia per modum cuiusdam alterationis immutant medium, ita quod huiusmodi permutationes perveniunt usque ad sensum.	On the first point it must be considered that, as was established above, some held that a sense-power is changed by sensible things by way of an emanation, so that it is the sensible things themselves—that is, the emanations from them—that reach the sense-power. But Aristotle himself held that the sensible things change the medium by way of a certain alteration, so that it is the changes of this kind that reach the sense-power.
Est ergo quaestio, qualitercumque fiat sensus, utrum vel sensibilia secundum aliorum opinionem, vel immutationes quae sunt a sensibilibus secundum suam opinionem, primo perveniant ad medium, quam ad sensum. Et hoc non habet dubitationem in auditu et odoratu. Manifestum est enim quod aliquis de propinquo prius sentit odorem, et similiter sonus posterius pervenit ad auditum quam faciat ictus percussionis quae causat sonum, sicut manifeste potest percipere, qui percussionem inspicit ex longinquo. Manifestum est etiam quod in gustu et tactu haec quaestio locum non habet, quia non sentiunt per medium extrinsecum. Unde dubitatio videtur esse de solo visu, utrum scilicet visibile, et lumen quod facit videre, prius perveniat ad medium quam ad sensum, vel ad quemcumque terminum.	Therefore there is a question, however sensation occurs: whether the sensible objects themselves—according to the opinion of others—or alterations caused by the sensible objects—according to Aristotle’s own opinion—first reach a midpoint before reaching the sense-power. There is no difficulty about this in the case of hearing and smell, for it is clear that one senses odor earlier from nearby, and similarly that sound reaches hearing after the striking of the blow that causes sound occurs, as one who sees the blow from a distance can clearly perceive. And it is clear that this question has no place in the case of taste and touch, because they do not perceive through an external medium. Hence the difficulty seems to be about sight alone, that is, whether a visible object and the light that causes seeing first reach a midpoint before reaching the sense-power or any terminus.
Deinde cum dicit quemadmodum et obiicit ad quaestionem motam.	446a26 Then, when he says Empedocles says, he raises an objection concerning the question asked.
Et primo argumentatur ad partem falsam quaestionis. Secundo excludit quamdam falsam solutionem, ibi, et si omne simul.	First he argues on the false side of the question. Second he eliminates a false solution where he says Everything simultaneously hears (446b2).
Argumentatur autem ad quaestionem, primo per auctoritatem Empedoclis, qui dixit quod lumen a sole progrediens, primo pervenit ad medium quam ad visum qui videt lumen, vel ad terram, quae videtur per lumen et ultra, quam radius solis non procedit. Et hanc quidem opinionem tetigit in secundo de anima; sed improbavit eam per hoc, quod in tam magno spatio, sicut est ab oriente usque ad nos, latere nos temporis successionem impossibile est.	He argues in response to the question first by the authority of Empedocles, who said that light proceeding from the sun first reaches a midpoint before reaching the sense of sight that sees the light, or the earth that is seen by means of the light, and beyond which the sun’s ray does not proceed. He touched on this question in On the Soul II, but disproved the opinion as follows: in such a great distance as there is from the rising sun to ourselves, it is impossible for a temporal succession to escape our notice.
Secundo ibi putabitur autem argumentatur ad idem per rationem. Et dicit quod hoc videtur rationabiliter accidere, scilicet quod visibile vel lumen primo perveniat ad medium quam ad visum. Videtur enim esse quidam motus ipsius visibilis, vel luminis pervenientis ad visum. Omne autem quod movetur ab aliquo in aliud, ita se habet quod prius sit in termino a quo movetur, et posterius in termino ad quem movetur: alioquin, si simul esset in utroque termino, non moveretur de uno in aliud. Prius autem et posterius in motu, numeratur tempore: ergo necesse est esse aliquod tempus, in quo visibile vel lumen movetur a corpore visibili vel illuminante usque ad visum: omne autem tempus est divisibile, ut probatum est in sexto physicorum. Si ergo accipiamus medium illius temporis, adhuc radius luminis, vel ipsius visibilis, nondum pervenit ad visum, sed adhuc movebatur per medium, quia oportet dividi per magnitudinem per quam aliquid movetur, secundum divisionem temporis, ut probatum est in sexto physicorum.	446a28 Second, where he says It might be thought reasonable, he argues the same point by reason. He says that it seems reasonable for this to happen—that is, for the visible object or light to first reach a midpoint before reaching the sense of sight. For there seems to be some movement of the visible object itself, or of the light, in coming to the sense of sight. But everything that is moved is moved from something to something, in such a way that before, it is in the terminus from which it is moved, and after, it is at the terminus to which it is moved: otherwise, if it were simultaneously at both termini, it would not be moved from one to the other. But before and after in movement are counted by time. Therefore there is necessarily some time in which the visible object, or the light, is moved from the visible or illuminating body to the sense of sight. But every length of time is divisible, as was proved in Physics VI. Therefore if we take the midpoint of the time in question, at that point the ray of light, or the visible object itself, has not yet reached the sense of sight, but is still being moved through the medium, because the magnitude through which something is moved must be divided according to division of time, as was proved in Physics VI.
Deinde cum dicit et in omne excludit quamdam insufficientem responsionem. Posset enim aliquis putare quod sensibilia non prius perveniant ad medium quam ad sensum, quia sensus simul percipit sensibile absque successione, ita quod in auditione non prius est audire quam auditum esse, sicut in successivis prius est moveri quam motum esse; sed simul dum aliquis audit, iam audivit, quia in instanti perficitur tota auditio. Et universaliter hoc est verum in omni sensu, quod simul scilicet aliquod sentit et sensit. Et hoc ideo quia non est generatio eorum, sed sunt absque fieri.	446b2 Then, when he says Everything simultaneously hears, he eliminates an inadequate response. Someone could think that sensible objects do not first reach a midpoint before reaching the sense-power because sense perceives a sensible object all at once, without successiveness. Thus, in hearing, hearing does not come before having been heard in the way that, in what is successive, being moved does come before having been moved: rather, when someone is hearing, he simultaneously already has heard, because the whole act of hearing is completed in an instant. And this is universally true of every sense, that is, that it simultaneously senses and has sensed something. This is so because there is no generation of sensations; they have no coming into being.
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Illorum enim dicitur esse generatio, ad quorum esse pervenitur per aliquem motum successivum; sive illius successivi motus sit ipsa eorum forma terminus, sicut si album dicatur generari, quia per successivam alterationem pervenitur ad albedinem; sive ipsa dispositio ad formam ipsorum sit motus successivi termini, sicut ignis et aqua dicuntur generari, quia dispositiones ad formam ipsorum, quae sunt qualitates elementales, per alterationem successivam acquiruntur.	We say that there is a “generation” of things that have a being (esse) which is reached by a successive or gradual movement: whether the terminus of the successive movement is the very form of the things, as when a white thing is said to be generated because a thing reaches whiteness through successive alteration; or whether the terminus of the successive movement is a disposition to their form, as fire and water are said to be generated because dispositions to their forms—that is, elemental qualities—are acquired through successive alteration.
Illa vero incipiunt esse absque hoc quod generentur vel fiant, quae nec secundum se, nec secundum aliquas dispositiones praecedentes in ipsis per motum successivum causantur, sicut dextrum causatur in aliquo, nullo successivo motu praeexistente in ipso, sed quodam alio facto sibi sinistro. Similiter et aer incipit illuminari nullo motu successivo praeexistente in ipso, sed ad praesentiam corporis illuminantis. Et similiter sensus incipit sentire, nullo motu in ipso praeexistente, sed ad debitam oppositionem sensibilis. Et ideo simul aliquis sentit, et iam sensit.	But those things begin to be without being generated or coming into being that are not—either of themselves or with respect to any preceding dispositions in them—caused through successive movement. For example, “to the right” is caused in a thing not by any successive movement pre-existing in it, but by something else having been made “to the left” of it. Likewise, air begins to be illuminated not by any movement pre-existing in it, but at the presence of an illuminating body. And likewise, a sense-power begins to sense not by any movement pre-existing in it, but at the requisite placing of a sensible object before it. Thus one simultaneously senses and already has sensed.
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Nihilominus tamen propter hoc non oportet quod sensibilia vel motus sensibilium, absque successione sensibilium perveniant ad sensus; manifeste enim apparet, quod simul aliquis audit, et audivit statim, et tamen sonus, non statim facto ictu, qui causat sonum, pervenit ad auditum.	Nevertheless it is not for this reason necessary that sensible objects, or movements of sensible objects, reach a sense-power without succession. For it is clear that one simultaneously is hearing and has heard, and nevertheless sound does not reach hearing immediately when the blow that causes the sound is struck.
Et hoc fit manifestum per transfigurationem literarum, quando alicuius locutio auditur ex longinquo, ac si sonus vocis literatae deferatur per medium successive. Propter hoc enim audientes sonum, non videntur auditu discrevisse literas prolatas, quia aer motus in medio transfiguratur, quasi admittens impressionem primi sonantis.	This is made clear by the reconfiguration of letters that occurs when someone’s speech is heard from a distance, indicating that the sound of the voice formed into letters is being carried successively through the medium. It is for this reason that those who hear the sound apparently have not by hearing distinguished the letters pronounced: because the air moved in the medium is reconfigured, as if losing the impression made by the one who first caused the sound.
Quod quidem contingit quandoque propter aliquam aliam aeris immutationem, sicut cum multis loquentibus non potest discerni quod aliquis eorum dicat, propter hoc quod motus invicem se impediunt. Quandoque vero contingit propter distantiam: sicut enim actio calefacientis, in remotioribus debilitatur, ita etiam immutatio aeris, quae est a primo sonante; ex quo contingit quod ad illos qui sunt prope loquentem, perfecte contingit sonus locutionis cum debita expressione litterarum; ad remotos autem cum quadam confusione.	This sometimes happens because of some other alteration in the air, for example when, because many are speaking, it is impossible to make out what one of them is saying, for it the movements impede one another. But sometimes it happens because of distance: for as the action of heating is weakened in what is farther away, so also does the alteration of the air by the one who first produces the sound, and as a result the sound of the speech may reach those who are near the speaker perfectly, with the requisite articulation of letters, but reach those who are farther away with some confusion.
Videtur igitur similiter se habere et de colore et de lumine; quia etiam color et lumen non videntur quomodocumque sint disposita secundum situm, sed requiritur determinata distantia. Sicut enim locutiones a remotis audiuntur, absque discretione literarum, ita etiam corpora videntur a remotis absque discretione dispositionis singularum partium.	446b9 The case of color and light, then, seems to be similar, for color and light also cannot be seen by being positioned in just any way: rather, a determinate distance is required. For just as utterances are heard by those at a distance without distinction of the letters, so also bodies are by those at a distance without distinction of the arrangement of individual parts.
Nec est ita de relatione visus et visibilis, sicut de relatione aequalitatis: ad hoc enim quod aliqua sint aequalia, non requiritur aliquis determinatus situs, sed qualitercumque varietur eorum situs, semper manent eodem modo aequalia. Nec differt utrum sint prope vel longe. Videtur ergo quod sicut transfiguratio literarum manifestat sonum successive pervenire ad auditum, quamvis postquam iam pervenerit simul audiatur, ita etiam imperfecta visio visibilium remotorum, videtur significare quod color et lumen successive perveniant ad visum quamvis simul videantur.	The relation between the sense of sight and the visible object is not like the relation of equality: for no determinate location is required in order for things to be equal; rather, however their location varies, they always remain equal in the same way, and it makes no difference whether they are near or far. Therefore it seems that just as the the configuration of letters makes it clear that sound reaches the sense of hearing by succession, although once it has reached hearing, it is heard it at once; so the incomplete vision of remote visible objects seems to indicate that color and light reach the sense of sight by succession, although they are seen all at once.
Deinde cum dicit vel circa hoc ponit veram solutionem, ostendens differentiam visus ad alios duos sensus, qui sunt per media exteriora, auditum et olfactum.	446bl3 Then, when he says On the other hand, he presents the true solution, showing the difference between sight and the other two senses that perceive through external media, namely hearing and smell.
Et dividitur in partes duas. Primo namque assignat differentiam visus ad auditum et odoratum. Secundo excludit obiectionem, ibi, rationabiliter autem.	This is divided into two parts. First he gives the difference of sight from hearing and smell. Second he concludes to his proposal, where he says But it is reasonable (447a8).
Prima pars dividitur in duas secundum duas differentias quas ponit. Secunda incipit, ibi, omnino autem, nec similiter.	The first part is divided into two according to the two differences he gives. The second begins where he says In general, alteration and transfer (446b28).
Dicit ergo primo, quod rationabile est hoc accidere circa sonum et odorem, quod successive perveniant. Cuius rationem assignat ex hoc, quod aer et aqua quae sunt media, quibus huiusmodi sensibilia deferuntur ad sensus sunt quidem secundum suam substantiam continua, sed tamen in eis possunt fieri motus abinvicem divisi;	Accordingly he first says that it is reasonable for this to happen in the case of sound and odor, namely that they reach the sense-power by succession. He gives as the reason for this the fact that air and water, which are the media by which these objects are brought to the sense-power, are indeed in their substance, continua, and yet movements distinct from one another can take place in them.
quod contingit propter facilem divisionem aeris et aquae, sicut patet in motu proiectionis, ut philosophus ostendit septimo physicorum, in quo sunt multi motus, multa moventia et mota. Nam una pars aeris movetur ab alia, et sic sunt diversi motus sibi invicem succedentes, quia pars aeris mota adhuc remanet movens, postquam cessat moveri, et sic non omnes motus partium aeris sunt simul, sed sibi invicem succedunt, ut ostenditur in octavo physicorum.	This can happen because of the easy divisibility of air and water which, as the Philosopher shows in Physics VII, is evident in the movement of throwing something, where there are many movements, many movers, and many things moved. For one part of the air is moved by another, and thus there are different movements succeeding one another, because a part of the air that has been moved still remains a mover after it ceases to be moved. Thus the movements of the parts of the air are not all simultaneous; rather they succeed one another, as is shown in Physics VIII.
Et hoc etiam apparet in sono, qui causatur ex quadam aeris percussione; non tamen ita quod totus aer, qui est medius, uno motu moveatur a percutiente; sed sunt motus multi sibi succedentes ex eo quod una pars primo mota movet aliam. Et inde est quod quodammodo idem est quod audit primus qui est propinquus percussioni causanti sonum, et extremus qui est remotus; quodam autem modo non idem.	This is also evident in the case of sound, which is caused by a striking of air, but not in such a way that the whole of the air in between is moved by what strikes it in one movement. Rather, there are many movements succeeding one another, for one part, having been moved first, then moves another. Thus in a way it is the same thing that the first person hears—the one who is close to the striking that causes the sound—and that the last person hears—the one who is at a distance. But in a way it is not the same thing.
Apud quosdam enim videtur de hoc esse dubitatio: quia quidam dicunt, quod, cum diversi per diversa organa sentiant, impossibile est quod idem sentiant. Quod quidem verum est, si referatur ad id quod proxime movet sensum, quia diversorum sensus immutantur immediate a diversis partibus medii sibi propinquis, et ita intercipitur hoc, et distinguitur illud quod unus sentit, ab eo quod sentit alius. Si vero accipitur id quod primo movet medium, sic erit unum idem quod omnes sentiunt, sicut unius percussionis sonum audiunt omnes, sive propinqui sive remoti; et similiter unum corpus odoriferum, puta cothonium vel thus in igne ardens, odorant omnes; sed id, quod iam proprie pervenit ad unumquemque est alterum numero, sed est idem specie, quia ab eadem forma primi activi, omnes huiusmodi immutationes causantur. Unde simul multi vident et odorant et audiunt idem sensibile, per diversas immutationes ad eos pervenientes.	446b17 According to some, there seems to be a difficulty on this point: some say that, since different people sense by means of different organs, it is impossible that they sense the same thing. Now this is true if it refers to what proximately moves the sense-power, because the senses of different people are immediately altered by the different parts of the medium that are close to them, and so what one senses is “cut off,” and distinct from, what another senses. But if what is understood is what first moved the medium, then all sense one and the same thing. For instance everyone, whether near or far, hears the sound of the one blow; likewise, everyone smells the one odorous body, for example the quince, or the incense burning in fire. What reaches each one individually one is numerically different, but is specifically the same, because all these alterations are caused by the same form, the form of what first activates them. Hence many simultaneously see and smell and hear the same sensible object by the different alterations that reach them.
Huiusmodi autem quae perveniunt ad singulorum sensus, non sunt corpora defluentia a corpore sensibili, ut quidam posuerunt; sed singulum eorum est motus et passio medii immutati per actionem sensibilis. Si enim essent diversa corpora, quae ad diversos per defluxum pervenirent, non accideret hoc, quod scilicet idem omnes sentirent, sed unum sentiret, scilicet solum corpus ad ipsum perveniens. Et quamvis non sint corpora, non tamen sunt sine corpore, vel medio, quasi passo et moto a sensibili, quasi primo movente et agente. Sic ergo per praedicta patet, quod sonus pervenit ad auditum per multos motus partium medii sibiinvicem succedentes; et simile est de odore, nisi quod mutatio odoris fit per alterationem medii: immutatio autem soni per motum localem.	446b25 But these things that reach the senses of each individual are not bodies emanating from a sensible body, as some held: rather, every individual one of them is a movement and an affection of a medium that has been altered by the action of a sensible object. For if they were different bodies that reached different individuals by emanation, then this—that is, everyone sensing the same thing—would not happen, but each would perceive only the body that reached him. And although they are not bodies, nevertheless they are not independent of body, or of the medium that is as it were affected and moved, or of the sensible object that is as it were what first moves and acts. 446b27 It is clear, then, from what has been said that sound reaches the sense of hearing through many successive movements of parts. And it is similar in the case of odor, except that alteration by odor occurs through alteration of a medium, but alteration by sound through local movement.
Sed de lumine est alia ratio. Non enim per motus sibi succedentes in diversis partibus medii pervenit lumen usque ad visum; sed per unum aliquod esse, idest per hoc quod totum medium sicut unum mobile, movetur uno motu a corpore illuminante. Sed non est ibi motus, qui succedat motui, sicut dictum est de odore et sono.	But the account of light is different. For light does not reach the sense of sight through many movements succeeding one another in different parts of the medium, but through one single being (esse)—that is, by the whole medium being moved, as one moveable thing, in one movement, by an illuminating body. In this case there is not one movement succeeding another, as there was said to be in the case of odor and sound.
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Huiusmodi autem differentiae ratio est: quia quod recipitur in aliquo sicut proprio subiecto et naturali, potest in eo permanere et esse principium actionis; quod autem recipitur in aliquo solum sicut adventitia qualitas, non potest permanere, nec esse principium actionis.	The reason for this difference is that what is received in something as in its proper and natural subject can remain in it and be a principle of action, but what is received in something only as an adventitious quality can neither remain in it nor be a principle of action.
Quia vero formae substantiales sunt principia qualitatum et omnium accidentium, illa qualitas recipitur in subiecto aliquo secundum esse proprium et naturale, quae disponit subiectum ad formam naturalem, cuius est susceptivum; sicut aqua ratione suae materiae, est susceptiva formae substantialis ignis, quae est principium caloris. Et ideo calor recipitur in aqua, disponens ipsam ad formam ignis; et ideo remoto igne adhuc aqua remanet calida calefacere potens.	Now because substantial forms are the principles of qualities and of it accidents, that quality is received in a subject according to its proper and natural being which disposes the subject to the natural form of which it is receptive. For instance, water, by reason of its matter, is receptive of the substantial form of fire, which is the principle of heat; and so heat is received in water as disposing it to the form of fire, and when fire is removed, the water still remains hot and capable of heating.
Et similiter odor recipitur in aere et aqua et sonus in aere secundum suum esse proprium et naturale et secundum quod aer et aqua immutantur ab enchyma siccitate et aer a percussione alicuius corporis. Et inde est quod cessante percussione, remanet sonus in aere, et remoto corpore odorifero adhuc sentitur odor in aere, propter hoc quod pars aeris immutata ad sonum vel ad odorem potest aliam similiter immutare, ut sic fiant diversi motus sibiinvicem succedentes.	Likewise odor is received in air and water, and sound in air, both according to their proper and natural being, and according as air and water are altered by enchymous dryness, or air by the striking of a body. Thus, when the striking ceases, sound remains in the air; and when the odor causing body is removed, odor is still perceived in the air. The reason is that the part of the air that has been changed so as to take on a sound or odor can likewise change another part, and thus different movements are produced that succeed one another.
Sed diaphanum non est susceptivum formae substantialis corporis illuminantis, puta solis, qui est prima radix luminis; neque per receptionem luminis disponetur ad aliquam formam substantialem. Unde recipitur lumen in diaphano sicut quaedam qualitas adventitia, quae non remanet absente corpore illuminante, nec potest esse principium actionis in aliud. Unde una pars aeris non illuminatur ab alia; sed totus aer illuminatur a primo illuminante quantum potest se extendere virtus illuminantis; et ideo est unum illuminatum et una illuminatio totius medii.	But the transparent is not receptive of the substantial form of the illuminating body, for instance the sun, which is the first “root” of light, and neither is it disposed by reception of light to any substantial form. Hence light is received in the transparent as an adventitious quality that neither remains when the illuminating body is absent, nor is able to be a principle of action on something else. Hence one part of the air is not illuminated by another, but the whole of the air is illuminated by what first illuminates it, however far the power of the illuminating body is able to reach. Thus, there is one thing illuminated, and one illumination of the whole medium.
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Deinde cum dicit omnino autem ostendit secundam differentiam. Et dicit, quod si universaliter loquamur de alteratione, idest loci mutatione, non similiter se habet in utroque, quia loci mutationes rationabiliter perveniunt prius ad medium magnitudinis, supra quam est motus, quam ad ultimum; quia scilicet in loci mutatione est motus de extremo magnitudinis, ad extremum eius, unde oportet quod mobile in medio temporis pertingat ad medium magnitudinis; et tunc ratio superinducta locum habet in loci mutatione. Sonus autem consequitur quemdam motum localem, inquantum scilicet ex percussione causante sonum commovetur aer usque ad auditum; et ideo rationabile est, quod sonus prius perveniat ad medium, quam ad auditum.	446b28 Then, when he says In general, alteration and transfer, he shows the second difference. He says that, to speak generally about alteration and “transfer”—that is, change of place—the two are not alike. It is reasonable that changes of place should first reach the midpoint of the magnitude over which the movement takes place before reaching the terminus, since in change of place there is movement from one extreme of a magnitude to the other extreme. Hence, the moveable thing must reach the midpoint of the magnitude at the midpoint of the time. Thus the argument introduce above has a place in the case of change of place. And sound is a consequence of local movement inasmuch as the air is disturbed by the striking that causes the sound all the way to the power of hearing. it is reasonable, then, that sound should reach a midpoint before reaching the sense of hearing.
Sed in his quae alterantur non similiter se habet. Termini enim alterationis non sunt ipsa extrema magnitudinis. Et ideo non oportet, quod tempus alterationis, per se loquendo, commensuretur alicui magnitudini, ita quod in medio temporis, motus perveniat ad medium magnitudinis super quam fit motus; quia hoc non est dare in alteratione, quae non est motus in quantitate vel in ubi, sed in qualitate, neque ad medium magnitudinis quae movetur.	But in the case of what is altered, it is not like this. For the termini of alteration are not extremes of a magnitude, and so the time of the alteration is not necessarily, of itself, commensurate with a magnitude in such a way that at the midpoint of the lime, the movement would reach the midpoint of the magnitude, whether the midpoint of the magnitude over which the movement occurs (for this cannot be given in alteration, which is not a movement in a quantity or a “where,” but in a quality), or the midpoint of a magnitude that is itself moved.
Contingit enim aliquando quod totum corpus simul alteratur, non autem dimidium eius prius, sicut videmus quod tota aqua simul congelatur.	447a1 For it can sometimes happen that the whole of a body is altered all at once, not half of it first, as we see that a whole body of water may be frozen all at once.
Sicut enim in motu locali tempus commensuratur distantiae magnitudinis, super quam transit motus, et secundum divisionem eius dividitur, ut probatur in sexto physicorum; ita etiam in alteratione, tempus commensuratur distantiae terminorum. Et ideo maius tempus requiritur ceteris paribus, ad hoc quod de frigido fiat calidum, quam ad hoc quod de tepido fiat calidum.	In local movement, the time is commensurable with the magnitude over which the movement passes, and is divided according to division of the magnitude, as is proved in Physics VI. Likewise, in alteration, the time is commensurable with the distance between the termini, and so, other things being equal, more time is required for something cold than for something tepid to be made hot.
Et ideo, si aliqua extrema sunt inter quae non sit accipere medium, oportet quod de uno extremo in aliud fiat transitus absque medio. Contradictio autem est oppositio, cuius non est medium secundum se, ut dicitur in primo posteriorum, et eadem ratione supposita aptitudine subiecti, cum privatio nihil aliud sit quam negatio in subiecto. Unde omnes mutationes quarum termini sunt esse et non esse, vel privatio et forma, sunt instantaneae, et non possunt esse successivae. In alterationibus enim successivis attenditur successio secundum distantiam unius contrarii ab alio determinata media:	Thus if there are some extremes between which one cannot take a midpoint, transition from one extreme to the other must occur without intermediary. Now a contradiction is an opposition that of itself has no intermediary, as is said in Posterior Analytics I. And, with the supposition of the receptivity of a subject, the account of privation is the same, for privation is nothing but negation in a subject. Hence all alterations of which the termini are being and non-being, or privation and form, are instantaneous and cannot be successive, for in successive alterations the succession is noted by means of determinate intermediaries with respect to the distance of one contrary from the other.
in qua quidem distantia tota magnitudo corporis, in quam potest immediate virtus primi alterantis, consideratur sicut unum subiectum, quod statim simul incipit moveri. Sed, si sit corpus alterabile tam magnum, quod virtus primi alterantis non possit ipsum attingere secundum totum, sed secundum partem eius, sequitur quod prima pars primo alterata, alterabit consequenter aliam.	447a3 Within this distance, the whole magnitude of the body over which the power of the first cause of the alteration immediately extends is considered as one single subject that instantaneously, all at once, begins to be moved. But if there is a body that is capable of being altered, but is so large that the power of the first cause of the alteration cannot reach it as a whole, but only part of it, it will follow that after the first part has been altered, it will subsequently alter another one.
Et ideo dicit quod, si fuerit multum corpus quod calefit vel quod congelatur, necesse est quod habitum patiatur ab habito, idest quod consequens pars ab immediate praecedente alteretur. Sed prima pars alteratur ab ipso primo alterante, et simul et subito, quia scilicet non est ibi successio ex parte magnitudinis, sed solum ex parte contrariarum qualitatum, ut dictum est. Haec autem est causa quare odor prius pervenit ad medium quam ad sensum, quamvis hoc fiat per alterationem sine motu locali, quia corpus odoriferum non potest simul immutare totum medium, sed immutat partem unam, quae immutat aliam; et sic successive pervenit immutatio usque ad olfactum per plures motus, ut supra dictum est. Et esset simile in gustu sicut in odoratu, si nos viveremus in humido aqueo, quod solum susceptivum est saporis, sicut in aere, qui est susceptivus odoris, et si iterum posset sentiri sapor per alterationem medii a remotis, antequam tangeremus corpus saporosum, sicut contingit circa odoratum.	And so he says that if it is a large body that is heated or frozen, what is contiguous is necessarily affected by the contiguous—that is, a subsequent part is necessarily altered by the immediately preceding one. But the first part is altered, all at once and instantaneously, by the very thing that first causes the alteration, because here there is not succession from the point of view of magnitude, but only from the point of view of contrary qualities, as was said. It is because of this that odor first reaches a midpoint before reaching the sense-power, even though this occurs by alteration without local movement. For an odorous body cannot alter the whole medium all at once; rather, it alters one part, which alters another, and so the alteration reaches the sense of smell by succession, through several movements, as was said above. And it would be the same in the case of taste as it is in the case of smell if we lived in watery moisture, which alone is receptive of flavor, as we now live in air, which is receptive of odor; and if, again, flavor could be sensed by alteration of the medium from a distance before we touched a flavored body, as is the case with smell.
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Videtur autem quod hic dicitur esse contrarium ei, per quod philosophus probat in sexto physicorum, omne quod movetur esse divisibile, quia pars eius est in termino a quo, et pars in termino ad quem. Sic igitur videtur quod dum aliquid alteratur de albo in nigrum, quando una pars eius est alba, altera sit nigra, et sic non potest esse quod totum simul alteretur sed post partem.	Now what is said here seems to be contrary to the argument by which the Philosopher proves in Physics VI that everything that is moved is divisible, because part of it is at the terminus a quo and part at the terminus ad quem. Thus it can be seen that while something is being changed from white to black, when one part of it is white, another is black. This it cannot be that the whole is altered all at once, but rather part after part.
Dicunt autem quidam, quod intentio philosophi ibi, est ostendere non quidem quod una pars mobilis sit in termino a quo, et alia in termino ad quem; sed quod mobile sit in una parte termini a quo, et in alia parte termini ad quem, et sic in alteratione non oportet quod una pars mobilis prius alteretur quam alia, sed quod totum mobile, quod alteratur, puta de albo in nigrum, habeat partem albedinis et partem nigredinis.	But some say that the intention of the Philosopher there is to show not that one part of a moveable thing is at the terminus a quo and another at the terminus ad quem, but that the moveable thing is at one part of the terminus a quo and at another part of the terminus ad quem. And so in alteration it is necessary not that one part of the moveable thing be altered before another, but that the whole moveable thing that is altered, for instance from white to black, have a part of whiteness and a part of blackness.
Hoc autem non convenit intentioni Aristotelis; quia per hoc non probaretur directe quod mobile esset divisibile, sed quod termini motus sint aliqualiter divisibiles, nec etiam competit verbis quibus utitur, sicut patet diligenter literam eius intuenti, in qua manifeste hoc refert ad partes mobiles.	But this does not agree with Aristotle’s intention, because this would not directly prove that a moveable thing is divisible, but rather that the termini of movement are somehow divisible. Nor again does it agree with the words Aristotle uses, as is clear to anyone who carefully looks at his text, where the passage clearly refers to the parts of the moveable thing.
Et ideo aliter dicendum est, quod demonstratio illa intelligitur de motu locali, qui est vere et secundum se continuus. Agit enim Aristoteles in sexto physicorum de motu sub ratione continui: motus vero augmenti et alterationis non sunt simpliciter continui, ut dictum est in octavo physicorum. Unde in alteratione non verificatur illud Aristotelis dictum omnino, sed solum quod accipit quamdam continuitatem ex mobili, cuius una pars alterat aliam. Mobile vero, quod totum simul attingitur a virtute primi alterantis, habet se sicut quiddam indivisibile, quantum ad hoc, quod simul alteratur.	Thus a different explanation has to be given, namely that the demonstration is understood with reference to local movement, which is truly and of itself continuous. For in Physics VI Aristotle treats of movement under the aspect of the continuous. But movements of growth and alteration, as was said in Physics VIII, are not simply continuous. Hence Aristotle’s remark is not universally true of all alteration, but only of alteration inasmuch as it gets continuity from a moveable thing in which one part alters another. But a moveable thing that the power of the first cause of the alteration reaches all at once, as a whole, is something indivisible inasmuch as it is altered all at once.
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Deinde cum dicit rationabiliter autem concludit ex praemissis principale intentum. Et dicit quod rationabiliter in sensibus in quibus est aliquod medium inter sensibile et organum sentiendi, non simul patitur et movetur totum medium, sed successive, praeter quam in lumine: et hoc propter praedicta. Primo quidem, quia illuminatio non fit per motum localem, ut sonatio, sicut Empedocles posuit, sed motum alterationis. Secundo, quia non sunt ibi multi motus, sicut dictum est de odore, sed unus tantum. Quibus addendum est tertio, quia lumen non habet contrarium, sed tenebra opponitur ei sicut simplex privatio, et ideo illuminatio fit subito.	447a8 Then, when he says But it is reasonable, he concludes from the foregoing to the principal intention. He says that it is reasonable, in the case of the senses for which there is a medium between the sensible object and the organ of sensing, that the whole medium be affected and moved not all at once, but by succession, except in the case of light, and this because of what has been said: first, because illumination does not, as Empedocles held, occur by local movement, as the spread of sound does, but by alteration; second, because in illumination there are not several movements, as there were said to be in the case of odor, but only one. To these points we must add a third: that light has no contrary, but darkness is rather opposed to it as simple privation, and so illumination occurs all at once.
Et idem oportet dicere de visione, quia lumen facit videre, unde medium immutatur a visibilibus proportionabiliter lumini.	And the same must be said about vision, because light causes seeing. And hence the medium is altered by visible objects analogously to the way it is altered by light.

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CHAPTER 16 447A12–448A1
Ἔστι δ΄ ἀπορία καὶ ἄλλη τις τοιάδε περὶ τὰς αἰσθήσεις, πότερον ἐνδέχεται δυεῖν ἅμα αἰσθάνεσθαι ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ καὶ ἀτόμῳ χρόνῳ, ἢ οὔ.	447a12 But there is also another such objection raised concerning the senses: whether it can happen that two sense simultaneously at the same indivisible point of lime, or not?
εἰ δὴ ἀεὶ ἡ μείζων κίνησις τὴν ἐλάττω ἐκκρούειδιὸ ὑποφερομένων ὑπὸ τὰ ὄμματα οὐκ αἰσθάνονται, ἐὰν τύχωσι σφόδρα τι ἐννοῦντες ἢ φοβούμενοι ἢ ἀκούοντες πολὺν ψόφοντοῦτο δὴ ὑποκείσθω, καὶ ὅτι ἑκάστου μᾶλλον ἔστιν αἰσθάνεσθαι ἁπλοῦ ὄντος ἢ κεκραμένου, οἷον οἴνου ἀκράτου ἢ κεκραμένου, καὶ μέλιτος, καὶ χρόας, καὶ τῆς νήτης μόνης ἢ ἐν τῇ διὰ πασῶν, διὰ τὸ ἀφανίζειν ἄλληλα. τοῦτο δὲ ποιεῖ ἐξ ὧν ἕν τι γίγνεται.	447a14 If a greater movement always drives off a lesser, which is why people do not sense what is brought under their eyes if they are intensely thinking about something, or are afraid, or are hearing a loud sound.... Let this, then, be supposed, and also that one can sense anything better when it exists as simple than when mixed: for example, wine that is unmixed can be better sensed than wine that is mixed; and honey; and color; and a note alone better than one with the octave, because they obscure one another. Now it is things from which some one thing is made that do this.
εἰ δὴ ἡ μείζων τὴν ἐλάττω κίνησιν ἐκκρούει, ἀνάγκη, ἂν ἅμα ὦσι, καὶ αὐτὴν ἧττον αἰσθητὴν εἶναι ἢ εἰ μόνη ἦν· ἀφαιρεῖται γάρ τι ἡ ἐλάττων μειγνυμένη, εἴπερ ἅπαντα τὰ ἁπλᾶ μᾶλλον αἰσθητά ἐστιν. ἐὰν ἄρα ἴσαι ὦσιν ἕτεραι οὖσαι, οὐδετέρας ἔσται αἴσθησις· ἀφανιεῖ γὰρ ἡ ἑτέρα ὁμοίως τὴν ἑτέραν, ἁπλῆς δ΄ οὐκ ἔστιν αἰσθάνεσθαι. ὥστε ἢ οὐδεμία ἔσται αἴσθησις, ἢ ἄλλη ἐξ ἀμφοῖν· ὅπερ καὶ γίγνεσθαι δοκεῖ ἐπὶ τῶν κεραννυμένων ἐν ᾧ ἂν μειχθῶσιν.	447a21 If, then, a greater drives off a lesser, then, if they are simultaneous, even the former is, necessarily, less able to be sensed than if it were alone. For something is taken away by admixture of the lesser one, if indeed everything that is simple is better able to be sensed. Therefore, if they are equal, but exist as separate, neither will be sensible, for each obscures the other; and it is impossible to sense either as simple. Therefore either there will be no sensation, or there will be a different one out of the two. This seems to be brought about by things mixed together, whatever they may be mixed together into.
ἐπεὶ οὖν ἐκ μὲν ἐνίων γίγνεταί τι, ἐκ δ΄ ἐνίων οὐ γίγνεται, τοιαῦτα δὲ τὰ ὑφ΄ ἑτέραν αἴσθησιν (μείγνυνται γὰρ [447b] ὧν τὰ ἔσχατα ἐναντία· οὐκ ἔστι δ΄ ἐκ λευκοῦ καὶ ὀξέος ἓν γίγνεσθαι ἀλλ΄ ἢ κατὰ συμβεβηκός, ἀλλ΄ οὐχ ὡς ἐξ ὀξέος καὶ βαρέος συμφωνία),	447a29 From some objects, something else can be made; but from some it cannot, and these are objects that come under different senses. For objects that can be mixed together have extremes that are contraries. But one object cannot be made out of white and high-pitched, except accidentally, but not in the way that a harmony is made out of high-pitched and low-pitched.
οὐκ ἄρα οὐδ΄ αἰσθάνεσθαι ἐνδέχεται αὐτῶν ἅμα. ἴσαι μὲν γὰρ οὖσαι αἱ κινήσεις ἀφανιοῦσιν ἀλλήλας, ἐπεὶ μία οὐ γίγνεται ἐξ αὐτῶν· ἂν δ΄ ἄνισοι, ἡ κρείττων αἴσθησιν ἐμποιήσει.	447b3 Therefore it is not possible to sense them simultaneously. For when their movements exist as equal, they will drive out one another, because one movement is not made out of them. But if they are unequal, it will be the stronger that causes sensation.
ἔτι μᾶλλον ἅμα δυοῖν αἴσθοιτ΄ ἂν ἡ ψυχὴ τῇ μιᾷ αἰσθήσει ὧν μία αἴσθησις, οἷον ὀξέος καὶ βαρέος (μᾶλλον γὰρ ἅμα ἡ κίνησις τῇ μιᾶς αὐτὴ ἑαυτῇ ἢ τοῖν δυοῖν, οἷον ὄψεως καὶ ἀκοῆς),	447b6 Moreover, it is more likely that the soul will simultaneously sense two objects of one sense, such as high-pitched and low-pitched, with the one sense: for it is more likely that movements of one sense would occur simultaneously than of two, for instance sight and hearing.
τῇ μιᾷ δὲ ἅμα δυοῖν οὐκ ἔστιν αἰσθάνεσθαι ἂν μὴ μειχθῇ (τὸ γὰρ μεῖγμα ἓν βούλεται εἶναι, τοῦ δ΄ ἑνὸς μία αἴσθησις, ἡ δὲ μία ἅμα αὑτῇ), ὥστ΄ ἐξ ἀνάγκης τῶν μεμειγμένων ἅμα αἰσθάνεται, ὅτι μιᾷ αἰσθήσει κατ΄ ἐνέργειαν αἰσθάνεται·	447b9 But it is not possible to sense two objects simultaneously with one, if they have not been mixed. For a mixture tends to be one thing. But one sense-power at one moment has one object. And it is itself one at the one moment. Therefore it necessarily senses mixtures all at once, because it senses by means of one sense-power in actuality. For as numerically one in actuality, it has one object; but as specifically so, it is one in potentiality or power.
ἑνὸς μὲν γὰρ ἀριθμῷ ἡ κατ΄ ἐνέργειαν μία, εἴδει δὲ ἡ κατὰ δύναμιν μία· καὶ εἰ μία τοίνυν ἡ αἴσθησις ἡ κατ΄ ἐνέργειαν, ἓν ἐκεῖνα ἐρεῖ. μεμεῖχθαι ἄρα ἀνάγκη αὐτά. ὅταν ἄρα μὴ ᾖ μεμειγμένα, δύο ἔσονται αἰσθήσεις αἱ κατ΄ ἐνέργειαν. ἀλλὰ κατὰ μίαν δύναμιν καὶ ἄτομον χρόνον μίαν ἀνάγκη εἶναι τὴν ἐνέργειαν· μιᾶς γὰρ ἡ εἰσάπαξ μία χρῆσις καὶ κίνησις, μία δὲ ἡ δύναμις. οὐκ ἄρα ἐνδέχεται δυοῖν ἅμα αἰσθάνεσθαι τῇ μιᾷ αἰσθήσει.	Therefore, if it is one sense-power in actuality, it will say that one object. Therefore, they are necessarily mixed together. Therefore, when they are not mixed, there will be two senses in actuality. But, with respect to one power, at one indivisible moment, there is necessarily only one operation, for there is only one use, and one movement, of one thing at one time, and it is one power. Therefore it is not possible to sense simultaneously two objects with one sense-power.
ἀλλὰ μὴν εἰ τὰ ὑπὸ τὴν αὐτὴν αἴσθησιν ἅμα ἀδύνατον, ἐὰν ᾗ δύο, δῆλον ὅτι ἧττον ἔτι τὰ κατὰ δύο αἰσθήσεις ἐνδέχεται ἅμα αἰσθάνεσθαι, οἷον λευκὸν καὶ γλυκύ.	447b21 But if this is impossible simultaneously in the case of objects that come under the same sense-power if there are two of them, it is obvious that it is still less possible to sense simultaneously objects of two senses, such as white and sweet.
φαίνεται γὰρ τὸ μὲν τῷ ἀριθμῷ ἓν ἡ ψυχὴ οὐδενὶ ἑτέρῳ λέγειν ἀλλ΄ ἢ τῷ ἅμα, τὸ δὲ τῷ εἴδει ἓν τῇ κρινούσῃ αἰσθήσει καὶ τῷ τρόπῳ. λέγω δὲ τοῦτο, ὅτι ἴσως τὸ λευκὸν καὶ τὸ μέλαν, ἕτερον τῷ εἴδει ὄν, ἡ αὐτὴ κρίνει, καὶ τὸ γλυκὺ καὶ τὸ πικρὸν ἡ αὐτὴ μὲν ἑαυτῇ, ἐκείνης δ΄ ἄλλη, ἀλλ΄ ἑτέρως ἑκάτερον τῶν ἐναντίων, ὡς δ΄ αὔτως ἑαυταῖς τὰ σύστοιχα, οἷον ὡς ἡ γεῦσις τὸ γλυκύ, οὕτως ἡ ὄψις τὸ [448a] λευκόν, ὡς δ΄ αὕτη τὸ μέλαν, οὕτως ἐκείνη τὸ πικρόν.	447b24 The soul seems to say that something is numerically one by nothing other than this “all at once”; but it seems to say that something is specifically one by the sense that judges and by the manner. What I mean is this. The same proper one will judge that, say, white and black are different. And one sense, different from that one, but itself the same, will judge that sweet and bitter are different. They judge each of the contraries in a different way, but they judge the corresponding elements in the same way: For instance, as taste judges sweet, sight judges white; and as the latter judges black, the former judges bitter.

Commentary
Solutis duabus quaestionibus, hic philosophus prosequitur tertiam, quae est ex parte ipsius sensus.	447a12 Having solved two questions, here the Philosopher follows the the third, which is from the point of view of the sense-power itself.
Et circa hoc tria facit. Primo movet quaestionem. Secundo obiicit ad partem falsam, ibi, si autem semper. Tertio determinat veritatem, ibi, de prius autem dicta obiectione.	On this point he does three things. First he raises the question. Second he argues for the false position where he says If a greater movement (447a14). Third he determines the truth where he says With respect to the objection (Ch.18, 448b17).
Dicit ergo primo, quod circa ipsos sensus est quaedam alia talis obiectio: utrum scilicet contingat quod simul et in eodem indivisibili tempore sentiant duo sensus, puta simul dum visus videt colorem, auditus audiat vocem.	Accordingly he first says that concerning the senses themselves there is another such objection raised, namely whether it can happen that two senses sense simultaneously and at the same indivisible point of time, for instance that while sight sees a color hearing simultaneously hears a voice.
Deinde cum dicit si autem obiicit ad partem falsam, scilicet ad ostendendum quod duo sensus non possunt simul sentire.	447a14 Then, when he says If a greater movement, he argues for the false position, attempting to show that two senses cannot sense simultaneously.
Et primo ponit rationes ad hoc ostendendum. Secundo excludit quamdam falsam solutionem, per quam hoc sustinebatur, ibi, quod autem dicunt.	First he presents arguments to show this. Second he eliminates a false solution by which this position was maintained, where he says Some of those who discuss symphoniae (Ch. 17, 448a 19).
Circa primum duo facit. Primo ponit tres rationes: quarum prima accipitur ex immutationibus sensibilium; secunda ex parte ipsius sensus, ibi adhuc si magis; tertia ex contrarietate sensibilium, ibi, amplius contrariorum.	On the first point he presents three arguments. The first is based on alterations caused by sensible objects. The second is based on the sense-power itself; it starts where he says Moreover, it is more likely (447b6). The third is based on contrariety of sensible objects; it starts where he says Moreover, if movements of contraries are contrary (Ch. 17, 448a 1).
Circa primam rationem praemittit duas suppositiones.	He prefaces the first argument with two presuppositions.
Quarum prima est, quod maior motus repellit minorem: et ex hoc dicit provenire multotiens quod ea quae iacent sub oculis, homines non sentiunt propter alium fortiorem motum, vel interiorem sive rationis sicut cum homines aliquando vehementer intendunt ad aliquid, sive appetitivae virtutis sicut cum homines vehementer timent, vel etiam exteriorem alicuius sensibilis sicut cum homines audiunt magnum sonum: hoc igitur propter evidentiam dicit esse supponendum.	The first is that a greater movement drives back a lesser. Because of this, he says, the result is that often human beings do not sense what lies under their eyes, because of a more powerful movement. This may be an interior movement, whether of reason, as when they are intensely thinking about something, or of appetitive power, as when they are intensely afraid. Or it may be an external movement caused by some sensible object as when they are hearing a loud sound. This, then, he says, is to be supposed as evidence.
Secunda suppositio est quod unumquodque magis sentitur si sit simplex, quam si sit alteri permixtum, sicut vinum purum fortius sentitur, quam si sit temperatum aqua. Et idem est de melle quantum ad gustum, et de colore quantum ad visum, et quantum ad auditum de una voce, quae magis sentitur si sola sit, quam si audiatur in consonantia ad aliam vocem, puta in diapason, vel in quacumque alia consonantia: et hoc ideo, quia quae commiscentur, obscurant se invicem. Sed haec secunda suppositio non habet locum nisi in his ex quibus unum fieri potest: haec enim sola permiscentur.	The second presupposition is that anything is sensed better if it is simple than if it is mixed with something else, as wine has a stronger taste if it is pure than if it is mixed with water. The same is true of honey with respect to taste; and of color with respect to sight. And, with respect to hearing, it is true of one single note, which is better sensed if it is alone than if it heard in harmony with another tone such as the octave, or in any other harmony. This is so because things mixed together obscure one another. But this second presupposition applies only to things from which one thing can be made, for such things alone are thoroughly mixed together.
Ex his autem duabus suppositionibus ulterius procedit cum subdit, si itaque maior, et dicit quod si maior motus repellat minorem, ut prima suppositio dicit, necesse est, si ambo motus sunt simul, quod etiam maior motus minus sentiatur, quam si esset solus: quia aliquid eius aufertur per minoris commixtionem, ut patet ex secunda suppositione, scilicet quod simplicia sunt magis sensibilia quam permixta. Signanter dicit autem si sint simul, quia maior motus quandoque est tam fortis quod non permittit alium motum fieri; et tunc in nullo diminuitur ex motu minori, quia non est. Sed si tantum praevaleat, quod non omnino impediat minorem motum fieri, duobus motibus existentibus, necesse est quod minor motus in aliquo obscuret maiorem. Si ergo motus fuerint omnino aequaliter diversi existentes, neuter erit sensibilis, quia totaliter alter obscurat alterum; nisi forte ex istis duobus motibus permixtione fiat unus motus: sed non potest aliquis eorum simplex sentiri: et sic oportet quod vel nullus sensus fiat illorum motuum aequalium, vel quod sit quidam alter sensus compositus ex utrisque, inquantum scilicet id quod sentitur est compositum ex utrisque: et hoc manifeste apparet in omnibus quae commiscentur. Nam permixtum non est aliquid eorum quae commiscentur, sed quoddam alterum compositum ex his. Sic ergo ex praemissis patet, quod, si duo motus fuerint inaequales, maior obscurat minorem; si autem aequales vel nil sentitur, vel aliquid commixtum.	447a21 From these two presuppositions he goes further when he adds If, then, a greater drives off a lesser. He says that if a greater movement drives back a lesser, as the first pre-supposition says, then, if both movements are simultaneous, even the greater one is necessarily less able to be sensed than if it were alone, because something of it is taken away by admixture of the lesser one, as appears from the second presupposition, namely that what is simple is better able to be sensed than what is mixed. It is significant that he has said “if they are simultaneous,” because the greater movement is sometimes so strong that it does not allow another movement to occur, and then it is not at all diminished by a lesser movement, because there is none. But if it does not prevail to the extent that it completely prevents the lesser movement from occurring, then, while the two movements exist, the lesser movement necessarily obscures the greater one to some extent. Therefore, if the movements are completely equal, but exist as different, neither will be sensible, because each wholly obscures the other—unless perhaps from the two movements one movement is made by mixture, but then what is simple in them cannot be sensed. And thus it must be either that no sensation of the equal movements occurs, or that there is a different sensation composed from both, that is, inasmuch as what is sensed is composed out of the two. And this is clearly the case in everything that is mixed together, because the mixture is not any of the things that are mixed together, but something else composed out of them. It is clear, then, from the foregoing that if two movements are unequal, the greater obscures the lesser, but if they are equal, either nothing or a mixture is sensed.
Ex his autem ulterius procedit, proponens quod quaedam sunt, ex quibus potest aliquod unum fieri; quaedam vero sunt, ex quibus unum fieri non potest: et huiusmodi sunt illa quae sentiuntur diversis sensibus, sicut color et odor. Illa enim solum commisceri possunt, in quibus extrema sunt contraria, quia commixtio fit per quamdam alterationem; sed ea quae sentiuntur diversis sensibus, non sunt contraria adinvicem, unde non possunt commisceri. Unde non fit aliquid unum ex colore albo et sono acuto, nisi forte per accidens, inquantum conveniunt in eodem subiecto; non autem per se, sicut symphonia constituitur ex voce gravi et acuta.	447a29 And from these points he proceeds further. He proposes that there are some objects out of which some one thing can be made, but there are some out of which one thing cannot be made, and such are objects, such as color and odor, sensed by different senses. For only those objects can be mixed together in which the extremes are contraries, because mixture occurs by alteration. But objects that are sensed by different senses are not contrary to one another, and hence cannot be mixed together. For example, some one object is not made out of a white color and a high-pitched sound, except perhaps accidentally, inasmuch as they come together in the same subject; but not per se, in the way that a harmony is constituted out of a low-pitched and a high-pitched tone.
Et ex his concludit quod nullo modo contingit sentire sensibilia diversorum sensuum simul. Quia, si eorum motus sint aequales omnino, destruent seinvicem, cum non possit unum fieri ex ipsis; si vero sint inaequales, maior motus praevalebit, et ipse solus sentietur.	447b3 From this he concludes that it is in no way possible to sense objects of different senses simultaneously, because if their movements are equal, they will entirely destroy one another, since one thing cannot be made out of them; but if they are unequal, the greater movement will prevail, and it alone will be sensed.
Deinde cum dicit adhuc si magis ponit secundam rationem, quae sumitur ex unitate et pluralitate sensuum. Et arguit per locum a maiori negative.	447b6 Then when he says Moreover, it is more likely, he presents the second argument, which is based on the unity and plurality of the senses. He argues by denial of what is more likely.
Magis enim videtur quod anima possit duo aliqua sentire simul pertinentia ad unum sensum, sicut acutum et grave in sonis, quam diversa sensibilia ad diversos sensus pertinentia per duos sensus. Et huius rationem assignat: quia quanto motus sunt magis diversi, minus videntur eidem potentiae simul attribui. Duo autem motus quibus anima diversis sensibus sentit diversa sensibilia diversorum sensuum et diversorum generum, sunt magis diversi quam duo motus, quibus per unum sensum sentit diversa sensibilia eiusdem generis. Unde magis videtur quod possit esse simul in una anima motus unius sensus respectu diversorum sensibilium eiusdem generis, quam motus duorum sensuum, puta visus et auditus.	It seems more likely that the soul is able to sense simultaneously two objects pertaining to one sense—such as high-pitched and low-pitched in sounds—by means of the one sense, than that it is able to sense simultaneously different objects pertaining to different senses by means of the two senses. He gives the following reason for this. To the extent that movements are more different, they seem less able to be attributed to the same thing But two movements by which the soul, by means of different senses, senses different objects belonging to different genera are more different from one another than are two movements by which the soul perceives through one sense different objects belonging to the same genus. Hence it seems more likely that there could simultaneously be in one soul movements of one sense in relation to different sensible objects of the same genus, than movements of two senses, for instance sight and hearing.
Posita autem hac comparatione, removet, id quod magis videtur: et dicit quod non contingit simul sentire duo sensibilia per unum sensum, nisi illa duo fuerint commixta; et tunc quando mixta sunt, non sunt duo, quia mixtum naturaliter est aliquid unum.	447b9 Having presented this comparison, he eliminates what seems more likely. He says that it is not possible to sense simultaneously, by means of one sense, two objects, unless the two have been mixed together, and then when they have been mixed together, they are not two objects, because, a mixture is naturally some one thing.
Quod autem sensus unus non possit cognoscere multa nisi inquantum fuerint unum per mixturam, probat per hoc quod unus sensus in actu, non potest esse simul nisi unius, sicut nec aliqua una operatio aut unus motus terminatur nisi ad aliquid unum. Sensus autem non potest esse simul in actu nisi unius, sicut nec aliqua potentia simul recipit diversas formas. Unde necesse est, quod si aliquis sensus, puta visus vel auditus, debeat sentire plura, sentiat ea inquantum sunt facta unum permixtione. Et hoc ideo, quia potentia sensitiva sentit illa duo secundum unum sensum in actu, idest secundum unam operationem sensitivam. Ex hoc autem sensus secundum actum, idest operatio sensitiva, habet unitatem secundum numerum, quia est unius sensibilis: specie autem est unus sensus secundum actum, sive una operatio sensitiva, ex eo quod est secundum potentiam unam; sicut omnes visiones quorumcumque visibilium sunt eiusdem speciei propter unitatem potentiae; sed visio huius rei differt numero a visione alterius rei.	He proves in the following way that one sense cannot simultaneously know several things except to the extent that they become one thing by means of mixture. One sense-power can be in actuality at one moment with respect to only one object, just as the terminus of any one operation or movement can be only something that is one. And a sense-power in actuality must, at one and the same moment, be one and the same sense-power in actuality; for no power simultaneously receives different forms. Thus if a sense-power, for instance sight or hearing, has to sense several things simultaneously, it necessarily senses them inasmuch as they have been made one by mixture, because the sensitive power senses the two things by means of one sense-power in actuality—that is, one sensitive operation. A sense-power in actuality—that is, a sensitive operation has numerical unity because it has one sensible object. But it is specifically one sense-power in actuality—or one sensitive operation—because it is one in potentiality or power. For instance, all seeings of any visible thing are specifically the same because of the unity of the power; but the seeing of one thing differs numerically from the seeing of another.
Necesse est ergo, si est unus sensus secundum actum, quod unum dicat, idest iudicet; ergo oportet quod, si sunt multa, quod commisceantur in unum; et si non fuerint mixta, necesse est quod sint duo sensus secundum actum, idest duae operationes sensitivae. Sed necesse est quod unius potentiae in eodem indivisibili tempore sit una operatio, quia unius rei non potest esse simul nisi unus actus et unus motus. Unde, cum operatio sensitiva nihil aliud sit quam usus quidam quo anima utitur potentia sensitiva, erit motus quidam ipsius potentiae, inquantum sensus movetur a sensibili. Cum ergo unus sensus sit una potentia, non contingit quod sic multa sentiantur uno sensu.	Therefore, if it is one sense-power in actuality, it must “say”—that is, judge of—one object. Therefore, if there are many objects, they must be mixed together into one. Therefore, if they are not mixed, there must be two senses in actuality—that is, two sensitive operations. But there is necessarily only one operation of one power at one and the same indivisible moment, because here can only be one use, and one movement, of one thing at one time. Hence, since sensitive operation is nothing but a “use” in which the soul uses a sensitive power, as well as a “movement” of the power itself, inasmuch as the sense is moved by a sensible thing, therefore, since one sense is one power, it is not possible to sense simultaneously two objects with one sense.
Si ergo ea quae sunt unius sensus non possunt simul sentiri, si sunt duo, manifestum esse videtur adhuc quod minus contingit simul sentire quae sunt secundum diversos sensus, sicut album et dulce.	447b21 Therefore, if objects of one sense cannot be sensed simultaneously if there are two of them, it seems clear that it is still less possible to sense simultaneously objects of different senses, such as white and sweet.
Hanc autem illationem consequenter manifestat, dicens, quod anima nullo modo alio videtur diiudicare aliquid esse unum numero nisi inquantum simul ab ea percipitur: ipsa enim operatio sensitiva est una numero inquantum est simul, ut dictum est. Sed anima dicit aliquid esse unum specie, non ex eo quod simul sentit, sed quia est idem sensus qui iudicat utrumque, et quia est idem modus, quo uterque sentit.	447b24 Next he clarifies this inference. He says that the soul seems to judge that something is numerically one in no other way than the thing’s being perceived by it all at once, for sensitive operation itself is numerically one inasmuch as it is all at once, as was said. But the soul says that something is specifically one not because the latter is sensed all at once, but because it is the same sense that judges of each of two objects, and because it is the same manner in which it senses each.
Ad exponendum hoc quod dixerat subdit, quod idem proprium, idest idem sensus proprius iudicat de duobus diversis, scilicet de albo et de nigro, et similiter dulce et amarum diiudicat quidam sensus, qui est idem numero, quia eodem sensu, scilicet gustu utrumque cognoscitur. Sed iste sensus, qui idem existens cognoscit dulce et amarum, alius est ab illo qui cognoscit album et nigrum. Sed tamen unus et idem sensus aliter cognoscit utrumque contrariorum: unum enim cognoscit sicut habitum et aliquid perfectum, et aliud sicut privationem et aliquid imperfectum: omnia enim contraria hoc modo se habent: tamen idem est modus quo uterque sensus cognoscit cognata, idest principia proportionabiliter sibi respondentia. Eo enim modo, quo gustus sentit dulce, visus album; et sicut visus nigrum, ita et gustus amarum.	To explain what he said, he adds that the same proper one—that is, the same proper sense-power—judges of two different objects, namely white and black. Likewise, a sense that itself is the same, judges sweet and bitter, for both are apprehended by the same sense, namely taste. But this sense that, while being the same, knows sweet and bitter, is different from the one that knows white and black. Nevertheless, one and the same sense knows each of the contraries in a different way: for it knows one as a possession and something perfect, and the other as a privation and something imperfect, since all contraries are related in this way. However the way in which both senses know the corresponding elements—that is, the principles that analogously correspond to one another—is the same: for sight senses white the way taste senses sweet, and taste senses bitter as sight senses black.
Patet ergo quod anima iudicat aliqua esse diversa specie, vel diversa sensu, sicut album et dulce vel eodem sensu, sed diverso modo, sicut album et nigrum; unum autem numero ex hoc quod simul sentit. Si ergo impossibile est illud quod est unum specie esse unum numero, videtur impossibile esse quod anima simul sentiat, vel ea quae cognoscuntur diversis sensibus, vel ea quae cognoscuntur uno sensu, sed alio modo, quae minus diversa esse videntur.	Therefore it is clear that the soul judges that things are specifically different either by a different sense-power, as in the case of white and sweet, or by a different manner of sensing, as in the case of white and black; but it judges that a thing is numerically one by perceiving it all at once. if, then, it is impossible for what is specifically one to be numerically one, it seems to be impossible for the soul to sense simultaneously either things that are known by different senses, or even things that are known by one sense but in different ways, and which seem to be less different from one another than are things known by different senses.

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CHAPTER 17 448A1–B16
ἔτι εἰ αἱ τῶν ἐναντίων κινήσεις ἐναντίαι, ἅμα δὲ τὰ ἐναντία ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ καὶ ἀτόμῳ οὐκ ἐνδέχεται ὑπάρχειν, ὑπὸ δὲ τὴν αἴ σθησιν τὴν μίαν ἐναντία ἐστίν, οἷον γλυκὺ πικρῷ, τούτων οὐκ ἂν ἐνδέχοιτο αἰσθάνεσθαι ἅμα.	448a1 Moreover, if movements of contraries are contrary; and contraries cannot simultaneously be in the same atomon; and there are contraries, for instance sweet and bitter, under one sense-power—then one cannot sense them simultaneously.
ὁμοίως δὲ δῆλον ὅτι οὐδὲ τὰ μὴ ἐναντία· τὰ μὲν γὰρ τοῦ λευκοῦ τὰ δὲ τοῦ μέλανός ἐστιν, καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ὁμοίως, οἷον τῶν χυμῶν οἱ μὲν τοῦ γλυκέος οἱ δὲ τοῦ πικροῦ.	But likewise, clearly, neither can one simultaneously sense objects that are not contraries. For some belong to white and some to black. And likewise in other cases: for instance some flavors belong to sweet and some to bitter.
οὐδὲ τὰ μεμειγμένα ἅμα (λόγοι γάρ εἰσιν ἀντικειμένων, οἷον τὸ διὰ πασῶν καὶ τὸ διὰ πέντε), ἐὰν μὴ ὡς ἓν αἰσθάνηται. οὕτως δ΄ εἷς ὁ λόγος ὁ τῶν ἄκρων γίγνεται· ἄλλως δ΄ οὔ,	Nor can one simultaneously sense mixtures simultaneously, for the proportions belong to opposites, for instance the octave and the fifth; unless they are perceived as one, but thus one proportion is made of the extremes, but otherwise not.
ἔσται γὰρ ἅμα ὁ μὲν πολλοῦ πρὸς ὀλίγον ἢ περιττοῦ πρὸς ἄρτιον, ὁ δ΄ ὀλίγου πρὸς πολὺ ἢ ἀρτίου πρὸς περιττόν.	For there will be simultaneously many to few, or odd to even, or few to many, or even to odd.
εἰ οὖν πλεῖον ἔτι ἀπέχει ἀλλήλων καὶ διαφέρει τὰ συστοίχως μὲν λεγόμενα ἐν ἄλλῳ δὲ γένει τῶν ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ γένει (λέγω δ΄ οἷον τὸ γλυκὺ καὶ τὸ λευκὸν καλῶ σύστοιχα, γένει δ΄ ἕτερα, τὸ γλυκὺ δὲ τοῦ λευκοῦ πλεῖον ἔτι τῷ εἴδει διαφέρει ἢ τὸ μέλαν), ἔτι ἂν ἧττον ἅμα ἐνδέχοιτο αὐτὰ αἰσθάνεσθαι ἢ τὰ τῷ γένει ταὐτά. ὥστ΄ εἰ μὴ ταῦτα, οὐδ΄ ἐκεῖνα.	If then, the so-called “corresponding elements,” which are in different genera, stand apart and differ from one another still more than do objects in the same genus (I call sweet and white, for instance, corresponding elements in different genera, and sweet differs specifically from black much more than white does); then one can sense these simultaneously still less than those in one genus. So if not the former, then neither the latter.
ὃ δὲ λέγουσί τινες τῶν περὶ τὰς συμφωνίας, ὅτι οὐχ ἅμα μὲν ἀφικνοῦνται οἱ ψόφοι, φαίνονται δέ, καὶ λανθάνει, ὅταν ὁ χρόνος ᾖ ἀναίσθητος, πότερον ὀρθῶς λέγεται ἢ οὔ; τάχα γὰρ ἂν φαίη τις καὶ νῦν παρὰ τοῦτο δοκεῖν ἅμα ὁρᾶν καὶ ἀκούειν, ὅτι οἱ μεταξὺ χρόνοι λανθάνουσιν.	448a19 Some of those who discuss symphoniae say that sounds do not arrive simultaneously, but they seem to, and it escapes notice, since the time is insensible. Is it correct to say this or not? Perhaps someone will say that it is also because of this that one thinks that he simultaneously sees and hears, namely because the intervening lengths of time escape notice.
ἢ τοῦτ΄ οὐκ ἀληθές, οὐδ΄ ἐνδέχεται χρόνον εἶναι ἀναίσθητον οὐδένα οὐδὲ λανθάνειν, ἀλλὰ παντὸς ἐνδέχεται αἰσθάνεσθαι;	448a24 Or perhaps it is not true that any length of time can be insensible or escape notice: rather, absolutely all of them can be perceived.
εἰ γάρ, ὅτε αὐτὸς αὑτοῦ τις αἰσθάνεται ἢ ἄλλου ἐν συνεχεῖ χρόνῳ, μὴ ἐνδέχεται τότε λανθάνειν ὅτι ἔστιν, ἔστι δέ τις ἐν τῷ συνεχεῖ καὶ τοσοῦτος ὅσος ὅλως ἀναίσθητός ἐστι, δῆλον ὅτι τότε λανθάνοι ἂν εἰ ἔστιν αὐτὸς αὑτόν, καὶ εἰ ὁρᾷ καὶ αἰσθάνεται [καὶ εἰ αἰσθάνεται].	448a26 For if when one senses oneself or something else in a continuous length of time, it cannot escape his notice that it is existing; and something is existing in a continuous length of time; and it is so brief as to be completely insensible; it is clear that it will then escape his notice whether he himself is existing, and that he is seeing, and that he is sensing, and whether he is sensing.
ἔτι οὐκ ἂν εἴη [448b] οὔτε χρόνος οὔτε πρᾶγμα οὐδὲν ὃ αἰσθάνεται ἢ ἐν ᾧ, εἰ μὴ οὕτως, ὅτι ἐν τούτου τινὶ ἢ ὅτι τούτου τι ὁρᾷ, εἴπερ ἔστι τι μέγεθος καὶ χρόνου καὶ πράγματος ἀναίσθητον ὅλως διὰ μικρότητα·	448a30 Moreover, there will be no length of time (and no thing that one senses) during which it is not the case that it is being sensed in some part of it (or that one sees some part of the thing)—if indeed there is some magnitude of time, and of a thing that is insensible because of smallness.
εἰ γὰρ τὴν ὅλην ὁρᾷ, καὶ αἰσθάνεται τὸν αὐτὸν συνεχῶς χρόνον, οὕτω, τῷ ἐν τούτου τινί, ἀφῃρήσθω τὸ ΓΒ, ἐν ᾧ οὐκ ᾐσθάνετο. οὐκοῦν ἐν ταύτης τινί ἢ ταύτης τι, ὥσπερ τὴν γῆν ὁρᾷ ὅλην, ὅτι τοδὶ αὐτῆς, καὶ ἐν τῷ ἐνιαυτῷ βαδίζει, ὅτι ἐν τῳδὶ τῷ μέρει αὐτοῦ. ἀλλὰ μὴν ἐν τῷ ΓΒ οὐδὲν αἰσθάνεται. τῷ ἄρα ἐν τούτου τινὶ τοῦ ΑΒ αἰσθάνεσθαι λέγεται τοῦ ὅλου αἰσθάνεσθαι καὶ τὴν ὅλην. ὁ δ΄ αὐτὸς λόγος καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς ΑΓ· ἀεὶ γὰρ ἐν τινὶ καὶ τινός, ὅλου δ΄ οὐκ ἔστιν αἰσθάνεσθαι.	For if one is seeing and sensing the whole during the same continuous length of time not because one does so in some part of it—then let GB, in which it was not being sensed, be subtracted. Accordingly, one does not sense “during a part of it,” or “a part of it,” in the way that one sees the whole earth because one sees a part of it, and one walks during a year because one does so during this part of it. Rather, one senses nothing in GB. Therefore, it is because one senses it in a part, namely AG, that one is said to sense the whole of AB, and the whole thing. But the same account also applies to AG: it is always a case of “during a part of it,” and “a part of it,” and it is impossible to sense the whole of AGB.
ἅπαντα μὲν οὖν αἰσθητά ἐστιν, ἀλλ΄ οὐ φαίνεται ὅσα ἐστίν· τοῦ γὰρ ἡλίου τὸ μέγεθος ὁρᾷ καὶ τὸ τετράπηχυ πόρρωθεν, ἀλλ΄ οὐ φαίνεται ὅσον, ἀλλ΄ ἐνίοτε ἀδιαίρετον, ὃ ὁρᾷ δ΄ οὐκ ἀδιαίρετον.	448b12 All things, then, are sensible, but do not appear to be everything that they are: the size of the sun appears from far away to be four cubits. A thing does not appear to be everything that it is: rather, sometimes it is indivisible, but one sees what is not indivisible. The cause of this has been stated in the foregoing.
ἡ δ΄ αἰτία εἴρηται ἐν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν περὶ τούτου. ὅτι μὲν οὖν οὐθείς ἐστι χρόνος ἀναίσθητος, ἐκ τούτων φανερόν·	448b16 Therefore it is clear from these remarks that no length of time is insensible.

Commentary
Positis duabus rationibus ad ostendendum quod non contingit sensus duos simul sentire, hic ad idem ponit tertiam rationem, quae sumitur ex contrarietate sensibilium.	448a1 Having presented two arguments to show that it is impossible for two senses to sense simultaneously, here be presents a third argument for the same conclusion based on the contrariety of sensible objects.
Et dicit quod immutationes, quae sunt a contrariis, sunt contrariae, sicut calefactio et infrigidatio. Contraria autem non possunt simul esse in eodem atomo, idest indivisibili; in eodem indivisibili possunt simul esse contraria secundum diversas partes. Manifestum autem est quod ea quae cadunt sub unum sensum, sunt contraria, sicut dulce et amarum: ergo non possunt simul sentiri.	He says that alterations caused by contraries are contrary, for instance heating and cooling. But contraries cannot simultaneously be in the same “atomon”—that is, the same indivisible part (contraries can simultaneously be in the same divisible part with respect to different parts of it) But it is clear that objects under one sense-power are contraries, for instance sweet and bitter. Therefore they cannot be sensed simultaneously.
Et similis ratio est in his quae non sunt contraria, scilicet in mediis, quorum quaedam magis appropinquant ad unum extremum quaedam magis ad aliud, sicut supra dictum est de coloribus et saporibus; quia colorum mediorum, quidam pertinent ad album, et quidam ad nigrum; et similiter saporum mediorum, quidam pertinent ad dulce, quidam ad amarum:	The argument is similar in the case of objects that are not contraries, that is, intermediate objects, some of which more closely approach one extreme, and some the other. For instance, as was said above about colors and flavors, some intermediate colors pertain to white and some to black, and likewise some intermediate flavors pertain to sweet and some to bitter.
et eadem ratio est de commixtis omnibus, quia diversae commixtiones habent quamdam contrarietatem, quia diversae commixtiones fiunt secundum diversas proportiones, quae habent quamdam oppositionem adinvicem, ut patet in consonantiis, quarum una dicitur diapason, quae consistit in dupla proportione, quae est duorum ad unum; alia autem dicitur diapente quae consistit in proportione sesquialtera, quae est trium ad duo; ista autem inquantum sunt commixta diversis proportionibus, non possunt simul sentiri propter oppositionem proportionum, nisi forte duo sentiantur ut unum, quia sic fiet una proportio ex diversis extremitatibus.	And the argument is the same in the case of all mixtures, for different mixtures have a contrariety between themselves because they are made in different proportions, and different proportions have an opposition to one another. This is clear in harmonies: one is called the octave, which consists in the double proportion, that of two to one; another is called the fifth, which consists in the sesquialteral proportion, that of three to two. Such things, I say, thus mixed together in different proportions, cannot be simultaneously sensed, because of the opposition between proportions—unless, perhaps, two are perceived as one, because thus one proportion will be made out of two extremes.
Ostendit autem consequenter diversas proportiones esse oppositas secundum duplicem oppositionem, quae in numeris invenitur: quarum una est secundum multum et paucum, et secundum hoc opponuntur proportio dupli et proportio dimidii: nam proportio dupli est multi ad paucum proportio vero dimidii est pauci ad multum. Alia vero est oppositio secundum par et impar, et secundum hoc opponuntur proportio dupla et sesquialtera: nam proportio dupla est duorum ad unum, quasi paris ad impar, unum enim est forma imparis numeri. Sesquialtera autem proportio est trium ad duo, quod est imparis ad parem.	Next be shows that different proportions are opposed according to the two kinds of opposition found in numbers. One is according to many and few, by which the proportion of double and the proportion of half are opposed: for the proportion of double is one of many to few, but the proportion of half is one of few to many. The other kind of opposition is according to even and odd, by which the double proportion and the sesquialteral proportion are opposed: for the double proportion is one of two to one, that is, of even to odd, but the sesquialteral proportion is of three to two, that is, of odd to even.
Sic ergo patet quod non possunt simul sentiri quae cadunt sub eodem sensu. Plus autem distant adinvicem quae coelementariter sibi correspondent in diverso genere existentia, puta dulce et album, quam ea quae sunt unius generis; quia ea quae sunt unius generis, non distinguuntur specie nisi propter modum sentiendi, sicut album et nigrum. Ea vero quae sunt diversorum generum possunt differre specie non solum ex parte sensus, sed etiam ex parte modi, sicut dulce a nigro plus differt quam album, unde minus possunt simul sentiri, quod est quasi esse unum numero, ut supra habitum est. Si igitur ea quae sunt unius generis, propter contrarietatem non possunt simul sentiri, multo minus ea quae sunt diversorum generum, possunt simul sentiri.	Thus it is clear that objects falling under the same sense cannot be sensed simultaneously. But objects that correspond to one another as “elements” existing in different genera—for instance sweet and white—stand farther apart from one another than do objects belonging to one genus. For objects belonging to one genus, such as white and black, are specifically distinguished only because of the manner of sensing. But objects belonging to different genera can differ specifically not only from the point of view of the sense-power, but also from the point of view of manner of sensing: for instance, sweet differs from black more than white does. Hence they are less able to be sensed simultaneously, which is, as it were, to be numerically one, as was established above. Therefore, if objects belonging to one genus cannot, because of their contrariety, be sensed simultaneously, much less can objects belonging to different genera be sensed simultaneously.
Deinde cum dicit quod autem excludit quamdam falsam solutionem huius quaestionis.	448a19 Then when he says Some of those who discuss symphoniae, he eliminates a false solution of this question.
Et primo narrat eam. Secundo improbat, ibi, aut hoc non est verum.	First he relates it. Second he disproves it, where he says Or perhaps it not true (448a24).
Dicit ergo primo, quod quidam de symphoniis, id est de consonantiis musicis tractantes, dixerunt quod soni consonantes non simul perveniunt ad auditum, sed videntur simul pervenire, eo quod tempus medium est insensibile propter parvitatem. De quo potest esse dubium utrum recte dicatur vel non: si enim hoc recte dicatur, poterit aliquis similiter in proposito dicere consentiens praemissis rationibus, quod non est possibile simul videre et audire: sed tamen sensibiliter videtur ita contingere, quia latent nos tempora media visionis et auditionis.	Accordingly he first says that some who treated of “symphoniae”—that is, musical harmonies—said that the harmonizing sounds do not reach the sense of hearing simultaneously, but that they seem to reach it simultaneously because the intervening time is insensible on account of its brevity. There might be doubt about this: Is it correct to say this or not? If it is correct, someone who agrees with the arguments presented above will be able to say that, likewise, with respect to the question posed, it is not possible to simultaneously sec and hear, although this does seem to the sense-power to happen, because the intervening lengths of time between the vision and the hearing escape our notice.
Deinde cum dicit aut hoc improbat praedictam solutionem.	448a24 Then when he says Or perhaps it is not true, he disproves the above-mentioned solution.
Et circa hoc tria facit. Primo interimit id quod praedicta solutio supponit. Secundo probat quod dixerat, ibi, omnia quidem igitur.	On this point he does three things. First he eliminates something that the solution stated presupposes. Second he proves what he has said, where he says For if when one senses oneself (448a26). Third he clarifies what is true in the solution, where he says All things, then, are sensible (448b 12).
Dicit ergo primo, quod non est verum quod praedicta solutio supponit, scilicet quod sit aliquod tempus insensibile vel latens sensum; nullum enim tempus est tale, sed omnia tempora contingit sentire.	Accordingly he first says that something that the solution stated presupposes is not true, namely that there is a length of time that is insensible, or escapes the notice of the sense-power. For no length of time is like, this: rather, all lengths of time can be sensed.
Deinde cum dicit si enim probat quod dixerat duabus rationibus.	448a26 Then when he says For if when one senses oneself, he prove what he bas said by two arguments.
Circa quarum primam considerandum est, quod tempus non sentitur quasi aliqua res permanens proposita sensui, sicut videtur color, magnitudo; sed propter hoc sentitur tempus, quia sentitur aliquid quod est in tempore: et ideo sequitur, quod si aliquod tempus non sit sensibile, quod id quod est in tempore illo non sit sensibile.	Concerning the first of these, we must consider that time is no, sensed as a permanent thing presented to a sense-power in the way that color or size is presented to sight. Rather, time is sensed because something that is in time is sensed. It follows, then, that if there is some length of time that is insensible, what is in that length of time is insensible.
Dicit ergo quod, si aliquando aliquis sentit se ipsum esse in aliquo continuo tempore, non contingit latere illud tempus esse: manifestum est autem quod homo vel aliquid aliud est in quodam continuo tempore; et quantumcumque dicas parvum tempus esse insensibile, manifestum est quod latebit hominem, si ipse sit in illo tempore, et latebit etiam si in illo tempore videt vel sentit; quod est inconveniens omnino: ergo impossibile est aliquod tempus esse insensibile.	Accordingly he says that if at some point, in some continuous length of time, a human being senses that be himself is existing, it cannot escape his notice that that length of time is existing. Now it is clear that the human being, or the something else, is existing in some continuous length of time And however brief you say the insensible length of time is, it is clear that it will escape the human being’s notice that he himself is existing during that time, and it will escape his notice that he is seeing, or sensing, during that time, which is entirely unreasonable. Therefore it is impossible for a length of time to be insensible.
Secundam rationem ponit ibi, amplius nec circa quam primo considerandum est, quod, sicut dicit philosophus in quinto physicorum, tripliciter dicitur aliquid movere aut moveri. Uno modo per accidens, ut si dicamus musicum ambulare. Alio modo secundum partem, ut si dicamus hominem sanari, quia oculus sanatur. Tertio modo primo et per se, quando aliquid movetur vel movet, non quia una pars eius tantum movetur aut movet, sed quia totum movetur secundum quamlibet suam partem.	448a30 He presents the second argument where he says Moreover, there will be no length of time. Concerning this it must first be considered that, as the Philosopher says in Physics V, a thing is said to move or be moved in three ways: in one way accidentally, for instance, if we say that the one who is musical is walking; in another way with respect to a part, for instance, if we say that a man is healed because his eye is healed; and in a third way primarily and per se, that is, when a thing is moved or moves not because just one part of it is moved or moves, but because the whole is moved with respect to every one of its parts.
Et similiter potest dici tripliciter aliquid sentiri. Uno modo per accidens, sicut dulce videtur. Alio modo secundum partem, ut si dicamus hominem videri, quia solum caput eius videtur. Tertio modo primo et per se, scilicet quia aliqua pars eius videatur.	Likewise, a thing can be said to be sensed in three ways: in one way accidentally, as, for instance, what is sweet is seen; in another way with respect to a part, for instance, if we say that a man is seen because just his head is seen; and in a third way primarily and per se, that is, not because just some part of it is seen.
Dicit ergo quod, si est aliqua magnitudo, vel temporis vel etiam rei corporalis insensibilis propter parvitatem, sequeretur quod nec tempus nec illa res sit quae sentit, scilicet in quo tempore scilicet non sit, idest non sentiatur quia in huius aliquo. Quasi dicat. Nullum tempus erit possibile quod non dicatur sentiri propter aliquam partem eius. Et quantum ad rem corpoream subdit: vel quia istius aliquid videt. Quasi dicat. Nulla magnitudo corporea erit quae non sentiatur quia aliqua pars eius sentitur: quod est eam non esse sensibilem primo.	Accordingly he says that if there is some magnitude—whether of time, or of a bodily thing—that is insensible because of smallness, what will follow is this: there will be no length of time and no thing that one senses (i.e. no thing that is sensed, or that a sense-power senses) during which (i.e. during which length of time) it is not the case (i.e. during which the time is not being sensed) because it is being sensed in some part of it. In other words: there will be no length of time that is sensible “primarily,” i.e. that is not said to be sensed because some part of it is being sensed. And with reference to the bodily thing he adds or because one sees some part of the thing. In other words: there will be no bodily magnitude that is not sensed because some part of it is sensed, which means that no bodily magnitude is sensible “primarily.”
Ad probandum autem quod dixerat, subdit, quod si aliquis videt vel sentit quocumque sensu aliquo continuo tempore, non ratione alicuius partis temporis vel magnitudinis, et tamen ponatur aliqua magnitudo et tempus esse insensibilis propter parvitatem, sit igitur quaedam magnitudo vel temporis vel rei corporalis, scilicet a c b, et sit pars eius, quae est b c, insensibilis propter parvitatem. Non ergo de hac parte insensibili propter parvitatem poterit dici quod sentiatur in huius aliquo si sit tempus insensibile, vel quod sentiatur aliquid istius si sit insensibile corpus, eo modo quo dicitur de tota terra, quod videtur ab aliquo quia aliqua pars eius videtur: et de aliquo quod ambulat in amne, quia ambulat in quadam parte amnis. Quia ergo in c b, nil sentit, relinquitur quod dicatur sentire totum a b, sive sit tempus, sive corpus, quia in residua parte eius sentitur, scilicet a c. Et eadem ratio est de magnitudine a c quae ponebatur sentiri: quia aliqua pars eius erit insensibilis propter parvitatem. Et ita semper dicetur sentiri quodcumque sensibile quia in aliquo eius sentitur, si sit tempus, vel quia aliquid eius sentitur, si sit corpus. Nihil autem totum erit sentire: sicut nec a c b.	To prove what he has said he adds that if someone sees, or senses by any sense, during some continuous length of time not by reason of a part of the time or magnitude; and nevertheless some magnitude and length of time are held to be insensible because of smallness; then let there be a magnitude—whether of time or of a bodily thing—namely AGB, and let the part of it that is the GB be insensible because of smallness. Accordingly, it cannot be said of this part that is insensible because of smallness that it is sensed “in a part of it”—if it is an insensible length of time—or that “a part of it” is sensed—if it is an insensible body—as the whole earth is said to be seen by someone because a part of the earth is seen, and as someone is said to walk during a year because he walks during a part of the year. Therefore, because one senses nothing in GB, it remains that one is said to sense the whole of AB—whether it is a time or a body—because the whole of AB is sensed in the part of it that is left, namely AG. And the account of the magnitude AG, which is held to be sensed, is the same, because a part of it will be insensible because of smallness. And so anything sensible will always be said to be sensed because it is sensed in a part of it—if it is a length of time—or because a part of it is sensed—if it is a body. But it will be possible to sense nothing whole, such as AGB.
Hoc autem videtur inconveniens: non ergo est aliquod tempus vel aliquod corpus insensibile propter parvitatem.	But this seems unreasonable. Therefore there is no length of time or body that is insensible because of smallness.
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Videtur autem haec ratio efficaciam non habere. Sentitur enim aliquid per hoc, quod habet virtutem immutandi sensum: probatur autem septimo physicorum, quod si aliquod totum movet aliquod mobile in aliquo tempore, non oportet quod pars eius moveat illud mobile in quocumque tempore: et tamen dicitur esse primum movens, quia totum movet, licet forte nulla pars eius moveat. Similiter ergo videtur posse dici quod aliquid sit primo sensibile, licet aliquae partes eius sint insensibiles propter parvitatem.	But this argument does not seem to work. For a thing is sensed because it has power to alter a sense. Now it is proved in Physics VII that if some whole moves something moveable in some length of time, it need not be the case that a part of the whole moves the rnoveable thing in any length of time. But although no part of the whole, perhaps, could cause the movement, nevertheless, the whole that causes the movement is said to be the first mover. Likewise, it seems, one could say that a thing can be sensible “primarily” although some parts of it are insensible because of smallness.
Est autem ad hoc dicendum, quod differt loqui de parte in toto existente et de parte separata a toto. Pars enim alicuius moventis primo, si sit separata, movere non poterit: sed, si in toto existens, non concurreret ad virtutem movendi totius, sed omnino esset expers virtutis motivae, sequeretur quod totum non esset primo movens, sed ratione partis ad quam pertinet virtus motiva.	In response to this it must be said that there is a difference between speaking of a part existing in a whole and a part separated from a whole. If a part of what primarily causes movement is separated, it may not be able to cause movement. But if, while existing in the whole, it did not cooperate in the power to move of the whole, but completely lack power to move, it would follow that the whole would be the mover not “primarily,” but by reason of the part to which power to move does belong.
Similiter etiam nihil prohibet aliquam partem separatim acceptam latere sensum propter parvitatem, ut supra habitum est: quae tamen, prout in toto existit, cadit sub sensu inquantum sensus fertur super toto non exclusa aliqua parte. Et ideo ad hanc dubitationem aperiendam.	Likewise, too, nothing prevents a part taken separately from escaping the notice of a sense-power because of smallness, as was established above, while nevertheless, the part as existing in the whole does fall under the sense-power inasmuch as the sense-power is brought to bear on the whole, with no part left out.
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Consequenter cum dicit omnia quidem ostendit quid sit verum circa praedicta. Et dicit quod omnia, sive magna, sive parva, sunt sensibilia sed non videntur quaecumque sunt idest non videntur omni modo secundum quod sunt: sicut patet de sole, cuius magnitudo est longe maior terra, tamen propter hoc quod a longe est, videtur quatuor cubitorum vel etiam minus. Similiter etiam licet omnia sint sensibilia sensui secundum naturam, non tamen videntur in actu quantumcumque sint. Sed aliquod indivisibile potest intelligi dupliciter.	448b12 To address this doubt, next, when he says All things, then, a sensible, he shows what is true in the foregoing. He says that all things, whether big or small, are sensible, but do not appear to be everything that they are, that is, they do not appear as they are in every way. This is clear in the case of the sun, the size of which is far greater than that of the earth, and nevertheless, because it is far away, it appears to be four cubits in size, or even smaller. Likewise, although all things are sensible by their nature, nevertheless an object does not appear in actuality to be everything that it is: rather, sometimes it is indivisible, but one sees what is not indivisible. This can be understood in two ways.
Uno modo secundum quod indivisibile dicitur aliquod corpus naturale minimum, quod non potest dividi ulterius quin corrumpatur, et tunc resolvitur in corpus continens. Et tunc sensus erit, quod corpus indivisibile, est quidem in seipso insensibile, sed tamen huiusmodi indivisibile sensus videre non potest.	One way is according as “indivisible” refers to some minimal natural body that cannot be further divided without being destroyed, and then absorbed into the surrounding body. Thus the meaning will be that an indivisible body is sensible in itself, although the sense-power cannot see an indivisible object of this kind.
Alio modo potest intelligi indivisibile, quod non est actu divisum sicut pars continui; et huiusmodi indivisibile non videt sensus in actu.	In the other way, “indivisible” can be understood as what is not divided off in actuality, for example a part of a continuum. The sense power does not see this kind of indivisible object in actuality.
Et quantum ad utramque expositionem competit quod subditur, quod causa huius dicta est prius in determinatione primae quaestionis. Videtur autem secunda expositio melior, quia per hoc solvitur obiectio praedicta, quia scilicet pars quaelibet continuae magnitudinis sentitur quidem in toto, prout est in potentia in ipso, licet non sentiatur in actu quasi separata.	What he adds fits either explanation: that the cause of this has been stated above, that is, in the determination of the first question. But the second explanation seems to be better, because by means of it the abovementioned objection is resolved, because any part whatsoever of a continuous magnitude is indeed sensed within the whole inasmuch as it is in the whole in potentiality, although it is not sensed in actuality as separate.
Ultimo autem concludit manifestum esse ex praedictis, quod nullum tempus est insensibile.	448b16 Finally he concludes that it is clear from what has been said that no length of time is insensible.

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CHAPTER 18 448B 17–449B4
περὶ δὲ τῆς πρότερον λεχθείσης ἀπορίας σκεπτέον, πότερον ἐνδέχεται ἅμα πλειόνων αἰσθάνεσθαι ἢ οὐκ ἐνδέχεται. τὸ δ΄ ἅμα λέγω ἐν ἑνὶ καὶ ἀτόμῳ χρόνῳ πρὸς ἄλληλα.	448b17 with respect to the objection stated above, it must be considered whether it is possible or not possible to sense several things simultaneously. By “simultaneously” I mean together in one indivisible moment of time.
πρῶτον μὲν οὖν ἆρ΄ ὧδ΄ ἐνδέχεται, ἅμα μέν, ἑτέρῳ δὲ τῆς ψυχῆς αἰσθάνεσθαι, κἀν [οὐ τῷ ἀτόμῳ] οὕτως ἀτόμῳ ὡς παντὶ ὄντι συνεχεῖ;	448b20 First, then, whether it is possible to sense simultaneously by means of a different part of the soul, which is not indivisible, but is indivisible in the way that something continuous is.
ἢ [ὅτι] πρῶτον μὲν κατὰ τὴν μίαν αἴσθησιν, οἷον λέγω ὄψιν, εἰ ἔσται ἄλλῳ αἰσθανομένη ἄλλου καὶ ἄλλου χρώματος, πλείω γε μέρη ἕξει εἴδει ταὐτά; καὶ γὰρ ἃ αἰσθάνεται ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ γένει ἐστίν.	448b22 Or first, the case of objects sensed by one sense. For instance if sight senses different colors with different parts of itself, it will have several parts specifically the same, for what is sensed belongs to the same genus.
εἰ δέ, [ὅτι] ὡς ὄμματα δύο, φαίη τις οὐδὲν κωλύειν οὕτω καὶ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, [ὅτι] ἴσως ἐκ μὲν τούτων ἕν τι γίγνεται καὶ μία ἡ ἐνέργεια αὐτῶν· ἐκεῖ δέ, εἰ μὲν ἓν τὸ ἐξ ἀμφοῖν, ἐκεῖνο τὸ αἰσθανόμενον ἔσται, εἰ δὲ χωρίς, οὐχ ὁμοίως ἕξει.	448b26 If someone says that, since there are two eyes, nothing prevents it from being like this in the soul as well—it must be said that perhaps out of these some one thing is made, and they have one operation. But in the other case, if some one thing is made out of two, that will be what senses; but if they are separate, it will not be like the other case.
ἔτι αἰσθήσεις αἱ αὐταὶ πλείους ἔσονται, ὥσπερ εἴ τις ἐπιστήμας [449a] διαφόρους φαίη· οὔτε γὰρ ἡ ἐνέργεια ἄνευ τῆς κατ΄ αὐτὴν ἔσται δυνάμεως, οὔτ΄ ἄνευ ταύτης αἴσθησις ἔσται.	448b29 Moreover, there will also be several senses that are the same, as if someone were to speak of sciences that are not different. For there can be neither an operation without its own power, nor a sense-power without the former.
εἰ δὲ τούτων ἐν ἑνὶ καὶ ἀτόμῳ μὴ αἰσθάνεται, δῆλον ὅτι καὶ τῶν ἄλλων· μᾶλλον γὰρ ἐνεδέχετο τούτων ἅμα πλειόνων ἢ τῶν τῷ γένει ἑτέρων. εἰ δὲ δὴ ἄλλῳ μὲν γλυκέος ἄλλῳ δὲ λευκοῦ αἰ σθάνεται ἡ ψυχὴ μέρει, ἤτοι τὸ ἐκ τούτων ἕν τί ἐστιν ἢ οὐχ ἕν. ἀλλ΄ ἀνάγκη ἕν· ἓν γάρ τι τὸ αἰσθητικόν ἐστι μέρος. τίνος οὖν ἐκεῖνο ἑνός; οὐδὲν γὰρ ἐκ τούτων ἕν. ἀνάγκη ἄρα ἕν τι εἶναι τῆς ψυχῆς ᾧ ἅπαντα αἰσθάνεται, καθάπερ εἴρη ται πρότερον, ἄλλο δὲ γένος δι΄ ἄλλου.	449a2 But if it senses this by one indivisible part, it is clear that it also senses the others. For it is more possible for several of these to be sensed simultaneously than ones of different genera. If, then, the soul senses sweet by one part but white by another, out of these either some one thing is made or it is not. But it necessarily is, for the sensitive part is some one part. What one object, then, does it have? For there is no one object made out of these objects. Therefore there is necessarily some one part of the soul by which it senses everything, as was said before, but it senses different genera by means of different parts.
ἆρ΄ οὖν ᾗ μὲν ἀδιαίρετόν ἐστι κατ΄ ἐνέργειαν, ἕν τί ἐστι τὸ αἰσθητικὸν γλυκέος καὶ λευκοῦ, ὅταν δὲ διαιρετὸν γένηται κατ΄ ἐνέργειαν, ἕτερον;	449a10 Accordingly, inasmuch as it is indivisible it is one power in actuality able to sense sweet and white. But when it is made divisible, it is different in actuality.
ἢ ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῶν πραγμάτων αὐτῶν ἐνδέχεται, οὕτως καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς ψυχῆς; τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ καὶ ἓν ἀριθμῷ λευκὸν καὶ γλυκύ ἐστι, καὶ ἄλλα πολλά· εἰ γὰρ μὴ χωριστὰ τὰ πάθη ἀλλήλων, ἀλλὰ τὸ εἶναι ἕτερον ἑκάστῳ. ὁμοίως τοίνυν θετέον καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς ψυχῆς τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ ἓν εἶναι ἀριθμῷ τὸ αἰσθητικὸν πάντων, τὸ μέντοι εἶναι ἕτερον καὶ ἕτερον τῶν μὲν γένει τῶν δὲ εἴδει. ὥστε καὶ αἰσθάνοιτ΄ ἂν ἅμα τῷ αὐτῷ καὶ ἑνί, λόγῳ δ΄ οὐ τῷ αὐτῷ.	449al3 Or again, as it is in things themselves, so also in the soul For one and numerically the same thing is white, and sweet, and many other things, if the affections are not separable from one another But the being (esse) of each is different. Similarly, then, we should posit that also in the soul the power that is able to sense all things—although these differ in being, some in genus and some in species—is one and numerically the same. Hence it will also perceive by means of what is simultaneously one and the same, but not the same in aspect (ratio).
ὅτι δὲ τὸ αἰσθητὸν πᾶν ἐστι μέ γεθος καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν ἀδιαίρετον αἰσθητόν, δῆλον. ἔστι γὰρ ὅθεν μὲν οὐκ ἂν ὀφθείη ἄπειρον τὸ ἀπόστημα, ὅθεν δὲ ὁρᾶται, πεπερασμένον· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὸ ὀσφραντὸν καὶ ἀκουστὸν καὶ ὅσων μὴ αὐτῶν ἁπτόμενοι αἰσθάνονται. ἔστι δή τι ἔσχατον τοῦ ἀποστήματος ὅθεν οὐχ ὁρᾶται, καὶ πρῶτον ὅθεν ὁρᾶται. τοῦτο δὴ ἀνάγκη ἀδιαίρετον εἶναι, οὗ ἐν μὲν τῷ ἐπέκεινα οὐκ ἐνδέχεται αἰσθάνεσθαι ὄντος, ἐν δὲ τῷ ἐπὶ τάδε ἀνάγκη αἰσθάνεσθαι. εἰ δή τι ἔστιν ἀδιαίρετον αἰσθητόν, ὅταν τεθῇ ἐπὶ τῷ ἐσχάτῳ ὅθεν ἐστὶν ὕστατον μὲν οὐκ αἰσθητὸν πρῶτον δ΄ αἰσθητόν, ἅμα συμβήσεται ὁρατὸν εἶναι καὶ ἀόρατον· τοῦτο δ΄ ἀδύνατον. [449b]	449a20 Now it is clear that everything that is sensible is a magnitude, and what is indivisible is not sensible. For there is an infinite distance from which it will not be able to be seen, but that from which it can be seen is finite. And it is similar with the audible and the odorous, and whatever senses without touching the things themselves. And so there is a limit to the distance from which it cannot be seen, and a point from which it can first be seen. And so there is necessarily something indivisible beyond which there is no sensing, but on this side of which there is necessarily sensing. If, then, something indivisible is sensible, when it is placed at the limit that is the last point from which it is not sensible and the first point from which it is sensible, it will simultaneously be visible and invisible. But this is impossible.
περὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν αἰσθητηρίων καὶ τῶν αἰσθητῶν τίνα τρόπον ἔχει καὶ κοινῇ καὶ καθ΄ ἕκαστον αἰσθητήριον εἴρη ται· τῶν δὲ λοιπῶν πρῶτον σκεπτέον περὶ μνήμης καὶ τοῦ μνημονεύειν.	449b1 Something has been said, then about the sensitive parts, and sensible objects, how they are related, both in general and with respect to each sensitive part. Of what remains, the first to be considered are memory and recollection and sleep.

Commentary
Postquam philosophus exclusit secundam solutionem falsam, hic inquirit veram.	448b17 After the Philosopher bas eliminated a false solution, here he seeks the true one.
Et circa hoc tria facit. Primo inquirit veritatem praedictae quaestionis. Secundo probat quoddam, quod in praecedentibus supposuerat, ibi, quod autem sensibile omne. Tertio epilogat quae in hoc libro dicta sunt, ibi, de sensitivis quidem igitur.	On this point he does three things. First he investigates the truth about the aforementioned question. Second he proves something he presupposed in the foregoing, where he says Now it is clear that everything that is sensible (449a2O). Third he adds an epilogue to what was said in in his book, where he says Something has been said, then (449b1).
Circa primum duo facit. Primo proponit quod intendit. Secundo exequitur propositum, ibi, primum quidem igitur.	On the first point he does two things. First he proposes what he intends. Second he carries out the proposal, where he says First, then, whether it is possible to sense simultaneously (448b20).
Dicit ergo primo quod, ex quo conclusum est, quod quidam dixerunt plura sentiri simul, non quasi in indivisibili temporis secundum rei veritatem, sed quasi in tempore imperceptibili propter parvitatem, oportet considerare de obiectione prius mota: utrum scilicet contingat vel non contingat plura sentire simul, ita scilicet quod intelligatur simul, hoc est in indivisibili tempore.	Accordingly, on the basis of the fact that what some have said has been eliminated—namely that several things are sensed simultaneously not in a moment of time that is indivisible according to the truth of the matter, but in a length of time that is imperceptible because of brevity—we must consider, with respect to the objection raised above, whether it is or is not possible to sense several things simultaneously, taking “simultaneously” to mean in an indivisible moment of time.
Deinde cum dicit primum quidem supposito quod animal simul sentiat diversa sensibilia, quia hoc manifeste experimur, inquirit quomodo possibile.	448b20 Then when he says First, then, whether it is possible to sense simultaneously, presupposing that an animal does sense different sensible objects simultaneously—for we obviously have experience of this—he investigates how this is possible.
Et circa hoc tria facit. Primo proponit quemdam modum falsum. Secundo improbat ipsum, ibi, vel quoniam primum. Tertio proponit modum verum, ibi, igitur secundum quod indivisibile.	On this point he does three things. First he presents a false way. Second he disproves it, where he says Or first, the case of objects sensed by on sense (448b22). Third be presents the true way, where he says Accordingly, inasmuch as it is indivisible (449a10).
Dicit ergo primo, quod primo considerandum est, utrum contingat simul sentire diversa sensibilia per aliquam partem animae, quasi sensitivum animae sit non indivisibile, idest non quod non possit dividi; sit tamen indivisibile, idest non divisum in actu, ac si esset quoddam totum continuum. Si autem intelligamus partem animae sensitivam esse sicut quoddam continuum, solventur praemissae rationes, quia nihil prohibebit diversa et contraria esse in virtute vel potentia sensitiva animae secundum diversas partes eius, sicut invenimus unum corpus esse album in una parte, et nigrum in alia.	Accordingly he first says that it must first be considered whether it is possible simultaneously to sense different sensible objects by means of a different part of the soul, the sensitive part of the soul being, as it were, not indivisible—that is, not incapable of being divided—although it is indivisible in the sense that it is not divided in actuality, being like a continuous whole. For if we understand the sensitive part of the soul to be like a continuum, the arguments presented above are dissolved, because nothing will prevent different and contrary things from being in the sensitive power of the soul with respect to its different parts, in the way we see that one body is white in one part and black in another.
Deinde cum dicit vel quoniam improbat modum praedictum.	448b22 Then when he says Or first, the case of objects sensed by one sense, he disproves the way just mentioned.
Et circa hoc tria facit. Primo ostendit quod sequeretur etiam quod unus sensus, puta visus, dividatur in plures partes. Secundo ostendit hoc esse impossibile, ibi, si autem quemadmodum. Tertio ostendit quia etiam non est possibile quantum ad diversos sensus, ibi: si autem hoc.	On this point he does three things. First he shows that it will follow that even one sense, for instance sight, is divisible into several parts. Second he shows that this is impossible, where he says If someone says (448b26). Third he shows that it is also not possible with respect to different senses, where he says But if it senses this by one indivisible part (449a2).
Dicit ergo primo, quod cum contingit plura secundum eumdem sensum sentire, sicut cum visus discernit inter album et nigrum, oportebit dicere secundum eamdem rationem, quod diversos colores sentiat secundum diversas sui partes: et sequetur, quod idem sensus habebit plures partes easdem specie: non enim potest dici, quod partes sensus visus differant specie, quia omne, quod sentitur per visum, est eiusdem generis. In potentiis autem sensitivis nihil differt specie, nisi propter diversa genera sensibilium.	Accordingly he first says that since one can simultaneously sense several objects by the same sense, as when sight distinguishes between whit and black, according to the foregoing argument one will have to say that it senses the different colors by different parts of itself, and so it will follow that the same sense will have several parts specifically the same. For it cannot be said that parts of the sense of sight differ specifically, because everything sensed by sight belongs to the same genus, and there is specific difference among sensitive powers only because of different genera sensible objects.
Deinde cum dicit si autem improbat quod dictum est duabus rationibus.	448b26 Then when he says If someone says, he disproves what was said by two arguments.
Quarum prima est, quod, si aliquis dicat, quod, sicut sunt duo organa visus, scilicet duo oculi, sic nihil prohibet in anima sensitiva etiam esse duos visus, dicendum est hoc esse falsum; quia ex duobus oculis fit aliquid unum, et una est operatio amborum oculorum, inquantum scilicet visio utriusque oculi concurrit per quosdam nervos ad aliquid intrinsecum in suum organum, quod est circa cerebrum, ut supra dictum est. Si autem similiter in anima fiat unum ex duobus visibus, per hoc quod uterque visus concurrat ad aliquod unum principium, illi uni attribuetur operatio sentiendi; si vero omnino separatim se habent duo visus in anima, quod non concurrant in aliquod unum principium, tunc non similiter se habebit de visione in anima, sicut de oculis in corpore; et ita similitudo non fuit conveniens ad manifestandum propositum. Non ergo videtur rationabiliter dici, quod sunt duo visus in anima.	The first is that if someone says that, just as there are two organs of sight—that is, two eyes—nothing prevents there being two senses of sight in the sensitive soul as well, in response to this it must be said that out of the two eyes some one thing is made, and that there is one operation of both eyes—that is, inasmuch as the seeings of the two eyes concur, by way of certain nerves, at an inner organ of sight that is near the brain, as was said above. But if, likewise, in the soul some one thing is made out of two powers of sight by the two powers concurring in some one principle, it is to that one principle that the operation of sensing will be attributed. But if the two powers of sight are altogether separate in the soul because they do not concur in some one principle, the relation of powers of sight in the soul will not be like that of eyes in the body, and so the comparison was not suitable for showing what was proposed. Therefore, it does not seem reasonable to say that there are two powers of sight in the soul.
Secundam rationem ponit ibi, amplius et. Et dicit quod secundum praedictam positionem hoc modo erunt plures sensus, qui sunt idem specie, puta plures visus aut plures auditus, sicut si aliquis dicat, scientias non differentes specie esse plures in eodem homine, ut plures grammaticas vel plures geometrias, esse quidem plures grammaticas numero, vel plures hominibus possibile est, sed non in uno et eodem homine: sicut nec plures numero albedines sunt in uno et eodem subiecto. Subiungit autem ad ostendendum quod non possunt esse plures sensus eiusdem speciei in eodem: quia virtus sensitiva et operatio seinvicem consequuntur, ita quod neque virtus est sine propria et per se operatione, neque operatio sine propria virtute. Operatio autem sensitiva distinguitur secundum sensibilia, et ideo ubi sunt omnino eadem sensibilia non sunt diversae virtutes sensitivae causantes diversas operationes. Et simile est de habitibus scientiarum, quarum actus distinguuntur secundum obiecta.	448b29 He presents the second argument where he says Moreover, there will also be several senses. He says that according to the position stated above there will be several senses that are specifically the same, for instance several senses of sight or several senses of hearing. it would be as if someone said that there are, in the same human being, several sciences that are not specifically different, for instance several grammars or several geometries. It is certainly possible for there to be numerically several grammars or several powers of sight in different human beings, but not in one and the same human beings, just as it is impossible for there to be numerically several whitenesses in one and the same subject. To show that there cannot be several senses specifically the same in the same human being, he adds that sensitive power and operation follow from one another in such a way that neither can there be a power without its proper and per se operation, nor an operation without its proper power. But sensitive operation is distinguished according to sensible objects, and so where sensible objects are completely the same, there are not different sensitive powers causing different operations. The habits of the sciences are similar: their acts are distinguished according to their objects.
Deinde cum dicit si autem hic ostendit esse impossibile in sensibilibus diversorum sensuum, ut scilicet per eamdem partem animae sentiantur. Et dicit quod, si sensibilia diversorum generum sentiuntur per aliquid animae unum et idem indivisibile, manifestum est quod multo magis alia, quae sunt unius generis. Probatum est enim supra, quod magis contingit ea quae sunt unius generis simul sentire, quam ea quae sunt diversorum generum; et hoc maxime verum est quantum ad identitatem sentientis:	449a2 Then when he says But if it senses this by one indivisible part, he shows that this is impossible for objects of different senses, that is, that it is impossible for them to be sensed by different parts of the soul. He says that if sensible objects belonging to different genera are perceived by some one and the same indivisible part of the soul, it is clear that much more so are the others, that is, those belonging to one genus. For it was proved above that it is more possible for objects belonging to one genus to be sensed simultaneously than objects belonging to different genera, and this is especially true with respect to the identity of the one perceiving.
quod autem eadem indivisibilis anima sentiat sensibilia diversorum generum, probat, quia, si anima sentit per aliam sui partem dulce et per aliam album, aut ex istis duabus partibus erit aliquid unum vel non erit. Sed necesse est dicere quod sit aliquid unum, ad quod referantur omnes istae partes, scilicet diversi sensus, quia sensitiva est quaedam una pars animae; non autem potest dici quod pars sensitiva animae sit alicuius unius generis sensibilium; nisi forte diceretur, quod ex omnibus sensibilibus particularium sensuum, puta, colore, sono et aliis huiusmodi, fieret unum sensibile correspondens isti uni parti sensitivae, quae est communis omnibus propriis sensibus; hoc autem est impossibile. Necesse est ergo quod sit aliquid unum animae, quo animal omnia sentit; sed aliud genus per aliud, puta colorem per visum, et sonum per auditum, et sic de aliis.	He proves as follows that the soul does perceive sensible objects of different genera by the same indivisible part. If the soul senses sweet by one part of itself and white by another, out of these two parts either some one thing will be made or it will not. But one must necessarily say that there is some one thing to which all these parts—that is, the different senses—are referred, because the sensitive part is some one part of the soul. But it cannot be said that the sensitive part of the soul has some one genus of sensible objects—unless, perhaps, it were said that out of all objects of particular senses—for instance color, sound, and other such objects—is made one sensible object that would correspond to the one part of the sensitive part that is common to all proper senses. But this is impossible. Therefore there is necessarily some one part of the soul by which an animal senses everything, but it senses different genera by means of different parts, for instance color by sight, and sound by hearing, and so on.
Considerandum autem est hic, quod ubicumque sint diversae potentiae ordinatae, inferior potentia comparatur ad superiorem per modum instrumenti, eo quod superior movet inferiorem. Actio autem attribuitur principali agenti per instrumentum, sicut dicimus, quod artifex secat per serram. Et per hunc modum philosophus dicit quod sensus communis sentit per visum et per auditum, et alios sensus proprios, qui sunt diversae partes potentiales animae; non autem diversae partes sunt alicuius continui, ut superius dicebatur.	Now here it must be considered that wherever there are different ordered powers, a lower power is related to a higher one as an instrument, because the higher moves the lower, and action is attributed to the principal agent acting by means of an instrument, as we say that a builder cuts by means of a saw. It is in this way that the Philosopher says here that the common sense perceives by means of sight, and by means hearing, and by means of other proper senses, which are different potential parts of the soul, and not, as was claimed above, like different parts of a continuum.
Deinde cum dicit igitur secundum ostendit quomodo eadem pars animae indivisibilis possit simul sentire diversa. Et assignat duos modos.	449a10 Then, when he says Accordingly, inasmuch as it is indivisible, he shows how the same indivisible part of the soul can simultaneously perceive different things. He presents two ways.
Quorum primum breviter et obscure ponit, quia in libro de anima apertius positus est. Ad huius ergo evidentiam considerandum, quod, cum operationes sensuum propriorum referantur ad sensum communem, sicut ad primum et commune principium, hoc modo se habet sensus communis ad sensus proprios et operationes eorum, sicut unum punctum ad diversas lineas, quae in ipsum concurrunt. Punctum autem, quod est terminus diversarum linearum, secundum quod in se consideratur, est unum et indivisibile. Et isto modo sensus communis secundum quod in se est unum, est indivisibilis, et est unum sensitivum actu dulcis et albi: dulcis per gustum, et albi per visum; si vero consideretur punctum seorsum ut est terminus huius lineae, sic est quodammodo divisibile, quia utimur uno puncto ut duobus. Et similiter sensus communis, quando accipitur ut divisibile quoddam, puta cum seorsum iudicat de albo, et iudicat seorsum de dulci, est alterum secundum actum: secundum vero quod est unum, iudicat differentias sensibilium. Et per hoc solvuntur rationes supradictae, quia quodammodo est unum, et quodammodo non est unum illud quod sentit diversa sensibilia.	He presents the first briefly and obscurely, because it has been presented more fully in On the Soul. For evidence on this point, then, it must be considered that, since the operations of the proper senses are referred to the common sense as their first and common principle, the common sense is related to the proper senses and their operations in the way that one point is related to different lines that meet in it. Now a point that is the terminus of different lines is, considered in itself, one and indivisible, and in this way the common sense, inasmuch as it is in itself indivisible, is one power in actuality, able to sense sweet and white, sweet by means of taste, and white by means of sight. But if the point is considered separately insofar as it is the terminus of this line, and separately again insofar as it is the terminus of another line, it is thus in a way divisible, because we take the one point as two. Likewise the common sense, when it is taken as something divisible—for instance when it separately judges of white, and separately again of sweet—is different in actuality. But inasmuch as it is one, it judges differences among sensible objects. By this the arguments introduced above are dissolved, inasmuch as what senses different sensible objects is in a way one, and in a way not one.
Secundum modum ponit ibi, vel quemadmodum. Et dicit, quod sicut est in rebus exterioribus, ita potest dici in anima. Videmus enim quod corpus unum et idem numero est album et dulce, et multa alia huiusmodi, quae accidentaliter de eo praedicantur; sed tamen huius passiones separantur abinvicem, sicut contingit quod aliquod corpus retinet albedinem et amittit dulcedinem; sed quamdiu non sic separantur istae passiones, album et dulce remanent, vel sunt idem subiecto, sed differunt secundum esse. Et similiter potest poni de anima, quod unum et idem subiecto est sensitivum omnium sensibilium, tam eorum quae differunt genere sicut album et dulce, quam eorum quae differunt specie sicut album et nigrum. Et secundum hoc dicendum erit quod anima sentit diversa sensibilia quodammodo secundum unum et idem, scilicet subiecto, quodammodo diversa, inquantum ratione differunt.	449a13 He presents the second way where he says Or again, as it is in things themselves. He says that as it is in external things, so, it can be said, it is in the soul. For we see that one and numerically the same body is white, and sweet, and many other such things that are predicated of it as accidents—that is, if such affections are not separated from one another, as happens when a body keeps its whiteness and loses its sweetness. But as long as the affections are not thus separated, the white thing and the sweet thing remain the same in subject, but differ in being. Likewise, it can be posited of the soul that the power able to sense all sensible objects—both those that differ in genus, such as white and sweet, and those that differ in species, such as white and black—is one and the same in subject. And according to this, it will have to be said that the soul senses different sensible objects by means of what in a way is one and the same, that is, one and the same in subject, but in a way is not the same, inasmuch as it differs in aspect.
Difficulties
I
Potest autem contra hoc obiici, quia in rebus quae sunt extra animam, licet idem posset esse dulce et album, non tamen potest idem esse album et nigrum, et ita videbitur quod anima non possit simul sentire sensibilia unius generis, cum sint contraria.	Now an objection to this might be raised. For in what is outside the soul, although the same thing could be sweet and white, nevertheless the same thing cannot be white and black. Thus it would seem that the soul cannot simultaneously sense sensible objects of one genus when they are contraries. Aristotle raises this objection in On the Soul when he says, “And it is impossible for white and black to be simultaneous: therefore, neither can their species be experienced simultaneously.”
Hanc autem obiectionem Aristoteles removet in libro de anima, cum dicit: et impossibile est album et nigrum esse simul, quare neque species pati ipsorum. Et innuit solutionem per hoc quod subdit, si huius est sensus, et intelligentia vel intellectus. Per quod datur intelligi, quod non omnino se habet in sensu et intellectu, sicut in corporibus naturalibus. Corpus enim naturale recipit formas secundum esse naturale et materiale, secundum quod habent in se contrarietatem: et ideo non potest idem corpus simul recipere albedinem et nigredinem: sed sensus et intellectus recipiunt formas rerum spiritualiter et immaterialiter secundum esse quoddam intentionale prout non habent contrarietatem. Unde sensus et intellectus simul potest recipere species sensibilium contrariorum. Cuius simile potest videri in diaphano, quod in una et eadem sui parte immutatur ab albo et nigro: quia immutatio non est materialis secundum esse naturale, ut supra dictum est.	He suggests the solution by what he adds: “if sense and intellect are similar.” By this he gives us to understand that the situation in sense and intellect is not completely similar to that in natural bodies. For a natural body receives forms according to their natural and material being, according to which they have contrariety, which is why the same body cannot simultaneously receive whiteness and blackness. But sense and intellect receive the forms of things spiritually and immaterially according to an intentional being, in such a way that they have no contrariety. Hence sense and intellect can simultaneously receive species of contrary sensible objects. Something like this can be seen in the transparent, which in one and the same part of itself can be altered by white and by black, because the alteration is not material or according to natural being, as was said above.
Est etiam aliud considerandum, quod sensus et intellectus non solum recipiunt formas rerum, sed etiam habent iudicare: iudicium autem quod faciunt de contrariis non est contrarium, sed unum et idem, quia per unum contrariorum sumitur iudicium de altero. Et quantum ad hoc, verum est quod supra dictum est, quod magis simul possunt sentiri sensibilia unus generis, de quorum uno iudicatur per alterum, quam sensibilia diversorum sensuum.	There is also something else to be considered: that sense and intellect not only receive the forms of things, but also make a judgment about them. Now judgment about contraries is not itself contrary, but something one and the same, because by one of the contraries a judgment is taken about the other. To this extent, what was said above is true, that sensible objects belonging to one genus, where judgment about one of the objects is made by means of the other, can more readily be sensed simultaneously than objects of different senses.
II
Est autem et aliud circa hoc dubium: quia per praemissa verba philosophi, videtur confirmari opinio Stoicorum, qui posuerunt, quod non diversis potentiis sentitur color et odor et alia sensibilia; sed nec sunt diversae potentiae sensuum, sed ipsa anima secundum seipsam cognoscit omnia sensibilia, non differens nisi ratione.	But there is also another difficulty on this point, because the Philosopher’s words presented above (449a13-20) seem to confirm an opinion of the Stoics, who held that color and odor and other sensible objects are not sensed by different powers; and that there are not different sense-powers; but that the soul itself, of itself, knows all sensible objects, and in doing so differs only in aspect.
Sed dicendum est quod secunda solutio supponit primam. Unde intelligendum est, quod anima, idest sensus communis, unus numero existens, sola autem ratione differens, cognoscit diversa genera sensibilium, quae tamen referuntur ad ipsum secundum diversas potentias sensuum propriorum.	To this it must be said that the solution of this second difficulty presupposes the first solution. Thus it must be understood that the soul—that is, the common sense, existing as numerically one, and differing only in aspect—knows different genera of sensible objects, which, however, are referred to it by the different powers of the proper senses.
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Deinde cum dicit quod autem probat quod supposuerat, scilicet quod nihil sentitur nisi quantum. Et dicit manifestum esse quod omne sensibile est magnitudo, et nullum indivisibile est sensibile. Et ad hoc probandum inducit, quod est quaedam distantia ex qua non potest aliquid videri, et hanc distantiam dicit esse infinitam: quia, si in infinitum illa distantia protendatur, nihil inde videtur. Est autem aliqua distantia unde aliquid videtur, et haec est finita, quia a finita distantia incipit aliquid videri. Et simile est de aliis sensibilibus quae sentiunt ab aliqua distantia per medium extrinsecum non tangentes ipsa sensibilia, sicut auditus et odoratus.	449a20 Then, when he says Now it is clear that everything that is sensible, he proves something he presupposed above, namely that nothing is perceived unless it is of some size. He says that it is clear that everything that is sensible is a magnitude, and nothing indivisible is sensible. To prove this, he introduces the consideration that there is a distance from which a thing cannot be seen; he says that this distance is “infinite, “ because if the distance is extended to infinity, nothing is seen front there. And there is a distance from which a thing can be seen, and this is “finite,” because a thing begins to be seen from a finite distance. It is similar with the other senses, namely hearing and smell, that sense from some distance through an external medium without touching the sensible things themselves.
Cum igitur distantia, unde non videtur aliquid, sit infinita per remotionem a visu, finita autem versus visum, sequitur quod sit dare ultimum aliquod unde nihil videatur. Distantia autem ex qua videtur aliquod, est ex utraque parte finita. Est ergo dare aliquem terminum, unde primo possit aliquid videri: omne autem quod est medium duarum quantitatum invicem continuarum, est indivisibile; ergo necesse est esse aliquid indivisibile ultra quod nihil possit sentiri, et citra quod necesse sit aliquod sentiri. Si ergo aliquod indivisibile sit sensibile et ponatur in illo indivisibili termino, sequetur quod illud sit visibile simul et invisibile: invisibile quidem, inquantum est in termino invisibilis distantiae; visibile autem, inquantum est in termino visibilis; hoc autem est impossibile; ergo et primum, scilicet quod aliquod indivisibile sit sensibile. Si enim aliquod indivisibile in praedicto termino ponatur, partim videbitur et partim non videbitur, quod de invisibili dici non potest.	Therefore, since the distance from which a thing cannot be seen is infinite in the direction away from sight, but finite in the direction towards sight, it follows that it is possible to identify a limit from which nothing is seen. But the distance from which a thing can be seen is finite in both directions. Therefore it is possible to identify a terminus from which a thing can first be seen. But anything intermediate between two quantities continuous with one another is indivisible. Therefore there is necessarily some indivisible point beyond which nothing can be sensed, and on this side of which a thing necessarily can be sensed. Therefore, if something indivisible is sensible, and it is placed at that indivisible boundary, it will follow that it is simultaneously visible and invisible: invisible inasmuch as it is at the boundary of the distance of the invisible, but visible inasmuch as it is at the boundary of the visible. But this is impossible. Therefore the first premise, that something indivisible is sensible, is also impossible. For if something indivisible is placed at the above-mentioned terminus, it will be partly seen and partly not seen, which cannot be said of the indivisible.
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Videtur autem quod haec probatio non valeat: quia non est dare aliquem terminum unde omnia visibilia incipiant videri; quia maiora a maiori distantia videntur, minora vero a minori.	Now this proof might seem to fail, because it is not possible to identify a boundary from which all visible things begin to be seen: rather, bigger things are seen from a bigger distance, and smaller ones from a smaller distance.
Dicendum est autem quod unumquodque sensibile ab aliqua determinata distantia videtur. Si ergo illud indivisibile, quod ponitur posse sentiri, videatur ab aliqua determinata distantia, sicut et aliquod divisibile, concludet ratio Aristotelis. Si vero non sit determinare aliquam distantiam, ex qua simul incipit videri cum aliquo divisibili, sequetur iterum quod nullo modo possit videri. Oportet enim accipere proportionem distantiae ex qua videtur aliquod divisibile, secundum proportionem magnitudinum quae videtur. Sed non est aliqua proportio indivisibilis ad magnitudinem divisibilem, sicut nec puncti ad lineam. Et ita sequetur quod ex nulla distantia possit videri indivisibile: quia cuiuslibet distantiae est aliqua proportio ad aliam distantiam. Sequetur ergo, si videtur, quod videatur coniunctum visui, quod est contra rationem visus et aliorum sensuum, qui non tangentes sentiunt. Si ergo indivisibile non potest sentiri, nisi forte secundum quod est terminus continui, sicut et alia accidentia continuorum sentiuntur.	To this it must be said that every sensible object is visible from some determinate distance. Therefore if the indivisible thing that is held to be sensible is seen from some determinate distance, like a divisible thing, then Aristotle’s argument will be conclusive. But if it is not possible to determine a distance from which it begins to be seen at the same time as a divisible thing is, it will again follow that in no way can it be seen. For one must take the proportion of the distance from which divisible things can he seen according to the proportion of the magnitudes that are seen. But there is no proportion of indivisible to divisible magnitude, for instance of a point to a line. Thus it will follow that what is indivisible cannot be seen from any distance, because any distance has a proportion to any other distance. Therefore it will follow that, if the indivisible thing is seen, it is seen by union with sight, which is contrary to the nature of sight and of the other senses that sense without touching. Therefore, an indivisible thing cannot be sensed—except, perhaps, inasmuch as it is the limit of a continuum, for other accidents of continua are also perceived in this way.
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Deinde cum dicit de sensitivis epilogat quae dicta sunt in hoc libro continuans se ad sequentia, et dicit quod dictum est de sensitivis, idest de organo sentiendi et de sensibilibus quomodo se habeant ad sensus, et communiter et secundum unumquodque organum sensus, partim in hoc libro, partim in libro de anima. Inter reliqua vero, quod primo considerandum occurrit est memoria et reminiscentia et de somno; quia, sicut per sensum cognoscuntur praesentia, ita et per memoriam cognoscuntur praeterita, et in somno fit aliqua praecognitio futurorum.	449b1 Then, when he says Something has been said, then, he makes an epilogue to what was said in this book and establishes continuity with what follows. He says that something has been said about the sensitive parts—that is, the organs of sensing—and about sensible objects, and how they are related to the senses, both in general and with respect to each organ of sense, partly in this book, partly in the book On the Soul. Of what remains, the first to be considered are memory and recollection and sleep, because as present things are known by the sense-power, so past things are known by memory, and there is a certain fore-knowledge of future things in sleep.

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